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Towards Principled Oceans
Governance
Problems such as the effects of global warming, overharvesting of fish stocks, the
impacts of marine pollution, ineffective maritime regulation and enforcement, and
security concerns are common throughout the world’s oceans, seas and marine regions.
Such crises are calling into question the ocean management paradigm as reflected in the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. As a result countries are
beginning to voyage beyond traditional fixations on sovereign rights to exploit marine
resources, to a new emphasis on social and environmental responsibilities and increasing
calls for more “principled” ocean governance. International legal principles, such as pre-
caution and ecosystem-based management, have emerged but the principles only set
general directions. A sea of conceptual and practical challenges face countries and cit-
izens as they navigate towards implementation strategies and measures.
Australia and Canada have been at the forefront of efforts to operationalize integ-
rated oceans and coastal management. Throughout the 1990s both countries
devoted considerable effort to developing strategies to give effect to international
ocean management obligations. Towards Principled Oceans Governance brings together
papers authored by leading Australian and Canadian policy-makers and scholars in
ocean law and policy, to consider principled oceans governance from the perspective
of two large coastal states that have actively engaged in domestic, regional and
international ocean governance agendas. The book assesses the obligations, com-
pliance, implementation and trends in international ocean law and their impact on
Australia and Canada, and explores how these countries have responded to the chal-
lenges of ocean governance, looking at the legal, policy and political responses that
the countries have adopted. While Australia and Canada alone cannot set the inter-
national ocean governance agenda, this volume considers the ways in which they
have attempted to influence that agenda and the “lessons learned” from their respec-
tive successes and failures, lessons that could be applied to nearly all coastal states
seeking to engage in an oceans governance policy.
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The oceans and seas of the world are at a critical juncture in their history.
The pressures of development brought about by the globalisation of the
world economy continue to intensify through the major sectors of ocean 
use. In parallel marine management and policy issues become larger, 
more numerous, and more urgent. The response of this series is to provide
in-depth analysis of ocean development, management and policy from a 
multidisciplinary perspective, encompassing a wide range of aspects of inter-
relationships between the oceans and seas on the one hand, and maritime
human activities on the other. Several strands run through the series.
• Studies of the development and management of major ocean industries
and uses including shipping and ports; strategic uses; mineral and
energy resources; fisheries and aquaculture; the leisure industries; waste
disposal and pollution; science and education; and conservation.
• Inter- and multidisciplinary perspectives provided by the natural sci-
ences; geography, economics, sociology, politics, law and history.
• Responses to the need to devise integrated ocean policies and manage-
ment measures which cover the deep oceans, the bordering seas, and
coastal zones.
• Regional studies at a variety of geographical scales from large ocean
regions to regional seas.
The series is of interest to all concerned professionally with the oceans and
seas, ranging from scientists and engineers to surveyors, planners, lawyers
and policy makers working in the public, private and voluntary sectors. It is
also of wider public interest to all those interested in or having a stake in the
world ocean and its bordering seas.
1 Development and Social Change in the Pacific Islands
Edited by A.D. Couper
2 Marine Management in Disputed Areas
The case of the Barents Sea
Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein
3 Marine Mineral Resources
Fillmore C.F. Earney
4 The Development of Integrated Sea-Use Management
Edited by Hance D. Smith and Adalberto Vallega
5 Advances in the Science and Technology of Ocean Management
Edited by Hance D. Smith
6 World Fishery Resources
James R. Coull
7 International Law and Ocean Use Management
Lawrence Juda
8 Sustainable Ocean Governance
Adalberto Vallega
9 Shipping and Ports in the Twenty-First Century
Globalization, technological change and the environment
Edited by David Pinder and Brian Slack
10 Managing Britain’s Marine and Coastal Environment
Towards a sustainable future
Edited by Hance D. Smith and Jonathan Potts
11 International Maritime Transport
Perspectives
Edited by James McConville, Alfonso Morvillo and Heather Leggate
12 Towards Principled Oceans Governance
Australian and Canadian approaches and challenges




Australian and Canadian approaches
and challenges
Edited by Donald R. Rothwell and
David L. VanderZwaag
I~ ~~o~f !;n~~;up 
LONDON AND NEW YORK 
First published 2006 by Routledge
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
matter and selection; the contributors their contributions
Typeset in Garamond by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN 13: 978-0-415-38378-3 (hbk) 
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA
Published 2017 by Routledge
Copyright © 2006 Donald R. Rothwell and David L. VanderZwaag editorial
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.tandfebooks.com, 
has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non
Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license. 
Contents





1 The sea change towards principled oceans 
governance 3
D O N A L D  R .  R O T H W E L L  A N D  
D A V I D  L .  V A N D E R Z W A A G
PART II
Integration 17
2 Beyond the buzzwords: a perspective on integrated 
coastal and ocean management in Canada 19
A L D O  C H I R C O P  A N D  L A R R Y  H I L D E B R A N D
3 Operationalizing integrated coastal and oceans 
management in Australia: the challenges 72
V E R O N I C A  S A K E L L
4 The application of compliance and enforcement 
strategies on Canada’s Pacific coast 99
F R A N Ç O I S  N .  B A I L E T ,  J A N N A  C U M M I N G  A N D  
T E D  L .  M C D O R M A N
5 Integrated maritime enforcement and compliance in 
Australia 119
S A M  B A T E M A N ,  A N T H O N Y  B E R G I N ,  
M A R T I N  T S A M E N Y I  A N D  D E R E K  W O O L N E R
PART III
The precautionary principle/approach 143
6 Canada and the precautionary principle/approach in 
ocean and coastal management: wading and wandering 
in tricky currents 145
D A V I D  L .  V A N D E R Z W A A G ,  S U S A N N A  D .  F U L L E R
A N D R A N S O M  A .  M Y E R S
7 Australia and the precautionary principle: moving 
from international principles to domestic and local
implementation 181
L O R N E  K .  K R I W O K E N ,  L I Z A  D .  F A L L O N  A N D  
D O N A L D  R .  R O T H W E L L
PART IV
Ecosystem-based management 203
8 Marine ecosystem management: is the whole 
greater than the sum of the parts? 205
B R U C E  G .  H A T C H E R  A N D  R O G E R  H .  B R A D B U R Y
9 Ecosystem bill of rights 233
R I C H A R D  J .  B E A M I S H  A N D  
C H R Y S - E L L E N  M .  N E V I L L E
PART V
Community-based management 247
10 Community involvement in marine and coastal 
management in Australia and Canada 249
M A R I A N  B I N K L E Y ,  A L I S O N  G I L L ,  




11 Aboriginal title and oceans policy in Canada 283
D I A N A  G I N N
12 Canada’s seas and her First Nations: a colonial 
paradigm revisited 299
R U S S  J O N E S
13 Indigenous rights in the sea: the law and practice of 
native title in Australia 315
G E O F F  C L A R K
14 Aboriginal peoples and oceans policy in Australia: an 
indigenous perspective 333
R O D N E Y  D I L L O N
PART VII
Future directions: theoretical and practical challenges 347
15 The challenge of international ocean governance: 
institutional, ethical and conceptual dilemmas 349
D O U G L A S  M .  J O H N S T O N
16 Principled oceans governance agendas: lessons learned 
and future challenges 400
D A V I D  L .  V A N D E R Z W A A G  A N D  




François N. Bailet, Ph.D., is Honorary Adviser to the President of the
International Ocean Institute Network (IOI) and Adjunct Professor in
Dalhousie Law School and Marine Affairs Programme, Dalhousie Univer-
sity, in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. His current research interests are
ocean governance and the implementation of the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion and the UNCED process, with a focus on maritime security, region-
alization and capacity building.
Sam Bateman, Ph.D., is a former officer in the Royal Australian Navy and
now a Professorial Research Fellow at the Centre for Maritime Policy at
the University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia and a Senior
Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore. He is a former member of the
National Oceans Advisory Group (NOAG) established by the Australian
Government to advise on the implementation of Australia’s Oceans Policy.
Richard J. Beamish, O.B.C., C.M., Ph.D., F.R.S.C., is the Senior Scientist
and former Director at the Pacific Biological Station, Fisheries and
Oceans Canada, in Nanaimo, British Columbia, Canada. He is a member
of the Order of Canada and Order of British Columbia and a Fellow of the
Royal Society of Canada. He has published over 150 scientific articles on
a range of topics from climate impacts on fish, to new species of fish. His
current research examines the factors that regulate the abundance of
Pacific salmon in the Pacific Ocean.
Anthony Bergin is an Associate Professor of Politics at the University
College, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force
Academy (ADFA), Canberra, Australia. He has published widely on Aus-
tralian and Asia Pacific oceans policy. From 1991–2003 he was the Direc-
tor of the Australian Defence Studies Centre, a security think tank based
at ADFA.
Marian Binkley, Ph.D., is Dean of Arts and Social Sciences and Professor of
Anthropology in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology
at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. Her research
interests include anthropology of coastal communities, occupational
health and safety of fishers, and tourism. Her current studies focus on the
restructuring of the town of Lunenburg, Nova Scotia, from a fishing-
based economy to one of tourism, and the impact of the Atlantic Cana-
dian fishery crisis on the health and safety of Newfoundland fishers.
Roger H. Bradbury, Ph.D., is a marine scientist with interests in coastal
ecosystems, particularly coral reefs, and an international reputation in
advanced modelling and analysis. Educated in Australia and Canada, he is
a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies
at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, and a Fellow
with the Resource Futures Program in CSIRO. Roger is the principal of
the consulting firm Tjurunga, specializing in the science of complexity.
Aldo Chircop, JSD, is a faculty member at Dalhousie Law School, Faculty
of Graduate Studies (Marine Affairs Programme) and Faculty of Arts and
Social Sciences (International Development Studies Programme) in
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. Dr. Chircop held the Canadian Chair in
Marine Environmental Protection at the World Maritime University,
Malmö, Sweden. His disciplinary and interdisciplinary research interests
are in comparative ocean law and policy, law of the sea, international
marine environmental law, maritime law and integrated coastal manage-
ment. He is co-editor of the Ocean Yearbook (University of Chicago Press)
and co-author of Maritime Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003).
Geoff Clark is Professor of Law, School of Law, James Cook University,
Cairns, Australia. He holds or has held a number of judicial and tribunal
appointments at the federal and state level, including as a member of the
National Native Title Tribunal (five years), a member of the Land Court
and as Deputy Chairperson of the Queensland Aboriginal Land Tribunal.
His research interests are in native title and in the field of alternative
dispute resolution with particular emphasis on the design of mediation
systems to cater for cross-cultural issues and decision making.
Janna Cumming is a graduate of the Faculty of Law, University of Victoria,
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, and a member of the British Colum-
bia Bar. She is currently practicing in Vancouver as a staff lawyer for
Legal Services Society of British Columbia. Her research interests include
a broad range of international public law and policy issues.
Rodney Dillon lives in Hobart, Tasmania, Australia and worked at the Pas-
minco zinc works for 23 years before his election to the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Commission Board in 1999. A Regional Councillor since
1993, he is also the former chair of the South East Tasmanian Aboriginal Cor-
poration. Mr. Dillon is an advocate of indigenous peoples’ land and sea rights,
including associated resource, hunting and fishing rights, and an active inter-
national campaigner for the repatriation of indigenous human remains.
Contributors xi
Liza D. Fallon is an Environmental Consultant and completing her doctoral
research at the University of Tasmania, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. She
is currently focusing on issues of global governance, sustainability and the
Southern Ocean fisheries. Her industry experience includes environmental
management, environmental impact assessment and four voyages to
Antarctica with the Australian National Antarctic Research Expeditions.
She has published on environmental management and environmental
impact assessment, coastal and ocean management, land-based water
management, sustainable tourism and visitor center planning.
Susanna D. Fuller is a doctoral candidate in the Biology Department at
Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. Her thesis focuses
on marine sponge populations in the Northwest Atlantic and the effects
of industrial fishing practices on these populations. She is particularly
interested in how science informs policy and legislation within environ-
mental and fisheries contexts.
Alison Gill, Ph.D., is a Professor at Simon Fraser University, Burnaby,
British Columbia, Canada, with a joint appointment in the Department
of Geography and the School of Resource and Environmental Manage-
ment. She is currently Associate Dean of Arts and Social Sciences. Her
research interests are in the processes of community change especially as
they relate to tourism. She is a principal investigator in the Linking
Science and Local Knowledge Node of the Ocean Management Research
Network.
Diana Ginn is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law at Dalhousie
University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. She teaches and writes in a
variety of areas, including aboriginal title, administrative law, property
law, and gender and the law.
Bruce G. Hatcher, Ph.D., is a generalist who studies the relationships
between ecosystem structure, function and human activities in marine
environments. Educated in Canada and Australia, he currently holds the
Chair of Marine Ecosystem Research at Cape Breton University, Sydney,
Nova Scotia, Canada, and is the Director of the Bras d’Or Institute there.
Certified as a Senior Ecologist by the Ecological Society of America, Dr.
Hatcher did much of the work for this chapter as the Professor and Direc-
tor of the interdisciplinary Marine Affairs Program at Dalhousie Univer-
sity in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
Larry Hildebrand is Adjunct Professor of Marine Affairs and Environ-
mental Studies at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada,
and is the Manager of Sustainable Communities and Ecosystems for
Environment Canada in Halifax. He serves on the editorial board for the
journal Ocean & Coastal Management, is the co-founder and current Vice
President-Liaison of the Coastal Zone Canada Association, and is a Board
xii Contributors
of Directors member of the Canadian Coastal Science and Engineering
Association and The Coastal Society in the U.S. He is the 2002 recipient
of the H.B. Nicholls Award for leadership in the field of coastal zone
management in Canada.
Douglas M. Johnston, Ph.D., is Emeritus Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, where he held the
Chair in Asia-Pacific Legal Relations between 1987 and his retirement in
1995. His previous appointments were at Dalhousie University
(1972–87), University of Toronto (1969–72), and Harvard University
(1966–69). He has taught and written extensively in international and
comparative law, marine and environmental law and policy, international
relations and modern Chinese studies. He is currently active as a member
of the Board of Governors of the Maritime Awards Society of Canada
(MASC).
Russ Jones or Xuya K’aadangaas (“Smart Raven”) belongs to the Haida
First Nation and resides in Skidegate, Haida Gwaii, British Columbia,
Canada. He is a fisheries consultant with a fisheries and engineering back-
ground who works mainly for First Nations clients in British Columbia,
Canada. His work focuses on fisheries management and policy issues
including topics such as co-management and marine protected areas.
Lorne K. Kriwoken, Ph.D., is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Environ-
mental Studies and a Research Associate at the Institute of Antarctic &
Southern Ocean Studies, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Tasmania, Aus-
tralia. Dr. Kriwoken has conducted research and published in the fields of
ocean policy and law, coastal zone management, marine protected areas,
World Heritage areas, sustainable polar tourism and environmental
impact assessment. He is a member of the World Commission on Pro-
tected Areas (IUCN), a member of the Environment Institute of Australia
and New Zealand and on the editorial board of Polar Record.
Ted L. McDorman is Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria,
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. Professor McDorman has written
extensively on ocean law, policy and management issues. Since 2000, he
has been “editor-in-chief” of Ocean Development and International Law: The
Journal of Marine Affairs.
Ransom A. Myers, Ph.D., holds the Killam Chair of Ocean Studies at Dal-
housie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. Dr. Myers current
major research is on the meta-analysis of data from many populations and
communities, and a global assessment of sharks.
Chrys-Ellen M. Neville, B.Sc., is a research biologist at the Pacific Biologi-
cal Station, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, in Nanaimo, British Columbia,
Canada. She has over 15 years’ experience working in fisheries research
Contributors xiii
and has co-authored over 30 scientific articles and reports including
several award winning publications. Ms. Neville has worked on a variety
of projects including factors impacting the early marine survival of Pacific
salmon and the impact of climate on fish stocks. Her recent interests
include the modeling of ecosystems including Bowie Seamount.
Donald R. Rothwell, Ph.D., is Challis Professor of International Law,
Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia, and Director of
the Sydney Centre for International and Global Law. His major research
interest is international law with a specific focus on law of the sea, law of
the polar regions, dispute resolution and international law in Australia.
He is currently working on a project reviewing the regime of navigation
under the law of the sea, and is the current President of the Australian
and New Zealand Society of International Law (ANZSIL).
Veronica Sakell is former Director, Australia’s National Oceans Office,
Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. Under her leadership, the National Oceans
Office was established and the South-east Regional Marine Plan develop-
ment commenced. Ms. Sakell previously held senior executive positions
in private industry and in the Department of Premier and Cabinet in Tas-
mania.
Phillip Saunders is Dean of Dalhousie Law School in Halifax, Nova Scotia,
Canada. Professor Saunders’ teaching and research interests are in marine
and environmental law, maritime boundary delimitation, offshore oil and
gas and aquaculture. He was formerly with the International Centre for
Ocean Development, a Canadian development agency, as Senior Policy
Advisor and as Field Representative, South Pacific.
Martin Tsamenyi, Ph.D., is Professor of Law and Director of the Centre for
Maritime Policy at the University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Aus-
tralia. Dr. Tsamenyi has written extensively on ocean policy making and
developing legal frameworks to implement the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion and has undertaken consultancy for several governments and inter-
national organizations. He is active in the development and
implementation of Australia’s Oceans Policy and served on the Steering
Committee charged with the implementation of Australia’s Oceans Policy
in the southeast region.
David L. VanderZwaag, Ph.D., is Professor of Law and Canada Research
Chair in Ocean Law and Governance at Dalhousie University in Halifax,
Nova Scotia, Canada. He was a co-founder of Dalhousie’s interdisciplinary
program in Marine Affairs. He is a member of the Commission on
Environmental Law, World Conservation Union (IUCN) and Chair of the
Specialist Group on Oceans, Coasts and Coral Reefs.
Geoff Wescott, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Environment, Melbourne
Campus of Deakin University, Australia. Dr. Wescott has been actively
xiv Contributors
involved in coastal and park management for 25 years and has published
extensively in these fields. He was the Chair of the National Reference
Group (NRG) of the Marine and Coastal Community Network until
2003. He continues as a member of the NRG and represents the Network
on Australia’s National Oceans Advisory Group. He is also Deputy Chair
of the Board of Directors of Parks Victoria (Australia) and a former
member of the Victorian Coastal Council.
Derek Woolner is a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. He
was Director of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group in the
Research Service of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australian
until 2002. Mr. Woolner has written numerous papers on the structure
and management of Australia’s maritime border protection regimes and
his contribution to this chapter was made whilst working in the Aus-
tralian Defence Studies Centre of the University of New South Wales, at




In September 2003, the World Parks Congress was held in the beachside
location of Durban, South Africa. Over 3,000 delegates met to debate issues
facing natural resource management. Since the latter part of the 1800s when
the national park system began, our focus has been on the terrestrial world.
At the end of the last century, when 1998 was designated as the Inter-
national Year of the Oceans, many believed that at last, worldwide attention
would be given to the planet’s greatest natural resource, the oceans. Leaders
at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development identified conser-
vation and management of marine and coastal areas as one of the pressing
challenges for countries domestically and internationally. Detailed targets
for action were set out in many areas including destructive fishing practices,
marine pollution, high seas biodiversity conservation, and marine protected
areas.
In recent years, articles have begun to appear in the public domain high-
lighting the threats that human activities are posing to the marine environ-
ment. While understanding of the need to do something may be increasing,
tangible results or even small steps appear few and far between. At Durban,
while accolades were given for the great expansion of the coverage of pro-
tected areas to over 12 percent of the world’s surface, little mention was
made of the fact that less than one percent of oceans, coasts and seas are pro-
tected and even less is truly managed. Perhaps the inability to amass support
to face the threats head-on comes from the fact that in the ocean environ-
ment, the credo of “think globally, act locally” which has benefited sustain-
able development, is very difficult to apply. Who are the custodians of the
oceans? How can oceans effectively be governed to ensure that the principles
of ecosystem and integrated management, intergenerational equity, and the
precautionary approach are implemented? These questions are for scientists,
policy- and decision-makers alike. This book is a definite step forward to
inform public debate and raise awareness of the many complexities that
exist.
While oceans are of importance to every part of the globe, the two 
countries, Australia and Canada, which are the focus of this book, have
vast coastlines and histories of indigenous cultures and aspects of national 
development linked to the oceans. Both perform leadership roles in their
regional spheres of influence with concomitant results on the international
stage. The two countries have ratified the United Nations Convention on
Law of the Sea, Australia in October 1994, and Canada in November 2003.
The way of life in many coastal communities is tied to the health of the
marine environment and the sustainability of living and non-living
resources. Both countries have delved into ocean governance issues. Australia
has a Commonwealth Oceans Policy and Canada has an Oceans Act. Tackling
the issues associated with moving from sector specific management (whether
it be oil and gas exploration and development, wild fisheries, aquaculture,
marine transportation, or tourism) to a holistic integrated approach to gov-
ernance is at the heart of strategic oceans’ directions in both countries.
At the same time there are a number of areas where the countries diverge.
Jurisdiction in marine areas is shared in Australia among the Common-
wealth and state governments, whilst in Canada, the federal government has
almost exclusive jurisdiction. Approaches to indigenous issues generally and
those associated with jurisdiction differ as well. The beach culture in Aus-
tralia has a profound impact upon the national psyche. In Canada, the three
oceans have their own individual characteristics that are reflected in the asso-
ciated patterns of human use. Australia has made a priority of marine pro-
tected areas since the establishment of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park in
1975, while Canada’s first federal marine protected area to protect biodiver-
sity, the Endeavour Hot Vents Marine Protected Area was designated only
in 2003. It is the exploration of these similarities and differences that serves
as the foundation for the Australian Canadian Oceans Research Network
(ACORN).
I am honored to have been involved with ACORN and was particularly
struck by the range of disciplines and depth of experience of participants at
the June 2002 Canberra Challenge Workshop which forms the basis for this
book. I would also like to express my appreciation to the Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation (APEC) Marine Resources Conservation Working Group
for having the insight to initiate work on oceans governance in the region
and support the work of ACORN. This type of leadership fosters informed
debate, identifies gaps in current knowledge and practice, and contributes to
the emergence of strategic approaches to oceans conservation and manage-
ment.
As Chairperson of the Canberra Workshop, I found it to be a really inter-
esting experience. The Workshop was designed around each research team
group, of which there were 11, presenting their research results to not only
their own peers but primarily to a challenge team of six distinguished Aus-
tralian and Canadian oceans governance opinion leaders.2 The challenge
team provided the presenters with valuable debate and feedback that was
instrumental in helping research teams finalize their papers, which are pre-
sented in this book.
It is critical at this time in our evolution that we address the lack of
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integrated frameworks for oceans governance both domestically and interna-
tionally. Over the years our terrestrial experience has influenced our atti-
tudes to oceans. Moving from coastal, to three nautical miles, then to 200
nautical miles, then beyond to the outer limits of the continental shelves we
are now beginning to debate the future of the common heritage of mankind
– the high seas. Our ability to explore the depths is increasing as is access,
development and utilization of deep-sea resources. These areas, previously
thought of as too remote and available to all who wished to venture there,
are now being recognized as needing urgent action and attention. The 
question is whether we can take steps in time before precious and unique
ecosystems are irreparably harmed.
Applying precaution, using a multidisciplinary integrated approach and
having foresight to take innovative actions such as involving more that just
resource users and governments in the determination of the future, would
certainly be a positive indicator of things to come. There must be informed
public discussion as effective governance of our oceans needs to reflect the
progression of societal values. If this can occur at domestic and regional
levels, then perhaps we can begin to see precaution and other governance
principles as they truly are, not as defined by a specific discipline, whether
lawyers, policy-makers or scientists. Our success will be measured by future
generations and we can hope that responses to the challenges posed by gov-
ernance of the oceans are not left to be defined only after a significant event
forces us to take action in hindsight. Hopefully the steps we are taking now
will be viewed as leading to positive results and not just as waves of ration-
ality in a perpetual sea of vagueness.
Notes
1 Assistant Deputy Minister – Special Envoy to Asia-Pacific Fisheries and Oceans
Canada; Visiting Deputy Secretary Department of Environment and Heritage
Commonwealth Government of Australia; Visiting Professorial Fellow Centre for
Maritime Policy, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong; and Lead Shepherd
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2 Ms. Donna Petrachenko – Chairperson; Dr. Arthur Hanson – Canada’s Oceans
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David VanderZwaag – Canada Research Chair in Oceans Law and Governance;
Dr. Donald Rothwell – Faculty of Law, University of Sydney; and Ms. Veronica
Sakell – Former Director, Australia’s National Oceans Office.
xviii Foreword
Preface
Just leaving port. That image describes countries around the globe, includ-
ing Australia and Canada, as they try to voyage beyond traditional fixations
on sovereign rights to exploit marine resources to a new emphasis on social
and environmental responsibilities and increasing calls for more “principled”
ocean governance. International legal principles, such as precaution and
ecosystem-based management, have emerged from the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development and the 2002 World Summit
on Sustainable Development, but the principles only set general directions.
A sea of conceptual and practical challenges face countries and citizens as
they navigate towards implementation strategies and measures.
This book is the outcome of a comparative research program in ocean law,
policy and management focusing on Australian and Canadian approaches
towards principled oceans governance. The book draws on papers authored
by leading Australian and Canadian policy-makers and scholars in ocean
law and policy and presented at workshops hosted by the Australian Cana-
dian Oceans Research Network (ACORN) in Vancouver (2000) and Can-
berra (2002). It highlights national challenges in implementing key
international oceans and environmental law principles in oceans and coastal
management, with a particular focus on the principles of integrated coastal
and ocean management, integrated maritime enforcement, precaution,
ecosystem-based management, indigenous rights, and community-based
management.
ACORN was formed in 1993 at the initiative of oceans law and policy
scholars based at Dalhousie University and the University of Tasmania.
During the first phase of ACORN’s work, attention was given to general
developments in Australian and Canadian oceans law and policy following
the adoption and entry into force of the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea and the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED). The outcome of that work was
published as Oceans Law and Policy in the Post-UNCED Era: Australian
and Canadian Perspectives (1996), Kriwoken, Haward, VanderZwaag and
Davis (eds).
Phase 2 of ACORN’s research agenda has focused on Australian and
Canadian initiatives to give effect to evolving international normative prin-
ciples within complex federal, legal, policy and political frameworks. A
feature of the current work is therefore a focus on national and local
responses in an attempt to provide something of a “report card” on Aus-
tralian and Canadian progress in this field, but also to highlight the chal-
lenges facing all coastal states as they come to grips with ocean policy
development and implementation in the new global oceans governance
environment.
The present volume consists of core overview papers emanating from the
project. Additional sectoral papers in the areas of shipping, oil and gas, fish-
eries and tourism have been published in a special volume 26(1) of the Dal-
housie Law Journal.
An additional feature of ACORN Phase 2 has been the strong support
given to the project by Environment Australia and Fisheries and Oceans
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1 The sea change towards
principled oceans governance
Donald R. Rothwell and David L. VanderZwaag
Introduction
Crises in ocean and coastal management are facing states throughout the
world. The effects of global warming,1 overharvesting of fish stocks, the
development consequences of aquaculture,2 the impacts of multiple forms of
marine pollution, competition over maritime space between both inter-
national and local actors, ineffective maritime regulation and enforcement,
and security concerns are common throughout the world’s oceans, seas and
marine regions.3
Such crises are calling into question the ocean management paradigm
that has dominated since the adoption of the four 1958 Geneva Conventions
on the Law of the Sea4 and their subsequent replacement by the 1982
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention).5 That para-
digm has emphasized state entitlements and general responsibilities over
ocean areas6 and has encouraged a top-down, bureaucratic and technical
approach to managing ocean uses where scientific knowledge is viewed as
the main litmus in rational decision making.7
In this chapter, a brief review will be undertaken of the development of
the global oceans legal framework, before an assessment is undertaken of the
challenges confronting principled oceans governance. The state of oceans
governance in Australia and Canada will also be briefly outlined.
The global legal framework
The global agenda for oceans management can be seen in three phases. First,
the developments up till 1958 in the international law of the sea and some
initial efforts at marine environmental management and protection.8 These
initiatives resulted in the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the
Sea, all of which entered into force throughout the 1960s and had ongoing
influence well into the 1980s.
Second, the period 1959–82, which saw a rapid development in the inter-
national law concerning the oceans culminating in the finalization of the
LOS Convention.9 At this time there were parallel developments in inter-
national environmental management highlighted by the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment,10 and new international instru-
ments regulating pollution from ships,11 ocean dumping,12 land-based pol-
lution13 and regional fisheries management.14 New institutions such as the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) with a strong oceans
management focus were also created.15 Scientific expertise in marine
environmental protection was also given prominence through the formation
of the Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental
Protection (GESAMP).16
Third, the period 1982 to the present. During this time, with the new
law of the sea framework established by the LOS Convention essentially
settled, adjustments have primarily been made to the law of the sea by way
of supplementary agreements regarding the deep seabed17 and straddling
and highly migratory fish stocks.18 New environmental initiatives, however,
have transformed international environmental law and management. The
outcomes of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) have been particularly influential, including the
Rio Declaration,19 Agenda 21,20 and the Convention on Biological
Diversity.21 With these instruments have come further development of over-
arching environmental norms such as the precautionary principle, intergen-
erational equity22 and sustainable development.23
In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) pro-
vided an opportunity to assess progress in meeting the objectives and goals
of Agenda 21 and the state of global environmental protection.24 WSSD
demonstrated that while there has been considerable progress, challenges
remain, particularly with respect to fleshing out and implementing the prin-
ciples of sustainable development.25 While the record of negotiation and, for
the most part, implementation of the new legal instruments for the oceans
has been impressive, compliance and enforcement with the new norms has
been variable. This is particularly evident in the contrast between the will-
ingness of coastal states to assert sovereign rights over the oceans,26 and their
reluctance to accept responsibility for ocean management of not only areas
within their own national jurisdiction and control but also in the case of
areas beyond national jurisdiction.27
Oceans governance
Against the background of the development of the legal framework for man-
aging the oceans, parallel developments have been taking place in the
concept of ocean governance around the world. However, the concept is not
easy to pin down because of multiple dimensions.28 The term captures the
ongoing evolution towards more “participatory decision making” involving
not just government agencies and departments but a broader range of
participants including the private sector, scientists, community groups,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academics, First Nations and
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others. Ocean governance also suggests a wider range of approaches to
influencing human behavior towards the oceans and coastal areas beyond the
traditional command–control icon where governments establish environ-
mental or marine conservation standards backed-up with sanctions, such as
fines and imprisonment. Those approaches include economic incentives and
disincentives, voluntary programs, community-based management, co-man-
agement and integrated ocean/coastal planning.29
Being an open-textured concept, ocean governance casts a wide discursive
net. It allows discussion of the complex array of contributing factors to the
degradation of marine resources and areas, such as poverty, population
growth, urban sprawls along the coast, over-consumption, consumerism,
limited financial and technical resources, and lack of political will. It opens
the door to interdisciplinary reflection on “good governance.” For example,
what legal, institutional, societal, economic and ethical changes are needed
to ensure ocean ecosystems capable of supporting human needs without
over-compromising marine biodiversity?
Various trends stand out in ocean governance, reflective of the post-
modern era. Those trends include increasing reliance on “soft law” instru-
ments, such as conference declarations and codes of conduct; a growing
influence of intergovernmental institutions such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the European Union and the North American Free
Trade Agreement; a fast-changing and fragmented proliferation of rules and
regulations; the expanding role of non-legal disciplines such as ethics, soci-
ology, ecology and economics in public policy formation; and an increasing
skepticism towards the primacy of science and expert opinions in reaching
decisions. Competing social interests (such as full employment and a clean
environment) and conflicting social values (such as deep and shallow
ecology) place a difficult burden on legislators, administrators and the
courts.30
Various legal principles have emerged through international agreements,
declarations and codes of conduct, and they are acting like engines of change
in the normative transition.31 Those principles include, among others,
integration, precaution, the ecosystem approach, community-based manage-
ment and indigenous rights.32 However, each of the principles tends to be
confusing because of multiple meanings and still evolving interpretive dis-
cussions.33 The integration principle carries at least nine differing connota-
tions34 with the two most common uses in the oceans governance context
being the calls for integrated coastal/ocean management35 and integrated
maritime compliance and enforcement.36 A topic of considerable controversy
is whether integration of economic, social and environmental goals, the core
dimension of sustainable development, should be simply a procedural bal-
ancing act or a substantive destination, for example, where ecological
integrity is not compromised.37
The precautionary principle/approach continues to be elusive and very
controversial.38 It is heralded by some as an “environmental savior,” holding
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off the evils of ever-expanding globalization and commercialization pressures
through fundamental regulatory shifts such as reversing the legal burden of
proof to proponents of change.39 Others perceive the precautionary prin-
ciple/approach as the potential doomsday for human technological and
scientific innovations.40
The ecosystem approach, often used interchangeably with the term
ecosystem-based management41 and being embraced under the auspices of
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)42 and the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity,43 also raises implementing challenges. While setting the
general directions of governing human uses based on ecosystem rather than
political boundaries and moving from species protection to broader biodi-
versity considerations,44 the approach has not settled the tensions between
ecocentric and anthropocentric perspectives.45 How far ecosystem processes
and functions should be protected in light of socio-economic demands is left
unanswered.46 How the approach can be actualized in light of the limited
understanding of marine ecosystems is another critical issue.47
The ecosystem approach also displays considerable overlap with other
principles, which may engender a sense of intellectual frustration over where
the concept begins and ends. For example, the precautionary approach,
public participation and integrated coastal/ocean planning are all viewed as
important supportive principles.48
A mix of measures has been suggested to put the ecosystem approach to
fisheries into practice. They include improving the selectivity of fishing
gear; lessening of effects of “ghost fishing” by lost nets through biodegrad-
able materials and active “sweeping” campaigns; prohibiting destructive
fishing practices such as trawling, at least in some sensitive areas; encourag-
ing less-impact fishing methods such as trapping and longlining; establish-
ing marine protected areas; substantially reducing fleet sizes; restoring fish
habitats; applying environmental impact assessment review to at least new
proposed fisheries; and promoting the use of eco-labeling.49
Perhaps the largest impediment to the ecosystem approach to fisheries is
in the area of compliance and enforcement. Even traditional fisheries man-
agement, focusing on single stocks, has been plagued by the problems of
illegal fisheries, misreporting and failures by flag states to control their
fishing vessels, especially on the high seas.50
The Plan of Implementation, adopted at WSSD in 2002, has placed
further elaboration and implementation of the ecosystem approach on the
political agenda. Paragraph 30(d) encourages the application by 2010 of the
ecosystem approach.51
The principle of community-based management, recognized in Principle
22 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,52 is also
fraught with implementation issues. How to define a community, for
example, on the basis of local place or a collective interest, is problematic.53
The principle is sometimes given an expanded interpretation to include co-
management where government shares decision-making authority with
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communities.54 The principle has the tendency to “blend” with indigenous
rights, as aboriginal communities are one of the major avenues for local
empowerment.55 The extent of management rights is also open to debate
with a spectrum of rights possible, running from the narrow right to share
in the access to fisheries, to a broader bundle of collective rights such as the
right to habitat protection and to be involved in regional planning and
international allocation agreements.56
Indigenous rights to offshore areas and resources are also subject to con-
siderable uncertainties. Whether aboriginal title, recognized for terrestrial
areas,57 can extend to ocean areas is unresolved.58 The extent of aboriginal
rights beyond fishing for food and a moderate commercial livelihood59
remains to be defined with various rights “waiting in the wings” including
the right to steward or manage fisheries60 and the right to environmental
integrity as a basis for ensuring cultural survival.61 The nature of the fidu-
ciary duties of the Crown to Aboriginal peoples also needs to be clarified
including the exact parameters of the duty to consult62 and the obligation to
support community-based and clean production-oriented fisheries.63
Australian/Canadian responses
This volume explores how two of the world’s largest coastal states64 – Aus-
tralia and Canada – are navigating in the transition towards principled
oceans governance. While Canada has established a legislative foundation for
integrated planning through a new Oceans Act,65 Australia has facilitated
planning pursuant to a National Oceans Policy.66 How effective the planning
processes will be remains to be seen for both countries. Numerous common
constraints include federal–provincial jurisdictional tension, lack of certainty
over how management plans will be given legal force, and limitation of
planning powers to marine areas.67
Integration in maritime compliance and enforcement is also complicated
in Australia and Canada by the multiple agencies that have a role in offshore
enforcement. In addition, there are numerous activities that need to be mon-
itored and controlled including fishing, vessel-source pollution, offshore
hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation, drug smuggling, illegal immigra-
tion, maritime terrorism and safety at sea. Both countries also face signific-
ant challenges in responding to maritime compliance and enforcement
because of the variable environmental conditions in which such operations
are undertaken, ranging from polar to tropical extremes.68
Both Australia and Canada have also experienced the challenges of imple-
menting the precautionary principle/approach. While both countries have
incorporated precaution into various pieces of federal legislation and have
already seen courts struggling to interpret legal implications, Australia
stands out in front of Canada through broader incorporation of the prin-
ciple/approach at the state/territorial level and through application of pre-
cautionary environmental impact assessments to marine fisheries proposals.69
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A related challenge is dealing with ecosystem-based management. While
Canada has talked about and even legislated for marine ecosystem-based
management,70 Australia has led in implementation partly through its well-
funded Collaborative Research Centres (CRCs) such as the CRC for the Sus-
tainable Management of the Great Barrier Reef in Townsville and the CRC
for Antarctic Research in Hobart. It is clear that more needs to be done in
this area to foster bureaucratic change so as to recognize public concern over
the need for a healthy marine ecosystem. To that end, proposals for an
“ecosystem bill of rights” are worthy of greater consideration.71
An important aspect of integrated marine and coastal management is the
role of community involvement. A range of options is available in devolu-
tion of management to the community level. However, to date there has
been limited consideration in the academic literature of what legal and insti-
tutional provisions may be necessary to support community-level gover-
nance.72 In Canada, attempts have been made to invoke co-management in
the Atlantic fisheries and joint project agreements and “community quotas”
have been issued mainly to sectors of the commercial fishing industry and
not to geographically defined local communities. In Australia, Coastcare, a
community-based grants scheme, has had a positive impact in its promotion
of community projects and education. However, the Australian experience
also suggests that some communities have not been seriously involved in
coastal decision making and have been used as an unpaid workforce.
Perhaps one of the most significant challenges facing principled oceans
governance for Australia and Canada is the full recognition of and integra-
tion of indigenous rights in governance structures. Because of their differing
historical, legal and political backgrounds, these issues have been addressed
differently in the two countries. In Canada, the extent of Aboriginal title
over the ocean seabed and adjacent waters remains unresolved.73 First
Nations have had a clear history of ocean use and interest off the Pacific
Northwest coast, and recently Haida, Tsimshian and Nuu-chah-nulth First
Nations have filed claims to sea title and fishing rights uses. Fish and
wildlife co-management arrangements have also been incorporated into
modern land claims such as the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement in the
Arctic. Concerns remain, however, with many First Nations in British
Columbia over possible offshore oil and gas activities and the threats of
salmon farming to wild salmon stocks.74
The Australian approach to resolving native title and rights claims is
based on the provisions of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), which established
the National Native Title Tribunal to mediate indigenous land claims
including marine claims. Following recent court decisions, which have
partly resolved the status of offshore native title in Australia, there has been
a surge of interest in this area to such an extent that as of 2001 there were
approximately 120 native title claimant applications in sea areas around
Australia.75 However, the Australian government’s narrow focus on Aborigi-
nal title and rights to marine resources has been subject to criticism and a
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wider vision has been urged where Aboriginal peoples’ involvement in
resource management is considered in the context of human rights and
social justice. In particular, it has been argued that there is more scope for
actual empowerment of indigenous peoples in the management of marine
resources and in the fishing industry.76
Conclusion
What then is the future of oceans governance? Recently, there has been
increasing debate over the institutional, ethical and theoretical dilemmas
confronting global society in trying to ensure sustainable seas.77 Key institu-
tional hurdles are evident in the shift to oceans governance such as conflicts
with state sovereignty in the move towards transboundary cooperation, dif-
ferences among states in their capacities to govern ocean affairs, and limited
and fragmented funding to promote effective and equitable ocean manage-
ment.78 Some of the difficult ethical issues surrounding ocean governance
include the appropriate roles for scientific and professional expertise in the
move towards participatory democracy; the conciliatory challenges raised by
weak and strong sustainability perspectives and differing moral philosophies
towards nature; the controversial nature of ocean equity, for example, the
accommodation of traditional and indigenous fishing community interests
with industrial fishing; and the unresolved interpretive viewpoints relating
to the precautionary principle. There are also major conceptual problems
such as the competing orders of rationality – biological, social, political and
legal.
Against this background, there has been an increasing focus on integra-
tion in oceans management and governance.79 This has taken place not only
through initial efforts in the LOS Convention to give greater priority to
marine environmental protection,80 but as a result of the development of
environmental norms and principles especially following UNCED,81 and
new international governance initiatives focused particularly on the marine
environment and the high seas.82 This raises questions concerning future
directions for regime building in ocean governance. Three sub-global levels
of regime building are thought to hold particular promise: the large marine
ecosystem (LME),83 the regional-sea level and the sub-regional sea scale.
Within the Pacific Ocean, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum in particular may be an appropriate mechanism for promoting more
effective ocean governance.84
The need for effective oceans governance has now become a matter of
global concern. The United Nations, a body with a long-standing interest in
ocean affairs, is actively engaged in the process of monitoring developments.
The United Nations Secretary-General has noted:
The most effective approach to ensure the protection of vulnerable
ecosystems is through the adoption of integrated, multidisciplinary and
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multisectoral coastal and ocean management at the national level, as
recommended in chapter 17 of Agenda 21 and by the Plan of Imple-
mentation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, as well as
by the Consultative Process. It is also necessary to adopt an ecosystem-
based management [sic], providing a more holistic approach, which
would focus on managing marine ecosystems as a whole rather than spe-
cific individual elements within them and to enable the development of
a longer-term sustainable strategy.85
The result of all these developments is that the health of the marine
environment has probably never before been the subject of such sustained
international attention. While for the most part the tools – both legal and
political – for addressing these issues are relatively well developed, there
remains significant variance in implementation of the agreed standards. Given
the truly global nature of the world’s oceans and their interconnected ecosys-
tems, failure to address problems in one ocean or one sector of the ecosystem
will have implications elsewhere. World attention is increasingly therefore
turning to the “implementation gap.”86 The practices of two significant mar-
itime states in addressing some of these issues is therefore of some importance
in terms of defining how states will meet the challenges ahead.
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Introduction
It is now more than eight years since the Oceans Act came into force as
Canada’s modern legal framework for integrated coastal and ocean manage-
ment (ICOM).1 Although there have been several integrated management
initiatives at the national, regional and provincial levels, the assessment of
the record to date is not a simple matter. This difficulty is well illustrated
by the 2001 parliamentary review of the Oceans Act and the federal govern-
ment’s response.2 The House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Fisheries
and Oceans (Standing Committee) concluded that
[T]he Oceans Act is fundamentally sound and [the Committee] does not
recommend any major amendments to the Act at this time. Neverthe-
less, the Committee has some concerns over the administration of
certain aspects of the Act. Certain principles and programs that were
key elements of the Act do not appear to have been as fully imple-
mented as they could or should have been. In addition, a number of
more specific concerns were raised particularly with respect to the cre-
ation of Marine Protected Areas and Integrated Management (Part II,
Oceans Management Strategy) and marine services (Part III, Powers,
Duties and Functions of the Minister) that the Committee believes
should be given due consideration.3
The Standing Committee held hearings across Canada and received inputs
from diverse interests groups. These inputs are visible in the 16 recommen-
dations proposed by the Standing Committee.
In its response to the Standing Committee’s recommendations, the
federal government is of the view that although there is still much to be
done, much has been accomplished.4 The federal government expressed
pleasure that the Act is seen as fundamentally sound. It listed many coastal
and ocean initiatives as part of the record of the administration of the Act.
The specific responses provided to each recommendation are more reserved.
Through guarded language the federal government disagreed with5 or
offered explanation or clarification of the basis6 of many of the recommenda-
tions. Where the government tended to agree it showed a willingness to
consider or agree with in part7 or simply confirm that the recommendation
was already being followed in whole or in part.8 Only one recommendation
was agreed to without comment.9
This exchange is evidence of the intertwining political and bureaucratic
agendas and processes over the key legislation prescribing integration in
Canada. It illustrates a major challenge for scholar and practitioner alike:
how to assess the record on integration in the context of conflicting claims.
The assessment of ICOM initiatives is difficult for several reasons including
complexity, lack of well-established and documented baselines, unclear or
insufficient indicators, lack of systematic project monitoring and time frame
of review to capture stated short-, medium- to long-term goals. The identifi-
cation of indicators can be particularly difficult as it may not always be pos-
sible to quantify results, and important as qualitative assessments may be,
they are necessarily prone to highly subjective interpretation moderated only
by political justifications and bureaucratic constraints. This complex task is
further accentuated in the context of states with complex systems of govern-
ment operating in situations of geographical, ecosystemic, political, socio-
economic and cultural diversity. Federal states are a case in point.
Understanding how well a particular initiative is doing may depend on indi-
vidual observation, motive, context and point in time.
Much is at stake: Canada’s ocean activities account for an estimated
CDN$20 billion in annual domestic economic activity, and this figure does
not represent the total value of the country’s seaborne trade.10 In addition,
the fate of coastal and marine ecosystems, and the well-being of innumerable
aboriginal and coastal communities depend on the management of the
marine environment.
This chapter attempts to rationalize an approach to assessing federal
policy, planning or management initiatives by developing a theoretical
framework drawing from Canadian ICOM practices. It then proceeds to
consider specific experiences in the context of this framework in Canada.
The experiences are a mixture of “old” and “new” federal initiatives at the
national and regional levels. The Atlantic Coastal Action Program (ACAP)
can be considered a “mature” initiative because of its longevity (13 years).
Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future (Oceans Strategy) was
adopted in 2002 but was preceded by a five-year gestation period. The
Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management Initiative (ESSIM), com-
menced in 1999, is still at a gestation phase. Despite the “immaturity” of
the latter two examples, both provide useful insights into the concept and
practice of integration, and offer a useful comparison with ACAP. All
three have grappled or are grappling with integration in their own indi-
vidual way, but in a common constitutional context. The Oceans Strategy is
different from the other two in that it is national in character. ACAP and
ESSIM are regional, both in the Atlantic, but are led by two different lead
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agencies, respectively Environment Canada and DFO. All three are chal-
lenging to assess.
The authors identify questions to be asked and factors to be weighed in
relation to both the development process of an initiative, the decision as mani-
fested in text, and actual results where these are ascertained. The assessment of
the integration record requires a sifting of buzzwords. The analysis leads to a
qualitative assessment and conclusions on what could or should have been
achieved, or is likely to be achieved, given intended objectives and the influ-
ence of relevant factors. This approach produces “relative judgments.”
Because of the experimental nature of this study, the authors do not
embark on in-depth influence analysis, but rather propose what they hope
will be a useful systematic approach for more in-depth analysis of case
studies. Although applied in a federal context, the analytical framework
would be equally useful to the study of provincial initiatives.
Context
ICOM initiatives in Canada occur in theaters of biogeophysical, socio-
economic and cultural diversity. Canada borders on the Arctic, Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans. The differences between these three marine environments are
further accentuated by intra-regional ecosystemic diversity.11 In addition,
the Great Lakes constitute significant hydrospace that is subject to many of
the interests and activities of marine areas. Canada’s extensive river systems
also have an intricate relationship to the marine environment, particularly
for the definition of management areas that include watersheds.
The socio-economic and cultural differences are also significant. New
Brunswick is the only officially bilingual province, while Newfoundland and
Labrador has the highest persistent unemployment rates in Canada. The
level of wealth across the country is very variable, with the poorest provinces
and highest rates of unemployment being in the Atlantic region. The Arctic
region presents a totally different scene with a fragile environment, low
population density, dominant Aboriginal peoples presence, and growing
political consciousness and aspirations.
Questions and factors
Triggers
The drivers of the policy-making, planning or management process are a
first consideration. Is the process a result of foresight or simply a reaction to
an unforeseen problem, event or emergency? The challenge for the decision-
maker is to remain ahead of events so as to avoid substituting reactive for
proactive approaches. Reactive approaches may lead to inefficient responses
and defensive posturing, possibly characterized by optics more than content,
in the light of uneasiness of political masters and public critique.
Canada: beyond the buzzwords 21
Sectoral and integrated coastal and ocean initiatives in Canada generally
have been the result of triggers or pressures. The triggers have tended to be
a singular or series of events leading to a crisis that has prodded the govern-
ment into action. These events have not necessarily been unforeseeable, yet
decision-makers remained unprepared. The 1999 Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in R. v. Marshall triggered a series of important developments in
aboriginal rights in coastal and ocean resource development, but in reality
constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights was foreseeable as a result of
preceding case law.12 Since the Constitution Act, 1982, a pattern in the consti-
tutional recognition of aboriginal rights in Canada has emerged.13 However,
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) was unprepared for the asser-
tion of fishing and other rights by First Nation bands in areas licensed to
other local resource users and the conflict this generated. The collapse of the
northern Atlantic cod stocks in the early 1990s was the result of longstand-
ing overfishing. The collapse led to a series of haphazard political, manage-
ment and fiscal responses by the federal government, e.g. The Atlantic
Groundfish Strategy (TAGS).14
Pressures have tended to influence the development of initiatives as a
result of osmosis. Pressures are influences resulting directly from larger
policy initiatives or changes in the governance environment. For example, in
the 1990s the privatization drive across a range of government services
affected maritime administration services. The introduction of marine
service fees and privatization of oil spill response were part of this phenome-
non. Somewhat similarly, the Atlantic Coastal Action Program (ACAP) was
influenced by the trend for inclusive participation in resource management.
ACAP thus employs a stakeholder-based approach under the influence of a
growing trend in community-based co-management.15
Ideally, the decision-maker should rationalize ICOM decisions on the
basis of projected goals and objectives based on foresight, in addition to
responding to crises. ICOM is much more than crisis management. Sustain-
ability requires ongoing costs/benefits assessment with reference to an
ecosystem’s ability to produce the intended goods and services.
Problem-response and baselines
There are three tasks to address in this factor. The first addresses to what
extent, if at all, is a particular initiative problem-oriented, and at what
scale? Is it responding to a problem as it arises, or is it anticipating it? These
questions are relevant for assessment of stated goals and objectives. While
clarity is highly desirable, goals and objectives must be flexible enough to
respond to unforeseen issues as they arise. Ideally, an ICOM initiative should
manifest a long-term vision and an ability to respond to issues as they arise
while maintaining a steady course.
The second task is to ascertain the existence of an integrated approach
and then to assess how it is formulated. The concept of integration is widely
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recognized as a basic principle of ICOM.16 Integration is a response to the
sectoralization of the environment and, in a marine context, the piecemeal
approach to ocean development that remains so pervasive throughout the
world. Sectoralization frequently results in multiple use conflicts and adverse
consequences on the marine environment because the activities of other users
and the cumulative environmental impacts are not anticipated. The integ-
rated approach requires a holistic approach, where local action must take
place within the context of the “big picture.” Thus, the manner in which a
problem is identified and formulated must take into consideration its
context. The integrated approach also has implications for management area
and institutional responses, as discussed below.
The third task concerns baselines. The function of baselines is to enable
performance measurement against a starting point in fact and time. Base-
lines are required in any evaluation process to enable a quantitative and
qualitative assessment of outputs, outcomes and impacts.
Management area
In planning and management initiatives, provision for the definition of the
operational area or the actual definition of such area is closely related to the
problem addressed. Does the problem define the area, or does the area define
the problem? There are two approaches: functionalist and administrative.
In a functionalist approach, area definition is premised by the full extent of
the problem, its impacts and the response needs. Of the two, theoretically this
is more consistent with the integrated approach and facilitates an ecosystem-
based approach, as long as the management area coincides with the relevant
ecosystem. Size per se is not necessarily an issue. There could be management
and administrative disadvantages, such as how far the logic of integration
might take problem definition and identification of a relevant ecosystem, and
the involvement of more institutional actors with different mandates. Ecosys-
tem boundaries might not be easy to define and in any case are not likely to be
permanent. A functionalist approach suggests that boundaries might need to be
reviewed in the light of changing scientific evidence and understanding.
The administrative approach, whereby a jurisdictional area is defined in
advance, follows identification of problems in an area addressed pursuant to
an institutional mandate. There is convenience, simplicity and clarity in the
applicability of a mandate-based approach. These benefits might occur at the
cost of relevance and effectiveness. A major difficulty is that the problem
might not be dealt with holistically and that an ecosystem-based approach
might not be possible.
Knowledge base
Several questions arise when we consider the knowledge base that a decision
draws upon. First, what knowledge of the problem and management area is
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available? A lack of knowledge could result in an initiative that is more
politically than knowledge driven.
How is that knowledge created and is it accessible? The integrated
approach necessitates a multidisciplinary knowledge of a problem, and this
in turn might result in an interdisciplinary response. Also relevant here is
the extent to which the approach to knowledge building is inclusive of
sources other than natural science so as to incorporate other disciplines,
traditional ecological knowledge and local user or community knowledge.
An inclusive approach suggests that the knowledge is not elitist, but can-
vasses all available sources. This could be very significant in the eyes of par-
ticipating actors. It is also useful to ascertain the extent to which a
government initiative draws on non-governmental research and knowledge
capabilities (e.g. universities, private sector). Is there an epistemic commun-
ity behind the decision? Are government experts networking with non-
governmental experts? Are decision-makers drawing knowledge directly
from stakeholders (i.e. value of consultation but also the lobbying this
entails) or hiring knowledge (consultants) or are they simply using in-house
expertise? Is there an opportunity for epistemic communities and the public
at large to question or peer review the science made available?
From a pragmatic perspective, it is important to ask how knowledge is
made available to the decision-maker. It is difficult for decision-makers to
deal with scientific uncertainty, information shrouded in jargon, or informa-
tion presented in an unusable manner. Scientists may be specialists, but
managers are generalists. Also, the relationship between science and man-
agement is not an easy one, as science may not always produce the definitive
answers that administrators and their political masters seek. In turn, scien-
tists are fiercely independent and tend to object to administrative controls.
Policy
What should be considered here is a policy decision and the policy frame-
work within which it occurs. There are various policy factors that may facili-
tate or constrain ICOM both at the development stage (policy-making
process) and in substantive content (the policy decision). Miles defined
policy as “a purposive course of action,” suggesting a rationalized decision in
view of achieving stated ends.17 Policy must clearly convey its purpose and
the action foreseen to avoid ambiguity of expectations. Clarity, consistency,
predictability and equity are important criteria. The content must withstand
at least a prima facie probing analysis. There should be benefits ensuing that
are justified by the costs (socio-economic, ecosystemic) incurred. There is no
objective standard. Rather the decision must be justifiable according to an
identifiable set of values, interests or policy promises, and those that decide
must be held accountable. Relevant questions to consider relate to the
degree of politicization of a decision, the extent to which a policy reflects
diversity, the extent of integration or sectoralization, targets of the decision,
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the relationship of the policy decision to other policies (coordination, com-
plementarity or conflict), resource commitments, intended effect (e.g. alloca-
tion, distribution, organization, etc.) and accountability.
The policy rationalization process is influenced by values or beliefs held
by the decision-maker and interests that are actively pursued. In assessing
ICOM initiatives, it is useful to enquire whose interests are driving the
policy development process and in whose interests the final decision is made.
The integrated approach implies an inclusive approach, and the policy
decision made is necessarily rationalized on the basis of the diversity of
interests. A policy decision that is particular rather than general can be
expected to be more exclusive than inclusive in the interests captured. Thus
where the context is characterized by diversity, the interests of diversity
cannot be served and integration cannot be achieved through an exclusive
approach. This is not to say that sectorally-based or -oriented decisions are
necessarily problematic, rather that decisions that purport to be integrated
ought to be looked at differently from those that are not. Therefore what are
the underlying values and interests and whether or not a particular initiative
is inclusive or exclusive are pertinent questions.
Efficiency is a further criterion for assessing a policy decision.18 Policy
making in a federal system necessarily occurs at different levels of govern-
ment as well as in different sectors, frequently in a parallel manner. When
policy making at different levels occurs without cross-referencing, a lack of
efficiency and possibly also a lack of effectiveness can be expected. This is so
because resources, especially limited resources (whether human or material),
cannot be said to be used efficiently if duplication occurs and objectives are
reached at a higher overall cost, irrespective of whether duplication occurs as
a matter of right, principle or simple competition.
ICOM policy making occurs within the larger governance and socio-
economic framework. Accordingly, it is to be expected that there will be a
relationship with other policy-making processes, frequently elbowing for
attention and resources, at times complementing and at other times compet-
ing with other processes. The ICOM process can be negatively or positively
influenced by extraneous factors, and likewise affects these other processes.
The presence and degree of influence or spill-over of other decision-making
processes, such as trade and energy, can be vital to explain why a particular
ICOM process is driven by shipping and/or offshore development. This
poses a challenge for the integrated approach as it may well be that it is the
consequence, rather than the cause of a coastal and ocean management chal-
lenge, that may have to be addressed, and in itself this poses limits to
integration.
Finally, the policy-making process occurs in context and rarely is this
static. Thus fisheries management in Canada in the 1990s faced massive
stock collapses, loss of livelihoods and displacement of coastal communities,
and the ensuing decisions had to reflect the ecological, political, economic
and social crises. Coastal and marine resource allocation must take into
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consideration the context of aboriginal rights. In the 1990s, the privatiza-
tion drive resulted in significant change in the institutional framework for
shipping, and ostensibly what was supposed to result in integration of ocean
management functions resulted in fragmentation of maritime administra-
tion functions. Contextual pressures significantly influenced policy making.
The lessons of the 1990s and into this millennium in Canada suggest that
ICOM prospects may be significantly shaped by context before they are even
initiated.
Legal framework
Legal factors that influence ICOM in Canada draw on Canada’s federal char-
acter, the historical division of powers and its international obligations. The
legal factors considered here are proposed as related classes of issues, namely
property and jurisdiction, aboriginal rights, statutory schemes (federal and
provincial) and applicable international law.
Federal and provincial property and jurisdiction
The first factor concerns Canadian maritime zones and related authority
exercised over ocean areas through the international law of the sea. This is a
facilitating factor for ICOM because it produces some degree of certainty for
Canada’s maritime claims in the international community. Although
Canada only became a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (LOS Convention) in November 2003, it had in effect legislated
through Part I of the Oceans Act and earlier statutes almost all maritime zone
entitlements under that treaty.19 Canada has an extensive system of straight
baselines in the Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific oceans that captures extensive
inshore waters as Canadian territory.20 Canada has also claimed many bays
on all three oceans as historic bays, mostly without protest from other mar-
itime powers.21 Modern maritime zone claims include a 12 nautical mile ter-
ritorial sea, a 24 nautical mile contiguous zone, a 200 nautical mile
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and a continental shelf.22 Although the full
seaward limits of the first three have been determined, the outer limits of
the continental shelf have not yet been determined. Given the broad margin
character of Canada’s potential claim in the Atlantic and Arctic oceans, the
lack of a seaward limit at this time could constrain the full exercise of
continental shelf rights and responsibilities in relation to non-living
resources and sedentary species.
The extent of Canadian authority over the various maritime zones is
highly variable. Internal waters and the territorial sea are subject to sover-
eignty, in effect entailing the exercise of the totality of jurisdictions and
powers that may be exercised on land, subject to the constraint of the inter-
national right of innocent passage. The contiguous zone permits the exercise
of enforcement jurisdiction for customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary
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purposes. For example, Canada has the right to turn away or apprehend
ships that may carry illegal immigrants. In reality this power is constrained
by humanitarian considerations and the frequent lack of seaworthiness of
rogue ships.23 The EEZ provides sovereign rights over natural resources,
exclusive rights over other economic activities and jurisdiction for environ-
ment, marine science, artificial islands and installations purposes. The
overall constraint in this maritime zone relates to the specificity of the exist-
ing rights. In practice, however, Canada has provided for the application of
federal and provincial laws over offshore activities.24 The continental shelf
within 200 nautical miles (i.e. co-extensively with the EEZ) poses no special
issues. It is outside 200 nautical miles and up to the as yet undefined outer
limits of the continental margin that Canada has a potential constraint to its
sovereign rights over natural resources (including sedentary species). In this
“outer” continental shelf area, offshore mineral activities will potentially be
subject to an international tax payable to the International Seabed Author-
ity.25 At the same time, the exercise of rights over sedentary species (the only
living resources tied to the continental shelf regime) may enable Canada to
protect the seabed and subsoil habitats of such species outside the 200 nauti-
cal mile limit.26
At a sub-national level, there is the ongoing constraint of provincial
claims to maritime property rights as distinct from federal jurisdiction. For
the most part, the federal government (as “Canada”) exercises the rights and
duties of a coastal state in the law of the sea.27 Maritime areas are generally
deemed to be “extra-territorial” and therefore prima facie are subject to this
national level of authority. However, this has not discouraged some
provinces from testing their claims over various maritime areas. British
Columbia does not enjoy a territorial sea but has property over the waters,
seabed and subsoil of the area enclosed between Vancouver Island and the
mainland.28 Newfoundland probably has a territorial sea of three nautical
miles, but not a continental shelf.29 New Brunswick and Nova Scotia have
not judicially tested their long-standing and pre-Confederation claims in the
Bay of Fundy.30 Nova Scotia has on occasion reminded the federal govern-
ment that Sable Island is part of the province. Nova Scotia has strong
grounds for a legal claim on historic grounds to maritime areas off its
Atlantic shores.31 On different occasions in the past, provincial courts have
exercised jurisdiction over causes of actions in bays.32
The constitutional law of Canada and case law do not effectively settle prop-
erty and jurisdictional issues. The Constitution Act, 1867 allocated extra-
territorial matters, fisheries, navigation and shipping to the federal government,
and property and civil rights to provincial governments.33 At the same time,
the property boundaries of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were protected as
at the time of Confederation, suggesting that whatever these provinces brought
into Confederation by way of property is still protected today.34
In practice, although provincial perceptions have tended to constrain
federal initiatives in ICOM, both levels of government have approached
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their differences in a pragmatic and functional approach and situation-by-
situation manner. This has enabled ocean development to proceed while
provincial claims remained unaffected. Two examples of this concern offshore
development and aquaculture. Following the Newfoundland Offshore Reference,35
the federal, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia governments entered into polit-
ical offshore accords that were legislated concurrently at both federal and
provincial levels.36 In aquaculture, the federal government concluded agree-
ments with several provincial governments that in effect recognize the
provinces’ lead role in the licensing and management of this marine use.37
Aboriginal government
As seen earlier, aboriginal rights are increasingly finding constitutional pro-
tection. While these rights can be seen as a type of encumbrance on the
Crown, their full extent remains uncertain. One view is that such rights
attach to Crown title wherever that title may be asserted.38 The potential
outcome of differences between the federal government’s regulatory conser-
vation authority and aboriginal groups that claim a right to manage a
resource as part of their aboriginal rights is also unclear. However, the 2002
agreement between the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Devel-
opment and Quebec’s Inuit indicates the federal government’s disposition to
addressing the right of Aboriginal peoples to share benefits in non-living
and living resources.39
Statutory schemes (federal and provincial)
Federal and provincial statutory schemes may also facilitate or constrain
ICOM. The most important federal statute in support of ICOM is clearly
the Oceans Act. Divided into three parts, this Act defines the maritime zones
of Canada, provides for integrated management, and allocates powers, duties
and functions to DFO. The Act gives DFO general authority to lead and
facilitate ICOM. The Act is a type of “constitution” for Canada’s ocean
space. As a result, much of it is declaratory, organizational and norm setting
at a level of generality.
Despite its comprehensiveness, the Act does not cover all relevant factors
for ICOM. Arguably, what is not covered by the Act is as important as what
is covered. A significant potential constraint to integrated coastal manage-
ment is the exclusion of rivers and lakes, and by implication watersheds.40
The full extent of application to terrestrial areas is also questionable, despite
a reference to integrated management plans for “all activities or measures in
or affecting estuaries, coastal waters and marine waters” (emphasis added).41
For integrated coastal management purposes, this is an obvious contra-
diction in the legislation. Federal initiatives under this Act would have to
find creative ways to apply integrated management plans to the “land”
component of the land–sea interface. The application of such initiatives to
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rivers and lakes would have to be orchestrated under the authority of other
legislation.42
The Act is primarily framework legislation and to date contains no sub-
sidiary legislation other than what was imported from the statutes that it
now supersedes. Stakeholders have perceived this absence of new regulation
as a weakness, and the Standing Committee has in fact recommended the
adoption of regulations.43
Beyond the Oceans Act and federal and provincial environmental protec-
tion acts lies a myriad of federal and provincial sectoral legislation. This leg-
islation establishes mandates for coasts and oceans-related concerns that
interact with DFO’s lead role in ICOM. Occasionally, there is at least
implicit, if not explicit, conflict or lack of complementarity between sec-
torally allocated powers and the integrationist role of the lead agency. This
has the potential of constraining ICOM. For instance, DFO, the Department
of the Environment (Canadian Wildlife Service) and the Parks Canada
Agency have mandates to establish protected areas, although under different
names.44 The Department of Transport is the maritime administration of
Canada, but the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is part of DFO.45 Culturally
and functionally (because of the shipping and navigation concerns), the CCG
is naturally closer to the Department of Transport (which still hosts marine
institutions such as the Marine Safety and Ports and Harbours) than to its
current institutional home.46 The Nova Scotia and Newfoundland offshore
petroleum boards have separate federal and provincial statutory authority to
grant offshore licenses and to set conditions for the conduct of exploration
and development activities. This can result in actual overlaps between off-
shore uses and other licensed or serviced uses, and protected areas established
by other departments under other statutory authority. The shipping legisla-
tion does not fully apply to offshore activities.47 Likewise, water quality cri-
teria for discharges into the marine environment are different for offshore
activities and shipping.
As a result, there are some overlaps of statutory mandates and inconsis-
tencies in regulatory standards for different users of the marine environment,
even in the same area. Potentially, these legislative factors will constrain
ICOM.
Interdepartmental conflict resolution mechanisms are not necessarily leg-
islated. Interdepartmental overlaps in mandates and consequent turfing may
be addressed through memoranda of agreement or joint committees
designed to harmonize or dovetail efforts, for example, the agreement to
address overlapping mandates to establish protected areas.48
Applicable international law and policy
Increasingly, international law plays a significant role in informing and
guiding Canada’s domestic legal system. Canada is party to numerous
ICOM-relevant treaties and these are implemented through federal
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statutes.49 Canada has also implemented treaties that it generally supports,
but is not a formal party to.50 There is also international customary law that
applies in Canada without necessarily being legislated through a statutory
scheme.51 The relevance of international law lies in the existence of inter-
national standards which Canadian courts have invoked in interpreting and
applying law consistently with Canada’s international obligations.52 The
factor to be weighed here is the existence or otherwise of international law
that should inform and guide a particular ICOM initiative and whether such
an initiative is consistent with or contrary to an international commitment.
Institutional framework
Institutional actors
A variety of institutional actors are involved in ICOM and these can be dis-
cussed in terms of extent of authority, function performed and interests
represented. The principal concern here is the extensive range of government
actors: cabinets, ministries, departments, agencies and inter-
ministerial/departmental committees. Authoritative actors in Canada are
located in federal, provincial and municipal53 levels of government, aboriginal
government, and in cases of delegation (e.g. through boards, tribunals or
crown corporations) or privatization (private sector bodies). Parliamentary and
provincial legislature committees may also have an indirect role to play, such
as the Standing Committee for Fisheries and Oceans, which conducts periodic
reviews of the Oceans Act and its implementation. The court of law, by facili-
tating dispute settlement or clarifying the import of a particular law, can have
far-reaching influence on ICOM, e.g. the Marshall decision’s impact on abo-
riginal resource rights and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on Canadian
maritime law that has significantly curtailed a widespread practice of judicial
application of provincial private law in a maritime setting.54 Key questions to
be asked in relation to authoritative decision-makers is who is driving,
leading, facilitating or constraining an ICOM initiative, and why?
Authoritative actors have a legal mandate to perform, are subject to polit-
ical and bureaucratic pressures, and can be targets for criticism or perceived
as sources of benefits. The manner through which they react to these pres-
sures can facilitate or constrain their ability to perform their mandates. For
instance, significant criticism of the first version of the Oceans Act as a bill
forced some reconsideration and re-introduction as an improved bill.55 Sim-
ilarly, public criticism of the Oceans Strategy discussion paper probably led to
its five-year “freeze” until the actual strategy was released in 2002.56
Although not possessing authoritative decision-making power, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) may screen decision making in the
interests of accountability, project particular interests, disseminate informa-
tion and educate the public alone or in partnership with decision-makers.
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Communities, whether working through NGOs or through an incorporated
body, may also share local authoritative decision making with a level of
government through co-management initiatives. The contributions of such
organizations in shaping a particular ICOM initiative, peer reviewing it or
in promoting accountability should be identified.
As institutional actors, industry stakeholders act to influence, pressure or
lobby authoritative decision-makers in pursuit of particular interests. For
example, when the federal government acted to privatize contingency plan-
ning response services to ships, over 30 objections were registered. In turn
these objections led to the establishment of a federal commission to enquire
into the basis of fees for such services.57
Nature and clarity of ICOM mandates
Controversial or unclear ICOM mandates can give rise to resistance or con-
flicting expectations between lead and other actors. Mandates can be either
formal, an authoritatively assigned power, or informal, where in the absence
of a specific allocation, a power may be assumed or expected to be assumed
by a concerned actor.
Perhaps the most important role belongs to DFO, which is designated as the
lead agency for ICOM in Canada. DFO also has the power to assume non-
designated responsibilities over any other ocean matter within federal jurisdic-
tion that is not assigned to another minister.58 It must be emphasized that this
lead role is with reference to the Oceans Strategy, integrated planning and man-
agement, and marine protected areas (MPAs). Other departments have their
own separate de jure lead roles in their respective sectors. Hence the recommen-
dation of the Standing Committee that “the government affirm that the Minis-
ter for Fisheries and Oceans has the primary responsibility for all matters
relating to the management of Canada’s oceans” could only be met with the
inevitable government response: “[B]oth the Department of Fisheries and
Oceans and the Oceans Act fully respect the existing mandates, responsibilities
and authorities of other federal departments and agencies. This is important
because nearly every federal department or agency has some level of respons-
ibility related to Canada’s oceans, and therefore has a legitimate and necessary
role to play in the future of oceans management.”59
DFO (through its minister) “shall lead and facilitate the development and
implementation of a national strategy for the management of estuarine,
coastal and marine ecosystems.”60 This broad function in relation to ecosys-
tems is accompanied by a complementary function with reference to differ-
ent types of waters, i.e. “the development and implementation of plans for
the integrated management of all activities or measures in or affecting estu-
aries, coastal waters and marine waters.”61 The dual role of leader and facili-
tator in both “strategizing” and “planning” is a significant combination of
powers that enables DFO to embark on its own initiatives and at the same
time assist with the initiatives of other departments.
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The Oceans Act mandate does not provide DFO with a carte blanche for the
exercise of its powers under the Act. First, the powers are actually legal
duties, meaning that lack of leadership or facilitation by DFO would be at
odds with the Act. The extent to which inaction is legally actionable or
simply a matter of political accountability is unclear. The political under-
tone of inaction was well-captured by the Standing Committee in recom-
mending that the Minister for Fisheries and Oceans “exercise his role as the
minister with overall responsibility for the management of Canada’s oceans
more proactively.”62
The Act requires that strategies and plans be based on principles of sus-
tainable development, integrated management and precaution.63 The ability
of these principles to facilitate or constrain ministerial activity depends on
their definition, although, in general terms, sustainable development and
precaution are defined.64 Precaution also benefits from further development
and application in other statutes and case law. Integration, on the other
hand, is not defined in any manner and could be problematic in its applica-
tion.65 The absence or flexibility of definitions is arguably useful for the
federal government in launching initiatives that are guided only by general
norms.
A more significant constraint is DFO’s duty to cooperate with “other
ministers, boards and agencies of the Government of Canada, with provin-
cial and territorial governments and with affected aboriginal organizations,
coastal communities and other persons and bodies, including those bodies
established under land claims agreements.”66 The duty here is arguably more
than a duty to consult, and is probably a duty to “collaborate” in the exercise
of powers of leadership and facilitation. The diversity of actors to be con-
sulted necessarily involves a high degree of complexity in communications
and interactions leading to decision making. In fact, ICOM initiatives
should also be screened to ascertain to what extent, if at all, they address
interdepartmental coordination and cooperation in view of a harmonized
approach.
The extent to which mandates facilitate or constrain ICOM also has to be
considered with reference to the institutional “heritage” of the body con-
cerned. For example, a long-standing criticism of DFO has been the heavy
emphasis on fisheries. Even following the entry into force of the Oceans Act,
where DFO received explicit responsibilities and powers for “oceans,” the
institutional fisheries stigma remained, and fisheries constituencies still
lobby for a higher profile for fisheries, interests.67 It is suggested that in the
eyes of non-fisheries stakeholders, this stigma may constrain ICOM initi-
atives as it might suggest bias. In this respect, as lead agency for oceans,
DFO needs to balance the needs and demands of integrated and multi-
sectoral management with the sectoral aspect of its mandate, i.e. fisheries.
Failure to create this balance could potentially create a conflict of interest in
the department’s dual mandate (i.e. oceans/multi-sectoral leadership v. fisheries/
sectoral leadership), and possibly undermine integrated management.
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Institutional behavior
The ICOM inquiry should also extend to the behavior of relevant actors.
There are those who are inclined towards cooperative or competitive behav-
ior or possibly non-involvement. Cooperation might result from normative
expectations, such as the expectation of collaboration from the Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans. Competition is likely the result of inter-governmental
and bureaucratic turfing. Non-involvement may simply be passivity, pos-
sibly as a result of disinterest, perceptions of lack of relevance, or lack of
resources to commit.
How decisions are made is also important. The institutional culture will
determine how meaningful overtures of cooperation might turn out to be.
For instance, if the public expects consultation before an initiative is
launched or a decision is made and this does not occur, resistance and non-
compliance can be expected. The decision to proceed with a consensus-based
approach at the First ESSIM Forum Workshop should be perceived as a new
way of doing business in the Maritimes, possibly resulting in better con-
stituency reception of this initiative than others. At the same time, it has
raised expectations on how DFO should proceed in the future.
Participatory processes
Central to governance is a class of factors loosely referred to as “participatory
processes”. They may be expressions of participatory rights and expectations
and potentially play a significant role in legitimizing or constraining ICOM
knowledge building, decision making, implementation and compliance.
Aspiration for good governance is increasingly enhancing ways to facilitat-
ing stakeholder and public participation, beyond mere information and con-
sultation. Federal and provincial environmental assessment legislation now
provides for public hearings or other types of participative processes.68 The
intensity of these “participatory processes” is even more visible in relation to
aboriginal communities, local communities and affected individuals who
may demand inclusion as a matter of right.
The traditional protection of individual rights (including property rights)
through principles of natural justice has now evolved into a more far-
reaching requirement of procedural fairness in most administrative decision-
making bodies.69 In particular, there may be legitimate expectations that a
particular procedure or process be followed because of the expectations
arising from a statutory scheme, government representations or treaty mem-
bership, and ultimately, the credibility of government.70 In oceans and
environmental contexts, this is particularly relevant with reference to DFO’s
duty to cooperate and in the conduct of environmental assessment hearings.
Integration, because of the implied diversity, suggests an inclusive
approach. The quantity or quality and timeliness of inclusion raise questions
of equity, or fairness. Administrative decision making that affects
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individuals or groups in a fundamental manner is bound to observe partici-
patory entitlements as a matter of procedural fairness.71 Participatory rights
have become very important in the administrative state. In an ICOM
context, where administrative decisions may grant or take away a license to
hunt or fish or pollute, issue, confirm or deny maritime documents, permit a
reduction in goods and services provided by an ecosystem, or facilitate the
urbanization of a coastline, among others, it is to be expected that those who
are affected will want to be consulted. It is difficult to envisage compliance
if the inequity of a decision-making process provokes resistance and griev-
ance, in turn forcing adoption of costly enforcement or conflict management
measures. Consequently, it is legitimate to ask the extent to which the
policy-making process is equitable in the eyes of both the decision-maker
and decision-receiver.72 This might help explain the degree of cooperation or
otherwise in an ICOM initiative.
A participatory framework can satisfy these equity concerns in various
ways, for example, co-management, public hearings or consultations and
discussion papers accompanied by workshops. There is no limit to the possi-
bilities. However, the context of the participatory process, the range and
intensity of participation, and the degree of satisfaction or non-objection of
stakeholders should favor some possibilities over others. The key question is
whether there is good process under the circumstances. This is a relative
test. An ICOM initiative should be screened for such participatory processes.
The diversity implied by the integrated approach and the consequent
inclusive participation provide an opportunity for competing interests to
influence a decision. Truly inclusive participation may avoid many potential
conflicts simply by ensuring access and exchange of information to avoid
misunderstandings. However, in some situations differences grounded on
values and entrenched interests could mature into open conflicts. An ICOM
initiative should anticipate this and include conflict management mechan-
isms.
Resources
ICOM initiatives entail costs. A development proposal may consume ecosys-
tem goods and services. A proposal may also allocate benefits to some, and
decrease benefits to others. There might be a cost for non-action, or a higher
cost associated with one option over another. There could be opportunity
costs. Government may need to appropriate funding to support an initiative.
Government may need to levy taxes to fund an initiative, or donations or
other voluntary allocations solicited. In all these instances, costs are incurred
because an ICOM initiative needs to be resourced. In successful ICOM initi-
atives, the original investment may be multiplied as a result of leveraging
other resources. This could be evidence of buy-in or ownership by stakehold-
ers who recognize the value of the initiative and commit to its continuity by
allocating more resources. Indeed, this could be an indicator of sustainabil-
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ity. The inverse of this is when there is no resource allocation to an initi-
ative, suggesting a lack of genuine commitment. The absence or insuffi-
ciency of resources may stultify an initiative. This could be an indicator of
lack of sustainability.
Evaluation
An ICOM initiative should also be screened to determine if its design
includes a monitoring and evaluation process to enable it to measure
progress or the lack thereof, and to adjust to lack of results, change and
unforeseen circumstances.73 As indicated earlier, an effective evaluation
process needs to start with a reliable set of baselines, performance indicators,
critical assumptions and clear objectives with targets to be achieved.
Results should be measured in terms of outputs (immediate products),
outcomes (short- to medium-term) and impacts (long-term). These should
be both quantitative and qualitative indicators. Ultimately, ICOM should
achieve effectiveness in terms of (1) behavioral change (actual or potential;
incentives) and (2) impact on the environment, economy, health, etc. Costs
will be incurred too; accordingly, there should be the possibility of measur-
ing the benefits against the costs, and this will indicate the level of efficiency
of an initiative. As a matter of good governance, there should be trans-
parency in the evaluation process. Ultimately, constituencies have to be sat-
isfied with both process and results.
Assessing specific ICOM initiatives
At this point the discussion moves from the theoretical framework to spe-
cific integrated management initiatives in Canada. How have the factors
presented above facilitated or constrained specific federal ICOM initiatives
in Canada?
Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future
The Canadian federal government released the long-awaited Canada’s Oceans
Strategy (Oceans Strategy) in mid-summer 2002.74 The Oceans Strategy consti-
tutes the policy framework for Canada’s vision for the management of its
ocean space and is likely second in importance only to the Oceans Act for
ICOM in Canada. The Strategy goes to some length to assert the importance
of ocean governance, specifically in terms of inter- and intra-governmental
collaboration, shared responsibility and an inclusive approach to decision
making. Because of its novelty, this instrument can only be assessed with
reference to the process that generated it and the actual content.
A reading of the Oceans Strategy and the accompanying communication
documents would lead the public to assume that interest in and preparatory
work for ICOM in Canada began only in the mid-1990s. There is no
Canada: beyond the buzzwords 35
reference at all to the significant level of cooperative effort that was under-
taken from the late 1980s through the early 1990s under an interdepart-
mental federal initiative known as Marine Environmental Quality (MEQ).
The 1987 Oceans Policy for Canada75 recognized that many federal agencies
share the responsibility for and must cooperate in the maintenance and
enhancement of the quality and sustainability of the marine environment. In
support of this need, an Interdepartmental Committee on Oceans (ICO) was
established to coordinate and guide marine programs and policies at the
federal level. ICO recognized that coordination at the federal level would be
essential and that an overarching framework for marine environmental
quality would be necessary. Thus in 1989, ICO established a Director-
General level sub-committee to oversee the preparation of a federal MEQ
framework and action plan. A working group of this DG Sub-committee,
co-chaired by Environment Canada-Atlantic Region and DFO-Ottawa and
composed of federal departments and agencies with a stake in the marine
environment, was established to lead this process.
In 1992, 17 federal deputy ministers/presidents endorsed a document
entitled “Framework for the Management of Marine Environmental Quality
within the Federal Government.”76 Following this endorsement, the ICO
Sub-committee further directed the Working Group to prepare a federal
MEQ Action Plan that identified interdepartmental activities related to the
marine environment and provided for the overall coordination of related pol-
icies and programs of the federal government. Once completed, a national
MEQ framework and action plan would be prepared, as a cooperative effort
involving the provinces, territories, First Nations, industry, universities and
the public.
The federal “Framework” and MEQ Action Plan set out a strategy for the
management of marine environmental quality in Canada.77 It consists of an
overall objective,78 a set of guiding principles79 and a series of specific goals
and related actions.80 The MEQ Working Group was active through early
1995 when proposed interdepartmental transfer of resources all but elimi-
nated discussion and precluded further collaboration. The MEQ initiative
was relegated to oblivion and the proposed national MEQ framework and
action plan were never pursued.
Even a cursory examination of the MEQ initiative’s principles, objectives,
goals and proposed actions demonstrate that much of the current ICOM
thinking as espoused by DFO was anticipated. However, the Oceans Strategy
provides no acknowledgment of this important earlier cooperative work
before DFO was designated lead federal department for coasts and oceans by
the Oceans Act. Two observations have to be offered in this regard: first, there
is loss of corporate memory, suggesting inefficiency and possibly leading to
the proverbial “re-invention of the wheel,” and second, this lack of acknowl-
edgment of other institutions’ contributions may not bode well for future
interdepartmental cooperation that will be so essential to ICOM.
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Trigger
The responsibility of DFO to develop a national oceans strategy is conferred
by the Oceans Act.81 Accordingly, this particular initiative cannot be said to
have been triggered by an event, but rather it constitutes the fulfillment of a
legal mandate. Nor can it be said, in the view of these authors, that any
particular crisis triggered the federal government to exercise its own
mandate. However, it can be said that the eventual release and content were
influenced by ongoing public pressure and perceptions of appropriate polit-
ical timing. The release of the Oceans Strategy on the eve of the impending
Rio + 10 UN conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, is no coincidence,
and suggests an opportune forum to showcase Canadian oceans expertise.
Problems and baselines
The legal mandate provided to DFO is with reference to a national strategy
for the management of Canadian estuarine, coastal and marine ecosystems.
Because of its generality as a management framework at a national scale, the
Strategy does not, and could not, purport to address in depth any one
problem or class of problems. Rather, it provides a framework to address any
coastal and ocean problem or issue in existence or that might arise through
integrated management plans, which are also mandated under the 
Oceans Act.
Consequently, the Oceans Strategy does not identify any baselines, and
could not possibly do so. This will have to be addressed at the level of integ-
rated management plans. At the same time however, the federal government
has indicated in the Oceans Strategy that evaluation will be based on identi-
fied performance indicators, possibly to enable results-based management.
Results-based management requires the identification of objectives in the
form of outputs, outcomes and impacts (change over the short, medium and
long term), the achievement of which would be measured against perform-
ance indicators, and against a situation or conditions at a particular moment
in time (physical and temporal reference points).
The overall performance of the Strategy will be difficult to assess without
identified baselines. However, the performance of individual integrated
management plans and MPAs established under the impetus of the Oceans
Strategy might be deemed to constitute the performance of the Strategy
itself.
Management area
The Oceans Strategy addresses management area concerns at various levels. On
a macro policy level, the Strategy applies to all Canadian coastal and marine
environments within national jurisdiction. Under certain conditions, it also
purports to apply to areas outside national jurisdiction. On an operational
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level, the Strategy provides for the identification of two types of manage-
ment areas: large marine ecosystem (large ocean management area, or
LOMA) and coastal management area. Both would be defined in ecosystemic
terms, and the coastal management area would be related to the larger ocean
management area.
The Strategy emphasizes that the ecosystemic approach may well produce
management areas that cut across different jurisdictional zones. What the
Strategy does not anticipate at this stage, but should be anticipated in integ-
rated management plans, is that ecosystemic “boundaries” are not necessarily
permanent, may vary in the case of overlapping ecosystems, and may fluctu-
ate over time. This seems to have been anticipated in the South-East Marine
Management Plan in Australia.82 In effect, the conscious decision to steer
away from formalistic jurisdictional boundaries for management areas signi-
fies the arrival of a functionalist approach to ocean zoning. There are merits
in this approach, but it will live side-by-side, rather than displace zoning for
sectoral purposes, such as offshore oil and gas exploration, development and
production licenses. How the two types of zoning, the first for integrated
management purposes and the second for specific sectoral purposes, interre-
late remains to be seen.
There may be limitations to this approach to management area definition.
The Strategy is careful to stipulate an ecosystemic approach or an ecosystem-
based approach, and not an ecosystem management approach. This is not
necessarily a problem-oriented approach, and in fact other than the need to
identify priorities, there is no hint in the Strategy that ICOM in Canada will
be problem oriented. The advantage of a problem-oriented approach is that
the ecosystemic definition of the management area would be more directly
related to the area of influence of the problem (which might cut across dif-
ferent systems). What should logically result from the approach in the Strat-
egy is that generalized ecosystems will be identified, and then problems
therein will be targeted for planning and management action, and not the
other way round.
Knowledge base
The Oceans Strategy is purportedly a knowledge-based instrument drawing
from national and international experience in ocean management. Know-
ledge is understood as solid multidisciplinary science subject to peer review.
The emphasis on marine science is accompanied by user knowledge (indus-
try, fisherfolk, local communities) and the traditional ecological knowledge
of aboriginal communities.83 Perhaps this is where the Oceans Strategy misses
the point on integration, in terms of the need for a better understanding of
the relationship between communities/users and the marine environment.
The understanding of human behavior in relation to complex systems will
require more than marine science. A notable under-emphasis is the role of
academic and research institutions operating outside the governmental
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framework. This suggests that the traditional uneasiness of civil servants
with the academic establishment continues and defeats the expressed intent
on integrating knowledge. Moreover, there seems to be an implicit assump-
tion that government bodies in Canada have the necessary knowledge and
expertise to undertake the complex integration required in ICOM. Govern-
ment would provide capacity to communities and to the international
community, but little attention seems to be paid to the need to build capac-
ity within the various levels of government in Canada.
On the positive side, there is an important commitment in the Oceans
Strategy to the dissemination of knowledge and access to information by
stakeholders and participants in integrated management plans. This will be
essential to leveling the playing field among the various actors and facilitate
informed and meaningful participation.
Policy factors: decision-making process and content
As noted earlier, a 1997 discussion paper initiated the process leading to the
release of the Oceans Strategy. Subsequent federal government hearings
invited public and stakeholder feedback. The critical reactions reflected the
great diversity among ocean interests across the country and the high expec-
tations on the federal government for this initiative. A major weakness at
that time and until the actual release of the Oceans Strategy was that there was
no clearly stated integrated national ocean policy or public release of a sequel
to the discussion paper. As a result, the discussion paper was perceived as
identifying potential issues that could be addressed in an oceans manage-
ment strategy in the absence of well-defined objectives. This major weakness
has now been addressed: the Oceans Strategy is the integrated national ocean
policy of Canada.
During this interim period the initiative for regional integrated manage-
ment planning was well under way, and it was in fact thought that the
learning-by-doing approach at the regional level would eventually lead to
the development of a national strategy (bottom-up approach). This period
also saw three successive ministers for DFO and the emergence of several
issues that derailed DFO’s attention (e.g. Marshall decision and the Burnt
Church crisis in New Brunswick). By 2002, the federal decision to develop
the Strategy internally and release it was effectively made without further
public consultation. To remedy this shortfall in follow-up public consulta-
tions, the Strategy is very careful in advocating an inclusive approach to
integrated management decision making.
On the policy content side, the fundamental goal of the Strategy is “to
ensure healthy, safe and prosperous oceans for the benefit of current and
future generations of Canadians.”84 This lofty goal is supported by three
major objectives: (1) marine environment protection, (2) promotion of sus-
tainable economic opportunities, and (3) the exercise of international leader-
ship.85 The pursuit of the goal and objectives is advanced as a principled
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approach.86 The principles advanced are drawn from the Oceans Act, namely
sustainable development, integrated management and precaution. Although
these fall short of the full range of principles stated in the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, several other principles in the latter are
identified in the Strategy.87 Thus, ecosystem-based approaches, indigenous
knowledge and coastal communities have a place and role in the Strategy.
Sustainable development is used more as a buzzword than a principle that
can have operational significance. Nothing new is offered in relation to precau-
tion, which is advanced both as principle and approach. However, of consider-
able significance are the federal government’s commitment to the “wide
application of the precautionary approach to the conservation, management and
exploitation of marine resources in order to protect these resources and preserve
the marine environment,” the promotion of an ecosystem-based approach to
management, application of conservation measures and establishment of MPAs,
investing in knowledge building, and maintaining ecosystem integrity.88 The
Oceans Strategy falls short of stipulating more widespread use of environmental
impact assessment under federal and provincial legislation as a planning tool
before development or resource allocation decisions are made. It remains to be
seen to what extent precaution will be widely applied with respect to the
numerous fisheries of Canada, especially since resource management tends to be
on a stock basis. Ecosystem science is still in its infancy and virtually every
fishery is subject to intense political pressure.
Not surprisingly given the contextual complexity of ICOM in Canada,
much of the Oceans Strategy and the accompanying Policy and Operational
Framework focuses on integration and the integrated approach. Integration is
defined as a “continuous process through which decision-making is made”89
and “a commitment to planning and managing human activities in a com-
prehensive manner while considering all factors”. It includes principles and
concepts such as (1) holistic knowledge, information sharing, communica-
tion and education, (2) inclusive and collaborative structures and processes,
(3) flexible and adaptive management as knowledge improves and in
response to uncertainty, and (4) planning on the basis of a combined
approach to natural and economic systems.90 There are three major dimen-
sions to its application, namely in relation to multiple ocean use planning,
the management of the relationship between human uses and the environ-
ment (ecosystems), and the design and implementation of institutional
responses. There seems to be a “conflict” bias in this approach to integration,
in the sense that while conflict avoidance and management are writ large,
there is no apparent emphasis on promotion of complementarities (e.g.
complementary coastal and ocean uses).91
Legal factors
The Oceans Strategy is cautious in dealing with sensitive constitutional issues.
Due respect is paid to the provinces’ primary responsibility for provincial
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lands, shoreline and specific seabed areas; municipalities’ responsibility for
many land-based activities that have an impact on the marine environment;
and aboriginal rights as recognized and protected by the Constitution Act,
1982 and treaty rights.92 The Strategy also recognizes that the various
government bodies have to operate within their existing statutory mandates.
Canada is committed to playing an international role in ICOM. Canada, a
main beneficiary of the LOS Convention, recognizes that the “maintenance
and preservation of sovereignty over national ocean space is . . . a fundamen-
tal right in international law and is a priority for Canada.”93
Institutional factors
The Oceans Strategy identifies collaboration between and within each level of
government as a core commitment to ocean governance.94 It also recognizes
that almost every federal government department or agency (some 20 in
total) is involved in ICOM.95 Although many have a strong marine mandate
(e.g. Department of Transport and Environment Canada), only two have a
broad explicit or implicit ICOM mandate. DFO has the explicit lead role in
integrated management in the Oceans Act. Environment Canada’s jurisdic-
tion is implicit in relation to all activities that have an adverse impact on the
marine environment (e.g. pollution, wildlife protection). Other departments
play a lead role for their particular sector or area of marine concern (e.g.
Department of National Defence). In the marine transportation area, the
Department of Transport is the maritime administration of Canada, but the
Canadian Coast Guard is part of the DFO necessitating close cooperation
between these two departments.
The integrated approach called for by the Strategy will also require
federal collaboration and coordination with and among provincial and
municipal governments. The Strategy proposes to use new and existing
institutional mechanisms such as committees and boards for this purpose.96
Given frequent departmental turfing at the federal level and occasional
federal–provincial turfing, there is no indication of how the lack of coopera-
tion and occasional competition will in fact be addressed. Moreover, line
departments weigh their participation and expected benefits against actual
costs. The Strategy is unclear as to whether and how line departments would
be expected to shoulder the costs of an integrated management initiative
under the lead of another department, when their primary concern will be
with the performance of the “core” of their (sectoral) mandate.
Participatory processes
According to the Strategy, “[T]he governance model proposed for integrated
management is one of collaboration.”97 In addition to the governmental
cooperation discussed above, the Strategy foresees broader social participa-
tion in three ways. First, the process of integrated management will result in
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the establishment of advisory bodies. Although the Strategy is silent on
their actual role and composition, it would seem that the collaborative
approach advocated throughout the Strategy would lead to the inclusion of
stakeholders. Second, where an integrated management body is created,
composition would include governmental and non-governmental persons.
Stakeholders will play more than an advisory role: “[P]articipants take an
active part in designing, implementing and monitoring the effectiveness of
coastal and ocean management plans, and partners enter into agreements on
ocean management plans with specific responsibilities, powers and obliga-
tions.”98 Third, there will be specific situations where co-management can
take place, although it is unnecessarily conceived only with reference to abo-
riginal communities and not to coastal communities generally.99 Given the
pervasiveness of co-management in many parts of the world and Canada, the
Strategy does not pay much attention to this form of management, leaving
it more as a prescription for “specific” cases, rather than promoting it as a
more general practice.
An innovation is attached to stakeholder participation. Integrated man-
agement bodies (second and third situations above) will not only provide
advice, but will “also assume responsibility for implementation of the
approved management plan.”100 This is consistent with the “collaborative”
governance approach advocated. How far this will be pursued remains to be
seen. One experience with privatization of contingency planning and
response led a federal commission to conclude that there are certain govern-
mental responsibilities (i.e. contingency planning for environment protec-
tion) that should not be delegated.101
What the Strategy leaves uncertain in relation to these notions of active
participation is who actually assumes responsibility when a problem arises as
a result of the management action undertaken. While this could be a poten-
tial problem in terms of holding persons accountable for their actions, it
could also encourage stakeholder participation. At its worst, participants
could expose themselves to legal liabilities. In order to address this potential
problem, it might be necessary (1) for the federal government to assume full
responsibility, including for decisions that are not fully its own, (2) to
provide participants with liability exemptions for the consequences of
decisions of integrated management bodies, or (3) to incorporate integrated
management bodies. The Strategy gives the impression that this potential
problem has not been given sufficient attention.
The Oceans Act already went to great lengths in establishing a duty to
consult on DFO. The Oceans Strategy goes much further in developing, in a
Canadian administrative law context, a legitimate expectation for stakehold-
ers to demand that the federal government live up to the stated policy for an
inclusive decision-making process. Although the Strategy notes that consen-
sus might not always be possible, there is no turning back to the dirigisme
that was the case in the past. ICOM decisions might be judicially reviewable
if procedural fairness is not observed.
42 Aldo Chircop and Larry Hildebrand
Resources
The Oceans Strategy is silent on the cost of implementation. Currently, it has
no separate budgetary allocation, and it is expected that elements of the
Strategy would be pursued through current departmental programing and
funding. The major challenge that this multi-sectoral strategy faces, and
will continue to face, is how to receive a fairer share of a decreasing depart-
mental budget that is oriented towards sectoral concerns. The Strategy gives
examples of activities and initiatives that could be undertaken over a four-
year period (with no indication as to start date). Some will require doing
current business in new ways, suggesting that the activities could be
pursued within current sectoral programing and budget. New multi-sectoral
activities, however, will require new resources.102
Evaluation
The Oceans Strategy is conceived as an iterative or “rolling” strategy that will
be updated regularly as a result of knowledge gained and lessons learned
from adaptive management. The Strategy stresses the importance of measur-
ing progress, relevance and effectiveness without suggesting how this might
be done. Evaluation will have great value for what is in effect a management
experiment. In order to do this it will be necessary to have a sophisticated
evaluation process that currently does not exist. Such an evaluation process
would need to integrate results-based management principles and
approaches discussed earlier, and factor-in the introduction of change while
the Strategy is still being assessed against stated performance indicators.
Change that is introduced on an ongoing basis is likely to make it difficult
to measure the Strategy’s performance, especially if performance indicators
are also changed.
Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management (ESSIM)
initiative
The Oceans Act mandates DFO to lead and facilitate the development and
implementation of integrated management plans (IMPs).103 To date, no IMP
has been established although there are integrated management initiatives
under way on the three oceans of Canada.104 ESSIM is one such initiative
under federal leadership and covers a large part of the marine area off the
Atlantic coast of Nova Scotia. Since ESSIM is in fieri in statu nascendi, the
analysis provided below must be considered provisional. This provisional
analysis is useful because this initiative already provides valuable insights on
the emerging practice of integrated management in Canada. There are
similar DFO initiatives for the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Pacific Ocean.
Another major initiative for integrated planning is in the Arctic (Beaufort
Sea), but it antecedes the Oceans Act.105 Of all these initiatives to date, ESSIM
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covers the most extensive management area, has the largest number of
participants and provides “an important national policy roadmap for future
oceans management.”106
Trigger
Consequent to DFO’s Oceans Act mandate concerning IMPs, ESSIM has at
least a legislative trigger. However, this on its own does not fully explain
why this area of the Atlantic region, among several candidates, was selected.
Of particular relevance to the genesis of this initiative is public concern over
perceived threats to the rich marine life in and over a submarine canyon on
the Eastern Scotian Shelf known as the Gully. Much of the Scotian Shelf is
covered by exploration licenses, mostly for natural gas. There are numerous
other marine uses off Nova Scotia that are occasionally in conflict with one
another, particularly fishing, the oldest and most widespread use of the area.
These spatial interactions often result in uneasy relationships among coastal
communities and between these communities and offshore developers.
Sable Island is located close to the Gully and is subject to conservation
and management by the Sable Island Preservation Trust.107 The Gully and
its waters will be subjected to a separate regime of protection. Mounting
conservation concerns had prodded the federal government to declare the
Gully as an area of interest as a marine protected area and the adoption of
the Sable Gully Conservation Strategy in 1997. This strategy recommended
the initiation of integrated ocean management with an offshore focus in this
area.108 The Oceans Act also tasked DFO with the leadership and coordination
of the development and implementation of a national system of marine pro-
tected areas for the purpose of integrated management planning in
Canada.109
Problems and baselines
Although there are several actual or potential problems (e.g. conflicts
between submarine cables and fishing in the same area; offshore oil and gas
licensing and conservation concerns; etc.) the ESSIM initiative to date has
left problem definition for later. The initiative will eventually address both
long- and short-term objectives. It has been recognized that there should be
prioritization of specific issues for immediate action. In effect, although the
initiative has been triggered by perceived problems as well as a legislative
mandate, the overall direction of the initiative is not problem-oriented. The
key elements set out for integrated management plans rely heavily on the
definition of an area and within that area the identification of actual issues to
be the subject of integrated management planning.110 Criteria for the inclu-
sion of issues in the IMP have been anticipated, namely “(i) an issue that
could involve multiple oceans use with social/economic impacts (i.e. inter-
sectoral spatial and temporal conflicts); or (ii) activities that could result in
44 Aldo Chircop and Larry Hildebrand
ecosystem impacts.”111 An issue-based approach might preclude proactive
planning, continuing the much-criticized issue-oriented response of the
past. ESSIM will need to hold a steady course and operate at two levels,
without one level derailing the other: first, defining medium- to long-term
planning and management objectives, and second, responding to immediate
problems, whether existing or as they arise.
Management area
It will be recalled that the Oceans Strategy provides for management at both
large and small scales (LOMA, such as ESSIM, and coastal management
areas yet to be initiated) that draw from a mix of ecological and administra-
tive criteria.112 The management area is perhaps one of the most unclear
matters in the ESSIM initiative. At approximately 325,000 square kilo-
meters, it covers only half of the Scotian Shelf. Although the Oceans Strategy
asserts that IMPs will be driven by ecosystem-based approaches, definition
of the ESSIM management area has very little ecosystemic basis and the
marine space that will be encompassed is uncertain and confusing. The area
currently covered by the initiative seems to have been inspired by various
factors, mostly jurisdictional or administrative, and hardly any of which
have any ecosystemic relevance.
First, if a large marine ecosystem were to be identified in the area, it
would have to encompass the entire Scotian Shelf, whereas only the eastern
part of the shelf is included in the initiative.113 The DFO has identified
natural divisions,114 but these have been questioned.
Second, the actual area coincides with an administratively defined fishing
zone: Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) division 4VW,
bordered by 4WX to the west and 4V to the east.115 This suggests that
fishery interests dominated the first cut at the management area and raises
the fundamental question of whether a sectoral boundary is useful for a
multi-sectoral ecosystemic task.
Third, in the vicinity of the eastern boundary, there is another relevant
boundary, i.e. the Newfoundland–Nova Scotia offshore boundary, pursuant
to the federal offshore accord legislation with the two provinces. This
boundary defined the limits of offshore licensing by the two federal–provincial
offshore boards and thus provided some convenience.116 An arbitration tri-
bunal has reviewed this boundary, and there is a new boundary that is con-
siderably closer to Sable Island (to Nova Scotia’s disadvantage).117 Thus the
eastern limit and a significant portion of the ESSIM management area now
falls within Newfoundland’s offshore raising the issue of Newfoundland’s
participation in the ESSIM development process.
Fourth, to date, the ESSIM area has excluded the territorial sea (a 12 nau-
tical mile belt along the coast), and there does not seem to be provision for
inclusion of the important territorial sea around Sable Island.118 Although
the stated intention of ESSIM is to address the offshore, the exclusion of the
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key territorial sea area will exclude a range of activities that have a signific-
ant impact on the Scotian Shelf ecosystem and which in effect are also a
springboard for offshore activities. There is very little human activity in the
ESSIM area that does not emanate from the coastal zone. Divorcing the off-
shore from the inshore defeats the rationale and purposes of the integrated
approach, which normally requires consideration of the full range of inter-
acting activities and cumulative impact (cause–effect relationships) on the
ecosystem. One reason put forward is that the impact of land-based activities
on the marine environment tends to be up to the 12 nautical mile limit, but
no supporting scientific evidence is provided.119 Again, this suggests that
jurisdictional concerns (federal–provincial constitutional limits) may have
been one deciding factor in addition to inshore water use complexities, such
as coastal fisheries. The consequence of this exclusion is that the ESSIM area
as defined is not justifiable on either user or on ecosystemic grounds.
Fifth, the seaward limits of the ESSIM area are also uncertain. ESSIM is
supposed to extend to the full extent of Canadian seaward jurisdiction, in
this case the extended continental shelf in accordance with the Oceans Act
and the LOS Convention. However, Canada has not defined its outer limits
and what is legally certain at this time is the limit of the EEZ at 200 nauti-
cal miles. In the case of Newfoundland, offshore exploration and develop-
ment licenses have been granted beyond 200 nautical miles despite the
absence of a formally defined Canadian outer limit.120
Policy factors
The Oceans Act and the Oceans Strategy are the two major instruments that set
out the policy framework for ICOM in Canada. In the case of the ESSIM
initiative, however, the principal policy guidance has come not from the
Strategy, but from the Act. Since 1999, the bulk of the initiative has run
parallel to the development of the Oceans Strategy. By the time the Oceans
Strategy was introduced in 2002, the ESSIM initiative was already well-
defined and with a proposed structure. The Oceans Act, on the other hand,
because it performs the function of legislating the policy framework and
directions for ICOM, and despite its high level of generality, served to guide
the development of ESSIM. It is conceivable that, because ESSIM had con-
ceptually advanced ahead of the Strategy by the time of the 1st ESSIM
Forum Workshop, the latter served to inform the former. There is little to
suggest that the Strategy added much that was not already anticipated and
factored into the ESSIM initiative. If this observation is correct, it suggests
that insofar as this Atlantic region initiative is concerned, initiatives at the
national level may lag behind regional initiatives and that leadership in
ICOM is more likely to be exercised at the frontline than at headquarters.
The “learning-by-doing” approach at the operational level is more likely to
guide this initiative than a highly generic national ocean policy.
The complexity and novelty of the ESSIM initiative makes it difficult to
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judge its efficiency. It remains to be seen how the significant stakeholder
input at the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop will be used to strengthen the
initiative.121 However, as shown below, ESSIM has paid meaningful atten-
tion to inclusive participation.
Legal factors
ESSIM operates within the statutory framework of the Oceans Act, but should
also be expected to be governed by other relevant federal statutes and regula-
tions governing marine activities, such as the Canada Shipping Act,122 Fish-
eries Act,123 Navigable Waters Protection Act,124 Canadian Environmental
Protection Act, 1999,125 and the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources
Accord Implementation Act.126 This is a substantial legal framework. The actual
operational relationships between the general (Oceans Act) and dedicated
(other statutes) legislation, mandates they confer on government bodies,
rights granted to ocean users, and standards set out for various activities
remain to be tested by an experimental integrated approach.
The offshore focus of the ESSIM management area avoids potential dif-
ficulties of property and jurisdiction with the province of Nova Scotia. As
noted earlier, Nova Scotia has historically maintained its position that it
brought into Confederation maritime property, and much of this is arguably
located within bays and inshore waters. In proximity to the ESSIM manage-
ment area, Nova Scotia considers Sable Island part of the province and also
levies a charge for the laying of transatlantic cables over submarine areas it
considers to be part of the province. Property matters apart, the federal
government retains jurisdiction for navigation, shipping and fisheries and
this facilitates promotion of integrated management in the ESSIM area.
There is no legal uncertainty in this regard.
Two constraining issues have already been alluded to. The first is the lack
of definition of the extended continental shelf, meaning that the full formal
seaward extent of jurisdictional authority in the ESSIM management area is
not known and is thus subject to some uncertainty outside 200 nautical
miles. The second is the implication of recognition of aboriginal resource
constitutional rights in the ESSIM area. If the argument that aboriginal title
is a form of encumbrance on Crown title is pushed to its logical conclusion,
then Crown title over the resources of the EEZ and continental shelf could
be encumbered.
There is also a substantive body of international law that applies to the
ESSIM area, as implemented through statutes or simply applicable as a
matter of treaty or customary law. This is relevant from two perspectives:
first, Canadian subscription to international instruments and second, entitle-
ments of the international community to use the ESSIM area. Examples of
the latter include the right of unimpeded international navigation through
the EEZ and the laying of submarine cables.127 Canada should take into
consideration whether the placement of offshore installations and structures
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or its conservation policies in the ESSIM area impede other legitimate uses
and rights protected by customary law.128
Institutional factors
Four levels of government (federal, provincial, municipal and aboriginal)
and over 20 federal and provincial bodies could potentially be engaged in
the ESSIM institutional framework.129 The ESSIM initiative proposes a plan-
ning and management structure that includes three major bodies, all of
which are encompassed in the ESSIM Forum. The ESSIM Forum for this
purpose should be distinguished from the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop,
which did not include the full range of senior level representation expected
in the area management structure yet to be established. Participants at the
1st ESSIM Forum Workshop noted that the proposed structure was unclear
as to where authoritative decision making lies and what the relationships
among the major bodies would be.
The first major ESSIM body is a Federal-Provincial Working Group com-
posed of senior government representatives at the federal and provincial
levels. This is the first level of government engagement, and clearly this
body will have executive decision-making authority.130 Perhaps the real
concern at the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop may not have been the lack of
clarity in the relationships between bodies as much as the actual locus of the
decision making (i.e. a committee of senior government officials), which
suggests that although the initiative is touted as collaborative and inclusive,
in reality the ultimate authoritative decision remains a governmental one. A
further issue is the extent of participation by aboriginal government. It is
unclear whether the federal government will treat aboriginal governments as
“governmental” partners or simply as stakeholders, although it is recognized
that First Nation involvement would occur in all ESSIM bodies other than
the Secretariat.131 It has been submitted that aboriginal groups are more
than stakeholders. In addition, although the initiative recognizes the
importance of municipalities, municipal governments are not included in
this governmental structure. Presumably, two justifications might be that
municipalities are creations of provincial governments (and therefore a
provincial government de facto represents municipalities) and that the
inshore has so far been excluded in the management area. Whereas the
exclusion of municipalities logically results from the exclusion of inshore
waters, one can anticipate a constraint in embarking on effective efforts to
address marine pollution from land-based activities, where municipal gov-
ernments have a significant role to play.
This raises a question as to what is, or should be, the role of the second
ESSIM body, the Oceans Management and Planning Group (OMPG). This
body consists of a plenary (the OMPG proper, which includes stakeholders
and government officials at the planning, but not senior decision-makers),
the Plan Implementation Working Group (PIWG) (an OMPG sub-
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committee that works both within and outside the plenary and consists of
government planning officials and reports to the Regional Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs – RCGA), and issues-based working groups (consisting of
stakeholders and government officials). Much attention has been placed on the
need to improve intergovernmental and interdepartmental coordination in the
framework. At the other end of the non-governmental spectrum, it is still moot
as to how meaningful the structure and process in this second body really is (i.e.
to what extent there is involvement in decision making). At the most, the
OMPG can hope to influence decision making by providing “information and
advice” to the RCGA.132 Non-governmental participants at the 1st ESSIM
Forum Workshop generally found this unsatisfactory.
The third body is the ESSIM Secretariat. Its role is facilitation and
coordination throughout the structure. This body is generally viewed
favorably.
ESSIM has not addressed sufficiently the sensitive subject of accountabil-
ity. On the one hand transparency is evident throughout the whole process.
The fact that the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop has occurred and the manner
in which it has occurred is a significant milestone in ICOM processes in
Canada. Because of its frankness, the report of the workshop proceedings
suggests that DFO (Maritimes) is committed to good process.
What remains to be addressed is the difficult question of accountability
in the context of inclusive processes. As a public service provider, govern-
ment is subject to an accountability system that elevates to a political level:
“the buck stops here!” Clearly, any government department is responsible
and accountable for its programs. However, in ICOM, DFO is a lead agency,
and frequently its role will be coordination and facilitation, and not
necessarily implementation. It will be interesting to see how collaborating
governments and departments will share responsibility and accountability in
this scenario, especially in a consensus-building process. If the intention
behind the RCGA is to define a “decision-making moment,” then partici-
pating institutions should be accountable for that decision.
Ironically, that “decision-making moment” can be obfuscated if decision
making is further decentralized to enable more inclusive participation by
stakeholders. Stakeholders are not necessarily public service providers and
most likely represent special interests. The dominant view by participants at
the 1st ESSIM Forum Workshop was that there should be wider stakeholder
participation in the decision-making process. However, to what extent par-
ticipating stakeholders could be held accountable together with govern-
ment, and the form of this accountability, are moot. The potential problem
arises where stakeholders participate in decisions that affect other interest
groups (e.g. designation of MPAs in places and in a manner that cause loss
to other users, e.g. offshore oil and gas industry).133 The likelihood is that
government, which cannot relinquish its public service responsibilities, will
continue to be accountable for decisions, no matter how inclusive they are,
especially those decisions that occur within its policy framework.
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Participatory processes
Although the Oceans Strategy and ESSIM are initiatives of the same depart-
ment, the participatory process devised for each is quite different. As seen
earlier, after the initial launch of the discussion paper and subsequent cross-
country consultations, development of the Strategy remained for the most
part an in-house affair until the release of the final document. In contrast,
with ESSIM’s launch in 1999, various groups were consulted informally,
two discussion documents were distributed in November 2001, an advisory
committee of invited stakeholders was set up, and a major workshop con-
vened in February 2002 with over 150 participants. The workshop was
novel because stakeholders were able to react to components of ESSIM and
to evaluate the workshop process. A survey was also conducted. At the end
of the workshop, stakeholders were invited to participate in the follow-up.
Irrespective of the substantive direction and content of ESSIM, the process
to date is consistent with the collaborative approach advocated for ESSIM
and suggests that stakeholder interest is likely to be maintained.
Still there are weaknesses in the ESSIM processes. First, ESSIM needs to
re-examine its current characterization of First Nations as “stakeholders”
considering the emergence of aboriginal government as an aboriginal right.
This development is not restricted to ICOM and affects all federal and
provincial initiatives.134 Second, a significant gap in stakeholder participa-
tion to date is the absence of the transportation sector, which is responsible
for Canada’s seaborne trade. This sector includes regulators, port authorities,
industry (shipowners and service providers), and the various professions ser-
vicing the sector. Its relevance is obvious: it affects the regulation of all navi-
gation in the ESSIM area and consequently concerns all uses, and the
designation of particularly sensitive sea areas affecting navigation needs the
approval of the International Maritime Organization. Standards for safety
and marine environment protection are set at the international level and
implemented domestically (this will constrain the regulatory tools used in
the ESSIM area). DFO has recognized this weakness and is committed to
including this vital sector in the next ESSIM development phase.
Given the diversity of interests involved in the development and eventual
implementation of ESSIM, it is unlikely that all differences will be immedi-
ately reconcilable. A genuinely inclusive participatory process should serve
as a conflict avoidance tool. The ESSIM structure will need internal conflict
management processes to address differences that mature into conflicts, e.g.
between levels of governments or between departments, multiple competing
users, federal or provincial government and First Nations, First Nations and
other fishing communities, and regulatory bodies and specific users or
special interest groups. The Oceans Strategy recognizes that consensus-based
decision making may not always be possible, and tough decisions may need
to be taken when consensus cannot be reached.135 ESSIM does not have a
similar proviso, but may well have to develop one since it operates within
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the framework of the Strategy. ESSIM could benefit from mediation and
conciliation structures that operate independently of ESSIM and probably
also of DFO.
Resources
Like the Oceans Strategy, ESSIM is not accompanied by separate financial
appropriation, and no funding was announced at the 1st ESSIM Work-
shop.136 DFO (Maritimes) has designated the Oceans and Coastal Manage-
ment Division to service this initiative, and eventually to serve as its
secretariat. Other federal departments and the provincial government have
been involved and this suggests that there are institutional costs for these
participants as well. Several stakeholders participating in the 1st ESSIM
Forum Workshop expressed concern over the time demands of volunteer
participation.137 However, these resources will not be sufficient for plan
implementation.138
Evaluation
At this early stage, no quality assurance system has been publicly discussed
in anticipation of inclusion in the future IMP for the ESSIM region. A pre-
liminary desk assessment of knowledge and institutional capabilities to
address ecosystem objectives has been undertaken.139 A draft IMP will be
developed for submission to the 2nd ESSIM Forum Workshop scheduled for
February 2003.140 The drafting process is expected to include management
objectives and indicators.141
The Atlantic Coastal Action Program
Not all ICOM initiatives in Canada derive from or necessarily operate under
the auspices of the Oceans Act, Oceans Strategy or the leadership and facilita-
tion of DFO. In fact, for the past several decades, several other federal
departments and provincial agencies have developed and supported “unoffi-
cial” integrated coastal management initiatives that address and deliver on
many of the principles and approaches espoused in current Canadian ICOM
thinking.142 These initiatives are due, in part, to a growing desire and capac-
ity of coastal stakeholders for a more participatory form of democracy and a
maturing attitude by governments toward sharing responsibility for plan-
ning and management in coastal areas.
One example of such a program is the Atlantic Coastal Action Program
(ACAP), which was launched by the Atlantic Region office of the federal
environment agency (Environment Canada) in 1991.143 ACAP was estab-
lished to build the capacity of ecosystem-based communities throughout the
four Atlantic provinces so that they could assume the lead in determining
their own long-term goals and environmental priorities, build multi-sectoral
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partnerships in their communities, and undertake direct action to address
local issues that constrain the sustainability of their watersheds and adjacent
coastal areas.
At the time of writing ACAP is a network of 14 community-driven,
watershed-based ecosystem initiatives with five sites in each of Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick and two each in Newfoundland and Labrador, and
Prince Edward Island.144 With over ten years of experience in ACAP, there
are several lessons learned that derive from objective analysis and examina-
tion of day-to-day operations.145
Trigger
ACAP was established in response to both an increasing concern by the
public about the environmental quality and sustainability of the Atlantic
coastal zone and their growing demand to be more actively and meaning-
fully involved in decisions concerning their future.146
Problems and baselines
ACAP is an innovative attempt to overcome the litany of sectorally-oriented
and government-controlled planning and management initiatives tradition-
ally practiced in Atlantic Canada and elsewhere. In traditional public
involvement processes, the public does not share in the responsibility or
ownership of the proposed initiative and ongoing implementation is usually
out of their hands. Before the establishment of ACAP, the most commonly
held viewpoint within government was that problems, information needs
and optimal solutions were “known” by government experts and the chal-
lenge was to convince others of what they already knew. Communities, for
their part, had little incentive to develop creative and innovative solutions to
local issues, and were often disappointed by government responses that did
not appear to fit their circumstances. ACAP changed this mental model that
both government and communities had of each other. Through ACAP, local
citizens, Environment Canada staff, and other government and non-
government stakeholders came together as peers to discuss concerns,
exchange ideas and negotiate their own interests. Multi-stakeholder
processes are by nature inclusive and recognize the rights of all interested
parties to be at the decision-making table. Their decisions reflect a wide
range of interests and ideas, and result in a better understanding of the con-
straints and opportunities facing each stakeholder. In ACAP, the local group
became the proponent and champion of the project or initiative, leading to
greater ownership and responsibility. Together ACAP participants have
developed and implemented realistic solutions that meet communities’
environmental concerns, as well as their economic and social goals. Many of
the solutions go well beyond the immediate scope of any single department
or level of government.
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Management area
ACAP is designed spatially on coastal watershed-estuary management
units147 and functionally on community leadership. The 14 program areas
range from medium-sized to large watershed-estuary complexes that contain
several municipalities and vary from urban-industrial to rural-agricultural
settings. Although the Oceans Strategy excludes rivers and lakes, and by
implication, watersheds, the watershed-based model employed in ACAP
should play a complementary role to integrated management initiatives
developed by DFO.
The majority of the sites are small, and where the watershed is large, the
participating communities tend to be well-defined. This combination
enables participants to relate more easily to the local impact of their actions
or inaction.
Knowledge base
The first five years of ACAP were focused on building the community
organizations, their institutions, priorities and partners. These planning
efforts culminated in the formulation of a Comprehensive Environmental
Management Plan (CEMP), a long-term strategy for the local ecosystem.
While there was no one prescribed methodology that all sites had to or
chose to follow, six components generally describe the CEMP development
process: (1) formation and incorporation of a multi-stakeholder organization
that is representative of the community; (2) reaching consensus on an integ-
rated community-based environmental, social and economic vision and well-
defined use objectives for the future of the area; (3) developing a common set
of goals and objectives for their ecosystem; (4) conducting an environmental
quality assessment that includes gathering relevant data to determine base-
line environmental conditions and the issues affecting environmental
quality; (5) identification of remedial options to close the gap between exist-
ing and desired levels of environmental quality; and (6) reaching a broad
consensus on an implementation schedule complete with timelines, a finan-
cial plan and the identification of those responsible for carrying out the
necessary actions.
All sites have geographical information systems to integrate data from
users, local knowledge and science.
Policy making
In ACAP, the traditional role of government is shared with the participating
local organizations. The local communities assume the traditional govern-
ment policy and priority-setting functions and the government agencies
become partners in responding to the communities’ identified needs.
There has not been any conscious and systematic treatment of principles
Canada: beyond the buzzwords 53
of sustainable development (as espoused in the Rio Declaration), but ACAP
partners have been guided by a generalized sense of sustainability of the
local ecosystems. Interestingly, at the local level, the discourse is not domin-
ated by polished concepts employed by scholarly and bureaucratic elites,
rather by participants’ basic perceptions of local problems and pragmatic
responses.
Institutional factors
ACAP was founded on two basic premises. First, complex coastal issues
cannot be resolved without a holistic, inclusive, participatory, ecosystem-
based approach that can influence behaviors that impact negatively on
environmental quality and community sustainability. Second, most solu-
tions to environmental and natural resource management issues will not be
effective unless the range of participants in coastal governance is expanded
to include all those with a stake in decisions concerning coastal resources
and uses. These stakeholders must be provided with the capacity and the
opportunity to take ownership of issues and responsibility for their solution.
“Community” in the context of ACAP does not refer solely to traditional
geographical or political conceptions. Community in this instance refers to
the degree of “common interest and unity” amongst social, economic and
environmental stakeholders. The institutional actors in the local ACAP
organizations include: municipalities, businesses and industries, universities,
federal and provincial government agencies, non-government organizations,
First Nations and environmental groups. Citizens at large also participate.
Thousands of volunteers and youth are engaged on local priorities. First
Nations’ involvement is also developing.
Perhaps the most important ingredient in keeping the ACAP organi-
zations functioning is a capable and respected community coordinator who
is hired, not by government, but by the local organizations. The coordina-
tors and several project and administrative staff are the only paid individuals
in the ACAP process at the community level; all other participants are vol-
unteers. A concern, and occasional constraint, is “volunteer burnout.” To
address this problem, Environment Canada facilitates periodic volunteer
training workshops and places a priority on recognizing and supporting the
volunteers.
While the ACAP approach made intuitive sense to those at the commun-
ity level, it was a bold step for the federal government in Canada. For
government, the program has presented several challenges. These include:
changing the corporate culture from hierarchical, linear delivery to one of
horizontal, or team delivery; shifting from the command-and-control model
to one of enabler and facilitator (Environment Canada sits on ACAP com-
mittees as a stakeholder, not as controller); adapting information and data to
meet community needs; opening effective communication channels; redi-
recting current programs and resources to support community initiatives;
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and recognizing management scenarios arrived at through community
consensus.
To meet these challenges in their modus operandi, bureaucrats as indi-
viduals needed to develop new skills and perspectives. This shift occurred
rapidly in those individuals who sit on the local ACAP committees directly
(referred to as “windows”).148 These “windows” have repeatedly stated that
they have found their work with communities to be one of the highlights of
their careers in terms of what they have learned, and what they have accom-
plished. It took more time, however, for the concept to infiltrate into and up
the bureaucratic system to the point where senior management and depart-
mental scientists understood the needs and accepted this sharing of control.
ACAP organizations have had positive effects on their communities and
individual and organizational behavior, and have become major contributors
to local sustainable development. Strong partnerships, alliances and multi-
stakeholder membership are key components to the success of this process.
Persons interested in local sustainable development or who are impacting
the local environment are encouraged to participate. This open and inclusive
approach has provided a cooperative forum for persons with competing
views or who do not normally come together to work for common ends.
Participatory processes
A basic premise of ACAP is that public participation in ICOM initiatives
must go beyond the mere provision of information and consultation. Rather
than being government-driven, the participatory process is led by locally-
incorporated multi-stakeholder community organizations. The federal
government provided seed funding and initial facilitation, but control rests
with local participants.
Environment Canada, as program sponsor and partner in each ACAP
initiative, participates in direction setting, issues identification and the
selection of appropriate responses to issues and priorities on a par with other
participants. Environment Canada contributes funds, information, expertise
and services. Interestingly, by participating in this strategic manner,
Environment Canada achieves departmental objectives and desired results,
such as improvements in air and water quality, characterization and remedi-
ation of toxic contaminants, habitat protection and restoration, weather and
environmental prediction, and understanding and preparing for the pre-
dicted impacts of climate change. Like other partners, Environment Canada
participates in those projects that are consistent with their mandate and
objectives.
Resources
The first phase of ACAP (1991–97) required a large amount of funding from
Environment Canada for planning, institution building and direct action
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projects. As the program and the local institutions matured, departmental
funding declined, partnerships multiplied and funding diversified. Today
Environment Canada enters into annual contribution agreements with each
ACAP organization and provides funds (CDN$80,000 per year) and tech-
nical, scientific and program support to undertake planning, management
and action projects in pursuit of departmental and ACAP organization
objectives. Environment Canada works with the ACAP organizations to
bring in other federal and provincial departments as partners to local initi-
atives.149
In turn, local ACAP organizations have assumed responsibility for the
implementation of plans of action. These organizations are expected to build
local partnerships, to secure funding from other sources and to undertake
work in the field. As a result, ACAP organizations have partnered with uni-
versities, foundations and industries. The diversification of partners and
funding has increased ACAP sites’ sustainability and independence.
Given recent federal government funding cuts, it is useful to consider
whether ACAP sites are truly sustainable and could survive a hypothetical
termination of Environment Canada funding. It is likely that most sites
would survive, but that some might face a difficult adjustment process, if
not struggle. However, it is useful to consider the federal government con-
tribution and its impact in a larger context. Local resources appear to be
accessed and used efficiently. For example, of the total cash funding pro-
vided to all ACAP groups only 32 percent has come from the federal ACAP
program. ACAP groups have received large contributions of donated labor,
services and materials. The modest CDN$12 million invested by Environ-
ment Canada since ACAP’s inception was used to leverage almost
CDN$100 million by the ACAP groups. In fact the argument in support of
sustainability can be taken much farther. In terms of the impact of the local
ACAP organizations on the Atlantic economy, a recent study of ACAP over
the five-year period 1997–2001 calculated the total GDP impacts to be in
excess of CDN$22 million, a taxation impact of CDN$8.03 million and the
creation of 482 person-years of employment.150 The same study estimated
that if Environment Canada had attempted to undertake the same suite of
projects and activities that the 14 ACAP organizations have completed over
the same period, it would have cost the department over CDN$71 million; a
significant increase over the CDN$6.1 million Environment Canada
invested. In summary, it does not appear that the existence of most indi-
vidual ACAP sites, as distinct from the federal program that supports them,
would be threatened if federal ACAP funds were terminated.
Evaluation
Like the other federal initiatives discussed in this chapter, ACAP did not
start with a well-defined set of baselines and performance indicators to
enable continual performance measurement of the program as a whole.
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There is no ongoing programmatic performance assessment but periodic
external evaluations are conducted. However, separately from the program-
matic level, each site has had a comprehensive environmental evaluation.
Consequently baselines have tended to be defined on a site-by-site basis.
Also each site hosts a major monitoring event, the annual general meeting,
for both participants and the public. Performance objectives are set annually
at this level, and progress on these is the subject of the annual report.
Phase II of ACAP (1998–2003) focused on implementing individual site
strategies, expanding the ACAP network, and collaborating with others to
understand science better and achieve measurable ecosystem goals. Phase III
(2003–08) will continue with the existing model and community partners,
but will add more sites, continue to work with multi-stakeholder coalitions
at a larger regional ecosystem scale, support greater networking and know-
ledge sharing among the sites, plus take more cooperative, theme-based
approaches (e.g. sewage).151
In terms of accomplishments to date, over 800 projects have been under-
taken by the 14 ACAP organizations, involving hundreds of organizations
and thousands of volunteers. Results have included pollution prevention
programs for business and households, restored habitats, the establishment
of new parks, the creation of artificial wetlands for enhanced sewage treat-
ment, training and education workshops for youth and the unemployed, sus-
tainable forestry management plans for industry and landowners,
reforestation of riparian zones, the development of environmental farm
plans, scientific research studies,152 air and water quality programs, climate
change projects and shellfish remediation activities. In some sites there has
been a significant spill-over of activity outside the original environmental
realm to include crime prevention, health education, youth training and
employment.
Additionally, several ACAP organizations have established community
resource centers providing the public, students, businesses and educators
with sustainability information. Today, most ACAP organizations are con-
sidered reliable third parties in their communities, trusted by all stakehold-
ers and depended on for reliable information. ACAP organizations are also
tackling priority region-wide issues. For example, ACAP convened a Coastal
Communities Sewage Workshop in Lunenburg in October, 1999, and is
now developing a regional strategy among all ACAP organizations and others
to address the pervasive regional issue of inadequate sewage treatment.
Assessment
The buzzword syndrome
“Sustainability,” “governance,” “integration,” “process,” “partnership,” “pre-
caution,” “transparency,” “responsibility,” “accountability,” “stewardship,”
“collaboration,” “ecosystem approach,” among others: the practice of ICOM
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in Canada is replete with buzzwords. It is unfortunate that concepts that
should be useful for policy, planning and management are so frequently
overused, misused or used loosely to the extent that their utility is severely
diluted. Perhaps one of the major weaknesses of the Oceans Strategy is that it
suffers from the buzzword syndrome: it places faith in repeated concepts
without offering substantive and action-oriented content. The concepts
obviously provide political kudos, but little management content. In fair-
ness, these concepts do carry underlying values and all initiatives need to at
least formally acknowledge them; however, beyond the ritual of respect lies
the task of articulating the “who,” “when,” “how” and “at what cost,” i.e.
the modus operandi.
Comparing initiatives
The three initiatives considered here were not triggered by crises or any one
individual event. At most, they were initiated as an exercise of a legal
mandate and possibly under osmotic pressure from a changing operational
environment and public expectations. All three had or have a significant ges-
tation period. This suggests that integrated initiatives require trial-and-
error and learning-by-doing accompanied by many inter/intra-institutional
transactions. Compared with some past sectoral policies that had short ges-
tation and specific triggers, such as a resource collapse or fiscal cuts, the
three initiatives were not “jolted” into existence. Thus integration initiatives
are less likely to be reflex reactions than crafted pioneering experiments.
With reference to a problem-oriented approach, ACAP is perhaps the
clearest of the three initiatives in terms of what it hopes to achieve. A man-
agement area is a combination of community, watershed and estuary func-
tioning as a system. This approach seems to have worked, but it should be
remembered that the scale was local. ESSIM is also local, but on a larger
scale. The definition of the management area is spatial, possibly use-biased,
and not problem-oriented. The extent to which an ecosystem-based
approach will work in a spatially defined management area remains to be
seen, but the focus is offshore, not inshore, and thus fewer user conflicts can
be expected. The Oceans Strategy is national in scope and provides a frame-
work for LOMAs and coastal management areas. Again, it is more spatial in
orientation than problem-oriented. The future relevance of the Oceans Strat-
egy and ESSIM will depend on the extent to which they allow smaller scale
local problem-oriented (proactive and reactive) approaches.
All three initiatives support an integrated approach to knowledge. The
Oceans Strategy and ESSIM do not indicate how natural science will actually
relate to social science, user and aboriginal knowledge. A challenge for DFO
as a lead agency is to articulate an approach to knowledge building that is
seen to be efficient and equitable, while not being unduly biased towards
natural science, its traditional knowledge base. ACAP offers an example of
how local knowledge of the area can be married to the scientific with tech-
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nical support facilitated by a federal agency (in this case Environment
Canada). All three cases are still experimenting with multidisciplinary
inputs into decision making and interdisciplinary decision outputs.
The policy experience is different in the three initiatives. ACAP enjoys a
simple policy environment, administered mostly by one federal department
and applied at the regional level. Because Environment Canada provides
seed money to generate local integrated planning and management initi-
atives, it is not dirigiste. The Oceans Strategy, in contrast, is the policy expres-
sion of a department statutorily mandated to play a national lead role. The
dilemma for DFO is two-fold: (1) scope-versus-focus in the strategy and (2)
not prejudicing other departments’ mandates. The generality of the Strategy
competes with the specificity of sectoral policies, while seeking to provide a
coordinating framework that involves departments that do not have a coun-
terpart statutory duty to follow DFO. As a result, the Oceans Strategy tries to
be everything to everyone. ESSIM commenced before the policy environ-
ment of the Oceans Strategy was created and is unlikely to be affected by any
perceptions of a weak national policy. On the contrary, ESSIM is more likely
to be perceived as providing content to the Strategy at the regional level and
perhaps further influence its development as a result of regional experience.
Legal factors have produced the same constitutional constraints for all
three initiatives. Environment Canada had to consider the interests and
views of Nova Scotia when introducing Sable Island as a new ACAP site.
Environment Canada also needed to ensure support for initiatives in all four
Atlantic provinces. The Oceans Strategy had to ensure intergovernmental
partnerships and involvement of First Nations. This underlies Canadian
federal and aboriginal constitutional realities and is further mandated by the
Oceans Act. Coastal ICOM initiatives will not be possible without full
provincial participation. ESSIM faces a further constitutional constraint:
DFO has chosen to focus the initiative away from provincial shores and
inshore waters in the offshore where there are potentially fewer constraints.
Even in the offshore, however, ESSIM must contend with federal–provincial
offshore development boards (themselves a politico-constitutional compro-
mise) and claims of Aboriginal peoples. ESSIM also has to contend with
rights of offshore actors (e.g. licensed offshore operators) acquired under
other departmental sectoral legislation.
Together with the constitutional framework, institutional issues are a
major constraint to these three ICOM initiatives. ACAP overcame potential
institutional difficulties early by working out compromises with individual
provincial governments. However, Environment Canada had less of a need to
work closely with other federal departments than DFO in either the Oceans
Strategy or ESSIM. As pointed out, although DFO has legal duty to lead,
there is no counterpart duty for other departments in the Oceans Act. As a
result, DFO’s transaction efforts and costs can be expected to be significantly
high, and with no new financial resources allocated to oceans, its ability to
influence the behavior of other departments is necessarily constrained. The
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alternative for DFO is to avoid such jurisdictional conflicts and exercise less
of a directing lead role in favor of a broader consensus-based approach with
other federal departments to promote buy-in and cross-departmental
commitment of resources.
There are significant novelties in the participatory processes promoted by
ACAP and ESSIM. ACAP has an established local decision-making and
implementation process led by coastal communities and facilitated, not
directed, by the federal government. Although not all potentially important
stakeholders are involved, the ESSIM development process likewise has a
creative and successful approach to stakeholder involvement. The promotion
of inclusive participation is no longer purely a matter for administrative
discretion, but one of legal necessity under the Oceans Act and public
expectation.
It remains to be seen whether ESSIM can maintain the process and pace it
has set without new departmental financial resources. The danger is that
demanding, but well-meaning stakeholders will expect follow-up at a time
when resources are not available. If DFO were to slow down the process
until funds are available, it could affect credibility and continued involve-
ment of stakeholders. Thus, although the ESSIM participatory process is
highly credible, the expectations and demands of participants may be diffi-
cult to meet. This is a major difficulty that could significantly constrain
DFO in exercising its oceans mandate: resources for oceans will likely have
to come from resources for fisheries. In addition to intra-departmental dif-
ficulties, DFO would also face the wrath of a historically influential fisheries
constituency. ACAP, on the other, has no such difficulty. Environment
Canada is a contributing partner and its monies are part of a diversified
resource portfolio. As a result, ACAP has greater prospects of continuity
than ESSIM at this time.
A difficulty shared by all three initiatives is the lack of baselines and spe-
cific performance indicators normally needed to monitor and measure
progress. The Oceans Strategy speaks to indicators in a general sense, but
omits reference to baselines altogether. ESSIM has not started to address this
issue. Without such a framework in place, any assessment of progress is
more likely to be open to subjective and political influences. It is suggested
that Canada still needs to develop an ICOM evaluation approach.
Conclusion
A qualitative and comparative weighing of key factors suggests that the
ICOM experience in Canada is mixed and significantly more complex than
the exchange between the Parliamentary Committee on Fisheries and
Oceans and the federal government presented at the beginning of this
chapter suggests. There is much more to ICOM than the Oceans Act.
Although it is not possible to determine whether any of the three initi-
atives presented have improved the marine environment, this is a long-term
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evaluation issue, it is possible to assess the process of crafting, articulating
and implementing an integrated approach. Clearly, the development of
novel and creative participatory processes at the regional and local levels are
major achievements. Inclusive participatory processes are consistent with the
commitment to the integrated approach. In the case of ACAP, other
significant achievements are consistency, resource diversification and con-
tinuity. Major under-achievements are the insufficient management of inter-
institutional relations (departmental and constitutional), continued lack of
federal resources for ICOM at the regional and national levels (which sug-
gests a low profile for oceans on the national agenda) and absence of appro-
priate monitoring and evaluation frameworks.
Finally, would ICOM in Canada fare better if Canada were a unitary
rather than a federal state? Probably yes. Federalism requires a continuous
management of the relationships that keep the individual parts attached to
the greater whole while allowing diversity to flourish. Most unitary states do
not have to contend with this process. ICOM is complex enough in terms of
the high degree of integration needed. As a result, ICOM in Canada com-
petes with other national issues and is easily marginalized when resources at
the federal level are scarce and issues are prioritized. Where should this leave
the ICOM policy-maker, planner and manager? There is a lesson from
ACAP that sticks out: local, small, community-centered, inclusive and low-
resourced ICOM initiatives now have a proven track record in Canada.
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3 Operationalizing integrated





Australia’s coasts are currently subject to many pressures including declin-
ing water quality, record population growth, coastal development, increased
tourism, loss of habitat, weeds and introduced pests, lack of information,
capacity, and compliance and enforcement. These pressures need to be
managed for future economic growth and environmental health. Such man-
agement presents Australia with a continuous challenge. The challenge is
enhanced by the competing interests of coastal uses, the complex jurisdic-
tional arrangements that exist for coastal zone management, and cumulative
impacts of decision making in the coastal zone – the “tyranny of small
decisions.” To address these challenges, the Coasts and Clean Seas Initiative
was launched in 1996, the Australian Coastal Atlas project in 1997 and
numerous marine protected areas (MPAs) have been announced since 1996.
Additionally, a new National Coastal Policy to facilitate further integrated
coastal management is currently being investigated by the Commonwealth
Government.
Since Australia’s Oceans Policy was launched in December 1998,1 the
National Oceans Office has been tasked with its implementation. The cor-
nerstone of implementing the Policy is regional marine planning. The first
large marine ecosystem to be investigated in this context is the South-east
Marine Region. An extensive scoping and assessment phase has been under-
taken as part of the planning process, including wide-ranging stakeholder
consultation. As part of the assessment phase, new information has been
gathered in relation to biological and physical characteristics, impacts, uses,
community and cultural values, indigenous uses and values, and manage-
ment and institutional arrangements. The National Oceans Office has
developed an implementation framework for regional marine plans. Imple-
menting regional marine plans presents many and varied challenges, includ-
ing how to move from theory to practice and how to provide for
cross-jurisdictional coordination, cross-sectoral coordination, ecosystem-
based management, performance assessment, outcomes-based management
and participation, and transparency in decision making.
This chapter will identify and examine the challenges that face coastal
and oceans management in Australia with specific reference to operationaliz-
ing Australia’s Oceans Policy.
Operationalizing integrated coastal management
Marine governance in Australia is shared between the Commonwealth, state,
Northern Territory and local governments. While the state and Northern
Territory governments provide the legislative basis for coastal zone planning
and management, local governments are responsible for day-to-day manage-
ment. Offshore area responsibility is split between the Commonwealth and
the state and Northern Territory governments. Generally speaking, the
states and Northern Territory are responsible for offshore management from
the coast to three nautical miles and the Commonwealth from three to 200
nautical miles.
Under the Australian constitution, the Commonwealth has power to leg-
islate with respect to a number of different subject matters in relation to
oceans and coasts, including interstate and overseas trade and commerce,
fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits, taxation, defence,
lighthouses, quarantine, corporations, petroleum and minerals beyond three
nautical miles, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs, and territories
and external affairs (in relation to matters physically external to Australia
and in relation to giving effect to Australia’s international obligations). The
Commonwealth relies on these powers to legislate for oceans and coastal
management.2
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Commonwealth influenced coastal and
oceans policy by developing environmental protection and management leg-
islation.3 A number of institutions and agreements between the Common-
wealth and the states and Northern Territory were set up as a result,
including the Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS) and the Intergovern-
mental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE).
Constitutional and intergovernmental agreements
The OCS was negotiated between the Commonwealth, state and Northern
Territory governments in 1979 to resolve increasingly complex issues of sov-
ereignty over offshore areas. Under the OCS, the Commonwealth granted
title and legislative power over marine and seabed resources from the low
water mark to three nautical miles to the states and the Northern Territory.
The Commonwealth retained jurisdiction over the marine environment from
three to 200 nautical miles.4
The Commonwealth and the states and territories adopted the IGAE in
1992. It provides that Commonwealth responsibilities and interests in
national environmental matters include ensuring that the policies or prac-
tices of a state or territory do not result in significant external adverse effects
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on maritime areas within Australia’s jurisdiction, subject to existing Com-
monwealth legislative arrangements relating to maritime areas. It also pro-
vides that these Commonwealth interests and responsibilities cover
implementation of environmental treaties.
The 1997 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Heads of Agree-
ment on Roles and Responsibilities for the Environment states that the
Commonwealth has an interest in cooperation with the states to develop
strategic approaches to ensure the management and protection of Australia’s
marine and coastal environment. As a result of this set of complex arrange-
ments, one of the major challenges in relation to integrated coastal and
oceans management is cross-jurisdictional coordination.
Cross-jurisdictional coordination
All of the states and the Northern Territory have coastal policies and state-
level coastal advisory boards. The common thread to these policies is the
overall objective of achieving ecologically sustainable development of coasts
and coastal resources. Using this common objective across each level of
government, Australia is advancing integrated coastal management through
a joint Commonwealth/state and territory ministerial council – the Natural
Resource Management Council (NRMC). NRMC has a separate marine and
coastal committee to provide a forum specifically for oceans and coastal man-
agement discussions across and between spheres of government. NRMC
plays an important role in cross-jurisdictional and cross-sectoral communica-
tion on marine and coastal issues. It also provides a forum for the linkages
between coastal and oceans policy development. Another body, the Inter-
governmental Coastal Reference Group, consisting of state coastal manage-
ment agencies, local governments and state coastal council chairs, provides
further cross-jurisdictional integration on coastal management issues.
A National Coastal Policy
To further integrate management of coasts and coastal resources in Aus-
tralia, the Commonwealth government is developing a National Coastal
Policy with state and the Northern Territory governments. The focus of the
new national policy will be:
• improving water quality in coastal and marine areas;
• conserving and restoring important coastal and estuarine habitats and
biodiversity; and
• protecting the economic base of coastal areas, particularly fishing and
tourism.
Further, the Policy will be integrated with the regional catchment man-
agement approach in the National Action Plan on Salinity and Water Quality
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(NAP) and the extension of the Natural Heritage Trust, and with regional
marine planning under Australia’s Oceans Policy, to complete a comprehen-
sive natural resource management approach.
Marine protected areas
All levels of government in Australia are committed to developing a National
Representative System of Marine Protected Areas (NRSMPA). Development of
an NRSMPA fulfills Australia’s international responsibilities and obligations
under several international instruments including the 1992 Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity5 and the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals (Bonn Convention).6 State, territory and Common-
wealth governments initiated the NRSMPA through the Australia and New
Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC) in the early
1990s. According to ANZECC, MPAs contribute to the long-term sustain-
ablility and ecological viability of marine and estuarine systems and protect
Australia’s biodiversity.7 MPAs can be declared under Commonwealth, state or
Northern Territory legislation within their own jurisdictional waters.
Due to the varying legislation within each jurisdiction, Australian MPAs
use a range of naming conventions, subtypes and zones, including marine
parks, marine national parks, marine and intertidal habitat areas, coastal
reserves, marine management areas, fish habitat protection areas, aquatic
reserves, seaward extensions of national parks, marine nature reserves and
marine reserves. However, they share the common intent of protecting the
marine and estuarine environment, particularly habitats such as reefs, sea-
grass beds, tidal lagoons, mangroves, rock platforms, coastal, deep water and
underwater seabeds areas, and any marine cultural heritage. In excess of
2,000 MPAs have been established in Australia, including the Heard Islands
and McDonald Islands (HIMI) Marine Reserve covering 65,000km2.8
Integrated coastal management programs
One of the predominant ways in which the Commonwealth can influence
coastal management in Australia is through financial assistance grants to the
state, Northern Territory or local governments. Programs such as the Coasts
and Clean Seas Initiative, Coastcare and the Australian Coastal Atlas have
been instrumental in driving a national approach to integrated coastal man-
agement in Australia.
The Coasts and Clean Seas Initiative, launched in 1996, was established
to combat pollution problems and threats to water quality and marine life in
the coastal zone. Several complementary programs are supported under the
initiative at community, regional, state/territory and national levels, includ-
ing Coastcare and the Australian Coastal Atlas.
Coastcare promotes and encourages community involvement in the pro-
tection, management and rehabilitation of Australia’s coastal and marine
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environments. The program encourages linkages between communities and
local management. Coastcare is a cross-jurisdictional program that is sup-
ported by every level of government in Australia. The Commonwealth, state
and Northern Territory governments provide matching funding for Coast-
care community grants while local governments provide in-kind support.
Over 1,700 projects have been funded around Australia with the focus on
assisting on-ground work such as:
• protecting or rehabilitating dunes, estuaries and wetlands;
• monitoring beach conditions, and coastal flora and fauna;
• helping to develop and implement local management plans; and
• providing education and training activities that raise community aware-
ness, knowledge or skills on coastal and marine conservation issues.
Since the commencement of the Australian Coastal Atlas project in 1997,
in consultation with a wide forum of users, a network of nodes have been
established delivering almost 900 data layers over the Internet.9 The purpose
of the Atlas is to increase knowledge further about Australia’s coastal zone,
providing an accessible information base to support decision making for
coastal zone management. A diverse range of data is available at a variety of
scales to be mapped and queried, including administrative boundaries,
indigenous sites, species distribution, aquaculture, bathymetry, marine
habitats, cyclone tracks, beach safety and coastal reorganization.
Operationalizing integrated oceans management –
regional marine planning
Australia’s Oceans Policy provides the framework for integrated ecosystem-
based planning and management for all of Australia’s marine jurisdictions.
The cornerstone of the Policy is regional marine planning and the key plank
of regional marine planning is the ecologically sustainable development of
Australia’s oceans resources.
In developing regional marine plans (RMPs), Australia aims to integrate sec-
toral interests and conservation requirements and as far as possible integrate
planning and management across Commonwealth, state and territory waters. In
accordance with Australia’s Oceans Policy, each regional marine plan will:
• identify ocean resources and economic and other opportunities;
• identify current and emerging threats to ecosystem health and deter-
mine planning and management responses to those threats;
• within the region, set out what is known of ecosystem characteristics
and a broad set of objectives for those systems;
• identify the requirements and priorities for environmental baselines and
basic biological inventory and other surveys in the development of
regional marine plans;
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• identify priorities and put measures in place to meet conservation
requirements and determine those areas that should be assessed for
marine protected area declaration;
• identify community and sectoral interests, including the interests of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities;
• identify priorities for industry and economic development of the region;
• put in place a planning regime to prevent conflict between different
sectors over resources access and allocation;
• provide a framework within which there is increased certainty and long-
term security for marine-based industries; and,
• establish indicators of sustainability and requirements of monitoring,
reporting and performance assessment.10
Regional marine planning uses large marine domains (ecosystems) as one of
the starting points for the planning process by creating regional boundaries
that are based on ecosystem characteristics, representing a major step towards
ecosystem-based management. Large marine domains are extensive areas of
ocean that have relatively uniform broad-scale internal structures such as topog-
raphy, ocean currents and fish species groupings. There are 13 large marine
domains for which regional marine plans will be developed (see Figure 3.1).











Figure 3.1 Australia’s large marine domains.
0 
South-east Regional Marine Plan
The South-east Marine Region is the first region in Australia to be investi-
gated using this planning process. It includes waters off Victoria, Tasmania,
Macquarie Island, southern New South Wales and eastern South Australia –
capturing three of the large marine domains including the South-eastern,
Sub-Antarctic and Macquarie (see Figure 3.2).
There are four objectives for the South-east Regional Marine Plan, which
draw on the goals of Australia’s Oceans Policy. The objectives are to:
1 Develop a shared understanding and appreciation of the characteristics
of the South-east Region;
2 Design a RMP that is a decision making and planning framework for
management across sectors that:
• identifies shared values of the Region, including environmental, eco-
nomic, social and cultural values;
• identifies new information needed;
• integrates resource management on an ecosystem basis;
• identifies the methods for assessing performance;
• is adaptive to changing conditions and improved knowledge; and
• adds value to existing management arrangements;
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Area of the South-east Regional Marine Plan
Areas within the EEZ 200 nautical mile limit
Areas of claimable extended continental shelf
Figure 3.2 The South-east Marine Region.
• • 
3 Use the shared values of the Region to guide development of economic,
social and conservation opportunities; and,
4 Accommodate community needs and aspirations by encouraging
involvement and being inclusive, fair and transparent at all stages of the
plan.
The South-east regional marine planning process began in April 2000
with an Oceans Forum. On 9 May 2002, seven assessment reports were
launched, providing new information across six broad themes relating to
ecosystems and human activities over state and Commonwealth waters.
Those six assessment streams are:
• Biological and physical characteristics – identifying the key ecological
characteristics in the Region, their linkages and interaction;
• Uses within the Region – describing our knowledge of the nature and
dimension of human uses and their relationship with each other;
• Impacts on the ecosystem – providing an objective analysis of how
activities can affect the Region’s natural system;
• Community and cultural values – ensuring community wishes and
aspirations are reflected in the planning process;
• Indigenous uses and values – gaining an understanding of and support
for indigenous interests in the Region; and
• Management and institutional arrangements – analyzing current legis-
lative and institutional frameworks to determine the best mechanisms
for implementing regional marine plans.
As part of the process, scientific data collection, stakeholder workshops,
community surveys and consultations provided unprecedented information
in relation to Australia’s deep ocean’s ecosystems and marine resource use.
Specialist working groups of stakeholders and experts were also established
to provide direction and input to the process.
Biological and physical characteristics
The assessment of the South-east Marine Region’s biological and physical
characteristics provided an overview of the structure and function of its
ecosystems and produced two key inputs for developing an ecosystem-based
regional marine plan:
• An Interim Bioregionalization which identifies bioregions based on
ecological attributes (geology, ocean currents, biota) between the
continental shelf-break and the limits of Australia’s exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) – the bioregions provide an ecosystem-basis for developing
planning units for the Region; and
• Ecosystem conceptual models that illustrate how the ecosystems of the
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Region function. These conceptual models provide a starting point for
developing more formal models for specific management issues that are
addressed by regional marine planning. They also assist in the develop-
ment of ecosystem objectives and indicators, which are key elements in
evaluating the success of the plan so that management can change
depending on the outcomes of the evaluation (see Figure 3.3).
This biological and physical assessment of the South-east Marine Region
has significantly improved Australia’s knowledge of the deep-water ecosys-
tems of the region and its physical and biological characteristics, including
the characteristics of the marine ecosystems, seascapes, oceanographic
characteristics and diversity of marine life.11
Uses
The uses assessment provided an understanding of the current uses and pres-
sures in the South-east Marine Region, along with future uses and opportun-
ities, and the value of the marine resources. Two assessment reports were
produced, Resources – Using the Oceans and Resources – Macquarie Island’s
Picture documenting information about activities carried out in the South-
east Marine Region. The users of Australia’s oceans and its resources face
many challenges. These challenges were identified by the two reports as:
• Economic and market-based – those affecting users including changes in
demand for products and costs of inputs;
• Lifestyle – those brought about through changes in peoples’ preferences
or attitudes;
• Resource use – impacts of resource use on the environment and the pro-
vision of environmental services;
• Institutional – those arising from legal, regulatory or other institutional
requirements, including resource management arrangements; and
• Cross-cutting – those that arise when one use affects a number of others
or where a particular issue has potential implications across a range of
uses.
The report Resources – Using the Ocean also investigated how uses might
develop within the Region in the future, for example petroleum and miner-
als discovered in new areas of known economic potential which, depending
on market forces, may come under production within the next 25 years.
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Figure 3.3 Large-scale process conceptual model.
Large scale process Conceptual Model – primary productivity. Satellite measurements of sea surface productivity. Dark and
mid-gray colours indicate low levels of productivity; the East Australian Current imports a low-nutrient, low-productivity water
mass into the northeastern part of the Region. Light gray colours indicates higher productivity; evidence of local plankton
blooms can be seen in East Australian Current eddy east of New South Wales, along the Bonney Coast of southeastern
South Australia/western Victoria, and in the Subtropical front around Tasmania. Reproduced with permission from
David Griffin, CSIRO Marine Research.
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Impacts on the ecosystem
The impacts assessment categorized human activities and actions and their
effects on the marine environment in the South-east Marine Region. Impacts
were defined by the assessment phase as any human activity, action or
process that has an effect on the ecosystems in the Region. The purpose of
the impacts assessment stream was not to duplicate existing work on specific
impacts, but to consider the range of impacts across the whole South-east
Marine Region. Impacts – Identifying Disturbances defines and describes 12
categories of disturbance and provides an overview of where disturbances are
known to occur in the environment (see Table 3.1). The report also defines
13 categories of activities and describes those activities that are either
“known”, or considered “possible” to cause the disturbance (see Table 3.2).
It includes impacts that may be negligible, temporary and/or localized, as
well as impacts that are being mitigated by industry practices.
The two matrices developed as part of the assessment process are the first
step in meeting the challenge of considering the range of impacts across the
whole region. The assessment of the impacts on the natural system analyzed
the information from the perspective of the ecosystem, rather than the more
traditional approach of exploring the direct link between the activity itself
and any potential disturbance. As a result, the analysis described which parts
of the ecosystem are affected by each disturbance category. The outcome of
this analysis is illustrated in the matrix “Ocean environs and disturbances”
(see Figure 3.4). Direct links between each activity and the type of distur-
bance it causes are also explored. The outcome of this analysis is illustrated
in the matrix “Activity and disturbances” (see Figure 3.5).
The assessment process followed the Australian and New Zealand Standard
for Risk Management as a general methodology for analyzing information
about impacts on the ecosystem (see Figure 3.6). The matrices represent the
initial stage of “identifying the risks” and aim to identify the broad range of
impacts that affect the marine ecosystem.
Community and cultural values
The assessment of community and cultural links with the marine environ-
ment provided a snapshot of the community’s values and aspirations for the
deeper waters of the Region. People living within 50 kilometers of the coast
of the South-east Marine Region, key national and regional conservation
groups, and marine-focused community interest groups were consulted. The
coastal community’s level of knowledge about the Region and its broad
demographic data were collected.
The coastal area of the Region is home to approximately 1.4 million
people. A survey and workshop of marine-focused community groups identi-
fied their vision for the Region, which includes:
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• better management of the marine environment through use of manage-
ment tools, including marine protected areas;
• protection of endangered species;
• a reduction in pollution;
• resource and environmental sustainability; and
• increased education to promote a greater sense of community stewardship.
Indigenous uses and values
In assessing the indigenous uses and values of the Region, the underlying
message received was that indigenous people do not distinguish between
land and sea. Instead, land and sea exist irrespective of the boundaries put in
place over the last 200 years. Together land and sea form “country” – a
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Table 3.1 Disturbance categories used to define impacts to the South-east Marine
Region
Disturbance category Description
Chemical change Changing the concentration or properties of
compounds naturally occurring in the ocean, such as
changes to salinity, nutrients and dissolved oxygen
Contaminants Introducing substances that are not normally found in
the marine environment, such as heavy metals, PCBs
and litter
Temperature change Changing the marine environment’s natural
temperature range
Mechanical change Removing or changing structural (biological and
physical) components of the ecosystem, such as
building dams
Nuclear radiation Introducing radioactive isotopes into the marine
environment
Electromagnetic radiation Introducing radiation that consists of electromagnetic
waves
Noise Increasing the level or amount of sound in the marine
environment beyond its natural range
Biological interaction Removing or damaging organisms such as discarding
by-catch
Introduced pathogens Introducing disease-producing organisms to the
marine environment, either from terrestrial or marine
sources
Introduced marine species Introducing species from outside their natural or
historical ranges
Turbidity/light Changing the extent to which light penetrates the
water column
Artificial light Introducing a source of light that would not naturally
occur in the marine environment
Table 3.2 Sources of disturbance in the South-east Marine Region
Source of disturbance Description
Aquaculture Activities associated with cultivating the food
resources of the sea or inland waters, e.g. feeding,
waste disposal and physical location
Defence Activities specific to defence activities in the marine
environment, e.g. sonar, live firing exercises and
underwater explosions
Emerging Activities which are new or recent to the marine
environment, such as biotechnology
Harvesting Activities that relate to fishing activities, including
discarding of fish, diving and fishing gear
disturbance (shipping-related activities are included
under “Shipping”)
Human changes coastal zone Activities by humans that cause changes to the
coastal zone such as coastal construction and
dredging
Indigenous customary use Activities associated with indigenous customary
use, including customary harvest and ceremonial
activities
Land-based Activities that are distinguished from human
changes by the types of input that they have to the
environment, including industrial discharge,
sewage and urban discharge
Ocean dumping Activities that are associated with the disposal of
waste and other products (e.g. ammunition) at sea
Petroleum Activities that are associated with petroleum
exploration and production in the marine
environment, e.g. seismic survey, rig establishment
and produced formation water disposal (ship-related
activities are included under “Shipping”)
Recreational activities Recreational activities that do not fit into the
tourism category, including collecting species and
diving
Shipping All shipping-related activities, including those from
harvesting, petroleum and defence, including hull-
fouling, ballast water discharge and shipping
maintenance
Submarine cables Activities associated with submarine cables
including the physical presence of cables
Tourism Activities associated with tourism (not including
shipping, these are covered under “Shipping”)
including interactions with wildlife, and the
development of tourism sites
The disturbance is known to have an effect on this part of the ecosystem.
Possibly causes a disturbance, but there is no example in the South-east Marine Region.
It is unknown if the disturbance has an effect on this component of the South-east Marine Region.
























































































































































Figure 3.4 Ocean environs and disturbances.
Note
This report lists the range of impacts on the natural system that occur in the South-east Marine Region,
but does not make any judgments about the relative importance or consequence of those impacts or the
activities that cause those impacts, nor does it explain the many mitigation mechanisms in place.





























































































































































Figure 3.5 Activity and disturbances.
Note
This report lists the range of impacts on the natural system that occur in the South-east Marine
Region, but does not make any judgments about the relative importance of consequence of those
impacts or the activities that cause those impacts, nor does it explain the many mitigation mechan-
isms in place.
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Grey water discharges
The disturbance is known to cause this type of disturbance in the South-east Marine Region.
Possibly causes a disturbace, but there is no example in the South-east Marine Region.
It is unknown if the activity causes this type of disturbance in the South-east Marine Region.
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Figure 3.6 The risk assessment process.
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country of significant cultural sites and “dreaming tracks” of the creation
ancestors. During the consultation, Indigenous people expressed their desire
to improve their health and well being, particularly through:
• recognition and respect for culture;
• co-management and resource sharing;
• culturally appropriate education and training; and
• economically, environmentally and culturally sustainable employment
opportunities.
Management and institutional arrangements
The management and institutional arrangements assessment broadly
described the Commonwealth legislation affecting how Australia uses and
protects its oceans in the South-east Marine Region. The management
arrangements for oceans use in Australia arise from historical management
based on individual sectors in various state and Commonwealth waters, and
these are characterized by a complex system of legislation.
The overarching framework of marine regulation in Australia is domin-
ated by international law, principally the law of the sea, and Australia’s con-
stitutional structure. International law, as contained in the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention),12 sets out the
basic rules for the exercise of jurisdiction by a coastal state. This varies
according to the zone of jurisdiction, but usually extends to the limit of the
200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone.
The sovereignty and sovereign rights of Australia under the LOS Conven-
tion are given force in Australia by the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973
(Cth), which vests such rights in the Commonwealth for all waters except
those within the limits of state or territory waters. This legislative frame-
work is then linked to the OCS in terms of management of offshore areas,
and is given effect under the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) and
the Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 (Cth).13
The assessment of Commonwealth legislation presents issues regarding
the current framework and suggestions for implementing regional marine
plans as raised by stakeholders. Issues include the gaps and duplications in
existing management arrangements of each sector.
Northern Planning Area
In 2001 it was announced that the second regional marine planning area
would be in northern Australia encompassing the eastern part of the Arafura
Sea, the Gulf of Carpentaria and the Torres Strait. The initial stages of this
planning process focused on establishing contact and developing administra-
tive and consultative arrangements. This time the process of identifying
strategic information and planning priorities included a dedicated effort to
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bridge the cross-jurisdictional divide between the Queensland, Northern
Territory and Commonwealth governments. The positive response from all
levels of government to the initial scoping phase of the Northern Planning
Area means that the context of Australia’s second regional marine plan may
be markedly different from the first. Several issues and challenges have
already been identified for the process, including:
• Indigenous populations in the Northern Planning Area have significant
ownership and involvement in management of coastal resources. The
remoteness of communities combined with access issues are likely to
require the development of specific stakeholder liaison mechanisms which
may augment existing government or non-government arrangements.
• The Torres Strait also has remote communities that may be difficult to
access. Furthermore, the Torres Strait has independent institutional
arrangements from its neighboring state government.
• The waters of the Northern Planning Area abut waters of Papua New
Guinea and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia providing an international
dimension to regional marine planning not encountered before.14
Operationalizing integrated oceans management:
challenges ahead for regional marine planning
Eleven planning principles, drawn from the vision, goals and directions pro-
vided by Australia’s Oceans Policy, inform the regional marine planning
process. They embody recent developments in natural resource management
and direct the way that options for management will be developed and
negotiated. These principles highlight both the challenges and direction of
regional marine planning. Regional marine plans will:
• implement ecosystem-based management as the basis for decision
making and management, and embed the principles of ecologically sus-
tainable development, including precaution into all decision-making
processes;
• promote ecologically sustainable marine-based industries that con-
tribute to regional development;
• develop integrated management of sectoral activities and achieve strong
efficient cross-sector linkages;
• work towards consistency in management across jurisdictional bound-
aries when impacting upon the same oceans resource or sector;
• lead to clearly defined and agreed regional marine plan outcomes that
are integrated across all sectors;
• lead to fair decision making and conflict resolution regarding access to
oceans resources within and between generations;
• increase involvement of resource users and the community at large in
planning and decision making;
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• engender long-term responsible use of oceans resources, i.e. stewardship;
• provide flexible management arrangements that focus on measurable
outcomes coordinated across sectors;
• contribute to adaptive management based on monitoring and evaluation
of outcomes of management against expected performance including
providing for auditing and review processes; and
• establish clear and agreed definitions of issues and terminology.
Operationalizing the South-east Regional Marine Plan – moving
from theory to practice
The major challenges facing integrated oceans management in Australia are
moving from theory to practice; identifying shared values and objectives;
meeting objectives and defining planning issues and providing for cross-
sectoral coordination; ecosystem-based management; cross-jurisdictional
coordination; outcomes-based management; and participation and trans-
parency in decision making. Figure 3.7 indicates how the South-east
Regional Marine Plan moved from the theoretical to the practical level. In
2003 the “Draft South-east Regional Marine Plan”15 was publicly released
and public responses were sought from Stakeholders.16 The final Plan was
released on 21 May 2004 (see Postscript). However, the Plan is intended to
be a dynamic management document that will be progressively modified
and improved as new information becomes available and new mechanisms
for oceans management are established.
Identifying shared values and objectives
The specific objectives of each regional marine plan will vary depending on the
characteristics of each Region. Shared values are derived through community,
industry and government consultation; they focus on those attributes of the
region that Australians wish to maintain. Using these shared values it is pos-
sible to define what Australians want to achieve through the plan and this will
be clearly stated in objectives. The following shared values were distilled from
the South-east regional marine planning process:
• healthy thriving ecosystems;
• strong regional communities;
• partnerships with Indigenous peoples;
• competitive, diverse and innovative industries;
• responsive and responsible governance; and
• fair, efficient and participatory decision making.
Meeting objectives and defining planning issues
A further challenge of moving from theory to practice is determining if the
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objectives of the RMP are being met. If an objective is not being met,
finding out why will assist in defining planning issues. Guidance provided
by Australia’s Oceans Policy will be used to determine whether an issue can be
dealt with by the RMP. Also, each planning issue will be analyzed so that
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Figure 3.7 How the South-east Regional Marine Plan was developed.
ning issues require an immediate and specific response, for example, a list of
potential marine protected areas. Other issues might require activity-based
restrictions, for example, fishing gear modifications, or planning responses in
the case of the development of a threat abatement plan. Through a frame-
work of institutional arrangements, planning and management processes
and a built-in performance assessment system, planning issues will be
managed with a view to achieving the objectives of each plan.
Managing planning issues – options
Management options consist of different combinations of management tools
(management strategies) and implementation arrangements, including a
system to assess the performance of each strategy. Management tools are
measures used to control or direct particular aspects of an activity, methods
for reaching management decisions, or ways of influencing patterns of use.
Management tools range from very specific tools such as minimum mesh
size on fishing gear, to environmental impact statements for individual
activities, to large-scale spatial zoning of activities and/or market-based
incentives. The management options for regional marine planning would
focus on integrating existing management tools (through the responsible
agency) and addressing gaps and developing specific additional tools where
necessary. Examples of existing management tools that could form a man-
agement strategy include fishing quota systems, marine protected areas and
codes of conduct.
Management options may include several management strategies to
resolve regional marine planning issues. These strategies will focus on
setting management outcomes and may range from policy initiatives to
more specific measures such as legislation. It is likely that management
options will become apparent when the planning issues are being analyzed,
but they will need to be compared with each other in order to be specific
about the details of each option.
The management options will then need to be evaluated considering the
costs (economic, social and environmental) of implementation against the
benefits derived from the option. The practicality of implementation
requirements for each option will also need to be considered. Advice from
stakeholders and experts in their fields will be used in negotiating which
management options to include in the South-east Regional Marine Plan.
Cross-sectoral coordination
Australia’s Oceans Policy acknowledges that progress towards improved
marine management has been made within separate sectors, but that man-
agement and decision making have not been sufficiently integrated across
the various sectoral interests. It also recognizes that:
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management of our oceans purely on an industry-by-industry basis will
not be sustainable in the long run. Activities such as fishing, tourism,
shipping, aquaculture, coastal development and petroleum production
must be collectively managed to be compatible with each other and
with the ecological health of the oceans.17
A Stakeholder Working Group for the South-east Marine Region have
assisted in finalizing the regional marine planning objectives and analyzing
planning issues identified during the assessment phase for the South-east
Marine Region. Further, the South-east Regional Marine Plan Steering
Committee formed in the early stages of the regional marine planning
process will continue to guide the development of the Plan, with clear links
to the Stakeholder Working Group. To achieve this, the Chair of the Steer-
ing Committee chairs the Stakeholder Working Group.
Ecosystem-based management
To provide an ecosystem basis for regional marine planning, the South-east
Marine Region boundary has been designed to recognize ecological
characteristics by using large marine domains (see Figure 3.1). In addition, a
National Work Program for the continued collection and monitoring of
scientific marine data has been implemented.
Under the LOS Convention, Australia has one of the largest exclusive eco-
nomic zones (EEZs) in the world, covering an area of 11.1 millionkm2,
which equates to about one and a half times Australia’s land area.18 Unlike
the land and even the atmosphere, very little is known or understood about
Australia’s marine environment.19 This lack of knowledge and understand-
ing reduces Australia’s capacity to manage its oceans resources. Further, it is
not always possible to transfer management approaches based on terrestrial
environments to marine environments.20
Although our understanding of the marine environment has increased as
exploitation of resources and other uses has increased, our knowledge rapidly
decreases from the shoreline outwards. Gathering data for the whole of Aus-
tralia’s marine environment is a formidable task, both logistically and finan-
cially. To address this lack of knowledge and understanding, a National Work
Program (NWP) has been implemented to build on the existing knowledge
base, to map the seabed and resource potential of Australia’s marine jurisdic-
tion, to measure performance of regional marine plans, to establish access to the
existing marine data and to facilitate international cooperation via joint projects
and arrangements. Key inputs to the development of regional marine plans
have been identified by four major projects under the NWP, including:
• National bioregionalization – to provide fundamental inputs for the
development of ecosystem-based regional marine plans and planning
units.
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• National socio-economic survey and assessment – to address the need to
give appropriate consideration to potential socio-economic implications
of ocean use and management arrangements.
• NORFANZ survey – a proposed multilateral international survey of the
Norfolk Island Ridge and the Lord Howe Rise to increase knowledge of
the biodiversity and resource potential of this biologically and geologi-
cally unique region.
• Relationship between hydrocarbon fluxes and halimeda mounds (algal
beds) – to map and sample deep-water halimeda beds in northwestern
Australia to investigate the relationship between deep algal beds and
natural hydrocarbon seeps.
A number of expert bodies will be formed to assist with the NWP process.
Cross-jurisdictional coordination
The OCS, IGAE and COAG Heads of Agreement on Roles and Responsibil-
ities for the Environment create a complex jurisdictional division of oceans
governance in Australia. This poses substantial challenges to regional marine
planning that is inherently ecosystem-based rather than organized by juris-
dictionally defined “lines on maps.” The Natural Resource Management
Council is a joint Commonwealth, state and territory forum with the aim of
facilitating cross-jurisdictional coordination on natural resource issues. The
Council’s Marine and Coastal Committee is seeking agreement on integrated
oceans management principles between Commonwealth, state and territory
governments. This is another important step in providing a platform to
integrate further oceans management in Australia.
Outcomes-based management
To be outcomes based, a RMP would need to include a system to monitor
whether it is working – a performance assessment system. To assess perform-
ance, the objectives for the RMP should be further defined into measurable
operational objectives that relate directly to the management strategies. By
regularly monitoring these operational objectives, evaluation of whether the
management strategies are achieving the objectives of the RMP can be
conducted.
Participation and transparency
Australia’s Oceans Policy clearly points out the need and value of community
and industry participation in the regional marine planning process. The
South-east regional marine planning process provided a series of opportun-
ities for public participation. The release in 2003 of the Draft Plan was fol-
lowed by further public consultation and an opportunity for public
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comment. However, public participation in oceans planning and manage-
ment does not stop with the release of a regional marine plan. Rather, public
participation will play an important role in the periodic assessment and
review of RMPs.
Conclusion
Australia is facing many challenges in operationalizing integrated coastal
and oceans management. One of the main challenges is balancing the
increasing pressure on coastal and marine ecosystems while promoting sus-
tainable development for the benefit of all Australians now and in the
future. Arising from this challenge, the need for an integrated approach to
coastal and marine management is clear. Working in the context of complex
jurisdictional arrangements, Australia is beginning truly to operationalize
integrated coastal and oceans management. An essential link between coastal
and oceans governance is provided by the Natural Resource Management
Council through high level representation from Commonwealth, state and
territory governments. Through the National Representative System of
Marine Protected Areas, the Coasts and Clean Seas Initiative, and the devel-
opment of a National Coastal Policy, Australia is beginning to address the
increasing pressures on water quality in coastal and marine areas, coastal and
estuarine habitats and biodiversity, and the economic base of coastal areas.
In the marine environment, Australia is applying the principles of cross-
jurisdictional coordination, cross-sectoral coordination, ecosystem-based
management, outcomes-based management, and participation and trans-
parency in decision making through regional marine planning under Aus-
tralia’s Oceans Policy. Integrated coastal and oceans management in Australia
is now moving from theory to practice – guided by input from all levels of
government, experts in their fields, stakeholders and the community.
Postscript
The first regional marine plan under Australia’s Ocean Policy was completed
in May 2004 with the launch of the South-east Regional Marine Plan.21 The
Plan covers a marine region of more than two million square kilometers
surrounding the states of Victoria and Tasmania, and parts of South Aus-
tralia and New South Wales. It also extends to parts of the Southern Ocean
around the sub-Antarctic territory of Macquarie Island. The Plan contains
more than 90 designated actions, including the development of a system of
marine protected areas. However, the Plan has no legislative underpinning,
which is consistent with the approach Australia has taken to date in imple-
menting the Oceans Policy. Rather, the Plan provides an operational blue-
print for the federal, state and local government authorities responsible for
its implementation. The Plan has an important focus on the role of marine
industries, and seeks to create mechanisms to encourage and support marine
96 Veronica Sakell
industries within the South-east region. In addition, the Plan supports
greater engagement by Indigenous communities in the management of the
region’s marine resources. A Supplement to the Plan is anticipated in 2005
that will contain the complete system of marine protected areas within the
region.
Design and preparation has commenced for the second regional marine
plan that covers the “Northern Planning Area,” which extends from the
Torres Strait across northern Australia to include the waters of the Gulf of
Carpentaria and the eastern Arafura Sea.22 This Planning Area will
encompass up to 700,000km2 and includes waters over which indigenous
peoples have long exercised various access rights. In recognition of the
unique characteristics of the Torres Strait, including the presence of the
Australia/Papua New Guinea maritime boundary, a separate planning
process is proposed for those waters. The Scoping Phase of the Northern
Planning Areas was completed between 2002 and 2004 and it is currently
anticipated that the Plan should be finalized by December 2005. The next
proposed regional marine plan is for the southwest, which encompasses
waters offshore South Australia and southwest Western Australia.
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Introduction
Integrated maritime compliance and enforcement strategies must be geo-
graphically specific since from one region to another, ocean users differ,
legislative and policy goals vary and, as a consequence, capacity require-
ments will be different. The one commonality is the goal of integrated mar-
itime compliance and enforcement – the efficient and effective use of
traditional and non-traditional enforcement methods and resources to ensure
a high level of ocean-user compliance with the applicable laws and appropri-
ate practices.
This chapter will look at the application of integrated maritime com-
pliance and enforcement strategies on Canada’s Pacific coast by first outlin-
ing a structured approach to integrated maritime compliance and
enforcement, then providing a survey of the ocean uses that create com-
pliance and enforcement issues on Canada’s Pacific coast before moving to a
review of the way in which these issues are being met. The primary focus
will be on the mandates and capacities of Canadian federal departments and
agencies in inducing compliance through enforcement of the laws that are
applicable to particular activities. The concluding section sets out a series of
future challenges for compliance and enforcement strategies.
A structure for integrated maritime compliance and
enforcement
Introduction
It is customary to look at maritime compliance and enforcement in terms of
attaining or attempting to attain maritime security which is defined as the
protection of maritime national interests from threats in, on or concerning
the sea. Our understanding of maritime security has significantly expanded
in recent years beyond the traditional concepts that dealt primarily with
threats of a naval or military nature. The newer understanding of maritime
security can include:
[T]hreats and acts of violence to coerce, extort or accomplish a political
goal; direct challenges to national sovereignty; disregard of national and
international law; illegal resource exploitation; the illegal transportation
of goods and people; and the deliberate or unintentional creation of an
environmental hazard.1
To address effectively this broad range of threats and challenges to mar-
itime security, flexible and cooperative approaches to surveillance, monitor-
ing and control,2 including traditional strategies of naval sea control and
presence, are required. Essential to this is the ability to gather, manage and
understand a comprehensive database on activities in ocean areas. Only by
knowing what is happening and where, can a state respond to and formulate
strategies to address maritime security issues.
Related to the ability to respond to maritime security threats relying on
surveillance, monitoring and control techniques is the goal of the reduction
of maritime security threats, in short, achieving compliance with the laws of
the nation state. The relationship between reducing maritime security
threats and responding to maritime security threats is a mutually reinforcing
one. There are several strategies that can be utilized in reducing maritime
security threats by increasing compliance through education, training, codes
of conduct and self-regulation.3 Another important strategy is the involve-
ment of the relevant ocean-user communities, which would also include the
private sector entities to be regulated, in the creation of laws and, where
appropriate, in the implementation of that law. It is through the effective
involvement of constituents in the formulation and implementation of law
and policy and the adoption of other compliance inducement strategies that
enhanced compliance can be achieved and, as a result, decrease the need for
expensive state-centric enforcement operations.
The emphasis on the structure of integrated maritime compliance and
enforcement being developed herein is less on the “softer” compliance strat-
egies and directed more to the enforcement strategies that play a role in
inducing or re-enforcing compliance. Fundamental to these enforcement
strategies is the ability of a state to utilize surveillance, monitoring and
control techniques.
Taking a broad view of maritime security results in the identification of
five areas of marine activity for which a state may face a series of responsibil-
ities, challenges and threats that may require enforcement: management of
marine resources,4 protection and preservation of the marine environment,5
maintenance of maritime sovereignty, prevention of illegal activities, and
marine safety.6
Responses to marine challenges
In order for coastal and island states to ensure a certain level of maritime
security in the five areas of marine activity listed above, states may deploy
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various types of enforcement responses. These may include a combination of
the use of operational, legal, political and non-state means. Within each of
these response categories, there exist a variety of surveillance, monitoring
and control options that the states may exercise. The combination or mix of
enforcement responses utilized by a state is determined by its particular
enforcement requirements and priorities, as well as the actual enforcement
resources and response capabilities available to it.
Operational responses
Resources for the control of marine activities can encompass a wide range of
technical platforms, equipment and personnel, as well as the communica-
tions equipment and infrastructure to support and maintain them. The
resources will include: surface platforms and vessels; fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft, and other aerial platforms; underwater platforms such as sub-
marines, submersibles and fixed sensors; space-based satellites with sensors
and radar; as well as land-based platforms, such as coastal radar systems.
Information systems are critical to the effective use of operational resources.
Legal responses
For maritime security, a coastal state must have a system of laws, regula-
tions, standards and procedures applicable to its ocean jurisdiction, which
will form the legal basis for maritime enforcement strategies and general
control activities. National laws regarding marine activities are inevitably
reflective of international ocean law, conventions and agreements, including
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Conven-
tion).7
Political responses
Political and bureaucratic arrangements to achieve maritime security may
occur bilaterally or multilaterally with other states or actors, as well as inter-
nally within the state. Internationally, states can pool their respective
resources to meet common maritime security needs. The regional approach
to oceans development, management and enforcement offers economy and
efficiency in addressing maritime security requirements of member states
and in enhancing levels of maritime security in shared ocean areas. The
national, or internal, components relate to the interaction among levels of
government, departments and agencies responsible for oceans management
and enforcement. An integrated approach to maritime compliance and
enforcement requires careful management of relations among all the national
and regional actors involved.
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The macro-legal and political context of Canada’s Pacific
coast
The political geography of Canada’s Pacific coast waters
Canada’s Pacific coastline stretches approximately 27,200 kilometers, just
over 11 percent of Canada’s total coastline. Canada exercises jurisdiction
over internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the exclus-
ive economic zone (EEZ) on the West Coast. Canada’s Pacific waters,
however, constitute mere percentage points of Canada’s overall offshore area.
The EEZ has been legislatively defined,8 but the location is contested by the
United States both in the north and south.9 The territorial sea location has
been defined,10 but there are northern and southern gaps involving the
United States.
The northern ocean boundary problem between Canada and the United
States concerns the Dixon Entrance and the waters seaward of Dixon
Entrance. Fishers from both countries are occasionally arrested in the Dixon
Entrance area, although there appears to be a general forbearance by both
countries to take direct enforcement action except in the most obvious of
cases. The southern overlapping offshore claim problem is a small sliver of
ocean seaward of the Strait of Juan de Fuca.
In the most heavily utilized west coast waterway, the Strait of Juan de
Fuca between the southern part of Vancouver Island and the state of Wash-
ington, an ocean boundary has existed since 1846.11 There is no dispute over
the location of the international boundary in these waters.12 There has been
some uncertainty as to the precise international legal status of the waters of
the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the international legal capacity of the United
States to impose certain regulations on foreign vessels using the Strait on
their way to Canada.13 This uncertainty has not been an acute problem
between the two states.
The reality of the United States on Canada’s West Coast
Unlike on the east or Arctic coasts of Canada, the United States has an
imposing presence on the Pacific coast. Canadian waters being shouldered by
Alaska to the north and the state of Washington to the south have both
positive and negative effects. Positively, most of the ocean traffic in Canada’s
Pacific waters is either American, going between the lower states and
Alaska, or, if vessels are not calling on Canada, they are headed for the
United States. There is little vessel traffic in Canadian west coast waters that
is not ultimately subject to either U.S. or Canadian regulation and on issues
of marine pollution and vessel safety, U.S. standards are broadly comparable
with Canadian standards. Negatively, the United States’ sensitivity to
freedom of navigation rights, particularly in waters separating the American
states, makes it difficult for Canada to undertake unilateral initiatives.14
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Moreover, the United States can and does impose vessel regulations that may
be beyond what Canada deems reasonable or in Canada’s best interest.15
It also must be noted that many of the commercial vessels and virtually
all the visiting pleasure craft that frequent Canadian Pacific waters are
American. Thus, foreign vessels that breach Canadian laws on the West
Coast are almost always American vessels. While seizures and arrests often
take place, there can be political and neighborly undercurrents to Canadian
seizure and arrests of U.S. vessels that are different than when Canada seizes
a non-U.S. vessel.
The sharing of the high traffic and population areas of the Georgia-Puget
Basin and the Strait of Juan de Fuca has implications respecting fisheries
enforcement, vessel safety, smuggling, and pollution prevention and
response in these areas. There is an obvious need for inter-state cooperation
(Canada and the United States), cooperation amongst regional governments
(British Columbia and Washington), and cooperation amongst ocean users
in these areas for a wide variety of ocean management issues and for efficient
and effective maritime compliance and enforcement. Several joint initi-
atives/arrangements exist to meet these cooperative needs.16
The federal–provincial–Aboriginal constitutional and political
context
Constitutionally-recognized Aboriginal rights over land, ocean space and
particularly regarding fisheries, the full extent of which are still subject to
negotiation and litigation, are a critical component of the Canadian west
coast picture respecting legal and political authority over and responsibility
for ocean use management.17 Access to fisheries and the integration of Abo-
riginal claimants into the management structures of the fisheries has been an
important part of most land claim settlements in British Columbia.18
Unlike Canada’s other coasts, on the west coast there is a single political
sub-unit, the province of British Columbia, which shares with the federal
government of Canada, subject to the above-noted Aboriginal claims and
rights, constitutional authority regarding ocean space and activities.
Respecting federal–provincial constitutional jurisdiction over offshore
areas,19 Supreme Court of Canada cases have determined that the federal
government has, vis-à-vis British Columbia, exclusive legislative authority
regarding all waters and seabed areas west of Vancouver Island and the
Queen Charlotte Islands.20 The waters and ocean floor between Vancouver
Island and the mainland have been held by the Supreme Court of Canada to
be within provincial jurisdiction.21 There is legal uncertainty regarding
federal–provincial jurisdiction over the waters and sea floor between Van-
couver Island and the Queen Charlotte Islands (Queen Charlotte Sound) and
the waters and sea floor landward of the Queen Charlotte Islands (Hecate
Strait).22
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West coast ocean uses, activities and issues
Marine living resources
In British Columbia, commercial fishing involves the harvesting of more
than 80 species of aquatic plants and animals from oceans and rivers.
However, the primary focus is on wild salmon and shellfish. There are five
major species of Pacific salmon: coho, chinook, sockeye, pink and chum.
Since 1996, the Pacific salmon fleet has undergone a significant reduction as
a result of the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) policy
aimed at resource conservation. Through a process of buying back fishing
licenses, DFO has reduced the Pacific salmon fleet by nearly 50 percent.23
Sport fishing occurs in both tidal and fresh waters throughout British
Columbia. More than 600,000 annual recreational angler licenses are now
issued in the Pacific region. Given the crossover with the tourism industry,
the sport fishing industry includes operators in the transportation, accom-
modation, food and beverage services, boat and sporting goods retailing,
marinas and other recreation industries.
Aquaculture, particularly salmon farming, has emerged as a sensitive
issue on the West Coast. Until recently, there has been a moratorium on the
expansion of the finfish aquaculture industry in British Columbia. Under the
moratorium, pre-existing operations continued with the ban extending only
to new operations. Aquaculture has raised serious environmental concerns,
particularly regarding its impact on wild salmon stocks and marine
habitat.24 There have also been resource-use conflicts amongst industry, First
Nations and other communities.25
First Nations and the Aboriginal Fishery Strategy
The Aboriginal Fishery Strategy (AFS),26 in place since 1992, is a nationwide
federal government initiative that seeks to provide a framework for the man-
agement of the aboriginal fishery. The objectives of the AFS include provid-
ing opportunities for aboriginal people to fish for food, social and 
ceremonial purposes and providing a role for the aboriginal community
in the management of aboriginal fisheries through the development of 
arrangements such as pilot projects for the sale of fish, cooperative fisheries
management, and the creation of economic development opportunities for
First Nations. Also, the AFS seeks to facilitate the transfer of commercial
licenses from non-native fishers to native communities.
Several B.C. First Nations have been working on agreements designed to
build on and create new DFO/First Nations partnerships and co-
management schemes within the policy framework of the AFS. One such
group is the Confederated Aboriginal Resource Management Agencies
(CARMA). This group is led by the Skeena Fisheries Commission, which is
made up of a conglomeration of B.C. First Nations, including the Tsimp-
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shien, Gitxsan, Haisla, Carrier-Sekani, Shuswap and Okanagan Nations.
According to one member, CARMA’s approach is geared toward “creeping
co-management” encouraging a situation whereby more First Nations will
be working with and eventually within DFO.27
The policies of the AFS have generated some criticism and protest
action from some members of the B.C. commercial fishery.28 According to
one DFO fisheries officer working in Richmond, at various times there
have been significant numbers of commercial vessels fishing illegally as a
protest against commercial selling of fish harvested pursuant to the
AFS.29
Commercial shipping
Vancouver is Canada’s busiest port with an annual throughput of about 70
million metric tonnes per year, of which some five million are
containerized.30 It is a major gateway to North America’s Pacific Northwest
for wheat and grain exports and has a major coal terminal. Vancouver is also
a major port of call for the West Coast–Alaska cruise industry. There is little
intra-Canadian vessel traffic except for the B.C. ferry system from Vancouver
Island to the mainland. Virtually all the Vancouver vessel traffic is inter-
national and uses Haro Strait and the jurisdictionally shared Strait of Juan
de Fuca.
One consequence of the high level of vessel traffic within B.C. waters and
Canada’s west coast waters is vessel-source pollution. Public and environ-
mental concerns over the high volumes of tanker traffic and transported oil
were at their height in the 1970s when the tanker routing was first being
discussed. Awareness was revived in 1988 with the Nestucca spill where
875,000 liters of Bunker C oil was released off the coast of Washington.31
When this crude oil washed from U.S. waters to the Pacific Rim National
Park, it became British Columbia’s worst oil spill incident.
Recreational activities
The principal focus of recreational activity – pleasure boating, kayaking,
recreational fishing – is within the Puget Sound–Strait of Juan de
Fuca–Haro Strait area since this is where most of the Canadian west coast
population is concentrated. This creates a potentially serious maritime safety
issue as pleasure craft share the same ocean space with larger commercial
vessels utilizing the ports of Vancouver and Seattle. The presence of numer-
ous whales in Canada’s west coast waters has created a significant new ocean
industry directed primarily at tourists – whale watching. Although largely
confined to near-shore waters, whale watching can take place on the open
ocean. The industry has increased the vessel traffic in already congested
waters and has become a concern for the protection of the whales
themselves.32
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Drug and people smuggling
In 1999, several vessels attempted to deposit Chinese migrants33 on British
Columbia’s shores.34 These vessels were in various states of disrepair, ranging
from complete “rust buckets” to only somewhat less dangerous. Other
Chinese migrants have arrived in Canada in container vessels, usually in soft-
top containers. The migrants are reported to come from Fujian Province in
China and are part of an international persons trafficking system controlled
by crime syndicates.
The 1999 arrivals resulted in a significant public interest and outcry.
However, Canada receives many migrants every year by air, sea and land.
Such arrivals to B.C.’s shores are nothing new, they have been occurring for
the last 25 years.35 A number of factors contributed to the public furor
around the migrant arrivals: the large numbers, the decrepit vessels
“dumping” their human cargoes on Canadian shores, the horrible living con-
ditions that clearly existed on the vessels, and the subsequent intense media
attention presenting the image that Canada cannot control its own borders.
Drug smuggling is another maritime issue on British Columbia’s coast,
which is firmly rooted in the region due to, inter alia, the high level of traffic
in the Port of Vancouver (particularly containerized cargo), the region’s
proximity to the United States and the prevalence of Asian crime syndicates
in the Vancouver area who are actively involved in drug trafficking. The
number of enforcement agencies involved in counter-drug activities under-
scores the prevalence of drug trafficking on the West Coast. The Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is the lead department in terms of drug
enforcement, however, the Port of Vancouver also has a waterfront drug unit
made up of different agencies. Municipal police departments like the Van-
couver Police Department – Marine Unit are also involved.
Marine protected areas
There is considerable interest in the development and designation of marine
protected areas (MPAs) on the West Coast.36 The federal government has
created four pilot west coast MPAs: Race Rocks, at the eastern end of the
Strait of Juan de Fuca; Gabriola Passage in the Gulf Islands, offshore from
Nanaimo; the Bowie Seamount Area off the coast of the Queen Charlotte
Islands; and the Endeavour Hot Vents Area, 250km southwest of Vancouver
Island and part of the Juan de Fuca Ridge system. These pilot MPAs may
become part of a system of MPAs under the mandate of Parks Canada,
Environment Canada, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada. It is also worth
noting that British Columbia has moved to protect approximately 15
percent of the province’s coastline, and certain limited marine areas have
been included in these coastal protection plans.
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Defence
Canada’s naval presence on the West Coast is headquartered in Victoria at
Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt. While the Canadian Navy has an import-
ant maritime defence role, the Canadian Navy’s role has had an increasing
focus on the protection of Canadian sovereignty in terms of “peacetime sur-
veillance and control, countering illegal activities, fisheries protection,
search and rescue, and environmental surveillance in Canada’s territory, air-
space and maritime areas of jurisdiction.”37 Thus, in recent years, “the navy’s
strategy, doctrine and current fleet operations (have been) realigning in
support of . . . other government departments in achieving various national
goals in such areas as fisheries protection, drug interdiction and environ-
mental protection.”38
Enforcement responsibilities, capacities and operations
on the West Coast
Marine policy objectives
For the purposes herein it is necessary to identify what can be described as
the principal marine policy objectives for the purposes of compliance and
enforcement on the West Coast. The following four appear to be most
prominent. First is the sustainable management of marine living resources.
Second is cooperation and coordination of the many ocean users in the
Georgia Basin, the principal geographic area of concentration, particularly as
regards maritime traffic. A third objective is marine pollution prevention
and protection of the marine environment from continued degradation,
again specifically in the southern British Columbia geographic area of popu-
lation concentration. The fourth marine policy objective is an offshore “pres-
ence” (naval, coast guard, fisheries patrols, police) for purposes of projecting
and exercising control (sovereignty) respecting suspect foreign activities,
enhancing compliance with laws and standards, and responding to maritime
emergencies.
Management of marine living resources
Department of Fisheries and Oceans
It is the Conservation and Protection Division within the federal Depart-
ment of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) that has the responsibility for the
enforcement of fisheries regulations and management plans. In the Pacific
region, 175 fishery officers carry out this mandate.39 This involves maintain-
ing an enforcement presence at fishery openings; checking vessels to ensure
compliance; issuing warnings, tickets and appearance notices to violators;
collecting evidence with respect to charges; monitoring and assessing
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enforcement activities; training fishery officers; and coordinating with other
enforcement agencies.
Prior to 1995, the Conservation and Protection Division used DFO patrol
vessels to carry out the fisheries enforcement mandate. The Canadian Coast
Guard (CCG) was under the authority of Transport Canada and had its own
separate fleet and mandate. In the mid-1990s, CCG was merged into DFO40
with the goal being the creation of one civilian “multi-tasked” federal fleet
to maximize resources and reduce duplication. With the merger, two differ-
ent approaches/philosophies to enforcement/compliance have had to meet
and find a way to cooperate in the context of the shared fleet and a general
atmosphere of scarce resources. The changes brought about by the merger
and the scarcity of resources have made for a rocky transition and at times a
strained relationship between the two DFO bodies.41 Effective 12 December
2003, responsibility for the control and supervision of those portions of the
Directorate-General of Marine Programs responsible for policy related to
pleasure craft safety, marine navigation services, pollution prevention and
response, and navigable waters were transferred from DFO to the Depart-
ment of Transport.42 The operational arm of the CCG will be reconstituted
as a “separate operating agency” of DFO.
Coordination and cooperation
In general, coordination between the Conservation and Protection Division
and other government departments is common. Examples include the
Department of National Defence/DFO high seas driftnet enforcement opera-
tions off the coast of northern British Columbia, coordination with the
RCMP in support of the drug enforcement units and, where necessary,
coordination with local police forces at the regional and field levels.
The Conservation and Protection Division coordinates with a number of
U.S. bodies in carrying out its enforcement mandate. For example, Conserva-
tion and Protection meets once a year with the U.S. Coast Guard, the National
Marine Fisheries Services, and Washington and Alaska state enforcement
bodies. This forum provides an opportunity to exchange planned patrol activ-
ities and helps to avoid duplication and waste of resources.43 Also, Canada and
the U.S. have a Reciprocal Enforcement Agreement for Fisheries that allows both
countries to rely on each other’s evidence regarding suspect vessels.44 For
example, if Canadian authorities in British Columbia have evidence of sus-
pected violations by a U.S. vessel, but the vessel moves into U.S. waters before
being apprehended, Canadian authorities can give their evidence to U.S.
authorities that may use it to prosecute in the United States.
Management of vessel traffic
The Marine Safety directorate, a component of Transport Canada, has
authority for the regulation of commercial shipping in Canadian waters. On
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the West Coast, Pacific Marine Safety is responsible for the delivery of pro-
grams to control foreign and domestic commercial shipping, to prevent
ship-source pollution, to ensure safe carriage of regulated cargoes, to oversee
certification and training of marine crew, and for vessel certification, licens-
ing and registration.45
In terms of regulation of domestic commercial vessels, Marine Safety ship
inspectors are empowered under the Canada Shipping Act to board any vessel
and to detain it if it lacks proper certification.46 If an alleged criminal
offence is involved, then the RCMP takes over and may prosecute. However,
it is worth noting that vessel detention can be a fairly significant penalty,
given the costs that ensue when a vessel’s schedule is delayed.
In terms of the regulation of foreign commercial vessels, port state
control inspections occur in the form of spot checks. In 2002, 360 vessels
were inspected in Vancouver under the port state control program.47 Several
vessels were detained for as little as a couple of days to as long as a few
months. Detention creates enormous costs for vessels with schedules to
maintain. Over the last couple of years, Marine Safety has seen improve-
ments in the quality of ships coming into the Port of Vancouver. Appar-
ently, the message seems to be out that if your vessel does not meet
Canadian requirements, there will be costs.
While CCG is now under the authority of DFO, it continues to carry out
its more traditional transport-related functions and, as such, has enforce-
ment responsibilities respecting commercial vessel safety and regulation.48
CCG Pacific Region, is responsible for ensuring marine safety throughout
Canada’s west coast waters. There are 11 major vessels, 20 smaller vessels
and two air cushion vehicles in the Coast Guard Pacific fleet. Some of the
vessels are multi-tasked, carrying out combinations of search and rescue,
marine navigation services, conservation and protection, fisheries manage-
ment and ocean science responsibilities. Of the major vessels, five are capable
of taking on any role within CCG’s mandate.
Search and rescue
The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Victoria (JRCC Victoria), located at
CFB Esquimalt, is one of three JRCCs in Canada. The RCC is responsible
for coordinating responses to aeronautical and maritime search and rescue
(SAR) incidents within Victoria’s Search and Rescue Region. The Victoria
region consists of approximately 920,000km2 of mainly mountainous
terrain of Yukon and British Columbia and 560,000km2 of the Pacific
Ocean, extending to approximately 600 nautical miles offshore including
over 27,000km of British Columbia coastline.49 CCG Pacific Region
responds to over 2,000 emergency incidents annually.50
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International coordination
The Marine Safety Directorate of Transport Canada has a high degree of
interaction and cooperation with U.S. authorities, mainly because of the
jurisdictionally shared Juan de Fuca Strait, within which a shared traffic
management system operates. For example, there are three Canadian and
American radio stations that are in constant communication regarding vessel
traffic. Cooperative Vessel Traffic Services (CVTS) is a joint U.S.–Canada
body that meets twice a year. CVTS has a framework/strategy for handling
vessel problems in the shared zone that provides a decision-making process
that allows Canadian or American authorities to contact the proper Canadian
and/or American authority in the event of a problem in either Canadian or
American waters.
Marine pollution prevention
For fisheries and vessel traffic management, including vessel-source marine
pollution, it is relatively easy to point to a lead federal agency with the
primary responsibility for dealing with enforcement issues. Such is not the
case with marine pollution prevention that does not involve vessels. For
land-based sources of marine pollution the enforcement agency is most often
under the jurisdiction of British Columbia or a municipality within British
Columbia. What is generally recognized as the most effective federal author-
ity regarding marine pollution has been DFO and its responsibility to
enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Act that deal with marine pollution
and waters frequented by fish.51
Drugs and immigration
The RCMP has primary authority respecting the enforcement of Canada’s
laws on illegal drugs and immigration. The RCMP’s west coast resources are
limited to four high-speed three-person catamarans and some air support.
The RCMP and the Department of National Defence (DND) have a
working memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding joint counter-
narcotic operations that can result in DND providing operational equip-
ment and personnel and access to defence capabilities and expertise.52
The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) plays a supporting
role to the RCMP regarding drug smuggling at west coast ports. Related to
this is the innovative arrangement between CCRA and the Vancouver Port
Authority through which the two parties seek to work together to suppress
contraband smuggling through the Port of Vancouver.53 This successful
cooperative relation led to the acquisition by the Vancouver Port Authority
of gamma ray scanning equipment. This technology, designed to comple-
ment manual inspections, allows the Port inspectors to scan containers
safely, non-intrusively and quickly (at the rate of one per minute) for hidden
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compartments associated with the transport of contraband. Local CCRA
inspection officers will be able to view these radiographic images as cargo is
loaded and unloaded from vessels with minimum interruption to the rapid
flow of cargo.54 Citizenship and Immigration Canada plays a similar sup-
porting role to the RCMP regarding immigration issues.
Coastal Watch, an eight-year-old RCMP community-based program
that relies on the public to call in regarding suspicious activities on the
water, also has a role. The program is based on the premise that individuals
living and working on the coast or at sea possess intimate knowledge of
activities of their surroundings and are thus the best placed to notice 
abnormal activities. The Coastal Watch program enhances participants’
ability to identify abnormal activities through public education that 
presents profiles, possible indicators of criminal actions and contact
information for local authorities.55
Surveillance and control of the offshore area: the Canadian Navy
In addition to the capabilities and responsibilities of the Coast Guard on the
West Coast regarding surveillance, control and enforcement and the more
limited capabilities of the RCMP, there is the role and responsibilities of the
Canadian Navy, specifically Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAC). The Cana-
dian Navy has numerous maritime assets, which are generally equally dis-
tributed between MARLANT (Atlantic) and MARPAC, and are tasked
approximately 30 ship-days on a yearly basis to support RCMP counter-nar-
cotics. On the West Coast, the naval fleet is generally composed of five
patrol frigates, one destroyer, one operational support vessel, six maritime
coastal defence vessels (MCDV), one long-range patrol submarine and
several smaller auxiliary vessels. The Navy also has access to marine air
support resources including five Aurora patrol planes, six Buffalo planes, six
Sea King helicopters and four Labrador helicopters.
It is important to note that the Navy’s role in enforcement is distinct
from that of civilian agencies. Unlike, for example, CCG or CCRA, who
possess a mandate to enforce the laws of Canada, Department of National
Defence operations are limited by the principle of posse comitatus. As such,
DND operations can only be aimed at Canadian citizens in order to enforce
the laws of Canada under certain circumstances such as a civil emergency, or
under the Fisheries Act (where Canadian Forces personnel have fishery officer
status).56 Notwithstanding these exceptions, MARPAC seldom utilizes such
powers and generally limits its involvement in counter-narcotic operations
to one of operational support as exemplified by the DND-Solicitor General
MOU.57
The important role of MARPAC is to provide support to other govern-
ment departments involved in enforcement. MARPAC has increasingly been
the focal point for interdepartmental communication/operations related to
the broad concept of sovereignty protection. Some of the major areas of
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concern include illegal migrant and drug smuggling, environmental pollu-
tion surveillance, search and rescue, and emergency response. Interdepart-
mental communication between the Navy and other governmental
departments (primarily the RCMP, DFO and CCG) occurs on an ongoing
basis through informal and formal mechanisms. In addition, MARPAC has
representatives on numerous formal interdepartmental committees, such as
the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group (IMSWG).
IMSWG, established after 11 September 2001, is the coordinating body for
the federal response to marine security matters. IMSWG is chaired by
Transport Canada and 17 federal departments and agencies are members,
including all federal departments and agencies with fleet assets. IMSWG
replaced the Interdepartmental Program Coordination and Review Commit-
tee (IPCRC),58 which had been in existence in the 1990s to improve interde-
partmental coordination to maximize unused available ship capacity of
Canada’s two main federal fleets – the navy, and since 1995, the consoli-
dated Coast Guard fleet – but had fallen into disuse.
The Canadian Maritime Network (CANMARNET) is an unclassified,
near real-time geographic, information system that receives surveillance and
information inputs from a number of ocean-related government depart-
ments, agencies and the private sector. It comprises databases that are net-
worked between departments and the key product is a composite and shared
visual database: the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP). CANMARNET is
primarily controlled and utilized on both the east and west coasts by
Canada’s Maritime Forces, with the participation and support from Fisheries
and Oceans/Coast Guard, Transport Canada, Environment Canada, Customs
and Excise, Citizenship and Immigration, and the RCMP. It is utilized for
information collection, management and dissemination among enforcement
agencies, increasing the efficiency of Canada’s maritime enforcement regime
and improving oceans management.59
Conclusion and challenges
This snapshot of Canada’s Pacific coast ocean activities indicates the diver-
sity of ocean uses being undertaken in and on west coast waters. The geo-
graphy of ocean activities on the West Coast, largely centered in the Georgia
Basin, is more confined than on the East Coast. It is also worth noting that
the number of coastal communities in British Columbia is minute compared
with the number on the Atlantic coast. The ocean activities themselves are
somewhat different. For example, there is no offshore hydrocarbon develop-
ment as of yet, the dominant fisheries (salmon and shellfish) are conducted
near-shore, and there is little non-Canadian/American vessel traffic or fishing
activity in or near Canadian west coast waters.
What has been provided herein is a snapshot of the enforcement
responsibilities, capacities and operations of the principal federal agencies
that deal with the various ocean activities on the West Coast. Government
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enforcement capacity and operations is only one component of an integrated
maritime compliance and enforcement structure, yet it is an important one
since enforcement capacity provides the monitoring, surveillance and sanc-
tioning that can encourage and reinforce voluntary compliance. The
“enforcement” snapshot indicates that for different marine policy objectives
there are different lead agencies that rely on inter-agency cooperation, on
federal–provincial cooperation and, frequently, on bi-national
(Canada–United States) cooperation. Reconfiguring enforcement resources to
enhance use efficiency and to meet compliance objectives is an ongoing
quest.
Canada’s constitutional structure, the necessarily differing mandates of
government departments and the equally valid but numerous marine policy
objective priorities work to inhibit the operationalization of a heroic or
macro-model approach to integrated maritime compliance and enforcement.
However, for specific marine policy objectives, for example, sustainable
management of fisheries, or on a micro-level, it may be possible to overcome
some of the inhibitions that exist on the broader scale. To some extent this
has been attained or is being striven for on Canada’s Pacific coast.
The challenges that exist respecting integrated maritime compliance and
enforcement in Canada are not Pacific coast specific but are common on all
three Canadian coasts. The challenges can be grouped into three interlinked
categories: terrorism, resources for implementing enforcement strategies and
balance of responsibilities.
Concerns about terrorism create challenges for integrated maritime com-
pliance and enforcement as well as the possibility of enhanced capabilities. It
can be expected that the attention of enforcement strategies will shift
respecting immigration (movement of terrorists), customs (movement of
hardware that terrorists may use) and protection of offshore “assets” that
may be targets of terrorism. One of the challenges will be to monitor
whether this shift in attention is at the expense of enforcement strategies
designed to enhance marine resource sustainability and responsible use of
the oceans. It cannot be assumed that attention on terrorism necessarily
means less attention on other compliance and enforcement priorities since
improving capacity to implement enforcement strategies directed at terror-
ism may have the collateral benefit of augmenting enforcement capacities for
more traditional marine purposes.
Irrespective of the terrorism challenge, integrated maritime compliance
and enforcement still faces the challenge of determining the appropriate
amount and kind of resources that should be dedicated to enforcement strat-
egies. At-sea enforcement operations are very expensive and the information
requirements of surveillance, monitoring and control techniques are costly.
The challenge will be to make better use of existing technologies and to
develop lower cost technologies. One of the unspoken challenges to mar-
itime enforcement strategies is that of enforcement and compliance costs
versus the benefits. This arises most prominently in the fisheries context: is
Application on Canada’s Pacific coast 113
the cost of enforcement strategies commensurate with the benefits to Canada
and its citizens?
Another future issue in the deployment of at-sea enforcement resources is
the existing divide between the role of military vessels and non-military
vessels. Traditionally, gray-hulled vessels defend the state from “military”
risks, while non-gray-hulled vessels take on the role of policing and enforc-
ing national laws.60 In light of terrorism concerns and the costs–benefits of
enforcement strategies, is this a divide that continues to make sense? While
there is a comfort level with a “yes” answer, this will be a future challenge.
The balance of responsibilities and challenges for integrated maritime
compliance and enforcement highlights the relationship between enforce-
ment strategies and “softer” approaches to attaining compliance. Having
communities and user-groups “buy in” to policy and legislation through
involvement in the process of development of policy and legislation is often,
though not always, an effective way to enhance compliance while keeping
more costly enforcement strategies to a minimum. However, there can be a
public perception of coziness and favoritism amongst the governing and
governed in such arrangements. The challenge is to make these “softer”
strategies work better and to be perceived by the public as being effective.
The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in enhancing com-
pliance and enforcement is often touted as a low-cost, “softer” component of
integrated maritime compliance and enforcement. However, NGOs fre-
quently have their own agendas, suffer from non-transparency, have selective
and shifting memberships, and have little responsibility or accountability
for their actions or statements, which can make them uncertain and unreli-
able players in compliance and enforcement strategies. The challenge is to
make room for those NGOs that can add value to compliance and enforce-
ment strategies, while being aware of their limitations.
The final challenge regarding integrated maritime compliance and
enforcement is an over-arching one embedded in the word “integrated”:
finding new and better ways to enhance cooperation and coordination of all
the “players” (government agencies, user-groups, communities, the public,
NGOs) to keep enforcement strategy costs reasonable while inducing higher
degrees of compliance.
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5 Integrated maritime
enforcement and compliance in
Australia
Sam Bateman, Anthony Bergin, Martin Tsamenyi and
Derek Woolner
Introduction
Australia’s current arrangements for the enforcement of national legislation
and the protection of national interests at sea are far from integrated. They
owe much to their historical antecedents and the recommendations of suc-
cessive reviews of the maritime surveillance and enforcement function.1
Changes made to arrangements over the years have generally been ad hoc
and in response to a specific crisis. Divisions of responsibility are spread
widely between agencies of both the Commonwealth and the states. To the
extent that maritime enforcement and compliance is a system, it is one of
“distributed responsibility,” often characterized by less than optimum
coordination and cooperation between the agencies involved. The imple-
mentation of Australia’s Oceans Policy through the process of regional marine
planning (RMP) will add, however, new dimensions to maritime enforce-
ment and compliance in Australia.
It has frequently been noted that implementing oceans policy in Aus-
tralia requires better coordination between the federal, state and territory
governments in integrating planning and management to ensure that juris-
dictional boundaries do not hinder effective management.2 This applies as
much to maritime enforcement and compliance as it does to any other sec-
toral area of activity.3 This chapter discusses the structure of the current
regime for maritime enforcement and compliance in Australia and the
prospects of achieving a higher degree of integration and coordination than
exists at present.
Geographical and jurisdictional dispersal
Challenges of geography
Australia’s geography and the significant distances involved in reaching
both offshore territories and remote areas of the mainland pose great chal-
lenges for maritime enforcement and compliance. An unavoidable con-
sequence is that Australia’s enforcement of legislation in maritime zones
under national jurisdiction cannot be a simple extension of terrestrial juris-
diction.
The coastline of mainland Australia is nearly 36,000km in length.4 The
Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around
Australia and the offshore territories measure 8.15 million square kilome-
ters,5 nearly 20 percent larger than the Australian mainland. If the waters
contiguous to the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) are added, the EEZ
is approximately twice as large as the continental land mass. The distances
to some of Australia’s island territories are considerable. The Heard and
McDonald Islands are over 2,400 nautical miles (nm) southwest of the main-
land. Christmas Island is 1,500nm west of Darwin but less than 200nm
south of Indonesia, as are the Ashmore and Cartier Reefs, 500nm west of
Darwin.
Most attention regarding maritime surveillance and enforcement in Aus-
tralia has been given to the northern approaches to the mainland and the off-
shore island territories. Due to the geographical proximity of northern
Australian waters to the archipelagos to the north, these areas are where the
levels of threat are deemed to be higher. By far the largest amount of sur-
veillance and patrol effort is expended in northern areas, with only intermit-
tent fisheries protection patrols and occasional surveillance flights in
southern waters.6 The one exception is the area around the sub-Antarctic
islands (primarily Heard and MacDonald Islands) where considerable illegal
fishing has been evident in recent years.
Jurisdictional responsibilities
The Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) and the 1979 Offshore Consti-
tutional Settlement (OCS) sought to reflect developments in international
law and re-organize the structure of Australian offshore legislation. The
Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) is the key legislation that estab-
lishes the legislative framework for maritime enforcement and compliance.
This Act vests within each state/territory the power to make laws governing
waters out to three nautical miles. Under the broad framework of the OCS,
some state/territory agencies may have authority for particular areas of activ-
ity beyond the limit of their waters, such as port facilities and works, and
management of specified fisheries.7
In reality, however, most maritime enforcement falls to agencies of the
Commonwealth, sometimes in conjunction with their state/territory coun-
terparts. Regardless of legislative authority, it is most often only the Com-
monwealth that has resources of sufficient distribution and capacity to
determine what is happening in Australia’s maritime zones and to do some-
thing about it. Thus an important characteristic of Australian maritime
enforcement and compliance is the requirement for cooperation between
agencies. There are numerous practical examples of cooperation, such as
Western Australian fisheries officers accompanying Royal Australian Naval
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(RAN) vessels on missions to the Heard and McDonald Islands, while Aus-
tralian customs officers are authorized to act as fisheries officers under
Western Australian legislation.
Roles of relevant Commonwealth agencies
There are at least 12 Commonwealth agencies with an ongoing role in mar-
itime enforcement and compliance, whilst others may request assistance on
an ad hoc basis. State or territory agencies can request assistance through
their Commonwealth counterparts. Coastwatch is a branch of the Australian
Customs Service (ACS) with a RAN two-star officer seconded as Director-
General Coastwatch. It coordinates the aerial surveillance program and the
surface response operations when required by “client” agencies, manages the
aerial surveillance contractors and develops intelligence systems for mar-
itime surveillance and enforcement. ACS is responsible for controlling the
importation of illicit drugs and illegal goods and border protection gener-
ally. It administers the National Illicit Drugs Enforcement Strategy (NIDS)
and is the parent organization for Coastwatch. It also controls the National
Maritime Unit (NMU) of Australian Customs Vessels (ACVs).
The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is responsible for Commonwealth law
enforcement, often in conjunction with state police forces. AFP may be
involved in the prosecution of offences against Commonwealth law in virtually
all areas of maritime jurisdiction such as fisheries, navigation, marine environ-
mental protection and illegal importation. The Australian Fisheries Manage-
ment Authority (AFMA) manages Australian and licensed foreign fishing
within the AFZ. By agreement, it manages some fisheries that include state
waters. It takes enforcement action against illegal fishing both by foreigners
and nationals, but has limited operational and investigative resources of its
own, relying instead on other agencies for enforcement and compliance and on
the AFP to conduct criminal investigations on its behalf. The Department of
Environment and Heritage is responsible itself and with associated portfolio
agencies such as the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority for preserving
ecosystems in Australian waters, including the establishment of marine parks
and marine protected areas. The Department monitors pollution, sea dumping,
marine poaching and vandalism, and counters illegal taking of flora and fauna.
The Office of Transport Security (OTS) is a new key player in maritime
enforcement and compliance in Australia. Established in the Department of
Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) in Canberra in 2004, it is the
principal security regulator for maritime industry, including the implemen-
tation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code by
Australian ports and shipping. OTS includes a Transport Security Opera-
tions Centre operating 24 hours a day and seven days a week, and staff out-
posted in major ports and overseas.
The responsibilities of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service
(AQIS) extend to the prevention of the spread of exotic diseases through
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importation of infected insect, animal or vegetable material. These include
national arrangements for the management of ballast water and introduced
marine pests. The Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigen-
ous Affairs (DIMIA) manages entry programs and the entry of individuals
into Australia. It takes enforcement action against alleged illegal immi-
grants, including their removal from unauthorized transport to appropriate
accommodation.
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) is responsible for
shipping safety and the prevention of ship-sourced pollution in Australian
waters. This includes implementation of port state control (PSC) measures
in Australian ports including a network of regional offices around the
country. AMSA provides maritime safety services in Australia and Aus-
tralia’s allocated area of search and rescue (SAR) responsibility (approxi-
mately 10 percent of the Earth’s surface). This includes SAR operations for
vessels in distress and for aircraft at sea through Australian Search and
Rescue (AusSAR), which is part of AMSA. AMSA is also responsible for the
management and development of the national plan for response to pollution
by marine oil spills and other chemicals and for the maintenance and opera-
tion of the Commonwealth’s pollution response equipment.
The Department of Defence has no legislative enforcement responsibil-
ities (other than in respect of “naval waters”) but in certain circumstances,
the Australian Defence Force (ADF) may be used for the enforcement of civil
law and Defence officers may be granted powers under particular pieces of
Commonwealth legislation.8 Defence is the major supplier of Common-
wealth resources for maritime enforcement and compliance. In normal cir-
cumstances, Defence bears 70–80 percent of the total cost of the current
system. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is responsible
for treaties with other countries, including maritime boundary agreements.
This includes the Torres Strait Treaty with Papua New Guinea.9 DFAT has
a Torres Strait Treaty Liaison Officer based in Thursday Island who manages
the treaty arrangements on a day-to-day basis.
Pieces of Commonwealth legislation that give offshore enforcement
responsibilities to ADF or other Commonwealth agencies include the Migra-
tion Act 1958 (Cth), the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), and the Customs
Act 1901 (Cth), which also contains powers available to ADF personnel to
deal with offences under the Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth).
In addition to the Commonwealth agencies mentioned above, several
others potentially have some involvement in the process of maritime
enforcement and compliance.10 These include the Marine Investigation Unit
of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), which is responsible for
the investigation of marine accidents, and the Australian Security and Intel-
ligence Organization (ASIO), which has a major role in ensuring Australia’s
security against all forms of terrorism. The Commonwealth’s Director of
Public Prosecution (DPP) plays a major role in prosecutions for breaches of
maritime legislation.11
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Managing the Commonwealth’s interests
Operational roles
Although a large number of agencies have responsibility for some element of
control in Australia’s maritime zones, a much smaller group provides most
of the means for this to happen. Coastwatch coordinates requests from
“client” agencies for surveillance in support of their legislative responsibil-
ities, manages the contracts of commercial operators that provide aerial sur-
veillance and develops the intelligence base necessary to maximize use of its
comparatively limited resources across the extent of Australia’s maritime
zones. ACS also runs the NMU with eight sea-going patrol vessels, the Bay
class, which can be deployed in response to possible breaches of law.
However, RAN still supplies most of the response “muscle,” primarily
through its fleet of 15 patrol boats.12 The Royal Australian Air Force
(RAAF) provides approximately 250 hours of aerial patrol with P3C aircraft,
whilst the Army’s Regional Surveillance Units have some role in providing
intelligence, particularly 53 Far North Queensland Regiment, which con-
ducts open boat patrols in the Torres Strait area. Some agencies have a
limited capacity to respond to certain aspects of their responsibilities.
AFMA chartered a vessel for patrols of fishing areas in the Southern Ocean
from 2000 until this responsibility was transferred to NMU of ACS in
2003. AusSAR has a network of commercial operators of light aircraft, suit-
ably equipped for the role, with which it is able to respond to search and
rescue incidents.
In December 2004, the Prime Minister announced that the Common-
wealth government would assume direct responsibility for counter-terrorism
prevention, interdiction and response in all offshore areas of Australia.13
ADF will take responsibility for offshore counter-terrorism prevention,
interdiction and response capabilities, including the protection of offshore
oil and gas facilities. Coastwatch will retain responsibility for civil maritime
surveillance. Central to these new arrangements is a new Joint Offshore Pro-
tection Command to be established by March 2005 and headed by the
Director-General of Coastwatch. It will have a joint accountability structure
being responsible to the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) for its military
functions and to the Chief Executive Officer of the ACS for its civil func-
tions. The new command will manage the Maritime Identification Zone
extending up to 1,000 nautical miles from Australia’s coastline. On entering
this Zone, vessels proposing to enter Australian ports will be required to
provide comprehensive information such as ship identity, crew, cargo, loca-
tion, course, speed and intended port of arrival.
All states and territories maintain water police elements although the
capabilities vary from state to state. The water police deal with SAR inci-
dents and criminal activities in state waters. Their work may extend beyond
the three nautical mile limit, particularly for SAR incidents. In some
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circumstances, state or territory police officers may act as authorized persons
under relevant Commonwealth legislation. Several memorandums of under-
standing (MOUs) have been signed between AFP, ACS and state/territory
police forces directly related to maritime law enforcement. However, these
MOUs are limited to the achievement of specific objectives, such as the
interdiction of narcotics and “boat people,” and exclude other criminal activ-
ities. As these MOU exist in order to coordinate the approaches of state and
Commonwealth agencies for a specific purpose, they are not a complete solu-
tion to the problems of coordination. There are also volunteer coast guard
organizations across the country that can provide a local response to boating
accidents, often using the personal craft of the members.
Management and planning
Allocation of activities to operational elements is managed and planned
through a series of interdepartmental committees. Two of these operate at a
national level in Canberra whilst a third is a series of committees around
regional areas. The Operations and Program Advisory Committee (OPAC)
develops and reviews the program of surveillance flights and reviews
significant issues. After April 2000, its procedures were modified to encour-
age participating agencies to make greater use of it as a consultative forum.
The Planning Advisory Sub-Committee (PASC) determines the long-term
requirements for support capacity, including a rolling three-month sailing
plan. The Regional Operations and Program Advisory Committee (ROPAC)
has the same responsibilities as OPAC but meets in the regional locations,
where the bodies attending can include state agencies.
The way that each agency relates to the overall system varies significantly.
This is largely a reflection of their separate and often very different
responsibilities. This can be seen as creating different “classes” of agencies
with widely varying expectations. A review of Coastwatch conducted by the
Auditor General14 developed a typology to demonstrate this phenomenon
and distinguish between “major” and “minor” clients.15 The categorization
of different agencies depends largely on whether the agency has a long-term
ongoing tasking for Coastwatch16 or whether it is more a matter of a
response to a particular situation17 and on whether they are strategically or
tactically driven. What becomes clear from this review is that:
• there is no one agency that is involved across the full range of maritime
surveillance and enforcement activities; and
• there are some agencies that depend upon the continuing operation of
the system and others that require it only when specific events occur.
The current system is therefore far from integrated. No single agency has
a complete overview of the entire maritime enforcement and compliance
system. This includes Coastwatch. Although it has the most complete intel-
124 Sam Bateman et al.
ligence overview, and has been able to consolidate the advice of client agen-
cies, Coastwatch does not conduct risk assessments within the various port-
folio areas of its clients. This was a task that was specifically left to the
individual client agencies when the current system was established in 1988.
Functional areas
Maritime security and border protection
Maritime security has become an increasingly significant area in the last
decade as Australia seeks to protect itself from terrorism and reduce the
number of illegal immigrants arriving on Australia’s shores. The Customs Act
1901 (Cth) provides powers to board and search vessels18 and to seize
goods.19 These powers are exercisable in Australian territorial waters and
now extended to the contiguous zone under the Border Protection Amendment
Act 1999 (Cth). This legislation also enhances powers under the Fisheries
Management Act 1991 (Cth) and the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Powers under
the Migration Act to deal with suspected illegal entry vessels (SIEVs) have
been amended by the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act
2001 (Cth). Under the Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth) officers have the right to
board and inspect vessels and installations in Australian waters. Quarantine
officers are further permitted to take control of prescribed goods20 and order
crew members of the vessel to undertake medical examination.21
The Maritime Transport Security Act 2003 (Cth) (MTSA) gives effect to
Australia’s implementation and interpretation of the ISPS Code. Under the
new legislation, the Australian government will regulate the security
arrangements of Australian ports, port facilities and Australian-owned or
flagged ships. It extends ISPS provisions to all ships employed on interstate
voyages but not to ones employed on intrastate voyages. The legislation also
establishes robust compliance checking of foreign ships and is to be
extended to cover offshore oil and gas installations.
Illegal immigration
In response to increased numbers of illegal immigrants arriving in Australia
at the turn of the twenty-first century,22 the federal government adopted
new legislation to improve border security, to reduce the number of people
entitled to visas, and to increase Commonwealth powers to detain and
deport. Under the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act
2001 (Cth) certain Australian external territories were excised from the
migration zone for purposes related to unauthorized arrivals. This included
the external territories of Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Christmas Island,
Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the Coral Sea Islands, and certain sea and resource
installations. The Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Conse-
quential Provisions Act) 2001 (Cth) allowed for the detention and removal of
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unauthorized arrivals in the excision zone and included powers to remove a
person to another country where their claims, if any, for refugee status
might be handled. The measure was aimed at deterring further movement
from, or the bypassing of, other safe countries. The Border Protection (Valida-
tion and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (Cth) introduced minimum penalties
for people smuggling of five years for a first conviction and eight years for a
second conviction. The legislation provided additional statutory authority
for future action in relation to vessels carrying unauthorized arrivals and the
unauthorized arrivals themselves.
Shipping
The Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) provides the legislative basis for many of the
Commonwealth’s responsibilities for the regulation of shipping and naviga-
tion, including ship safety, the coasting trade, employment of seafarers, and
shipboard aspects of the protection of the marine environment. It also regu-
lates wrecks and salvage operations, tonnage measurement of ships, and the
survey, inspection and certification of ships. A vast array of other Common-
wealth legislation touches on the regulation of shipping, including the Pro-
tection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1983 (Cth) and the
Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 (Cth).23
The Shipping and Navigation Agreement under OCS establishes the divi-
sion of jurisdiction between the Commonwealth and the states/territories in
relation to shipping.24 Accordingly, the states and the Northern Territory
are responsible for trading ships on intrastate voyages, fishing vessels, pleas-
ure craft and inland waterway vessels, and the Commonwealth has respons-
ibility for:
• trading vessels on an interstate or international voyage;
• fishing vessels and fishing fleet support vessels on an overseas voyage;
• ships belonging to the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority;
and
• offshore industry mobile units and vessels, other than those confined to
one state or territory.
Fishing
The principal pieces of legislation for the management of Commonwealth fish-
eries are the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (FMA) and the Fisheries Administra-
tion Act 1991 (FAA) which establish relevant management institutions and
mechanisms. The FMA contains the provisions providing for the making of
arrangements to manage a fishery in accordance with either Commonwealth or
state law, and enabling joint authority management. It also contains provi-
sions for surveillance and enforcement of Commonwealth fisheries laws. The
FAA establishes the institutional administrative machinery responsible for
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managing Commonwealth-managed fisheries, other than joint authorities.
The FMA grants extensive enforcement powers to AFMA officers, including
stopping, boarding and searching vessels, seizure and powers of arrest. Unlike
other regulatory mechanisms, the enforcement provisions apply generally
without the need to be imposed by a specific management regime.
Crimes at sea
The Crimes at Sea Act 2000 (Cth) provides the framework of criminal law
applicable to Australian marine areas and to Australian-flag ships, offshore
installations and foreign vessels under certain circumstances. Australian law
applies according to coastal state jurisdiction. The law that is actually
applicable will depend on the nature of the offence and the maritime zone in
which it occurred. AFP has a major responsibility for the enforcement of
national criminal legislation in Australian waters and the investigation of
crimes at sea. However, it has difficulty in unilaterally discharging its
responsibilities because “despite having the requisite investigative expertise,
it lacks sufficient marine resources and, most importantly, presence in the
national maritime environment.”25
The Crimes at Sea Act is supported by an inter-government agreement
(IGA) that provides a general framework for inter-agency coordination.
However, the IGA lacks the specific coordinating mechanisms, such as those
in national plans to counter terrorism, natural disasters and major oil spills,
and does not indicate an appropriate enforcement agency. Past practice
would indicate that state and federal police might use their own resources to
deal with criminal activities close to shore and to act in concert with ADF in
respect of criminal activities further from shore.
While the Crimes at Sea Act has simplified enforcement by reducing the
risk of jurisdictional disputes and providing a legislative basis for coopera-
tive or joint Commonwealth-state/territory law enforcement operations,
there is still the problem created by the number of agencies that might be
involved in these operations. In the words of an AFP officer engaged in mar-
itime enforcement, “law enforcement within Australia’s maritime jurisdic-
tion continues to be fragmented, poorly coordinated and generally reliant
upon ad hoc arrangements at the operational level.”26
Marine pollution
Commonwealth, state/territory law regulating pollution from shipping is
predominantly based upon Australia’s various international obligations
under the framework created by the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention)27 and further developed under specific
instruments such as MARPOL28 and the London Convention.29 While
the Commonwealth retains principal constitutional power in this field, the
states also have complementary legislation applying in state waters.30 The
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Protection of the Sea (Powers of Intervention) Act 1981 (Cth) gives effect to the
1969 International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties.31
Marine protected areas
The process of establishing and managing Commonwealth marine protected
areas (MPAs) falls under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conserva-
tion Act 1999 (Cth). This Act operationalizes an environmental assessment
and approval regime for actions likely to have an impact on matters of
national environmental significance. It applies to areas under Australian
jurisdiction, including Commonwealth and state and territory marine
waters.32 What is allowable in a MPA depends on its purpose and how the
area is managed. Actions that might be prohibited include mining opera-
tions, certain other commercial activities, and those affecting native species
and heritage. In some cases, virtually all human activity is excluded, or
fishing and the removal of sea life may not be permitted. In other cases,
recreational and commercial activities, such as fishing, tourism or exploita-
tion, may occur providing the natural attributes of the MPA are not dis-
turbed. Other areas have seasonal restrictions on activities such as changes to
shipping routes to reduce impacts on migrating whales. The effectiveness of
an MPA will depend on the arrangements made for enforcement and com-
pliance but, with the exception of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, relat-
ively little consideration seems to have been given to these requirements so far.
Miscellaneous areas of regulation
Offshore installations are primarily regulated by the Sea Installations Act
1987 (Cth). This Act ensures that sea installations in Commonwealth waters
are operated with regard to the safety of the people using them as well as the
environment. The Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 (Cth) is designed to protect
shipwrecks. Actions near a shipwreck that may have an impact on the ship-
wreck are prohibited. The Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1963
(Cth) applies to cables and pipelines beneath the high seas and the seas of
the EEZ. The Act fulfills Australia’s international obligations with regard to
cables and pipelines under the LOS Convention by making it an offence to
break or damage wilfully or with culpable negligence, a submarine tele-
graph or telephone cable pipeline or a submarine high-voltage power cable.
Assets for maritime enforcement and compliance
Aerial surveillance
Civil aviation contractors provide most of the aerial surveillance effort for
maritime enforcement and compliance in Australia. They provide a fully
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operational system to Coastwatch with aircraft, crew, operational support,
maintenance and related services. Coastwatch closely monitors contractor
performance, operations and training. The fixed-wing aerial surveillance
operator is currently Surveillance Australia, an Adelaide-based operation
bought by the British company, FR Aviation, in 1999. It provides aircraft
for surveillance missions under a nine-year contract originally valued at
AUD$300 million. Reef Helicopters of Cairns provide rotary-winged sur-
veillance and air transport in the Torres Strait area. This arrangement was
extended in late 2004 until 2007, to allow for the evaluation of options for
the next generation of surveillance technology, scheduled for operational
introduction in the latter year.
Current fixed-wing aircraft on contract to Coastwatch are:
• five Bombardier Dash 8-200 – radar and electro-optic sensors; patrols
up to 100nm beyond the AFZ, radius of action up to 600nm;
• three Reims F406 – radar and night vision equipment; medium range
seaward operations;
• six Britten-Norman Islander – visual littoral search from Exmouth
northabout to Brisbane; and
• one Shrike Commander – visual search, based at Broome.
The helicopters used are:
• one Bell 412EP – electro-optical vision equipment; and
• one Bell Longranger IV – visual surveillance and special purpose trans-
portation, no surveillance devices fitted.
In addition, RAAF provides some 250 hours per annum of P3C Orion air-
craft surveillance, primarily in waters from Perth southabout to Newcastle.
Since the contracted aircraft are normally deployed in the north of Australia,
this is the major surveillance capability over southern waters.
Surface assets
Since the first attempt in 1978 to organize a coastal surveillance system,
RAN Fremantle class patrol boats and ACS sea-going vessels have provided
response resources for maritime border protection. These continue as the
basic assets but there have been some changes lately, most caused by specific
policy decisions. The current surface response force consists of:
• 1,800 boat days per annum from the RAN Fremantle class patrol boat
fleet with ten vessels based in Darwin and five in Cairns;
• eight Bay class ACVs managed by NMU and deployed at various loca-
tions around Australia providing 2,400 boat days per annum; and
• Oceanic Viking, a 105 meter 9,000 tonne ice-strengthened vessel,
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operational from November 2004 under a two-year lease managed by
NMU, for patrolling Australia’s Southern Ocean EEZs.
Although the emphasis on operations in the Southern Ocean has changed,
this list of assets remains much as it was before the incident involving MV
Tampa in August–September 2001. This event marked a substantial change
of policy on illegal entry of people by sea. On 3 September 2001, the federal
government announced a naval deployment to intercept and force back to
Indonesia an increasing number of vessels carrying people seeking to enter
Australian territory unlawfully but with the purpose of claiming asylum.
The deployment consisted of three frigates with embarked helicopters, a
support vessel and four P3C Orion aircraft. This decision marked the first
time that RAN combat vessels had been directly used for maritime border
protection by laying a blockade. At a later stage of the operation, HMAS
Manoora, transiting the area with people removed from the Tampa, also
became involved. A high level of ADF involvement continued as Operation
Relex, at least until the end of 2001 when the demands of participating in
the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan began to draw vessels away.
As an interim arrangement, the ocean-going survey ships, HMAS Leeuwin
and HMAS Melville, were painted gray, given additional crew (including
Army personnel) for boarding operations, and deployed on patrol and
enforcement duties in the northwest. These vessels have advantages of range
and sea-keeping qualities over the Fremantle class patrol boats. Their deploy-
ment confirms the gap that exists in Australia’s current capabilities for mar-
itime enforcement between guided missile frigates on the one hand and
patrol boats on the other.
However, the one significant capability enhancement is an increased
capacity to patrol the Southern Ocean, particularly the Heard and McDon-
ald Islands EEZ. This had been done intermittently since 1997 by RAN and
from 2000 by a chartered commercial vessel, initially managed by AFMA
and, from mid-2003, by NMU. Strategic developments limited RAN’s
capacity to deploy to the Southern Ocean after 2001, whilst the commercial
charter allowed for only two cruises a year (for a total of around 100 days
deployed) and had no capacity to impose a non-consensual intervention on
apparent breaches of Australian law.
With the value of the Southern Ocean fishery being heightened after
2001, the government decided in 2004 to increase both presence and capa-
bility in the Southern Ocean. From the end of 2004 Oceanic Viking has been
deployed for 200 to 250 days per annum for a two-year trial allocated
AUD$89.2 million. It is managed by ACS and maintained by P&O Mar-
itime Services. This vessel is better suited to conditions in the sub-Antarctic
but, more significantly, is the first ACS vessel to be armed in peacetime. It
carries two 0.5" machine guns (the same armament as on Canadian fisheries
vessels) and can launch an armed boarding party.
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Costs
Costs are a central issue in judging the efficiency of maritime enforcement
and compliance. Unfortunately, these are not known with any accuracy by
the public as a comprehensive costing has never been released. Figures are
available on the surveillance component of border protection, but even the
usefulness and clarity of these numbers has been subject to criticism.33 They
omit agencies that are funded to enforce relevant legislation. Nonetheless,
some attempt can be made to provide an estimate of the cost of maritime
border protection, depending on the assumptions that are made about its
components. The costs of the surveillance component of the system for
2003–04 were estimated to total AUD$257 million comprising $127
million for ACS costs and $129 million for Defence.34
However, this is not even the full cost of the surveillance and response
components. The costs presented in the ACS budget for civil coastal surveil-
lance cover the costs of Coastwatch, the value of Defence activities devoted
to this task, and the transfer of funding from DIMIA to Coastwatch for Dash
8 surveillance hours allocated since 1999. From 2004–05, over a period of
four financial years, the $114 million appropriated to DIMIA for surveil-
lance will be transferred to ACS, resulting in a more realistic estimate for
maritime surveillance costs in the 2004–05 budget of $308 million. Fur-
thermore, this accounting includes only an allocation of NMU costs against
the surveillance task. Other NMU activities, for instance against people
smuggling, will be costed against other entries in the ACS budget. During
2004–05, NMU appropriations will include new funding of $44 million for
an enhanced Southern Ocean patrol capacity. Including these and related
additional elements, such as AusSAR, and Torres Strait border protection, a
more realistic costing for the surveillance and response would exceed $400
million. In most definitions of maritime surveillance and enforcement, the
full cost of AMSA and AFMA would also be attributed as relevant costs. In
that case, a more comprehensive cost of maritime border protection would
bring the total cost to around AUD$500 million.35
Implications of Australia’s Oceans Policy
Goals and objectives
The first goal of Australia’s Ocean Policy is: “To exercise and protect Aus-
tralia’s rights and jurisdiction over offshore areas, including offshore
resources.”36 The priority accorded to sovereignty and sovereignty protection
was a conscious decision reflecting the basic responsibility of government for
national security. Thus the Policy commits government to providing effect-
ive surveillance and enforcement within Australia’s marine jurisdiction. This
is fundamental to protecting Australia’s national interests at sea. In turn,
Australia’s Oceans Policy commits the Commonwealth government to a
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number of ocean-specific surveillance and enforcement measures, including
measures as varied as the review and rationalization of effort involved in and
the capacity for surveillance and enforcement, possible alternatives to tradi-
tional surveillance and enforcement techniques, cooperative multilateral and
bilateral activities to reduce incursions into Australian waters, and the
development of improved marine intelligence networks and cooperation
between Commonwealth and state agencies in surveillance and enforcement
actions.37
A holistic view of Australia’s maritime interests, including ways and
means of protecting national interests at sea, is adopted throughout Aus-
tralia’s Oceans Policy. In a section on surveillance and enforcement, the Policy
notes that the challenges are:
• to ensure that there is an effective and efficient surveillance capacity for
Australia’s marine jurisdictions; and
• to ensure effective enforcement of national legislation throughout Aus-
tralia’s marine jurisdictions.38
The principles of integrated oceans management incorporated in Aus-
tralia’s Oceans Policy should also be reflected in national arrangements for
oceans management, including maritime enforcement and compliance. The
fact that they are not, and that the administrative and legislative frameworks
for the Australian marine environment remain extremely complex, throws
doubt on the capacity to implement regional marine plans under Australia’s
Oceans Policy. Enforcement and compliance will be important elements con-
tributing to successful implementation, and it is important that attention is
given to integrated arrangements.
Regional marine planning
Not a lot of attention has been paid so far to integrated enforcement and
compliance in the development of regional marine planning under the Oceans
Policy. On the basis of a series of community surveys and group workshops
conducted as part of the development of the South-east Regional Marine
Plan (SERMP), the community and cultural values assessment conducted by
the National Oceans Office found strong support for “more policing of the
resources of the Region.”39 Specifically, the community group workshops
identified “more and better enforcement (and policing) mechanisms,
particularly in relation to fishing and introduced marine pests”40 as an
important aspiration of marine-focused community interest groups.
However, this may have been mainly in the context of illegal fishing by
foreign vessels because “overseas fishers fishing in Australian waters” had
been identified earlier as an important issue for the community groups.41
A major implication of RMP for integrated enforcement and compliance
will be the need to achieve some consistency in arrangements around Aus-
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tralia. While the arrangements for coordinating maritime surveillance and
enforcement are generally complicated with a multiplicity of state and
federal authorities involved, this is particularly so in southern regions.
Unlike northern Australia, there is no regional structure of Coastwatch in
southern regions for managing regional surveillance. All coordination for
these regions is done through the central Coastwatch structure in Canberra.
To some extent Coastwatch will be “out of touch” with state authorities and
regional requirements. Another problem with achieving coordination and a
consistent approach to enforcement and compliance is that arrangements for
managing coastal and marine activities vary from one state or territory to
another.
South-east Regional Marine Plan
The Uses in the Region Assessment Report for the SERMP assessed the surveil-
lance requirements of the region as follows:
The current national surveillance issues – those of illegal immigrants
and illegal drugs and quarantine – have not been and are unlikely to be,
major issues for the South-east Marine Region. Such activity is more
likely to continue as a major issue off northern Australia. However, the
predicted increase in shipping activity and volumes of cargo will pose
its own onshore surveillance issues and create greater threats for illegal
drugs and increase the requirements for the monitoring of pollution
from ships. Illegal fishing activity is also likely to at least be a potential
issue along the outer edges of the Region until effective high seas man-
agement and real-time monitoring of flag of convenience vessels is in
place.42
Coastwatch does not consider the South-east Marine Region (SEMR) as
an area of high or emerging threat.43 Theoretically, there is no reason why
people smugglers, prospective terrorists or drug smugglers should not
attempt to land illicit cargoes in southern areas, particularly if the surveil-
lance effort in these waters is perceived to be less intensive. Illegal, unregu-
lated and unreported (IUU) fishing activity has also taken place in the
SEMR, including understating fish catch, unlicensed fishing, fraud in the
abalone industry and operations within Australia’s EEZ by foreign fishing
vessels.44 In April 1998, the (then) Deputy Commissioner of the AFP
expressed the view that while Australia’s maritime surveillance is adequate,
the ability to respond to surveillance, to intercept and detain, to board and
search, to enforce laws and to effect sovereignty is entirely inadequate.45
While this view was a general description of the situation throughout Aus-
tralia’s maritime jurisdiction, it is particularly applicable to the SEMR
where response capabilities are few and far between.
The SERMP was released during 2004.46 It includes an action 3.10.1 to:
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“Investigate the enforcement and compliance challenges and opportunities
associated with the increasing use of spatial management of marine resources
in the Region.”47 By addressing only resource issues, this action is rather less
than a satisfactory response to achieving integrated enforcement and com-
pliance across the range of illegal activities that might occur in the region.
Northern Region
The RMP for the Northern Marine Region (NMR) is now well advanced.
The NMR comprises waters off Arnhem Land, the Gulf of Carpentaria and
the Torres Strait. The Torres Strait poses particular problems for maritime
enforcement and compliance. It is as near as Australia comes to a land
boundary with foreign countries. Several Australian islands in Torres Strait
are only 15 minutes by boat from Papua New Guinea (PNG), whilst a trip
from PNG to Cape York, the nearest point on the mainland, takes several
hours in a small outboard-powered dinghy. The West Papua border with
Indonesia lies less than 160 kilometers from Boigu Island, one of the north-
ernmost of the Australian islands in the Strait. There are over 40,000 people
movements per annum across Torres Strait.48 The AFP has identified smug-
gling of cannabis into Australia and arms out of Australia across the Strait as
among the main law enforcement problems in the region.49
Policy considerations
Policy development for maritime enforcement and compliance reflects a
history of unwillingness to respond to any but pressing current problems.
The policies adopted have generally ameliorated the worst problems and
have avoided large expenditures. However, they have not addressed struc-
tural weaknesses, which have created a persistent risk of fragmentation and
remain a barrier to integration. The major exception to this rule was the
establishment of Coastwatch in 1988 as an agency with financial control
over the civil maritime surveillance program and, hence, the ability to take
ultimate control of operational procedures. All subsequent strengthening of
the system has built on this reactive approach.
Absence of a central authority
A major barrier to integration is that no single agency has the core role 
of and thereby, legislative authority for, overall law enforcement in areas of
national maritime jurisdiction. There is no agency with the responsibility of
reporting on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of maritime enforcement
and compliance. There is no body designated as the lead agency for develop-
ing legislation on maritime enforcement and compliance and certainly none
with the role of simplifying the historical tangle of existing law. To use
organizational jargon, there is no agency that “owns” the problem. Coast-
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watch itself has no legislative basis, which has meant that, in the past, ques-
tions of its own structure and independence have been placed second to
those of a client agency.50 The current system is one of “distributed respons-
ibility” in that many agencies have responsibility for distinct components
but no one agency has the power to assess and manage the overall perform-
ance of the whole system. The existing arrangements presume that there is a
partnership between the participating agencies and that cooperation will
produce optimal outcomes. Yet, just as important are the great differences
in the nature of the responsibilities of the constituent agencies. Most of the
time inter-agency cooperation works, but there is also potential for the
system to fail. The consequences of agency differences have the capacity to
undermine effective coordination of operations and to prevent the develop-
ment of optimal central objectives for the system as a whole.
Intelligence
Breakdowns in inter-agency coordination with intelligence and evaluation
most consistently explain failures of the system. Landings by boats carrying
unlawful entrants at Montague Sound in 1992, on the Coburg Peninsular in
1998 and on the East Coast in 199951 all followed failures to pass on import-
ant intelligence between agencies. The development of a centralized intelli-
gence function within the National Surveillance Centre of Coastwatch
(opened in January 2000) was supposed to have removed such problems. Yet
the problems of lack of coordination reappeared spectacularly in October
2001 with the confusion over the veracity of pictures in what has become
known as the “children in the water” incident. The government claimed that
children had been thrown overboard from a vessel carrying asylum seekers
but later it was established that they had not been. The incident was highly
politicized, and this distorted some of the earlier handling of the intelli-
gence.52
Effective maritime surveillance and enforcement requires comprehensive
knowledge of what is happening in offshore areas. It is only by knowing
what is happening in these areas that a state can properly respond to mar-
itime incidents. Following events of 11 September 2001, the concept of
maritime domain awareness has become central to the maintenance of mar-
itime homeland security in the United States.53 This concept recognizes
that, under existing arrangements, no single agency has the capability inde-
pendently to create a comprehensive picture of the maritime domain and
that an architecture that readily supports information sharing and collabora-
tion is crucial.54
Search and rescue
SAR is an activity that is closely related to maritime enforcement and com-
pliance.55 It requires similar assets and command and control procedures.
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AusSAR provides the national center for coordination of Australia’s civil
SAR activities combining air, land and maritime requirements. In each state
and territory, the police are the SAR authority with responsibility for
marine SAR operations for persons or ships in waters within the limits of
ports of a state or territory and in respect of pleasure craft and fishing
vessels. ADF is responsible for SAR for all military and visiting military
forces and will also provide assets to assist in civil SAR operations as
requested by AusSAR. SAR in Australian waters requires a high level of
cooperation and coordination, including with volunteer rescue organi-
zations.
An incident that attracted considerable adverse publicity for both state
and Commonwealth SAR authorities occurred in April 2001 when the 10-
meter fishing boat Margaret J disappeared with three men onboard on a
fishing trip to Hunter Island off Tasmania’s northwest corner.56 The sunken
craft was located a few days after the search was commenced but no trace of
the crew was found until the boat’s life raft and one body were found three
weeks later on an island off Tasmania’s northeast corner. This was some
125nm east of the official search zone and almost exactly where local fisher-
men had predicted any survivors and a life raft would have drifted. Bitter
recriminations followed between the authorities involved, Tasmania police
at the state level and AusSAR at the federal level, over issues of coordination
and responsibility, with much public criticism of the effectiveness of the
search and the quantity of resources employed. These criticisms included
allegations that both the state and Commonwealth governments had
reduced spending on SAR services.57
Adjusting to change
One of the characteristics of the Australian system of maritime surveillance
and enforcement has been the slow pace of improvement. In a system of dis-
tributed responsibility, caution and lack of common purpose amongst the
members usually leads to change occurring only when it is strongly in the
interest of an individual agency or is shown as necessary by some major
breakdown of the system. There is little interest in changes, and indeed few
mechanisms to promote changes that might improve the system as a whole.
An equally significant issue arising from the same cause is that, as the
system is currently structured, a problem that is not the responsibility of
one of the constituent agencies will not be seen to exist. Agencies will not
take on a task that does not fall explicitly within their own well-defined
responsibilities. Current practices of public sector management and general
under-funding of public services reinforce this attitude. Slow adjustment to
change leads to difficulty in recognizing the emergence of new threats espe-
cially with the current unwillingness to “own” non-portfolio problems.
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Crisis-driven change
Throughout its history in Australia, civil maritime surveillance and enforce-
ment has been driven by politics. A structure of distributed responsibility
seldom lends itself to pro-active policy development. Most recently, it has
been evident with the establishment of OTS and the new Joint Offshore
Protection Command that links civil maritime surveillance with military
maritime surveillance.
Most changes to existing arrangements have been made in reaction to the
political outcry caused by some particular development. The best way to
describe the development of the Australian regime for maritime enforce-
ment and compliance is that it is crisis-driven incrementalism. This has pro-
duced gradual evolution and, generally, improved operational performance
of the system. Yet it continues to maintain a very real risk of confusion of
policy focus, decisions of short-lived utility and risk of hijack. It remains too
easy for single agency agendas or outside bodies to take control of policy.
This appears to be what happened during the Tampa incident. DIMIA
appears to have forced its interests to the fore in what was initially a search
and rescue operation.58 Indeed, the most significant factor during the block-
ade of boat people and the subsequent confusion over what events took place
is the almost complete invisibility of Coastwatch during the entire period.
Under current arrangements, the only option for the government is to con-
tinue using the navy to blockade any future influx of boat people. Yet the
only proposal in the government’s 2001 election manifesto relating to mar-
itime response capacity was to double the number of sea days available from
ACS Bay class vessels. Whilst this represents a more efficient use of previ-
ously under-utilized assets, the Bay class vessels are even less relevant to
current policy on boat people than the patrol boats.
Conclusion
Australia faces major challenges with achieving integrated maritime enforce-
ment and compliance. However, pressures for changing current arrange-
ments will not stop. Potential law and order problems at sea include drug
smuggling, people smuggling, crimes at sea, illegal fishing and maritime
terrorism. The present complicated system for dealing with these problems
is an unsatisfactory answer to the challenges. While this is a general
problem throughout Australia’s maritime jurisdiction, it is particularly
acute in southern regions in view of the number of state agencies involved,
the relative lack of Commonwealth assets in these regions and the lack of
experience of agencies at working together. A satisfactory system appears to
have emerged in northern regions, but these depend on informal working
relationships between the agencies involved and are not necessarily indica-
tive of an institutionalized integrated approach to maritime enforcement
and compliance. With the implementation of Australia’s Oceans Policy, the
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conservation objectives of RMP will require monitoring and establish the
need for additional enforcement activity at sea.
Australia has traditionally drawn a careful line between civil maritime
surveillance and military maritime surveillance although this is now chang-
ing with the development of the Joint Offshore Protection Command. The
distinction between traditional security against military threats and non-
traditional economic, resource, human and environmental security is becom-
ing blurred. Increasingly, military assets are being used in support of
constabulary roles, particularly in Australia in recent years against the threat
of people smuggling, and the threat of terrorism is accelerating this trend. A
distinction between military and civilian responsibilities in maritime sur-
veillance and enforcement has proven to be a luxury that Australia can no
longer afford. It may have made sense when the civil area of interest was
mainly along the littoral, but makes no sense now that the civil surveillance
area is much larger, concepts of security more intertwined, and surveillance
and intelligence systems more technologically advanced and expensive.
If Australia is to resort to more than crisis-driven incrementalism to meet
these pressures and to introduce integrated maritime enforcement and com-
pliance, a significant reorganization of government functions is required.
There is no hierarchical system for Commonwealth public administration and
no Commonwealth department has the power to control the way that another
department meets its administrative responsibilities. The only effective way to
do this is to persuade a minister of the need for change. The problem for mar-
itime enforcement and compliance is that there is no single minister to influ-
ence. Many ministers have responsibility for bits of the area but they will only
take an integrated view if there is political reason sufficient to focus their
attention. A possible solution would be to appoint a minister with respons-
ibility for overall policy and legislative development in maritime enforcement
and compliance (perhaps with responsibility for oceans issues generally) and to
support him or her with an agency that has the requisite legislative authority
and capabilities. Despite the benefits of integrated maritime enforcement and
compliance and the limitations of existing arrangements for maritime surveil-
lance and enforcement in Australia, we are unlikely to see a more integrated
system in the foreseeable future.
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Introduction: the tricky currents of precaution
The precautionary principle or approach, while firmly grounded in inter-
national environmental law,1 fisheries law2 and in common sense,3 may be
likened to a life raft swirling in tricky currents. While the principle has
great potential to save lives and salvage the environment by requiring antic-
ipatory precautionary and preventative measures in the face of scientific
uncertainty4 and by having a core notion of placing the burden of proof on
those who propose change,5 it is buffeted by political and practical imple-
mentation challenges.6 Debate continues over terminology with some prefer-
ring the term precautionary approach because of its less onerous legal
connotations.7 Exactly what should trigger precautionary action remains
controversial with the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
suggesting a threshold of “serious or irreversible” harm.8 The extent the pre-
cautionary approach should be driven by “sound science” and risk
assessment9 versus social values and public perceptions is a further area of
contention.10 The Rio Declaration calls on states to apply the precautionary
approach. This leaves open the question as to which persons and institutions
within states should be made responsible for making precautionary determi-
nations and judgments.11
Tensions continue over how extreme precautionary measures should be.12
Extreme measures include outright bans, phase-outs for risky chemicals or
technologies, and reversals in the burden of proof where the proponents of
development activities would not be allowed to proceed unless they demon-
strate lack of significant harm or some other standard of safety/
acceptability.13 Less extreme measures include, among others, requiring pol-
lution prevention plans as a precondition to licensing polluting activities,14
broadly applying environmental impact assessment including alternatives
assessment,15 and ensuring strict or absolute liability approaches for pollu-
tion damage.16
In the fisheries management field a broad array of precautionary measures
are also available. Proponents of new fisheries might be required to demon-
strate no significant ecological damage or to meet some other legal litmus
before license approval. Other measures include: ensuring that all discards
are quantified and incorporated into estimates of fishing mortality;17 ensur-
ing that fish spawn at least once, so that all fish contribute to the population
before being harvested;18 limiting a fishery by the catch of a non-target
species (e.g. the pollock fishery in Alaska is shutdown once a specific amount
of halibut is caught);19 conducting environmental assessments of fishing gear
and managing according to the level of harm each gear risks within the
concept of ecosystem management; developing gear zoning legislation;20
eco-labeling of fish thereby providing a market-based incentive for precau-
tionary management and fishing practices;21 and following adaptive manage-
ment processes where decisions can be flexible based on the outcome of
regulated measures.
In light of the controversial and elusive nature of the precautionary
approach, the eventual “firming up” of precaution will likely depend largely
on national law and policy efforts. This chapter summarizes, through a four-
part format, Canadian initiatives and efforts to implement the precautionary
approach. The first section describes Canada’s general steps to adopt the pre-
cautionary approach including the 1998 Canada-wide Accord on Environmental
Harmonization22 and the Government of Canada’s Framework for Application of
Precaution in Science-based Decision Making about Risk issued in 200323 and
caselaw developments relating to precaution.24 The section concludes with a
brief look at the limited embracing of precaution in environmental impact
assessment review and strategic planning processes. The second section
reviews Canada’s efforts to address marine pollution – ocean dumping, land-
based, vessel-source and seabed activities – in light of precaution. The third
section examines Canadian experiences with implementing precaution in the
field of living marine resource management including fisheries, aquaculture
and biodiversity protection. The final section highlights Canada’s rather
non-precautionary responses to the threats of climate change.
Canadian general steps and wanderings
Environmental harmonization accord
Adopted on 29 January 1998 by the Canadian Council of Ministers of the
Environment (with the exception of Quebec), the Canada-wide Accord on
Environmental Harmonization pledges governments to cooperate in establish-
ing consistent environmental measures, in preventing inter-jurisdictional
disputes and to apply common environmental management principles.
Besides recognizing such principles as polluter pays, pollution prevention,
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public participation and Aboriginal rights, the Accord expressly adopts the
precautionary principle:
[W]here there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degrada-
tion . . .25
Sub-agreements developed under the Accord26 might be described as
“cautious wadings” as the precautionary principle is not strongly embraced.
The Sub-agreement on Canada-wide Environmental Standards,27 while expressly
repeating commitment to the precautionary principle,28 dilutes the commit-
ment through various qualifications, such as the statements that standards to
be developed will be based on “sound science”29 and that environmental
measures will be determined in a sustainable development context recogniz-
ing “socio-economic considerations.”30 The Sub-agreement on Environmental
Impact Assessment,31 aimed at avoiding duplication in project assessments
through designation of a lead party responsible for administering the assess-
ment process, avoids express mention of the precautionary principle in favor
of highlighting other principles – effectiveness, transparency and public
accountability, and efficiency and certainty.32
Government of Canada’s framework document
In 2003, the Government of Canada released a Framework for Application of
Precaution, prepared through a multi-departmental approach, to suggest
guiding principles for operationalizing precaution.33 The Framework pro-
poses ten “guiding principles”. The first five involve general principles of
application, for example, recognizing the legitimacy for decisions to be
guided by a society’s chosen level of protection against risk, suggesting
sound scientific information must be the basis for applying the precaution-
ary approach, and noting the importance of increased transparency, account-
ability and public involvement.
The latter five principles focus on precautionary measures and suggest
precautionary measures should be:
• subject to reconsiderations based on the evolution of science, technology
and society’s chosen level of protection;
• proportional to the potential severity of the risk being addressed and to
society’s chosen level of protection;
• non-discriminatory and consistent with measures taken in similar cir-
cumstances;
• cost-effective, with the goal of generating an overall net benefit for
society, at least cost and efficiency in the choice of measures; and
• least trade restrictive.
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The Framework’s three most fundamental limitations are: attempting to
furl the sails of precaution through a “sound science” limitation, failing
clearly to address the burden of proof in decision making and neglecting the
important approach of alternatives assessment. Perhaps the most important
limitation is the attempt in Principle 4.3 to restrict application of the pre-
cautionary approach to situations where there is adequate scientific informa-
tion and evaluation. Principle 4.3 reads, “Sound scientific information and
its evaluation must be the basis for applying the precautionary approach . . .”
(emphasis added). The accompanying commentary reinforces the need for
risk assessment: “Scientific data relevant to the risk must be evaluated
through a sound, credible, transparent and inclusive mechanism leading to a
conclusion that expresses the possibility of occurrence of harm and the mag-
nitude of that harm . . .”
Such reliance on scientific justification and risk assessments is in line with
international trade law restrictions which continue to be controversial.34
There continue to be strong arguments that national values and policy judg-
ments about acceptable risk should not be trumped by trade interests.35
A second major limitation is the restricted treatment of the burden of
proof. The Framework fails to recommend as a guiding principle the general
burden of proof reversal. Instead, in commentary for Principle 4.3, the
Framework restricts the burden of proof to the issue of who should bear the
burden of producing scientific information. The Framework suggests the
responsibility for providing the scientific information base should generally
rest with the party taking action associated with the potential of serious
harm, but that burden may shift depending on who in a concrete scenario
would be in the best position to provide the information base.
A third limitation is neglecting the important approach of alternatives
assessment. While risk assessment may be a useful tool in understanding
risk, an increasing number of academic writers are urging greater use of
“alternatives assessment.”36 Under such an approach, decision-makers are
encouraged to consider alternative technologies, locations, timings and
scales with the objective of identifying least environmentally intrusive
options.
Canadian caselaw
Although caselaw treatment of the precautionary approach in Canada has
not been extensive,37 the Supreme Court of Canada has opened the net for
citizens and environmental groups displeased with decisions inadequately
considering the precautionary approach to seek judicial review. In Spraytech
v. Town of Hudson,38 the Court recognized the precautionary principle is part
of international law39 and relied on the principle for justifying a broad inter-
pretation of provincial statutory authority allowing towns to regulate pesti-
cides through by-laws under the rubric of preventive action. The Court, in
upholding the Town of Hudson’s by-law restricting non-essential uses of
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pesticides, restated the potential importance of international legal principles
in not only statutory interpretation but also in assessing the reasonableness
of discretionary administrative decisions. Justice L’Heureux-Dube re-
emphasized the wave-making language from Baker v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration):40 “the values reflected in international human
rights law may help to inform the contextual approach to statutory interpre-
tation and judicial review.”41
A key case, Ecology Action Centre Society v. Attorney General of Canada,42 was
the first Canadian case to raise the precautionary principle in the context of
fisheries and marine environmental protection. The Ecology Action Centre,
located in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and represented by legal counsel from the
Sierra Legal Defence Fund, challenged the legality of the Regional Director-
General’s Variation Order under the Fisheries Act43 allowing draggers to fish
on Georges Bank. The applicant argued that harmful alteration of fish
habitat by draggers is not authorized pursuant to the Fisheries Act and should
be subjected to environmental impact assessment under the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act.44 In August 2004, the judge ruled against the
applicant, citing that the act of fishing could not be considered an undertak-
ing or activity as specified in Section 35(2) of the Act. 45 Of note in this case
is the fact that the science pertaining to the effects of trawling on the sea
floor was not contested.
The case of Brighton v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries)46
dealt with a citizen challenge, partly based on the precautionary approach,
to a ministerial decision in favor of licensing a finfish net cage aquaculture
farm in Northwest Cove, Nova Scotia. There a group of concerned citizens
(appellants) argued the Minister had failed to err on the side of caution in
light of so many unanswered questions regarding environmental con-
sequences of the proposal. The appellants referred to the precautionary
approach called for under Canada’s Oceans Act in section 30 and the pream-
ble.47 While Justice MacDonald agreed the Minister was under a duty to
proceed cautiously, whether legislatively directed or not, he found the
Minister in fact had proceeded cautiously in light of stringent license con-
ditions and ongoing monitoring requirements.
The case demonstrates some of the potential difficulties those challenging
administrative decisions in light of the precautionary approach may face.
Where natural resource legislation provides broad licensing discretion and
even favors economic development, judges are likely to be highly deferen-
tial.48 Courts may also be hesitant to address reversal in the burden of proof
given traditional faith in bureaucratic expertise.
Environmental assessment and strategic planning
While environmental impact assessment processes may be viewed as inher-
ently precautionary by supporting anticipatory and preventive planning,49
laws and practices at both the provincial and federal levels have not strongly
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embraced the precautionary approach. Provincial environmental assessment
laws do not make explicit reference to the precautionary principle.50 The
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA)51 may be criticized for various
“non-precautionary” aspects including: the largely self-assessment approach
where federal departments/agencies that are the proponent, funder, regulator
or grantor of a land interest are responsible for assessments and final
decisions;52 the limitation to project proposals and failure to include assess-
ment of government policies, programs and plans;53 the limits of public par-
ticipation particularly at the screening stage of review54 where public
comment is discretionary and participant funding is not ensured;55 and the
lack of decision criteria.56 CEAA has also been criticized for not requiring
alternatives to proposed projects to be addressed.57
Amendments to CEAA assented to on 11 June 2003, while not remedy-
ing the key deficiencies,58 do at least insert precaution as an overall purpose
of the Act:59
4(1) The purposes of this Act are
(a) to ensure that projects are considered in a careful and precaution-
ary manner before federal authorities take action in connection with
them, in order to ensure that such projects do not cause significant
adverse environmental effects . . .
A major gap in environmental assessment application has been in relation
to fish harvesting. Federal environmental assessment review has not been
applied to the issuing of fishing licenses, including destructive forms of
bottom trawling.60
While environmental assessment legislation has not explicitly mandated
the precautionary approach, various review panels have in practice addressed
precaution either because of participant arguments or by direction in terms
of reference. For example, in the joint federal–provincial assessment of Sable
natural gas projects off Nova Scotia, some intervenors argued the precau-
tionary principle should be used to impose zero-discharge limits on oil-
based or synthetic drilling muds and for produced water.61 The panel
rejected such extreme versions of precaution and was content with recom-
mending various measures relating to offshore wastes including implemen-
tation of an environmental effects monitoring program, further exploration
of alternatives to oil-based muds and implementation of environmentally
superior waste treatment methodologies if they became available during the
life of the project.62
A further general route towards sorting out the implications of precau-
tion might be through strategic planning efforts which to date have not
involved detailed precautionary commitments. Canada’s Ocean Act63 calls for
the development of a national oceans management strategy based upon the
principles of sustainable development, integrated management and the pre-
cautionary approach.64 However, Canada’s Oceans Strategy,65 released in 2002,
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simply reaffirms the Government of Canada’s commitment to promoting the
wide application of the precautionary approach to marine resource manage-
ment with additional general commitments to promote ecosystem-based
management, to establish marine protected areas, to improve understanding
of the marine environment and to give priority to maintaining ecosystem
health and integrity.66 Potential for future flux in precautionary approach
application is indicated: “Canada’s Oceans Strategy will be governed by the
ongoing policy work being undertaken by the Government of Canada.”67
Through amendments to the Auditor General Act68 in 1995, various
federal departments and agencies, including the Department of Fisheries and
Oceans, have been required to table sustainable development strategies with
Parliament.69 DFO’s Sustainable Development Strategy 2005–200770 does not
expressly discuss commitment to the precautionary approach, while the need
for smart regulation is mentioned several times.71
Wadings and wanderings in marine pollution control
As the following discussion describes, Canada has most strongly embraced
the precautionary approach in the field of ocean dumping, but is largely
wading with rather general and weak commitments in the areas of land-
based marine pollution control and the regulation of vessel-source pollution
and seabed activities.
Ocean dumping
Pursuant to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999,72 Canada has
adopted the “reverse listing” approach to ocean dumping in line with the
1996 Protocol to the London Convention. No person is allowed to dispose of
waste or other matter in waters under Canadian jurisdiction unless done in
accordance with a Canadian permit, and only substances listed on a “safe
list” set out in Schedule 5 may be disposed of at sea.73 Schedule 5 includes
dredged material; fish wastes; ships, aircraft, platforms or other structures;74
inert, inorganic geological material; uncontaminated organic matter of
natural origin; and bulky substances primarily composed of iron, steel, con-
crete or other similar matter.75 As an additional precautionary measure,
applicants for ocean disposal are required to undertake a waste prevention
audit exploring the feasibility of reducing or preventing wastes through
such techniques as process modification, input substitution and closed-loop
recycling.76
Land-based marine pollution
While an assessment of Canadian precautionary approaches to land-based
marine pollution is complicated by the overlap of provincial and federal
jurisdictional controls,77 a partial picture of Canadian precautionary efforts
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may be gleaned from looking at the three main federal statutes governing
land-based pollution – the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999
(CEPA, 1999), the Fisheries Act and the Pest Control Products Act78 – and
Canada’s National Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environ-
ment for Land-based Activities (NPA).79
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999
Through CEPA, 1999 the Government of Canada has waded into the waters
of precaution through four specific references to the precautionary principle.
The Preamble recites a Rio Declaration version of precaution.80 Second, the
legislation also imposes an administrative duty on the Government of
Canada to follow the precautionary principle and emphasizes pollution pre-
vention in implementing the Act.81 For example, the Minister of the
Environment, in deciding whether to authorize the manufacture or import
of new chemical substances to Canada, would be obliged to take a precau-
tionary approach.82 Third, the Act also requires a National Advisory Com-
mittee to use the precautionary principle in giving advice and
recommendations,83 for example on proposed regulations.84 Fourth, the Act
requires the Ministers of Environment and Health, when conducting and
interpreting the results of toxicity assessments, to apply “a weight of evid-
ence approach and the precautionary principle.”85
CEPA, 1999 might be described as taking a wandering approach to pre-
caution because the Act is not consistent with a strong embrace of the pre-
cautionary principle as applied to ocean dumping. The Act, like the
previous CEPA adopted in 1988, leaves over 23,000 chemicals on the
market,86 and will continue a reactive substance-by-substance toxicity assess-
ment approach before regulatory actions are taken.87 While the federal Min-
isters of Health and the Environment are required to establish a Virtual
Elimination List, setting lowest measurable levels for anthropogenic toxic
substances that are persistent and bioaccumulative, they are granted discre-
tion to not actually require virtual elimination in light of “relevant social,
economic or technical matters.”88 While the Act requires the precautionary
principle to be followed as an administrative duty, the Act does not provide
explicit guidance as to risk management implications.89
The Canadian Environmental Protection Act is exceedingly weak, partly due
to constitutional considerations, in general powers given to the federal
government to control land-based marine pollution beyond toxic chemicals.
The Act only allows the federal government to establish objectives, guide-
lines and codes of practice for land-based marine pollution.90 The Minister of
the Environment is only allowed to impose pollution prevention plans for
listed toxic substances or international air or water pollutants.91
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Fisheries Act
Legal wanderings toward precaution are especially evident in the main
federal lever to control marine pollution, the federal Fisheries Act.92 Although
the Act predates precautionary principle development in international law,
the Act does contain provisions somewhat in line with precaution by a
general prohibition on deposits of deleterious substances into water fre-
quented by fish and a general prohibition against harmful alterations of fish
habitat.93 However, six general sets of regulations94 under the Act allow con-
siderable pollution discharges for specific industries and adopt rather crude,
non-precautionary environmental standards, such as pollution limits based
on production capacity95 and acute toxicity testing for effluents.96
Pest Control Products Act
A modernized Pest Control Products Act, receiving Royal Assent on 12 Decem-
ber 2002, does go some distance in supporting precaution. The Act sets out
the primary objective of preventing unacceptable risks to people and the
environment from the use of pest control products.97 The Act places the
burden of proof on the person requesting registration of pesticides to demon-
strate to the Minister of Health that the risks and value of the pesticide are
acceptable.98
However, the Act has been seriously criticized for its numerous shortcom-
ings including a failure to strongly embrace the precautionary approach.99 The
Act does not even give a preambular “honorable mention” to precaution and
unlike CEPA, 1999 does not entrench precaution as a general administrative
duty. The Act marginalizes the precautionary principle by only requiring the
principle to be taken into account in the course of re-evaluation or special
review100 of a pest control product.101 The Act does not give legal force to the
substitution principle that would require older pesticides to be replaced with
newer, less toxic products and non-chemical alternatives.102 The Act does not
define acceptable or unacceptable risk.103 The Act fails to give the Pest Man-
agement Regulatory Agency a clear statutory mandate.104 The Act also avoids
imposing a legislative ban on the use of pesticides for “cosmetic use,” partly
because of constitutional limitation concerns.105
National Programme of Action for Land-based Activities
Canada’s National Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environ-
ment from Land-based Activities (NPA), released in June 2000, is a helpful
document in highlighting the main environmental problems in various
regions (Pacific, Arctic, Southern Quebec/St. Lawrence, Atlantic) and in
establishing national priorities for action. For example, inadequate sewage
treatment is listed as a high priority because of substantial environmental
and economic effects shared by various regions. Shellfish harvesting closures
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from bacterial contamination on the Pacific coast are reported at nearly
1,000km2 (up from 710km2 in 1989).106 The harvesting of shellfish has
been permanently or temporarily prohibited in the Quebec region because of
bacterial contamination in nearly half of all shellfish areas.107 In 1986, 35
percent of the classified shellfish growing area in Atlantic Canada was closed
to harvesting of shellfish because of fecal bacteria.108
However, the National Programme of Action might be described as weak in
addressing precaution. The NPA document gives “lip service” to the precau-
tionary approach but does not explore what the implications of precaution
might be.109 The NPA was not accompanied by a specific implementation
budget but has depended on the vagaries of funding at national, provincial
and municipal levels.110
Vessel-source pollution
Although Canada’s legal framework for controlling pollution from ships has
precautionary aspects, such as imposing strict liability on shipowners for oil
pollution damage111 and prohibiting discharges of garbage from ships,112 the
framework is not strongly precautionary. The Canada Shipping Act113 does
not mention precaution as a guiding principle. Oil Pollution Prevention Regu-
lations114 adopt the compromise standards of the MARPOL Convention115
with considerable pollution allowed. For example, oil tankers are authorized
to discharge oily mixtures from cargo spaces if they are more than 50 nauti-
cal miles from the nearest land and the instantaneous rate of discharge of oil
in the effluent does not exceed 30 liters per nautical mile.116 Pollutant Sub-
stances Pollution Prevention Regulations,117 rather than imposing a strict precau-
tionary “reverse listing” where ships would only be allowed to discharge
substances listed on a “safe list”, lists hundreds of substances (including
many heavy metals and pesticides) that are prohibited from discharge.118
Perhaps the least precautionary area of vessel-source pollution control is
Canada’s approach to controlling ballast water releases from ships. The 2002
audit of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Develop-
ment (CESD) called upon Environment Canada to address the threat of inva-
sive species properly, and specifically noted Transport Canada’s failure to
regulate ballast water dumping and the past and potential socio-economic
ramifications of this neglect.119 With regard to the precautionary principle,
the CESD concluded:
The precautionary principle, pollution prevention, and the concept of
“polluter pays” have been part of Canada’s environmental policies for
more than a decade. The federal government is not applying them to
manage invasive species that threaten our environment.120
A subsequent report in May 2003 by the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Fisheries and Oceans was also critical of federal efforts to
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address invasive species.121 Environment Canada was criticized for neglect-
ing invasive species issues and concentrating its efforts instead on getting a
new Species at Risk Act enacted.122 The report recommended that the Minister
of Fisheries and Oceans expedite the development and implementation of
ballast water management regulations.123
An Invasive Alien Species Strategy for Canada, issued in September 2004,124
noted the ongoing limited capacities of departments and agencies to address
invasive species and the inadequacy of existing legislation, policies and pro-
grams.125 The Strategy lamented that less than one percent of marine con-
tainer shipments are inspected for hitchhiking alien species at Canadian
ports.126 The Strategy was quite general and vague as to what legal responses
should be:
As appropriate, and where feasible, federal departments and agencies
and their provincial and territorial counterparts will develop legal and
regulatory tools and amend existing legislation and regulations to
strengthen measures to prevent, detect, respond, and manage invasive
alien species.127
Seabed activities
The legal framework governing offshore petroleum exploration and develop-
ment in Canada, the main type of seabed activity,128 does not strongly
embrace a precautionary approach. None of the multiple statutes governing
environmental aspects of offshore petroleum activities mentions the precau-
tionary principle.129 No specific regulatory requirements have been forged
for chemicals used in offshore drilling and production activities. Flexible
guidelines have been issued.130 Management of seismic surveys and threats of
seismic sounds from air guns on marine species has been controversial in
light of scientific uncertainties131 and lack of agreement on how precaution-
ary mitigative measures should be.132
The precautionary principle is minimally acknowledged in the oil and gas
regulatory field. For example, the memorandum of understanding (MOU)
between the Canada–Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board and the Depart-
ment of Fisheries and Oceans133 for coordinating management roles over off-
shore petroleum activities recognizes the precautionary approach as one of
the principles of cooperation.134 A similar MOU between the Canada–Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board and Environment Canada also refers to the
precautionary principle.135
In British Columbia, a Scientific Review Panel was appointed by the
British Columbia Minister of Energy and Mines on 19 October 2001 to
review scientific, technological and regulatory issues associated with possible
lifting of an offshore oil and gas moratorium in place since the early
1970s.136 Reporting in January 2002, the Panel recognized the precaution-
ary approach but did not extensively discuss the law and policy implications.
Canada and the precautionary principle 155
The Panel endorsed the 1998 Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary
Principle, which advocated the proponent of an activity, rather than the
public, should bear the burden of proof.137 However, the Panel also emphas-
ized the observation in the 2001 Lowell Statement on Science and the Pre-
cautionary Principle that “The goal of precaution is to prevent harm, not to
prevent progress.”138 The Panel noted the divisions among specialists regard-
ing how precautionary responses should be where there is a credible risk of
substantial environmental damage.139 The Panel recommended that before
actual exploration activities take place, a quantitative risk analysis be under-
taken along with a thorough cost–benefit analysis.140
Living marine resource management and precaution
Fisheries
Various Canadian fisheries policy documents have acknowledged the need
for adopting the precautionary approach in fisheries management, but at
quite a general level without detailed suggestions for reforms. For example,
A Policy Framework for the Management of Fisheries on Canada’s Atlantic
Coast,141 resulting from multi-stakeholder consultations on future directions
for fisheries management, calls for the development and adoption of a com-
prehensive risk management framework incorporating precaution. The
Framework indicates that conservation-oriented decisions will be sought
through establishment of target reference points (where resource benefits can
be obtained on a sustainable basis), setting limit reference points (where
unacceptable risk of serious or irreversible harm may occur), and determin-
ing in advance what corrective actions will be taken when limit reference
points are approached.142 The Framework document leaves considerable
uncertainty as to what future actions will be. For example, the document
states specific actions in Phase II of the Policy Review may include, among
others, “establishing parameters for applying precaution within the
decision-making framework, including defining negative outcomes and risk
tolerances, setting limit reference points for stocks and determining correc-
tive actions.”143
The Department of Fisheries and Ocean’s Policy Framework for Conserva-
tion of Wild Salmon,144 although not adopting the precautionary approach as a
guiding principle,145 does call for precaution to be followed in future
decision making relating to conservation of wild salmon. Under the precau-
tionary umbrella, the Policy proposes categorizing wild salmon Conserva-
tion Units into one of three status zones (green, amber or red) with social
and economic factors dominating management decisions in the green zone
and biological considerations being paramount in the red zone.146
A Policy for Selective Fishing in Canada’s Pacific Fisheries147 adopts the pre-
cautionary approach in Principle 1. The Policy establishes conservation of
Pacific fisheries as the primary objective and pledges that productivity of the
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resource will not be compromised because of short-term factors or considera-
tions.
A DFO policy for determining when new fisheries can be initiated148 also
recognizes the precautionary approach. The policy suggests placing the
burden on fisheries proponents to provide a reasonable scientific basis for
fisheries management through stock assessment information.
Practical efforts to invoke precaution in Canadian fisheries management,
however, have been limited.149 Considerable energies have been focused on
determining reference points for selected fish stocks.150 While fisheries clo-
sures have been used effectively, establishment of marine protected areas has
lagged. Over-reliance on quota management has occurred and at times pre-
cautionary scientific advice ignored. In some cases, the precautionary
approach has been invoked without adequate knowledge of ecosystem
effects.
Fisheries closures and lag in marine protected areas
Specific areas, determined to be essential for spawning or juvenile habitat,
can be closed seasonally or permanently under the Fisheries Act. Prior to the
adoption of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries or the ratifi-
cation of the UN Agreement on Straddling Stocks, the federal Department
of Fisheries and Oceans already closed certain areas to fishing. An example is
the “Haddock Box” area, on the Scotian Shelf, which has been closed since
1987 to protect juvenile haddock, and thereby allowing the stock to
rebuild.151 More recently, fisheries closures of areas encompassing habitat
structure, including the closure of 426 square kilometers in the Northeast
Channel between Georges and Browns Bank and 15 square kilometers in the
Laurentian Channel for deep-sea coral conservation152 and areas of the Hecate
Strait in the Pacific to protect ancient sponge reefs,153 signify that the federal
government is beginning to recognize the importance of habitat for fisheries
conservation. While closed areas offer advantages for seafloor habitat, juve-
nile species and spawning grounds, their implementation tends to displace
fishing effort, which has been a concern in further area closures.
The Oceans Act authorizes establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs)
as a measure to protect biodiversity and sustain fish populations.154 However,
Canadian efforts to designate and protect such areas have been extremely
slow. MPA establishment may not be popular with fishers, and the criteria
for protection and selection of areas, as well as specific objectives for protec-
tion, have yet to be agreed upon.155 Only two MPAs have been designated
under the Oceans Act, the Endeavor Hot Vents off British Columbia156 and
the Gully submarine canyon in the western North Atlantic.157 DFO lists 12
other Areas of Interest for future designation.158
The Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act, receiving Royal
Assent on 13 June 2002,159 also recognizes the precautionary principle but
designation of areas is at a political commitment stage. The Act, besides
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mentioning the precautionary principle in the Preamble,160 requires the
development of management plans within five years after MPAs are estab-
lished. Primary considerations in development and modification of plans are
to be the “principles of ecosystem management and the precautionary prin-
ciple.”161 In the Speech from the Throne on 30 September 2002, the
Government of Canada announced a commitment to create five new national
marine conservation areas over the next five years.162
Over-reliance on quota management and ignoring of precautionary scientific
advice
Canada’s experiences with fish stock collapse, such as the crisis in the East
Coast groundfishery since 1992, help demonstrate the limitations with the
primary method of fisheries management, the setting of total allowable
catches (TACs) based on biological reference points. Simply managing
according to reference points163 does not lead to sustainable fisheries, due to
the uncertainty in reference point estimation and general lack of specific
management objectives.164 Estimates of fishing mortality are biased and do
not include discards165 or indirect mortality.166 Fisheries regulations encour-
age large amounts of discarding, and political decisions often overrule pre-
cautionary scientific advice in fisheries management.167
An example of the non-precautionary approach spawned by over-reliance
on setting TACs and failure to follow scientific precautionary advice may be
seen in the events surrounding the collapse of commercial fisheries for
Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua), especially off Newfoundland. Massive social
disruption, including loss of work for some 40,000 fisheries workers has
occurred, and the Canadian government has spent approximately CDN$4
billion on special fisheries relief programs.168 Fundamental to this collapse
was the fact that fishing mortality was consistently much higher than the
recommended level, and no effective measures were taken to ensure that
young fish were not discarded or that spawning biomass was maintained at
adequate levels.169
Following the 1992 moratorium on directed fishing, numerous measures
were taken with little regard for precaution. Catches continued through by-
catch from other groundfish species, sentinel fisheries that began in 1995
and recreational/food fisheries.170 Exploitation rates calculated from the
results of tagging experiments conducted through the sentinel fishery esti-
mated fishing mortality to be between 10–30 percent of the total fish
biomass171 despite the ban on directed fishing. In 2000, the Fisheries
Resources Conservation Council (FRCC) recommended a TAC not to exceed
7,000 tonnes,172 to be taken in the recreational, sentinel and by-catch fish-
eries. In 2002, the FRCC recommended a TAC of 5,600 tonnes, including
all fisheries and by-catch, even though there was known to be an estimated
overshoot of the 2001 quota by 1,900 tonnes.173
The failure of the cod to return to even a fraction of historical levels
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prompted the federal Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to declare a complete
closure of the cod fishery in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and off northeast New-
foundland and Labrador on 24 April 2003.174 The Newfoundland and
Labrador population of Northern cod was declared endangered by the Com-
mittee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC) in May
2003.175 If measures are to be taken in the name of precaution, they must be
acted upon before a species declines to the point of being classified as endan-
gered. Indeed, the application of the precautionary approach is to ensure
that species do not decline to such low abundances.176 The extremely low
abundances of groundfish on the east coast of Canada renders previously
determined reference points inadequate for further management of these
stocks.
One of the emerging issues in marine conservation is effects of bottom
trawling on target populations and the sea floor.177 While Canada advocates
conservation of marine resources, during his address to the United Nations
General Assembly in November 2004 on the Sustainable Fisheries Resolu-
tion178 the Minister of Fisheries, Geoff Regan, maintained that no fishing
gear is inherently destructive.179 Canada is one of the few industrialized
fishing nations that has yet to recognize fully the differential effects of
fishing gear on the sea floor and continues to be quite unsupportive180 of
high seas conservation initiatives related to bottom trawling.181 This issue is
tightly linked to precaution, as there is little scientific information regard-
ing the effects of bottom trawling on the high seas and information on fish
stocks is lacking, making it difficult to calculate fishing effort that would
ensure maximum sustainable yield (MSY).
Invoking precaution with inadequate knowledge
There is also a danger of invoking the precautionary approach without ade-
quate knowledge about ecosystem effects, as shown by two Canadian
examples. In 1999, the FRCC,182 acting in the interests of conserving
groundfish stocks in the northwest Atlantic, recommended the following:
“In applying the precautionary approach to groundfish management, action
must be taken immediately in order to improve opportunities for the conser-
vation and recovery of cod . . . We strongly suggest that the seal herds be
reduced by up to 50 percent of their current population levels.”183
Here, precaution was suggested, as a large scale culling of seals, with no
real knowledge of the effect of this population on the cod fishery. Such a sug-
gestion does not take into account the complexities of marine food webs nor
does it adhere to an ecosystem approach. However, fishermen and managers
alike have often blamed the burgeoning seal population for the continued low
biomass of cod. More recent findings suggest that seal populations may in
fact have a positive effect on cod stocks in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.184
In response to the FRCC recommendation, the Minister appointed a
panel to investigate both scientific and management objectives for the seal
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populations. The results of this panel showed that there were no reference
points for seal population management, nor were there specific management
objectives.185
In a report to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO),186
Canada proposed that in the interests of protecting juvenile groundfish
species on the Southern Grand Banks, fishing for Greenland halibut (turbot)
be restricted to below 700 meters. This would be a precautionary measure
taken to ensure that juveniles are not subject to dangerously high fishing
mortality. The difficulty with this management suggestion (which was in
fact rejected by NAFO) is that there was no consideration given to the
effects of increasing fishing pressure in deeper waters. Making a decision
based on what is known about the by-catch of juveniles, without considering
the risk involved in limiting a fishery to depths where little is known, is an
example of improperly invoking precaution.
Need for a broader precautionary approach in fisheries
With a focus on the scientific basis for precaution through reference points
and control limits, Canada has lagged behind in strongly implementing pre-
caution in support of sustainable fisheries187 and a broader approach to pre-
caution needs to be considered. A broader approach would emphasize the
collection of ecological data, multidisciplinary inputs into management
decisions, increased communication between fishers and managers, and a
commitment to preservation of fishing communities.188
Aquaculture
The precautionary principle has not strongly infiltrated the field of aquacul-
ture management in Canada. The various memoranda of understandings,
whereby the federal government and provinces have agreed to jurisdictional
arrangements for controlling marine aquaculture developments, do not
mention the key principles of sustainable development including the pre-
cautionary principle.189 No provincial aquaculture legislation has expressly
incorporated reference to the principle.190 The Department of Fisheries and
Oceans, Office of Sustainable Aquaculture, has developed an Aquaculture
Policy Framework,191 but the policy document is quite general as to how the
precautionary approach might apply to aquaculture activities:
DFO’s use of the precautionary approach in the context of aquaculture
development will be informed by the Oceans Act and federal direction
regarding risk management, including the application of the precau-
tionary approach.192
The 2004 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Develop-
ment assessing the adequacy of salmon aquaculture management by Fish-
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eries and Oceans Canada was very critical.193 The Report noted significant
gaps in scientific knowledge about the potential environmental effects of
salmon aquaculture, lack of credible siting criteria for aquaculture sites,
limited monitoring of aquaculture operations and lack of progress in dealing
with the deposit of deleterious substances from fish farms.194
The details of how the precautionary approach might affect the regula-
tion of genetically modified (GM) aquaculture products remain to be
worked out. DFO’s Aquaculture Policy Framework does not specifically
address the issue of genetic modification of fish but appears supportive of
technological innovations.195 A Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel
Report on the Future of Food Biotechnology in Canada,196 undertaken on
behalf of Health Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency and
Environment Canada, recommended “it would be prudent and precaution-
ary to impose a moratorium on the rearing of GM fish in aquatic facilities”
because of the paucity of scientific information pertaining to genetic inter-
actions between cultured and wild fish.197 The Department of Fisheries and
Oceans, as part of the action plan of the Government of Canada in response
to the Royal Society of Canada Report on Food Biotechnology, pledged to
develop specific regulations governing transgenic aquatic organisms.198 The
action plan indicates DFO agreement with the need to keep reproductively
capable transgenic fish and transgenic aquatic organisms in secure land-
based facilities.199 In the seventh progress report on Action Plan implemen-
tation, Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, in
collaboration with DFO and Environment Canada, were reported as leading
the portion of the project, Transforming the Horizontal Regulatory Governance
of Biotechnology in Canada, involving the development of common regula-
tory governance principles.200
A National Code on Introductions and Transfers of Aquatic Organisms,201 pre-
pared by a federal–provincial Task Group on Introduction and Transfers, has
been issued for assessing proposals to move aquatic organisms intentionally
from one water body to another, including for aquaculture purposes.202 The
Code seeks to establish a standard set of risk assessment and approval proce-
dures and recognizes the precautionary approach as a guiding principle. It
notes that if a risk assessment outcome is uncertain, priority should be given
to conserving the productive capacity of the native resource.203
Biodiversity (species and habitat) protection
Unlike Australia,204 Canada has not adopted broad biodiversity protection
legislation, but has enacted a Species at Risk Act that demonstrates again a
rather wandering approach to precaution.205 The Act embraces the precau-
tionary principle in various ways including a preambulary reference206 and
placing a legal duty on ministers207 required to develop recovery strategies
and action plans for endangered or threatened species to consider the precau-
tionary principle.208 However, the legislation wanders away from a strong
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precautionary approach in various ways, including leaving the actual listing
of species at risk largely to political discretion.209 The Act also leaves wide
discretion for the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to issue “incidental
harm” permits allowing activities to proceed even though they may affect a
listed species, its residence or its critical habitat.210 Various prohibitions,
including those against harming individuals of listed endangered/threatened
wildlife species and damaging the residences of such species, will not apply
to activities permitted by a recovery strategy or action plan and also author-
ized under an Act of Parliament.211
Canada has yet to develop detailed regulatory requirements for whale
watching in accord with the precautionary approach. Existing Marine
Mammal Regulations212 under the Fisheries Act provide only a general obliga-
tion for persons not to disturb a marine mammal.213 A recent report has doc-
umented the growing scientific concerns over the effects of whale watching
vessels on whale behavior and life processes, and has urged more precaution-
ary controls be imposed through regulation, for example, limiting the
number of vessels near whales, establishing distance and speed restrictions,
and covering the duration of time any one vessel can spend in contact with
an animal or group of marine mammals.214 The Department of Fisheries and
Oceans is soliciting views regarding possible amendments to the Marine
Mammal Regulations and intends to develop regulatory proposals for public
discussion.215
Climate change and precaution
Perhaps Canada has displayed the most serious case of policy wanderings in
responding to potential threats of climate change. The significant environ-
mental risks associated with climate change, such as melting of sea ice in the
Arctic and potential disastrous effects on wildlife, such as polar bears and
ice-dependent seals,216 would seem to raise the “classic case” of the need for
strong precautionary actions.217 However, Canada has wandered away from
firm responses. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,218 rati-
fied by Canada in 1992,219 endorses a weak “cost-effective” policy towards
precaution as advocated by the United States:220
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at
the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures
should take into account different socio-economic contexts, be compre-
hensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse
gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors . . .221
162 David L. VanderZwaag et al.
Although adopting a commitment under the Kyoto Protocol222 to reduce
greenhouse gas emission by 6 percent from 1990 levels during the commit-
ment period 2008–12, Canada has been criticized for trying to “weasel out”
of emission reduction commitments. In climate change negotiations, Canada
was a leading advocate for counting carbon dioxide soaked up by forests and
soils (carbon sinks) against emission targets.223 Former Federal Environment
Minister, David Anderson, fought hard to gain international acceptance for
Canada receiving Kyoto credits for exporting clean-energy exports to the
United States of natural gas and hydro-electric power.224
While Canada did ratify the Kyoto Protocol in late 2002,225 how Canada
will implement Kyoto reduction commitments is still very much “up in the
air.” A Climate Change Plan for Canada226 set only very general directions for
action in seven areas.227 A further plan, Moving Forward on Climate Change: A
Plan for Honouring the Kyoto Commitment,228 released on 13 April 2005,229
largely sets out only broad response parameters. For example, for the about
700 companies considered to be large final emitters (LFEs), including com-
panies in the mining, manufacturing, oil and gas, and thermal electricity
sectors, a system of addressing their greenhouse emissions is proposed that is
largely market-based. While LFE companies could choose to invest for in-
house emission reductions, they could also comply with emission reduction
targets by various other compliance options including the purchase of emis-
sion reductions from other LFE companies and the purchase of “green” inter-
national credits recognized by Canada.230 The Plan, while proposing LFE
regulations to be developed in 2005 to, among other things, set rules for
domestic and international trading, does not spell out details and pledges
that the government will consult with Canadians on how the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act, 1999 might be used to implement the LFE
system.231
The Plan also relies heavily on incentives and voluntary approaches. For
example, one of the most criticized parts of the Plan is the decision to leave
automobile industry reduction commitments to a “soft” memorandum of
understanding.232 The industry has agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions in 2010 by 5.3 megatonnes from the light duty vehicle sector (cars and
light duty trucks) through such means as advanced emission technologies
and more alternative fuel and hybrid vehicles.233
Conclusion
To date, Canada has waded and wandered in the tricky currents of precau-
tion. Only cautious steps have been taken to incorporate the precautionary
principle into federal legislation while the provinces and territories have
hardly tested the legal waters. With the exception of ocean dumping
control, Canada has largely wandered towards weak versions of precaution
by emphasizing the need for “sound science” and cost-effectiveness and
giving primacy to economic growth.
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Given political, social and cultural differences in Canada, the precaution-
ary principle will likely provide an ongoing touchstone for discourses about
ecosystem protection and broader public interests.234 As noted by Stanley
Fish, legal principles are not neutral but provide catalytic sources for inter-
pretive arguments:
Principles don’t by themselves aggravate or produce anything; prin-
ciples never appear “by themselves” but are deployed and configured by
partisan agents in particular situations. Principles, in short, are part of
the arsenal or equipment of prudence, not an alternative to it.235
Tensions are certain to continue over application of the precautionary
principle. The extent to which the precautionary approach should be con-
strained by scientific research and traditional risk assessment is one area of
contention.236 The appropriate ethical viewpoint directing precautionary
action is another issue with various competing philosophies, such as deep
ecology favoring strong environmental rights and utilitarian approaches
embracing cost–benefit and risk–benefit analysis.237
Key questions remain. What institutional innovations are needed and
politically realistic at the national and international levels to support precau-
tionary decision making?238 To what extent will the parameters of the precau-
tionary principle be dictated through bureaucratic fiats and judicial decisions
rather than determined through discursive processes?239 Navigation through
the tricky currents of precaution is likely to be a long and rough voyage.240
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7 Australia and the precautionary
principle
Moving from international principles
to domestic and local implementation
Lorne K. Kriwoken, Liza D. Fallon and 
Donald R. Rothwell
Introduction: the tricky currents of precaution
The precautionary principle has been widely accepted in policy directives
and legislation at all levels of government in Australia. It has also been
specifically recognized as policy guidance for Australian coastal and ocean
planning and management. For example, the Commonwealth’s Guiding
Principles for Management of Coastal Resources define the precautionary
approach as:
1 If there is high risk of serious or irreversible adverse impacts from a use
of a resource, that use should be permitted only if those impacts can be
mitigated or there are overwhelming grounds for proceeding in the
national interest.
2 If a use is assessed as having a low risk of causing serious or irreversible
adverse impacts, or there is insufficient information with which to assess
fully and with certainty the magnitude and nature of impacts, decision-
making should proceed in a conservative and cautious manner. The
absence of scientific certainty should not be a reason for postponing
measures to prevent or mitigate negative impacts.1
Whilst the acceptance of the precautionary principle is widespread, the
operational details of precaution, in many cases, remain to be tested. Imple-
mentation of the precautionary principle therefore remains a significant
challenge for all levels of government in Australia, and not just at federal or
state/territorial levels, but also for local and municipal governments.
The overall aim of this chapter is to explore the application of the precau-
tionary principle in the context of the Australian coastal and ocean environ-
ment. It commences with relevant background to the precautionary
principle in Australia through the development of ecologically sustainable
development, the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment and Aus-
tralia’s Ocean Policy. Relevant legislative instruments are reviewed and
judicial and administration applications of the principle are assessed. Case
studies of two coastal and ocean sectors are undertaken and an assessment
made of how the precautionary principle has been applied in each instance.
Concluding comments are made as to the state of the precautionary prin-
ciple in Australia.
Australian general steps and wanderings
Ecologically sustainable development
In June 1990, the Hawke Labor Government released a discussion paper on
ecologically sustainable development (ESD) that identified a range of
environmental problems (air, water, land degradation, loss of species, inade-
quate waste control, and Australia’s contribution to stratospheric ozone
depletion and climate change).2 After two years of work the process pro-
duced nine sectoral (agriculture, energy use, energy production, fisheries,
forest use, manufacturing, mining, tourism and transport) and two inter-
sectoral reports containing a multitude of consensus-based recommendations
for consideration by Australian federal, state and territory governments.3
The 1992 National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development included
three core objectives and a set of guiding principles. The latter recognized
the precautionary principle. This set the stage for the Council of Australian
Governments to form an Intergovernmental Committee for Ecologically
Sustainable Development (ICESD) in 1992, pursuant to its adoption of an
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE).4 The ESD process and
the ESD Steering Committee that monitored the implementation of the
National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development influenced the
mandate of ICESD. ICESD published the Summary Report on Implementation of
the Ecologically Sustainable Development Strategy in December 1993,5 the
Forward Agenda in 1994,6 and the 1993–1995 Report on Implementation of the
ESD Strategy in July 1996.7 However, these reports tend to be descriptive of
achievements under the ESD Steering Committee’s own strategy, and it is
therefore difficult to assess the effectiveness of implementation merely from
a reading of the reports. It is especially difficult to say what is directly
related to the ESD process and what would have occurred irrespective of its
existence. In 1998, ICESD was wound up and future monitoring of the
implementation of the ESD Strategy, if any, is likely to rest with the federal
Department of the Environment and Heritage.
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment
In February 1992, through the IGAE, all levels of government throughout
Australia (Commonwealth, state and local) agreed to follow the precaution-
ary principle as part of a commitment to ecologically sustainable develop-
ment. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental
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damage, the IGAE agreed that a lack of full scientific certainty should not
be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degra-
dation. In the application of the precautionary principle, public and private
decisions should be guided by careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practica-
ble, serious or irreversible damage to the environment and an assessment of
risk-weighted consequences of various options.8
Australia’s Oceans Policy
Australia’s Oceans Policy was released in 1998. It recognized the need for
understanding and protecting of biodiversity, promotion of ecologically sus-
tainable development, encouraging equitable, efficient and economic utiliza-
tion of resources, job creation, and establishing broad principles and
planning and management approaches in an effort to achieve the goal of eco-
logically sustainable development for Australia’s oceans.9 Australia’s Oceans
Policy adopts Principles for Ecologically Sustainable Development, recognizing
that ocean health and integrity is fundamental to ecologically sustainable
development. Specific acknowledgement is made to the precautionary prin-
ciple:
Incomplete information should not be used as a reason for postponing
precautionary measures intended to prevent serious or irreversible
environmental degradation of the oceans.10
A key task for the National Oceans Office, established to implement and
give effect to Australia’s Oceans Policy, has been to interpret and apply prin-
ciples of ecologically sustainable development and the precautionary
principle.
Legislative instruments supporting the precautionary
principle
The precautionary principle is now widely accepted in Australian Common-
wealth legislation.11 Examples of specific federal legislative requirements for
the application of the precautionary principle include:
• Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
• Environment, Sport and Territories Legislation Amendment Act 1995
• Fisheries Administration Act 199112
• Fisheries Management Act 199113
• Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act 199714
• Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 197515
• Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) (Waigani Convention)
Regulations 1999
• National Environment Protection Council Act 1994.16
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Of these instruments, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conserva-
tion Act 1999 (EPBC Act) (Cth) represents the most significant attempt to
reform Commonwealth environmental law in Australia since the introduc-
tion of the Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth).17 The
principles of ecologically sustainable development are referred to in the
objectives of the Act. The objectives of the Act also include a definition of
the precautionary principle as part of the principles of ecologically sustain-
able development:
if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
measures to prevent environmental degradation . . .18
The EPBC Act emphasizes the protection of those aspects of the environ-
ment that are “matters of national environmental significance.” Six of the
seven matters of national environmental significance identified by the
Council of Australian Governments Agreement are direct triggers that
invoke the EPBC Act, including World Heritage properties, Ramsar listed
wetlands, listed threatened species and communities, listed migratory
species, protection of the environment from nuclear actions, and the marine
environment.
Of significance under the Act is the obligation placed upon the Minister
of Environment and Heritage to consider the precautionary principle in
decision making. The EPBC Act states:
Taking account of precautionary principle:
(1) The Minister must take account of the precautionary principle in
making a decision listed in the Table in subsection (3), to the
extent he or she can do so consistently with the other provisions of
this Act.
Precautionary principle:
(2) The precautionary principle is that lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to prevent
degradation of the environment where there are threats of serious or
irreversible environmental damage.19
Under the EPBC Act there are 14 decisions for which the precautionary
principle must be taken into account. These decisions involve determining
whether a proposed action is a controlled action, and whether to approve the
taking of an action. Decisions also concern the granting of permits and
making/adopting/varying management plans for various protected areas.20
The EPBC Act remains a relatively new initiative, and there is consider-
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able scope in its potential application to a range of marine activities in
support of Australia’s Oceans Policy.21 One area of potential application, espe-
cially in giving effect to the precautionary approach, is with respect to fish-
eries in both Commonwealth and state/territorial waters. While the focus of
the Act is on matters of national environmental importance, the potential
exists in the Act’s extension to the marine environment and thereby fisheries
within those waters, to fall under the application of the precautionary prin-
ciple.22 The consequential interaction of the EPBC Act with its strong
environmental principles and the Fisheries Management Act 1999 (Cth) has
the potential to raise some significant issues due to the different manage-
ment approaches of each Act.23
Other illustrations of the precautionary principle being implemented fed-
erally can be found in the Environmental Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981
(Cth), which regulates ocean dumping in Australian waters consistent with
the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Convention.24 The Act has been sub-
stantially adjusted in light of the 1996 Protocol, which while still not in
force has been given effect under Australian law, and accordingly imple-
ments an important international initiative supporting the precautionary
principle.
The Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Regulations 1999
(Cth) are intended to give effect to the 1995 Convention to Ban the Importation
into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control
the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within the
South Pacific Region (Waigani Convention).25 The precautionary principle
occurs once in these Regulations. Other areas of Commonwealth respons-
ibility where the precautionary principle is recognized are fisheries, marine
pollution and seabed activities.26
State and territorial legislation recognizing the precautionary
principle
At a state and territorial level in Australia there are also examples of where
the precautionary principle has been given effect. The Protection of the
Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW) commits to the principles of
inter-generational equity and the conservation of biological diversity and has
adopted the precautionary principle as an objective. The principle is worded
in a traditional fashion. If there are threats of serious or irreversible environ-
mental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason
for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation. Under the
Act, the New South Wales Environment Protection Authority must have
regard to the need to maintain ecologically sustainable development, includ-
ing the precautionary principle. The requirement that the principle be
applied is also set out in a number of federal natural resource policies that
inform state policies including the National Strategy for Rangeland Manage-
ment, the National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological
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Diversity, the Decade of Landcare, the National Water Quality Management
Strategy and the National Forests Policy Statement.27 The Environment Protection
Act 1993 (SA) also provides a commitment:
to apply a precautionary approach to the assessment of risk of environ-
mental harm and ensure that all aspects of environmental quality
affected by pollution and waste (including ecosystem sustainability and
valued environmental attributes) are considered in decisions relating to
the environment . . .
In Tasmania, a more comprehensive approach has been taken in the Tas-
manian Resource Management and Planning System (RMPS) adopted in
1994. RMPS consists of an integrated policy, statutory and legislative
framework for resource management.28 The cornerstone of the RMPS is the
State Projects and Policies Act 1993 (Tas), which provides for an integrated
assessment of state policies and sets out the principles and objectives of sus-
tainable development.29 The Tasmanian State Coastal Policy was developed
under the RMPS framework in 1996.30 The Living Marine Resources Manage-
ment Act 1995 (Tas) and the Marine Farming Planning Act 1995 (Tas) empha-
size a precautionary approach to development and use a “reverse onus of
proof” in enforcement and compliance.
Judicial and administrative application of the
precautionary principle
During the past decade, Australian courts at all levels have had occasion to con-
sider aspects of the precautionary principle, both as doctrine of the common
law31 and as endorsed by statute. The leading case is Leatch v. National Parks
and Wildlife Service.32 Considering the status of the precautionary principle in
New South Wales law, and the related impact of the 1992 Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity,33 Justice Stein considered that, even though there was no spe-
cific reference to the precautionary principle in the National Parks and Wildlife
Act 1974 (NSW), or to ecologically sustainable development, the legislation
allowed the decision-maker to take into account any matter that could be rele-
vant, including the precautionary principle. The judge found that a considera-
tion of the state of knowledge or uncertainty regarding a species, the potential
for serious or irreversible harm and the adoption of a cautious approach, were
consistent with the subject, scope and purpose of the legislation in question.
Subsequent decisions of the New South Wales Land and Environment Court
have endorsed and applied the Leatch decision, though none have further
advanced the debate on application of the principle.34
The application of the precautionary principle has since been confirmed
in nearly all Australian states and territories and is now firmly established as
an appropriate legal consideration. What remains evident, however, is an
uncertainty as to not only what the content of the principle is, but also how
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the courts are to apply it.35 For example, in the South Australian case of the
Tuna Boat Owners Association of SA Inc v. Development Assessment Commission,36
following an appeal from the Environment Resources and Development
Court,37 the Supreme Court of South Australia stated in reference to the
application of the principle:
There can be no hard and fast rules about what is required in a case such
as this. Everything will depend upon the circumstances of the particular
case, especially the level of knowledge about the impacts of the particu-
lar proposal.38
A significant difficulty for the development of the jurisprudence concerning
the precautionary principle has been the lack of superior court authority. In the
leading Federal Court case, Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v. Minister for
Environment and Others,39 Justice Sackville sought to limit its application to mean
interpreting the statute in a common sense cautious way, fully considering avail-
able evidence as to environmental impact. To date, there has been no serious
consideration of the principle by the High Court of Australia. However, there
have been emerging signs of the Court’s willingness to look to international law
principles when interpreting the common law and in ensuring that in the case of
ambiguity, statutes are interpreted consistently with international law.40
A significant administrative recognition of the application of the precau-
tionary principle was apparent in 1996 when a major mining company,
North Limited, submitted a development application for the Lake Cowal
Gold Project. This involved the development of an open pit gold mine, but
was refused consent by the New South Wales government on the grounds
that the unknown risks to the significant environment of Lake Cowal, a
national estate listed wetland, could only be avoided by refusing the pro-
posal. The company has since revised its risk assessment and resubmitted its
environment impact assessment.
Case studies on the precautionary principle
Aquaculture
Aquaculture involves the farming of aquatic organisms and includes breed-
ing, hatching, rearing and the cultivation of fish, mollusks, crustaceans and
aquatic plants for sale.41 It is a growing sector of the seafood industry that
has undergone significant expansion in Australia over the past decade.42
There are over 2,000 aquaculture licensees in Australia and fewer than 100
large-scale commercial producers that account collectively for the majority
of production and employment.43 While over 40 species are being produced,
this figure is broken down (by order of value) into pearls (comprising of
between 30 and 50 percent of total aquaculture), salmon/trout (16 percent),
prawns (8 percent), oysters (8 percent) and tuna (more recently 33 percent).
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Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) aquaculture was introduced to the island
state of Tasmania from Norway in 1985 and quickly became the second
most important aquaculture harvest before being overtaken by tuna fatten-
ing in 1998.44 This industry was valued at AUD$85 million in 1999–2000
and it contributes over 83 percent of the region’s total aquaculture produc-
tion.45 The fastest growing sector in the Australian aquaculture industry is
Southern bluefin tuna (Thunnus maccoyii), which began in 1991 to add value
to a severely diminished tuna catch quota. In 1999, tuna aquaculture was
worth approximately AUD$130 million although it has reached its limit of
expansion, constrained by the total allowable catch quota of 5,265 tonnes
per annum set by the Commonwealth government.46
Given the success and growth of the aquaculture industry in Australia,
environmental issues and access to suitable sites in marine waters are
important considerations.47 Suitable sites are highly contested. Although 85
percent of Australian aquaculture production is in coastal state waters, the
opportunities for expansion are more likely to be in offshore marine waters.
This expansion, and the concern for developing an environmentally sustain-
able industry, have resulted in Commonwealth government, aquaculture
industry and research body representatives drafting national and state man-
agement regimes that deal with issues such as disease resistance, immunity
stress, fish nutrition and feed development for freshwater and marine fish,
water quality, reproduction, and genetic variation and modification of
oysters, prawns and fish.
Management of marine aquaculture in Australia
The Commonwealth government has no specific statutory responsibility for
aquaculture management in Australia, although (along with state and terri-
tory governments) it does have a role in ensuring the industry is ecologically
sustainable. At the federal level, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) and the Wildlife Projection (Regulation of Exports
and Imports) Act 1982 (WP(REI) Act) (Cth) specifically promote ecologically
sustainable development. Under the EPBC Act, the Commonwealth govern-
ment has increased its assessment of marine aquaculture operations proposed
in sensitive areas, and any aquaculture development that is likely to have a
significant impact on a matter of national environmental significance
requires the approval of the Environment Minister. The primary objective of
the WP(REI) Act is to enable Australia to comply with its obligations under
the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES)48 by regulating the export and import of certain
animal and plant products. From December 2003, exports of all aquaculture
species will only be allowed if it can be demonstrated that they have been
farmed in an ecologically sustainable way and have not had a detrimental
effect on matters of environmental significance.
Aquaculture is a primary production activity under the authority of
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regional state governments.49 Marine farming is licensed under state legisla-
tion and licenses include environmental conditions to ensure that these
activities do not result in unacceptable impact on the marine environment.50
Australia also has an important responsibility in the planning and manage-
ment of marine aquaculture operations, particularly in the coordination of
policy including quarantine, disease control, product quality, labeling,
funding and taxation.
Developments in Australian aquaculture management
In March 1994, the Commonwealth government released the National Strat-
egy on Aquaculture in Australia. The Strategy was developed to provide a
vision for “an environmentally sustainable aquaculture industry” that gener-
ated economic benefit for Australia. However, the Strategy makes no
mention of the precautionary principle and although it states that the
“industry must be sensitive to community and government concerns for the
protection of the environment and operate in an ecologically sustainable
manner,” no direction is provided as to how this may be achieved.51
The implementation of the Strategy was expected to be effective once the
lead agencies developed and implemented action plans relating to each of
the major issues. In 1997, a Strategy Implementation Review was undertaken to
document its achievements and future action required to fulfill the Strat-
egy’s aims.52 Table 7.1 summarizes the major achievements and priorities
identified in the Implementation Review, including the need for more work
to be undertaken on ecologically sustainable development with regard to the
marine aquaculture industry, an environmental framework, increased
research and development, and increased resource and market access.
The Implementation Review concluded that the “continued growth and
development of a strong, environmentally sustainable aquaculture industry
depend on the timely implementation of the priorities for future action.”54
Again, no specific mention is made to the precautionary principle.
However, the Implementation Review recognized that aquaculture can
affect the environment, and that appropriate management practices and
technologies and management plans, codes of practice and risk assessments
of the possible interaction between cultured animals and wild fish stocks
were required if the industry was to be ecologically sustainable. In particu-
lar, it called for enhanced and enforced risk assessment protocols for intra-
and inter-state movement of aquatic organisms and the importation of
aquatic organisms (including aquarium fish, imported fish, fish products
and ballast waters) to minimize the accidental import of disease incursions
and exotic organisms.
Federal government responses to ecologically sustainable aquaculture
practices are also recognized in Australia’s Oceans Policy,55 which includes a
commitment to further implement the National Aquaculture Strategy, to
develop objective-based environmental standards and management
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measures, to develop consistent national guidelines for environmental stand-
ards, and to identify best practices for ecological sustainability, clarity, effi-
ciency and effectiveness. Despite these commitments, Australia’s Oceans
Policy fails to incorporate specific measures relating to the precautionary
principle and aquaculture.
The voluntary Code of Conduct for Australian Aquaculture was initiated in
1998 through the Australian Aquaculture Forum (renamed the National
Aquaculture Council in 2000), a body representing industry, governments
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Table 7.1 Key goals of the National Strategy on Aquaculture and the major achieve-
ments and priorities identified in the Strategic Implementation Review53
Key goal Achievement Priorities for future action
Government Developed state/territory/ Relevant authorities to 
framework regional plans for the improve coordination of
aquaculture industry aquaculture management
Environmental Revised relevant Develop national 
management legislation and license framework/guidelines for 
conditions to ensure that aquaculture
aquaculture operates 
within acceptable social 
and environmental 
standards From these guidelines 
develop industry codes of
practice that incorporate a
framework for regulatory
control
Water and land use Developed resource/ Designate aquaculture zones 
planning management plans that in coastal areas and achieve 
include aquaculture secure long-term tenure of 
and recognize industry sites and operations
needs
Research and Improved research and Improve communication 






Education and Cooperative Research Develop more short-term 
training Centre for Aquaculture specialist/technical courses 
financed collaborative and workshops, particularly 
research for 23 doctorate in biology and marketing
students
and environmental interest groups.56 The Code aims to maintain ecological
and economic sustainability and adopts the following principles: ecological
sustainable development; economic viability; long-term protection of the
environment to ensure the viability of suitable aquaculture sites; compliance
with, and auditing of adherence to, regulation and the Code; resource
sharing and consideration of other users of the environment; and research
and development. Again, the precautionary principle is not referred to
directly in the Code, however, it provides direction to facilitate ecological
sustainability and recommends that the aquaculture industry comply with
all regulations, respect the rights of others, protect the environment, treat
aquatic animals humanely, and promote safety of seafood and other aquatic
foods for human consumption. It supports a total catch management
approach based on natural resources management and promotes the mainte-
nance of efficient and sustainable stocking densities.
In 1998, Australia also became a member of the Network of Aquaculture
Centres in the Asia-Pacific to promote sustainable development. The volun-
tary Code of Conduct for a Responsible Seafood Industry was developed to set
standards of behavior to ensure the conservation of marine ecosystems and
management of living aquatic resources.57 In particular, the Code states that
operators will encourage the development and operation of aquaculture in a
manner, and at a rate, in accordance with ecologically sustainable principles.
In 1999, the Commonwealth government released the National Aquatic
Animal Health Plan (AQUAPLAN) to provide a strategic direction to animal
health issues.58 It includes eight programs, including protection of Aus-
tralia’s aquatic animal health status, quarantine, surveillance, and methods
and protocols to manage emergency aquatic disease outbreaks. During the
same period, the Commonwealth government convened a national aquacul-
ture workshop (which included industry and government representatives)
because the national aquaculture strategy and subsequent review were con-
sidered to be too broad in scope and unclear with respect to time frames.59
Following this workshop, the Aquaculture Industry Action Agenda Discussion
Paper was released in 2001. It presents the following vision for the aquacul-
ture industry and states:
By 2010 a sustainable, vibrant and rapidly growing Australian aquacul-
ture industry will achieve at least $AUD2.5 billion in annual sales by
being the world’s most globally competitive aquaculture producer.60
The Discussion Paper aims to assist the aquaculture industry in develop-
ing environmental principles and codes of practice.61 In addition, it provides
time frames, restates that marine aquaculture operations need continual
improvement, and refers directly to the National Strategy for Ecologically Sus-
tainable Development. However, despite the precautionary principle not being
actively mentioned, a number of precautionary “influenced” directions are
included, for example:
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• To avoid negativity “from coastal communities over their perceived loss
of aesthetic and recreational values, as well as concerns expressed over
the possible negative impact of aquaculture on the environment . . . one
possible response to reduced resource availability and lengthy approval
processes in high-demand coastal areas is to undertake aquaculture in
coastal areas with fewer users, in off-shore areas or inland.”
• The Australian aquaculture industry does not need to use significant
amounts of chemicals because it is free from many diseases found in
other countries.
• Incursions of endemic and exotic pests, weeds and diseases in the
aquatic environment need to be managed to maintain biodiversity.
• The aquaculture industry has expressed concerns over diseases entering
Australia through imports of aquaculture products from overseas.62
As the Aquaculture Industry Action Agenda Discussion Paper points out, if eco-
logically sustainable development is to be achieved for aquaculture, “the
industry needs to go beyond compliance and take steps, such as developing
Best Practice Management Practices” to integrate environmental manage-
ment and the precautionary principle into each stage of their operations.63
The Discussion Paper is intended to form the basis for new guidelines to
regulate and manage the aquaculture industry and provide consistency
across jurisdictions.64
Industry focus – marine aquaculture in Tasmania
Similarly to other marine areas in Australia, marine aquaculture in Tasmania
has expanded rapidly over the past decade and has become one of the state’s
major industries. As discussed, commercially farmed species in Tasmania’s
clean marine waters include Atlantic salmon, trout, abalone, scallops,
mussels, Pacific oysters (Crassostrea gigas) and Rock lobsters ( Jasus
edwardsii).65
Marine farms are located in Tasmanian territorial waters within three
nautical miles of the coast. In 1999, 145 marine farms were registered in
Tasmania occupying some 20km2 of coastal water.66 In Tasmania, prescribed
legislation legally implementing marine farm planning initially came under
the Fisheries Act 1959 (Tas), which was amended in 1982 to include marine
farming activities.67 Since then, the Marine Farming Planning Act 1995 (Tas)
has been developed to overcome deficiencies in the previous Act and to meet
the rapid growth of marine aquaculture in Tasmania. This new legislation is
loosely incorporated into Tasmania’s RMPS in an effort to promote sustain-
able development, fair and orderly use of the environment, integration of
marine farm activities with other marine users, public involvement, eco-
nomic development and the sharing of responsibility between spheres of
government, community and industry. This legislative and management
scheme has now been confirmed by the State Coastal Policy Validation Act
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2003 (Tas), which seeks to give effect to the revised Tasmanian State Coastal
Policy.
The Marine Farming Planning Act 1995 (Tas) allows for the preparation of
Marine Farm Development Plans in an effort to outline the legislative
framework, to provide a basis for aquaculture zoning, to develop manage-
ment plans, and to identify and mitigate environmental impacts resulting
from aquaculture operations. These development and zoning plans also “des-
ignate areas that are unsuitable for siting marine farms and prescribe limits
to the areal coverage of farms in zones where aquaculture will be
permitted.”68
All statutes under the Tasmanian RMPS have sustainable development
“objectives” that include the development of state policies under the State
Policy and Projects Act 1993 (Tas). The Tasmanian State Coastal Policy specifi-
cally states that marine farming must be planned and conducted in accord-
ance with sustainable development principles.69 In addition, other relevant
terrestrial and marine resource management and planning legislation is to be
consistent with the objectives, principles and outcomes of the Policy. In
particular, section 2.1.5 of the Policy describes the implementation of the
precautionary principle to the development of the “coastal zone” in accord-
ance with national ecologically sustainable development principles.
Additionally, the Tasmanian State of the Environment Report concluded that
more data and research were required on the environmental impacts of
marine farming and the precautionary principle must be applied in the plan-
ning and managing of marine farming operations.70 This point is exempli-
fied in the policy and background information to the Draft Marine Farm
Development Plan for the Pipe Clay Lagoon and Georges Bay as follows:
There is a general shortage of detailed long-term scientific information
providing baseline environmental data on the marine environment.
There has also been limited research into the impacts of the marine
farming industry in Tasmania . . . however, it is recognized that the
time and costs involved in obtaining a comprehensive data set would
delay strategies to cope with the expected pressures for growth in the
industry over the next few years.71
This example demonstrates how the Tasmanian Government and the
aquaculture industry absolved their responsibility when applying the pre-
cautionary principle as set out in the Tasmanian State Coastal Policy by
attempting to legitimize “industry pressures” as a valid reason for overlook-
ing the objectives set out in Tasmania’s marine and environmental legisla-
tion and policies.
Interestingly, the Victorian government utilized the precautionary prin-
ciple when it rejected the farming of Pacific oysters within its territorial
waters. This decision was in part based upon a report detailing the environ-
mental impacts of Pacific oyster farming in Tasmania.72 However, despite
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the rejection of this industry by the Victorian government, the Tasmanian
aquaculture industry continues to farm this species. Dense aggregations of
Pacific oysters in rocky areas limit food and space for native species. Escapes
from marine farms have also resulted in feral populations becoming estab-
lished outside enclosures, and the parasitic copepod (Mytilocola orientalis) has
been introduced to commercial mussels.73 Environmental sustainability, the
precautionary principle and inter/intra-generational equity may have been
compromised with regard to Pacific oyster farming in Tasmanian waters.
Overall, the Tasmanian aquaculture industry has benefited from the
introduction of the Marine Farming Planning Act 1995 (Tas), particularly
under section 65 that refers to tenure of security. Tenure ensures that marine
farm leases are secured for a period of 30 years and operators can apply for an
additional renewal period of ten years. Given that 30 years is a relatively
long time when considering the environmental impacts that marine farms
can have on the environment, the responsibility of ensuring ecologically sus-
tainable aquaculture operations, the precautionary principle and inter/intra-
generational equity for all marine users is placed directly back onto
individual marine farmers.
Biodiversity protection – marine protected areas
Consistent with its developing obligations under the 1992 Convention on
Biological Diversity, a Draft National Strategy for the Conservation of Aus-
tralia’s Biological Diversity was released in March 1992 with the broad goal
of protecting biological diversity and maintaining ecological processes and
systems. The principles of the Strategy recognized the role of in situ con-
servation and supported the specific use of marine protected areas (MPAs)
throughout Australia as a means of supporting marine biodiversity. In the
Australian context, a marine protected area is defined as an area of sea
(which may include the seabed and subsoil under the sea) established by
law for the protection and maintenance of biological diversity and of
natural and cultural resources. MPAs are considered an important manage-
ment tool for promoting marine conservation and management, protecting
biodiversity and supporting the sustainable use of marine resources.74
Approximately 58.5 million ha of terrestrial areas are protected (about 7.6
percent of the Australian mainland). However, the marine environment is
very different. Approximately 38.9 million ha is conserved in marine pro-
tected areas, or about 3.5 percent of the Australian exclusive economic
zone (EEZ). Nevertheless, Australia is still considered a world leader in
declaring MPAs for marine conservation and management, with nearly
one-quarter of all declared MPAs in the world residing in Australian terri-
tory. The administration, management and control of Commonwealth
reserves and conservation zones under the EPBC Act is the responsibility
of the Director of National Parks, within the Department of the Environ-
ment and Heritage.
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The precautionary principle is mentioned in an Act that has specific rele-
vance to MPAs. The object of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975
(Cth) was to “make provision for and in relation to the establishment,
control, care and development of a marine park in the Great Barrier Reef
Region” in accordance with the provisions of the Act.75 The precautionary
principle is referred to in Part VB of the Act, which deals with management
plans. It also occurs in section 39Z, which requires that the Great Barrier
Reef Marine Park Authority be informed by the precautionary principle in
the preparation of management plans. The precautionary principle is defined
as having the same meaning as in section 3(5)(1) of the IGAE which is set
out in a schedule to the National Environment Protection Council Act 1994
(Cth).
New Commonwealth MPAs can be proclaimed in waters from three nau-
tical miles to the 200 nautical mile boundary of the Australian EEZ. The
designation of MPAs often straddles the boundaries of state and federal
jurisdictions. In these cases, MPAs are jointly managed with the Common-
wealth government and the relevant state or territory. States and territories
can also declare MPAs within three nautical miles.
Australia’s Ocean Policy also supports the increased declaration of MPAs in
Commonwealth waters.76 Consistent with this approach, the South-east
Regional Marine Plan gives special emphasis to developing a system of
representative MPAs in Commonwealth waters within the region. Noting
that in the past, Commonwealth and state governments have tended to
develop their own MPAs independently, the Marine Plan envisages
enhanced linkages across jurisdictions. Other initiatives identified in the
Marine Plan include further identification of MPAs from broad areas of
interest within the South-east Region, along with a review of the process
and methods used for identifying candidate MPAs.77
Since the designation of the first MPA in 1938,78 significant advances
have been made in MPA development. One of the most recent advances has
been the promotion of the 1999 National Representative System of Marine Pro-
tected Areas (NRSMPA) with a goal to “establish and manage a comprehen-
sive, adequate and representative system of MPAs to contribute to the
long-term ecological viability of marine and estuarine systems, maintain
ecological processes and systems, and protect Australia’s biological diversity
at all levels.”79 Secondary goals of the NRSMPA are to promote integrated
ecosystem management, to manage human activities, to provide for the
needs of species and ecological communities, and to provide for the recre-
ational, aesthetic, cultural and economic needs of indigenous and non-
indigenous people, where these are compatible with the primary goal.80 The
NRSMPA represents a national system of MPAs that contain representative
samples of Australia’s marine ecosystems. The system explicitly adopts the
following principles: regional framework, comprehensiveness, adequacy, rep-
resentativeness, highly protected areas, the precautionary principle, consul-
tation, indigenous involvement and integration of decision making. The
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precautionary principle is specifically referred to with respect to MPAs as
follows:
The absence of scientific certainty should not be a reason for postponing
measures to establish MPAs to protect representative ecosystems. If an
activity is assessed as having a low risk of causing serious or irreversible
adverse impacts, or if there is insufficient information with which to
assess fully and with certainty the magnitude and nature of impacts,
decision-making should proceed in a conservative and cautious
manner.81
The NRSMPA uses the 1998 Interim Marine and Coastal Regionalisation for
Australia (IMCRA)82 as a framework for the representative designation of
MPAs. IMCRA represents a series of maps and descriptions used to identify
distinct biological and physical characteristics. Maps are produced at a
regional scale (or meso-scale referring to 100s to 1,000s of km) and at a
provincial scale (greater than 1,000s of km). By using these two scales, it is
possible to plan at a broad ecological level and at more detailed ecosystem,
community and species distribution levels. In this way, IMCRA can assist in
identifying areas that need further representation and provide for priority
setting and delivery of programs to support the NRSMPA.
IMCRA maps have been produced, outlining five distinct categories
ranging from no protected areas in an IMCRA bioregion to a category repre-
senting greater than 50 percent coverage. The 60 IMCRA bioregions repre-
sent only 2.2 millionkm2, which is a small portion of Australia’s EEZ. What
is also evident is that a vast difference exists in representation between biore-
gions. Twenty-one bioregions have no MPAs, 21 have MPAs with coverage
of less than 1 percent and five bioregions have coverage between 1 and 10
percent. MPAs are skewed towards 11 bioregions, representing 92 percent of
MPAs. Understandably these bioregions represent the Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park (GBRMP) (Queensland), the Great Australian Bight Marine
Park (South Australia and Western Australia) and Shark Bay Marine Park
and Ningaloo Marine Park (Western Australia). The GBRMP is therefore
not representative of the size of most Australian MPAs. Most MPAs are very
small, and the low number of large MPAs contributes disproportionately to
the total protected area.
The small size and number of MPAs declared at state level is illustrated
in Tasmania. The 1990 Joint Policy for the Establishment and Management of
Marine Reserves in Tasmania83 identified additional sites for MPA designa-
tion. Four new MPAs were declared under the National Parks and Wildlife
Act 1970 (Tas). The fish, however, within these MPAs were protected under
the Living Marine Resources Act 1995 (Tas).84 In 2001, over ten years later,
the Tasmanian government released the Tasmanian Marine Protected Area
Strategy to establish and manage new MPAs.85 In 2003, areas previously
identified as potential MPAs in the Davey and Twofold Shelf bioregions
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were finally declared, representing the first substantial designations in over a
decade.86
In contrast, just off the Tasmanian continental shelf and surrounding
Macquarie Island (which is under the jurisdiction of the state of Tasmania),
the Commonwealth government has declared significantly sized new MPAs.
The Tasmanian Seamounts Reserve was declared on 16 May 1999, recogniz-
ing the unique habitat and wildlife of the area and to protect the vulnerable
benthic communities of the seamounts from human-induced disturbance.87
Located 170km south of Hobart, the MPA covers 37,000ha and includes
some 70 seamounts that are remnants of extinct volcanoes between 200 and
500 meters high and several kilometers across at their base. This distinctive
geological feature supports a unique benthic community with at least eight
new genera. The unique aspect of this MPA is the way in which it has been
zoned. A “managed resource zone” includes the area from the surface to a
depth of 500 meters. This zone promotes the long-term protection and
maintenance of biological diversity and also provides access to commercial
fishing using non-trawling methods, such as the tuna longline fishery. The
“highly protected zone” includes the areas from a depth of 100 meters to
500 meters below the seabed. This zone is managed to protect the integrity
of the benthic ecosystem and excludes fishing, petroleum or mineral explo-
ration.
Conclusion
Australia has a mixed record in terms of implementing and giving effect to
the precautionary principle. There has been considerable governmental effort
in defining the principle and seeking to embed it within environmental and
resource management policies and strategies. Further, transposition of the
precautionary approach into national law and administration has been
affected by articulating it as an objective or required consideration in legis-
lation at both federal, state and territory levels. This has, at least, ensured
that the precautionary approach is addressed, even if in disparate ways.
However, operationalizing the principle has proved a challenge. As this
chapter has demonstrated, in certain sectors of coastal and ocean manage-
ment, such as aquaculture and marine protected areas, progress has been
made. However, distinctive federal and state legislative frameworks and pol-
icies create challenges to ensuring complementarities in a national approach.
Other sectors, such as land-based marine pollution still have considerable
hurdles before a true precautionary approach will have been taken.88 The
Australian experience suggests that disciplined interpretations and method-
ologies for application of the precautionary principle will evolve over time.
The implementation of Australia’s Oceans Policy and the work of the National
Oceans Office in developing regional marine plans is another step in this
process, which has begun to show promise with the release of the South-east
Regional Marine Plan. The Plan places particular emphasis upon the further
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development of MPAs and implementation of the NRSMPA.89 It holds the
promise of greater coordination of law, management and policy, which for a
precautionary approach in a country as large as Australia, will be vital.
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8 Marine ecosystem management
Is the whole greater than the sum of
the parts?
Bruce G. Hatcher and Roger H. Bradbury
Introduction
The emergence over the last 20 years of a paradigm for ecosystem manage-
ment parallels recognition of the necessity for holistic approaches to control-
ling human use of natural resources. Like most paradigm shifts, the move
towards an ecosystem management regime is driven by necessity born of the
failings of existing regimes, and runs the risk of uncritical acceptance at the
expense of established paradigms.1 Theory and practice have not always been
well linked, and at present the conceptual development exceeds implemen-
tation in most arenas. If we accept a simple definition of ecosystem manage-
ment as “. . . the manipulation of the ecosystem by man,”2 it is clear that
we have been managing terrestrial ecosystems at least since the use of fire
by Aboriginal peoples to direct forest productivity, and continue to do so
in restricted ecosystems through the practices of agriculture and aquacul-
ture. Only recently, however, has the approach infiltrated the highly sec-
toral governance structures of the over-developed nations as a formal
management process for the use of ocean space and marine resources.3 The
knowledge and tools required for ecosystem management in the marine
environment are less available, and the concepts and applications less well
developed than those on land. The opacity, remoteness, complexity and
connectivity of marine ecosystems make integrated management a prag-
matic necessity and a serious conceptual and logistic challenge. Agencies
responsible for marine management in both Australia and Canada are
adopting ecosystem-based approaches with varying degrees of commit-
ment and success.
In this chapter we review the theory and practice of marine ecosystem
management in the Canadian and Australian contexts by considering two
questions: What are the essential precepts of marine ecosystem manage-
ment? How are these being incorporated into the mandate and practices of
marine resource management and ocean governance?
Essential precepts of marine ecosystem management
Ecosystem-based approaches to management have received considerable
description and synthesis in the literatures of natural science and resource
management.4 There is no universally accepted definition of ecosystem man-
agement, and the variable use of the term has been justly criticized.5 Three
fundamental aspects of ecosystem management must, however, be specified
in any operational definition:
1 the intended objectives or outcomes of management (i.e. preservation of
marine biodiversity, conservation of exploited marine resources, or reser-
vation of rights of access and usage),
2 the ecological entities in which management occurs (i.e. the ocean space,
marine or coastal ecosystem), and
3 the governance structures and processes by which management is
executed (i.e. legislation, regulation and compliance).
Of these, how the marine ecosystem is defined scientifically largely
determines how management is prescribed to operate at this level of under-
standing in order to achieve stated outcomes: ecosystem management is
predicated upon the understanding of an ecosystem. The actual manage-
ment techniques employed, and the degree to which management actually
achieves these outcomes, however, have less to do with the scientific basis of
the management policy and regime than they do with the practical limita-
tions on our ability to control ecosystem components (especially human
behavior). For example, the boundaries and regulatory framework of many
marine protected areas (MPAs), a popular ecosystem management tool, are
well matched to our understanding of marine ecosystem structure and func-
tion.6 Yet, the majority of MPAs fail to achieve their management object-
ives because of problems of implementation of those regimes.7 Indeed, it is
too early in the history of marine ecosystem management to assess rigor-
ously the effectiveness of various models and techniques. All we can do at
this stage is assess the degree to which management prescriptions match
our current best models of ecosystem function and best practice of natural
resource management.
The main thesis of this chapter is that the goals of ecosystem manage-
ment are well-enough prescribed by our current scientific knowledge, but
that this understanding, while necessary, is insufficient to prescribe the tech-
niques of ecosystem management. Comparative analysis of various experi-
ments in ecosystem management is the way ahead.
In search of holism – the justification for ecosystem approaches
The diversity and complexity of the natural world is structured by multiple,
interacting processes and patterns that are difficult to see or comprehend
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(especially underwater). Natural scientists deal with this complexity by
reduction to smaller units or integration to larger units. Reductionism dom-
inates, perhaps because it is easier; historically because it is philosophically
more acceptable (the world is a machine: to understand its working, break it
down into its constituent parts and figure out how they work). Failure  to
predict adequately the effects of human activities on a wide range of ecolo-
gical entities (from landfill rat populations to coral reef communities) using
reductionistic models have stimulated applied ecologists to experiment with
holistic methodologies that extend the theoretical underpinnings. Ecosystem
management is a case in point.
Holism is rare and more tenuous (bordering on superstition at the limit,
e.g. Gaia “theory”), but at its best distils the emergent properties from the
system’s structure or function into models for understanding, prediction or
control.8 Both approaches are essential to the advancement of our under-
standing of the natural world because they simplify the unmanageably
complex. They are best used in a complementary way, rather than in opposi-
tion, to figure out how nature works. The ecosystem is ecology’s unit of
holism, and ecosystem approaches to marine management universally
identify the ecosystem as the object of management, and demand holistic or
integrative models and methods.9
The concept of the ecosystem
The ecosystem concept and the usage of the term “ecosystem” are hardly
contentious in the field of ecology.10 It is a flexible entity that has no univer-
sal definition, yet has near universal currency and meaning in the commun-
ity of natural scientists. It is used widely and variably to refer to an
interacting system of living and non-living components in a scale-dependent
context. Thus one scientist measures the flux of nitrogen from bacteria to
interstitial water in the surficial sediment ecosystem (100mm scale), and
another measures the flux of nitrogen from mixed layer plankton communit-
ies to slope depicentres in the continental shelf ecosystem (100km scale).
The universality of the concept approaches that of the biological species
(which is a remarkably liquid entity, commonly defined as what a competent
taxonomist says it is!), but the rigor of the supporting theoretical and
empirical evidence is nowhere nearly as well developed.11 The different
maturity of these two scientific concepts contrasts curiously with the extent
and strength of policy and regulation based on them (e.g. numerous national
and international endangered species acts compared with a few based on the
ecosystem). Nonetheless, the ecosystem word increasingly finds its way into
soft and hard law, with or without explicit definition. For example, by inter-
national convention the ecosystem is “a dynamic complex of plant, animal
and microorganism communities and their non-living environment interact-
ing as functional unit,”12 while in Canada’s most recent national legislation
for marine management the term is used 17 times without formal
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definition.13 In Australia, the planning processes for the Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park Authority and the more recent regional marine plans of the
National Oceans Office are both explicitly ecosystem based.
At least 40 definitions of “ecosystem” appear in the large scientific liter-
ature on the ecosystem concept and its application to natural resource man-
agement. Rather than list them, we summarize the key elements of the
definitions, and their frequency of occurrence in the literature (Table 8.1).
Of these, two essential attributes distinguish marine ecosystems from
other categories of ecological organization (e.g. the species population, the
community or the habitat). First, marine ecosystems explicitly include the
interactions among organisms and the viscous, energetic environment they
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Table 8.1 Definitional attributes of marine ecosystems (derived from 40 published
definitions)
Ecosystem attributes Frequency Representative
of use (%) reference
The definition of ecosystem: (n=40)
Includes all living organisms (biodiversity, 100 van Dyne 1969
species, human beings)
Includes the abiotic environment (habitat, 100 Golley 1993
substratum, fluid medium)
Includes biotic–abiotic interactions (trophic 80 Odum 1994
structure, competition, succession)
Includes bio-physical processes (connectivity, 75 Lie 1985
bio-geochemical cycling)
Is dimensionally explicit (spatially fixed 70 Likens 1992
boundaries, temporal stability)
Exhibits system integrity (homeorhesis, 63 Hatcher 1997
resilience, closure)
Is hierarchically organized (emergent 25 O’Neill et al. 1986
properties, vertical symmetry)
Includes adjacent terrestrial systems 20 Sherman 1994
(watersheds, intertidal zone, coastal 
development)
Sources: George M. van Dyne (ed.) The Ecosystem Concept in Natural Resource Management (Acad-
emic Press, New York: 1969); Frank B. Golley A History of the Ecosystem Concept in Ecology
(Yale University Press, New Haven: 1993); Howard T. Odum Ecological and General Systems:
An Introduction to Systems Ecology (University Press of Colorado, Denver: 1994); Ulriche Lie
“Marine Ecosystems: Research and Management” in J. Richardson (ed.) Managing the Oceans:
Resources, Research, Law (Lomond Publ. Inc., Mt. Airy, MD: 1985); Gene. E. Likens “The
Ecosystem Approach: Its Use and Abuse” in O. Kinne (ed.) Excellence in Ecology, Volume 3
(Ecology Institute, Oldendorf/Luhe: 1992); Bruce G. Hatcher “Coral reef ecosystems: How
much greater is the whole than the sum of the parts?” (1997) 16 Coral Reefs 77–91; Robert V.
O’Neill, Donald L. DeAngelis, John B. Wade and Thomas F.H. Allen A Hierarchical Concept
of Ecosystems (Princeton University Press, Princeton: 1986); Kenneth Sherman “Sustainability,
biomass yields and health of coastal ecosystems: An ecological perspective” (1994) 112
Marine Ecology Progress Series 277–301.
inhabit (i.e. the processes at the bio-physical interface). The fluid medium of
the ocean connects marine populations, communities, habitats and pools of
biogeochemicals far more intimately than their terrestrial counterparts.14
Second, marine ecosystems implicitly exhibit some form of integrity
reflected in emergent properties (i.e. the whole is greater than the sum of the
parts, Figure 8.1), and organizational or thermodynamic closure (i.e. internal
transformations exceed transboundary fluxes).15 Without these attributes, it
is not an ecosystem in the functional sense, although it may have the appar-
ent structure of one.
A potential problem for the translation of the scientific concept of the
ecosystem to the practice of ecosystem management is that the functional
attributes are necessary but not sufficient criteria upon which to define any
particular ecosystem. Indeed, the term “ecosystem” is used so widely and
variably as to be essentially useless in governance structures that require a
spatially and temporally defined entity as the object of management focus.
The very definitional flexibility that allows ecosystems to be defined in
terms of thermodynamics (e.g. dissipative structures) or in terms of a
dominant species (e.g. kelp beds) is acceptable for science, but jeopardizes
the incorporation of the concept into civil policy and legal instruments
(Figure 8.1). It is one thing to identify a spatially discrete ecosystem like a
lake and its watershed as a management unit. It is another, more difficult
challenge to identify an ocean production system, such as an upwelling
region, as an object of management, much less to predict the outcomes of
various management interventions on ecosystem function. Yet many ecolo-
gists and some marine managers believe that the ecosystem is the most
appropriate level of biophysical organization at which to attempt regulatory
control.16 For scientists, prediction is primarily used for the goal of under-
standing. For managers, however, prediction is part of the more difficult
goal of sustaining the delivery of marine ecosystem goods and services to
humans (Figure 8.1).
Hierarchical organizations
A fundamental feature of ecosystems is hierarchical organization.17 Nesting
is everywhere evident in the natural world: organelles within cells within
organisms within populations within communities, etc. It is a truism that
no matter how circumscribed the unit of investigation, there will be a
smaller one still embedded within, and a larger one (an environment)
surrounding it. And in biology at least, each level is likely to have as much
apparent complexity, and as many counter-intuitive surprises, as those above
and below.
Two fairly distinct hierarchies have emerged in ecology: one based on
structural organization (word-sketched above); the other on functional
organization (flows of energy and materials). Ecosystems exist at the apex of
both hierarchies, but the structural and functional attributes do not map
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cleanly onto one another.18 An emerging body of theory strives to derive the
rules of assembly within levels of a hierarchy and rules of transference across
levels.19 The latter are virtually always non-linear, such that predictions of
marine ecosystem trajectories cannot be derived by simply summing the
trajectories of component populations (even if this were possible). While
great strides have been made in the field over the last decade (e.g. in the case
of the ecosystem effects of fishing),20 it is not pessimistic to say that models
capable of predicting quantitatively how management actions will propagate
through the hierarchy of marine ecosystems are still decades away.
































Figure 8.1 Contrasts between the scientific and governance aspects of ecosystem
management. Emergent properties of ecological hierarchies (e.g.
resilience) are well-known attributes of ecosystems that cannot be pre-
dicted from reduction to their parts. High-level management structures,
by contrast, are rarely more, and sometimes even less effective than the
aggregation of often overlapping management units (e.g. federal vs. state
governments). Ecosystems are well-defined scientifically, but poorly
defined as objects of management. Interactions among organisms and
their environment are strong and reciprocal, while those among people
and their governments are decidedly stronger from top-down than
bottom-up. The unachievable but worthwhile goal of predictive ecosys-
tem science is complete understanding, while the essential goal of
ecosystem-based management is ecologically and economically sustain-
able human development. WiG-SoP=Whole is Greater than Sum of
Parts; ICZM=Integrated Coastal Zone Management.
Hierarchies are not unique to the organization of ecosystems: most
anthropogenic social, political, legal and economic structures are hierarchical
(Figure 8.2). A potentially powerful, but little explored approach to recon-
ciling ecosystem and management structures is to attempt to match levels of
management capacity to levels of ecological organization.21 Thus, a residen-
tial human community might take responsibility for the management of an
adjacent salt marsh while provincial agencies might effectively manage the
estuary in which the marsh is embedded. While this strategy is not explicit
in current marine management practice in Canada, the tendency is for the
management of small, coastal ecosystems to be increasingly co-managed at
the municipal level with the local communities of residents (e.g. Environ-
ment Canada’s Atlantic Coastal Action Program).22 The management
responsibility for the larger, coastal seascape is held primarily by the






















































































































































Figure 8.2 Differential scaling of the scientific and governance aspects of ecosystem
management in the ocean realm. The dual hierarchies of ecosystem and
management structures are portrayed from the smallest, least complex
levels (bottom) to the global system (top). The domain of ecosystem-
based management extends from the level of the ecological and human
community to the large marine ecosystem (LME), as attempted, for
example, through the Regional Seas Programme of the United Nations
Environment Programme. The two hierarchies are not fully coincident.
Scientists and managers increasingly produce indicators of objectives at
the higher, ecosystem levels of organization, but the objects of manage-
ment intervention are concentrated at the lower levels of management
units. MPA=Marine Protected Area. OMA = Ocean Management Area.





















provincial level of government, while the control of massive, offshore ecosys-
tems in which these coastal zones are embedded falls in the federal domain
(e.g. the large Ocean Management Area of the Scotian Shelf).23 Similarly in
Australia, the Draft South-east Regional Marine Plan (the first plan to be
developed by the National Oceans Office) suggests a hierarchical mapping of
management responsibility with ecosystem level.24 Unfortunately, the sepa-
ration of powers and competition between these levels of government in
both countries often means that, in practice, they will function in parallel
rather than hierarchically.
Spatial-temporal scaling
Intimately linked to the hierarchical organization of marine ecosystems is
the relationship between the spatial and temporal scales at which ecological
structures evolve and persist.25 In this realm the biological and physical
components of marine ecosystems diverge. Physical processes such as
mixing, advection and exchange turnover, and the oceanographic structures
they engender such as eddys, gyres and coherent water masses tend to scale
linearly in space–time (i.e. smaller is faster, larger is slower in mathemati-
cally tractable fashion). Biological processes such as photosynthesis, growth
and predation, and the ecological structures they engender such as algal
blooms, fish stocks and coral reefs are disjunctive and patchy in their
space–time distribution. The beautiful allometry that characterizes the
physiology of individual organisms (e.g. respiration scales exponentially to
body mass) starts to break down at the level of the population, and is mathe-
matically intractable at the level of the community.26 Thus, while there is a
rough scaling of higher levels of organization to larger–longer domains, it is
not a relationship readily extrapolated to ocean management units (e.g. estu-
aries will not always be larger or older than the populations of salt marsh
organisms that inhabit them).
As a key aspect of ecological holism and ecosystem management is the
“up-scaling” from the small sections of ecosystems that can be experimen-
tally manipulated, monitored and patrolled to the entire ecosystem: the
scaling relationships of process and structure are very important. Scale mis-
matches between measured and predicted systems comprise the single most
serious source of error in ecology. It is in part for this reason that many ecol-
ogists conceptualize ecosystems as processors of materials rather than ensem-
bles of organisms, and then invoke physical models and controls that can be
up-scaled more confidently than biological interactions.27
A creative tension exists between those who perceive ecosystems as pri-
marily controlled by physical processes and those who see biological interac-
tions as the dominant structuring forces. As is invariably the case in ecology,
it is always a mix of both types of factors that yield a particular ecosystem
function or configuration at any particular place and time. A parsimonious
approach to ecosystem delineation is to determine the variability explained
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by the physical processes, and if that is not sufficient for prediction, then
turn to the biological processes. This is particularly defensible in the context
of decision support for management because of the relative ease of defining
the geographical and temporal domains of the physical entities and
processes. Thus, for example, the zoning of benthic ecosystems for biodiver-
sity preservation on both the western and eastern shelves of Canada is
predicated primarily on the distribution of topography, substratum and sed-
iment grain size, itself a reflection of hydrodynamic and geological
processes.28 There has been a similar, if perhaps less rigorously developed
approach in Australia, where geomorphic and oceanographic processes are
being used to define the large-scale management entities, within which
more biologically-based management entities are nested.29
Relationships between ecosystem structure and function
Perhaps the most important development in marine ecology this decade has
been the rapprochement of the fish counters and carbon fluxers under the
combined banners of biodiversity conservation and ecosystem goods and ser-
vices. Growing maturity in both streams of the young discipline of ecology
allowed new collaborations focused on determining how the structure of
ecosystems (e.g. the relative proportions of different feeding types in a
community) influence key functions of the ecosystem (such as the remineral-
ization of organic inputs). Important concepts and metrics such as keystone
species and functional redundancy were rejuvenated or developed to explain
how, for example, two ecosystems with very different species compositions
could produce very similar harvestable yields or create bioherms at identical
rates. The implications for the selection and protection of conservation man-
agement or resource exploitation targets are obvious, but are virtually unex-
plored. This is a particularly rich vein for research.
Although most of the arguments above draw on ecosystem theory and
data in the generic sense, there exist profound differences between marine
and terrestrial ecosystems, which limit the relevance of many of the large
majority of theoretical constructs, case studies and models stemming from
research in terrestrial ecosystems. In brief, marine ecosystems are more open,
more variable, more biologically diverse, and more highly interconnected
than their terrestrial counterparts. These attributes translate into more
extensive geographical areas and more diffuse boundaries associated with
marine ecosystems. As oceans management moves inevitably towards the
owning and zoning of marine territory (the dominant terrestrial manage-
ment strategy), these large and fuzzy lines will be hard to transfer onto legal
deeds, leases and zoning plans for human usage.30 This is a problem that will
not be solved by more or better ecological research. It must be resolved by a
change in the methodology of zoning as it is adapted to the marine environ-
ment. There is a need for legal, institutional and governance structures to
adapt to the reality of marine ecosystems, not the reverse. This adaptation
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will be challenged by the mismatches between the scaling of marine ecosys-
tems and of ocean governance systems (Figure 8.2). One of the most serious
challenges to their reconciliation is the fact that even the most advanced and
adaptive ecosystem management is ultimately effected at the level of the
individual human or sectoral peer group (Figure 8.2). We do not yet have
ecosystem-scale agents of management. For this reason, ecosystem manage-
ment is correctly termed “ecosystem-based management”, as our manage-
ment actions do not operate directly on the ecosystem itself in the vast
majority of ocean applications.
Another key ecological concept relating ecosystem structure to function is
that of the source–sink relationship. These may be fluxes of genetic informa-
tion, fish larvae, migrating whales or atmospheric carbon among ecosystems
and ecosystem components: the concept remains applicable throughout the
hierarchy of ecosystems. Identifying sources and sinks is an ecological
research challenge that implies a creative variety of tools from genetic
micro-satellites to earth-orbiting space satellites. In the end, it results in a
biogeographical product that is directly transferable to zoning schemes and
upstream regulatory protocols. We see this as the most promising of all
current ecological endeavors in the context of ecosystem management.
Dealing with variability and uncertainty
Natural systems are inherently variable and complex (i.e. middle number
systems), and shallow marine ecosystems comprise an end member of the
continuum because of their strong connections to the adjacent atmospheric
and terrestrial systems. Heteroscedasticity, non-linear dynamics and chaotic
behavior are the norm, homogeneity, linearity and predictability the excep-
tions. No one can know the number of fish in the sea: they can only state a
range of statistical probability.31 Vehicular traffic patterns and macro-
economic time series are paragons of determinism by comparison. This is an
area where ecologists seeking more money and time to “understand the
ecosystem” should be treated with skepticism by the manager with urgent
decisions to make. The management sciences and their tools (e.g. risk analy-
sis, multiple criteria analysis) are better equipped to deal with the
intractability than the natural sciences when it comes to ecosystem-based
management. The challenge is to incorporate formally the best ecological
statistical approaches and our growing understanding of ecosystems as
complex systems32 into adaptive, ecosystem-based, decision support
systems.33
Incorporation of ecosystem science into marine
management (with a Canadian perspective)
Operationalizing the ecosystem concept in oceans governance and marine
resource management is a top agenda item in environmental and develop-
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ment agencies worldwide.34 Its top-down implementation in Canada has
been cautious and sporadic. The federal and provincial agencies responsible
for the conservation of wildlife and pristine habitat (e.g. Environment
Canada and Parks Canada), supported by academia and non-governmental
organizations, led the way by identifying and sequestering parks and pro-
tected areas on the basis of representivity and species at risk.35 The main
focus of this work so far has been the classification of Canada’s marine
ecosystems with the explicit or implicit goal of designating a network of
marine protected areas that preserve the nation’s marine and coastal
biodiversity (especially birds and mammals). Lately, the inclusion of 
resident communities of humans as co-managers of these areas has gained
momentum.
In parallel, the apparent degradation of Canada’s most intensely used
“seas” (the Great Lakes) fostered the development of holistic approaches to
environmental quality assessment for management decision support through
the monitoring of new metrics of ecosystem integrity.36 The key inputs here
were from academia, with some excellent implementation by governmental
(including municipal) agencies. The Great Lakes clean up is one of the few,
well-documented success stories of ecosystem-based management.
Not surprisingly, the federal agency responsible for the management of
exploited living marine resources, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans
(DFO), was the last to join the ecosystem management bandwagon. A 25-
year investment in systems ecology37 was never translated into decision
support for resource management, and the focus of this agency was predomi-
nantly on the management of the great fisheries using single species stock
assessment and population modeling with gear and quota-based interven-
tions. The crises of the collapsing ground and anadromous fisheries in the
1990s, followed by the visionary Oceans Act of 1996, have caused many of
the agency’s fisheries biologists to question their assumptions and to reach
out to more holistic approaches. Simultaneously, the oceans branch (as dis-
tinct from the science and fisheries management branches) was created and
invigorated with a cadre of new or reformed staff who brought an ecosystem
approach a priori. In short order, three major initiatives have been made in
marine ecosystem management: the delineation of large ocean management
areas for zoning-based management (e.g. the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integ-
rated Ocean Management Plan),38 the identification of candidate marine pro-
tected areas,39 and the incorporation of ecosystem objectives and metrics into
fisheries management planning.40
On the latter issue, there is healthy resistance to ecosystem-based man-
agement within the agency, based on scientific uncertainty and enforcement
practicality. For many fisheries scientists and managers in DFO, suitable
indicators and reference points for ecosystem management consist of the
additive combination of several single species stock assessments. The focus
on maintaining yields and verifiable management outcomes is encapsulated
in a statement of the objective of ecosystem management circulated in the
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agency: “The prevention of reductions in the productivity of resources, or
modification of the function of ecosystems in ways that are difficult or
impossible to reverse, as a result of human activities.”41 The tension between
approaches to marine ecosystem management based on management of indi-
vidual components informed by the whole, and management of the whole
without attempting to micro-manage its components (Figure 8.3), reflects
the theoretical and practical uncertainties facing an agency confronting the
challenge of ocean management with the tools of exploited resource manage-
ment.
Observing and working with this large, science-based agency as it grap-
ples with the major challenges of implementing the ecosystem management
mandate of Canada’s Oceans Act is an education and a privilege. Here we con-
sider the main scientific issues of marine ecosystem management as it is
developing in Canada.






















Figure 8.3 Two operational approaches to marine ecosystem-based manage-
ment. Small, patterned circles represent different components or
sub-systems (e.g. coral reef, fishery) of a large marine ecosystem des-
ignated for integrated management. The arrows represent manage-
ment actions (e.g. protection of biodiversity, prevention of
land-based sources of pollution). In the first approach (left), manage-
ment actions are directed at a well-defined ecosystem (closed circle),
and are designed to contribute to management objectives for all con-
tained ecosystem components. In the second approach (right), the
ecosystem is poorly defined (dashed circle), and management actions
are directed at better-known components of the ecosystem in the
context of their interactions within it. This is the status quo for
ecosystem-based management, but the first approach is increasingly
the desired target.
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Models and currencies of ecosystem management
The dual hierarchies of ecosystem organization reflect a duality of ecological
models and metrics by which ecosystem management outcomes may be
assessed. Those ecologists who count things have dominated the field in
numbers, theory development and empirical data collection. Their ecosys-
tems are defined by the distribution and abundance of communities of
plants and animals, and their theory and models are predicated on the
dynamics of the species population. If the ecosystem is incorporated into this
knowledge, it is as a suite of abiotic and biotic factors (i.e. externalities) that
influence the trajectory of the population. This is the realm of wildlife and
fisheries biology, which has dominated marine resource management in
Canada since Confederation. Apparent failings of resource management
based on population biology42 have been a major incentive for the develop-
ment of more holistic (ecosystemic) approaches to oceans governance in
Canada.43 In essence, this represents a paradigm shift, a transition from a
focus on the parts to a focus on the whole as the object of management
(Figure 8.3).
Those ecologists who measure ecosystems in terms of fluxes are a vocal
minority. Their ecosystems are defined by the pools and exchange networks
of materials, energy and information. Their theory and models are predic-
ated on the physical-chemical principles of thermodynamics and conserva-
tion of mass, and on the mathematical analysis of pattern and information
flows.44 The incorporation of the ecosystem is explicit, as these models and
metrics are constituted at the higher levels of organization (e.g. nutrient
sequestering by an estuary, tidal subsidy to the productivity of the Bay of
Fundy). This is the realm of biogeochemical cycling, landscape ecology and
ecosystem modeling.
During the 1960s and 1970s, a large investment was made in ecological
modeling based on trophodynamic and thermodynamic theory and prin-
ciples.45 The desired goals were ambitious and exceeded the capacity of the
poorly developed theory and analytical techniques. A vast amount of model-
ing was done; very little of this stood up to rigorous verification and testing,
and the good stuff46 largely got buried in the piles of disillusioned rubbish.
After a decade’s hiatus, some of this material is being recycled, reinvented
and extended to ecosystem-based management. The theory and tools are
more robust, and the modelers more humble. The new hybrid, coupled
physical–biological numerical models, are particularly promising for pre-
dicting source–sink relationships relevant to the design of networks of
marine protected areas (MPAs).47 The massive data demands of empirical
description of even the simplest marine ecosystem mean that modeling will
always be a primary tool of ecosystem-based management.
The contributions of ecosystem modeling to ecosystem-based manage-
ment in Canada have been best developed in the Great Lakes,48 while major
initiatives in marine applications during the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. the
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Marine Ecology Laboratory at the Bedford Institute of Oceanography),49
were abandoned in favor of species-based approaches during the 1980s.
There is, at present, little apparent effort on the part of Canadian agencies
charged with the funding of scientific research or the management of marine
ecosystems to re-invest in these approaches.
Both types of natural science-based models and their currencies have
strengths and weaknesses in their capacity to explain and predict ecosystem
structure and function in the context of anthropogenic effects. Both should
be used, according to their availability and relevance to particular cases, to
provide qualitative and quantitative inputs to formal decision support
systems for marine ecosystem-based management. A significant research
challenge is to contrast rigorously the different models in the same ecosys-
tem management scenario, and to derive guidelines for managers to select
the less risky and most cost-effective currencies for assessing management
effectiveness. Towards this end, DFO has identified three main conservation
objectives of marine ecosystem-based management: to maintain biodiversity,
productivity and physical-chemical properties of the oceans.50 The models
and techniques for achieving these objectives are yet to be finalized, but the
tendency is to apply population-based models and currencies to the biodi-
versity objective, biogeochemical models to the environmental quality
objective, and a combination of both to the productivity objective.
Measures of ecosystem integrity and health
The greatest promise of the ecosystem approach to marine management is
the potential to identify single metrics of the integrated response of an
ecosystem to an anthropogenic perturbation (be it a “push” or a “press”).51
An example is the ratio of new to recycled primary production (the “f-ratio”)
in photic zone water masses at bay to shelf scales.52 This single measure,
relatively easily obtained, encapsulates the trophic status of the water
column, the dependence of the biotic community on allochthonous inputs of
nutrients (e.g. land-based sources), and the capacity of that community to
export biomass (e.g. potential fish yields). Similar indices have been
developed for coral reef ecosystems.53 In general, however, these measures
disappoint when it comes to management decision support, usually because
the sensitivity is low and the inferred chain of causality cannot produce the
“smoking gun” that unequivocally identifies a target of management action.
It is difficult to envision an expert witness ecologist successfully defending
such a measure in a court of law. Yet, if ecosystem-based management is to
flourish, robust measures of the integrity and health of marine ecosystems
must be developed so that its effectiveness can be quantified. This is
arguably the most important area of research and development for marine
ecosystem-based management,54 because managers are generally involved by
stating clearly what they need, rather than waiting for ecologists to tell
them what they can have.
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Universal indicators of marine ecosystem integrity or health should not
be a priority because of the variety of ecosystems and management object-
ives. Three common attributes may, however, be identified from the existing
experiences with ecological indicators of the effectiveness of ecosystem man-
agement. A good indicator should:
1 Capture in a few metrics a substantial portion of the structural and
functional complexity inherent to the ecosystem at lower levels of
organization (i.e. use emergent properties).
2 Exhibit a measurable response to planned management actions that pro-
vides a clear guide for decision making (i.e. be statistically robust).
3 Be practically and financially feasible for measurement at appropriate
spatial and temporal scales (i.e. involve monitoring).
Such indicators are currently best developed for terrestrial and freshwater
ecosystems in Canada in the management contexts of protected areas and
water quality maintenance.55 Most commonly, mappable changes in habitat
characteristics are used to indicate change in biodiversity based on empirical
relationships between habitats and their biota. Specification of indicators for
Canada’s large “ocean management areas” is a recent initiative.56 The
approach involves the identification of ecosystem objectives (e.g. maintain
trophic structure) and specific characteristics (e.g. predator–prey relation-
ships) within each of the three, overarching management goals (conserving
biodiversity, productivity and environmental quality). Then, one to five
indicators are suggested for each characteristic (e.g. a measure of food-web
complexity) and reference points are specified (e.g. proportion of prey to
predator species). Finally, an achievable, operational objective of manage-
ment is detailed (e.g. retain historical patterns of abundance of predators and
their prey). The resulting matrix includes no less than 76 indicators of
ecosystem status or function, begging the question of whether meeting the
third criterion (above) is possible.
Including humans in ecosystems
Our focus to this point has been almost exclusively on the application of
natural science products to marine ecosystem management. This bias contra-
dicts a tenet of ecosystem management as “. . . a complex and interdiscipli-
nary type of management in which human beings are the fundamental
elements. . ..”57 It reflects the history of marine resource management,
however, that targets the non-human components of ecosystems (e.g. fish),
while depending almost exclusively on management methods directed at the
control of human activities within arbitrary portions of marine ecosystems
(Figure 8.2). Until recently, most marine ecologists preferred to conduct
their research in ecosystems with minimal human influence (preferably none,
other than themselves of course!). Fisheries biologists are an obvious 
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exception, where the assumption is that fishing mortality is the dominant
control on fish populations. Even when the human component is large and
evident, measurements of ecosystem processes typically treat the people as
externalities rather than components whose behavior is to be studied as part
of the whole. This is a significant problem for ecosystem management that
can only be redressed through the marriage of the natural and social sciences
in bioeconomic and governance models.58
The reasons for explicitly including the human organism in any program
of research in support of marine ecosystem-based management are obvious
and compelling. First, they are often the dominant organism in the system:
top predator, major cause of disturbance or main source of biogeochemical
loading. It follows that neglecting to measure the human role jeopardizes
the entire research. Even if the human component is negligible at present, it
will not be in the future. Second, the primary methods used to exploit,
protect or restore marine ecosystems involve the regulation of human behav-
ior and activity through education, legislation and enforcement. Building
the distribution, abundance and behavior of humans into ecosystem models
from the outset means that the research products will be more likely to
provide sound support for management decisions.
A potentially effective, but little-used way to include humans in research
and monitoring for ecosystem management is to use the exceptionally well
understood physiology and psychology of the organism to provide metrics of
ecosystem integrity and health. For example, rates of mortality, morbidity,
malnutrition and migration, as well as various epidemiological and eco-
nomic indices of human health and livelihoods in coastal fishing communit-
ies, can provide directly relevant measures of the health of the adjacent
marine ecosystems upon which these people depend.59
While explicitly stating the goal of sustaining the human usage of marine
ecosystem goods and services,60 the strategies and tools for marine ecosystem
management in Canada make scant use as yet of social science models or
research products. However, several experimental initiatives in community-
based co-management of marine ecosystems are underway,61 and the recently
formed Ocean Management Research Network62 is an interdisciplinary acad-
emic group with a strong social science orientation.
Setting the boundary conditions
Major simplifying assumptions are necessary to deal with the problem of the
complexity of natural ecosystems and human societies in ocean management:
the domains of the management units and issues must be sharply delineated.
Setting the boundary conditions on the ecosystem and the parameters of
control is the first, difficult part of ecosystem management. Even the appar-
ently straightforward business of establishing the spatial boundaries of the
management unit is problematic because of the difficulty in matching
ecosystem domains to the spatial patterns of enforceable management units.
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The edges of marine ecosystems are often hard to locate and their positions
vary through time. Similarly, the habitat components of ecosystems form
shifting mosaics at multiple spatial scales.63 In the case of the management
goal of preserving benthic biodiversity on the shelf ecosystems of Canada, for
example, the characteristic spatial scales of distinct varieties of seabed
habitat (and their associated assemblages of organisms) range from decime-
ters to kilometers, and the positions of the boundaries of these units may
change by similar distances inter-annually.64
As the dominant operational tool for marine management of ocean space
is multiple use zoning of various human activities, the spatial scales at
which marine ecosystems are classified become a prime determinant of the
location and sizes of the various management zones. Marine ecosystem clas-
sification is a topic of intense research globally,65 and is steadily leading to
the mapping of ocean habitats and communities at ever-finer scales.66 Such
detailed delineation of marine ecosystems may exceed the practical require-
ments of management. For example, the smallest management unit that can
be reliably monitored and enforced on the Scotian Shelf is approximately
10km by 10km with not more than six way points, which sets an opera-
tional limit on the scale at which benthic ecosystems need be mapped for
management purposes.67
Given the present state of ecosystem theory and practice, it seems to us
that we should look first to the limitations of the management tools to set
the boundaries of the ecosystems we attempt to manage. This suggestion
does not in any way preclude good natural science. Managers should set the
research agenda in terms of verifiable indicators of effective management,
and boundary conditions of the monitoring science should be matched 
to the spatial resolution at which practical control of human activity is 
possible.
Putting ecosystem-based management into practice (with
an Australian perspective)
The real advances in marine ecosystem-based management to date are more
a matter of expedient necessity than of the precautionary application of theo-
retical understanding. Australia leads the way in actually developing marine
management regimes focused on spatially explicit ecosystems and their com-
ponents. The small human population and low ratios of marine scientists to
coastline and ocean space have encouraged Australians to seek alternatives to
reductionism, resource-by-resource and sector-by-sector management struc-
tures. The scientific traditions of the nation have not generally been con-
ducive to holism. The British-model universities are strongly disciplinary
(still separating botany and zoology on most campuses). The dominant
government research agency, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organization (CSIRO), has an industry-by-industry heritage. The
American (Odum) school of ecosystem ecology, focused on trophodynamics
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and biogeochemical cycling, had little impact on the development of Aus-
tralian marine ecological sciences, which focused strongly on population
dynamics and community structure and function. The few, early, research
initiatives focused at the level of entire marine ecosystems (e.g. CSIRO’s
Port Hacking Estuary project of the late 1970s68 and the Western Australian
Coastal Ecology Program of the 1980s)69 had little impact on management,
even at the level of the main commercially exploited species.
By contrast, Australia’s government management authorities at both state
and federal levels, and the emerging power of “green” politics from the mid-
1970s on produced a series of marine ecosystem management initiatives that
stimulated and demanded science for management at this level. Most
notable of these was the creation of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park
(GBRMP), which led to the massive expansion of the Australian Institute of
Marine Science (AIMS) and an explosion of academic research under a unify-
ing theme of the nation’s flagship ecosystem. Perceived, ecosystem-wide
threats to the integrity of the Great Barrier Reef, such as the Crown of
Thorns starfish and nutrification from coastal development further served to
rally scientists and managers to a common cause that sometimes transcended
their disciplinary and institutional separations.70 National advisory boards
(e.g. the Australian Marine Science and Technology Advisory Council) and
academic research funding agencies such as the traditional Australian
Research Grants Council, and the more specific Marine Sciences and Tech-
nologies Grants Scheme dedicated attention and resources to support
research on marine ecosystems by university and government scientists. The
innovative program of establishing well-funded Collaborative Research
Centres (CRC) focuses public and private sector partners on particular
ecosystems judged to require integrated management, such as the CRC for
the Sustainable Management of the Great Barrier Reef in Townsville and the
CRC for Antarctic Research in Hobart. Australian policy-makers and 
the Australian public understand what marine ecosystems are and accept the
necessity and advantage of management at that level.
The division of responsibility for the management of marine resources
between state and federal governments in Australia (so much more equitable
than in Canada) has allowed the federal agencies to invest heavily in research
and experimentation for alternative, ecosystem-based management regimes
in a few key areas. The Northwest Shelf of Australia falls within federal
jurisdiction and produces large amounts of both renewable and non-renew-
able resources, contributing substantially to the nations’ economy. CSIRO,
in collaboration with Western Australian institutions and AIMS is investing
heavily in the development of science-based decision support tools for
ecosystem-based management, including coupled bio-physical models for
conserving fisheries and preserving marine biodiversity in the face of intense
offshore gas exploitation in partnership with Indonesia.71 Another ecosystem
focus has been Antarctica, in which Australia claims a major stake. Through
its participation in the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
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Living Resources (CCAMLR), Australia has made significant contributions
to the ecosystem-based management of the southern ocean krill fishery in a
model of shared international responsibility for ocean governance.72
The National Oceans Office (NOO) represents a multi-ministry, national
policy body that has supported and facilitated a biogeographical approach to
the implementation of ecosystem-based coastal and marine management in
Australia by providing a scientific basis for the identification of bioregions,
while remaining flexible on the locale-specific modes of implementation.73
The approach is explicitly spatial, and the boundary conditions for the man-
agement units are clearly to be set on the basis of the best available science.
(But the lack of complete scientific knowledge or understanding is not per-
mitted to delay the process.) The focus of implementation is on a consensual,
multi-stakeholder process involving multiple levels of government and non-
governmental agencies, according to their jurisdictions and capacities
(which vary greatly from region to region around the nation’s coasts). All of
the bioregions and many of the lead management agencies have been identi-
fied, but NOO is taking a step-by-step approach, starting with one of the
better known, but most societally and managerially complex regions, the
southeast coast.74 It is too early to judge the efficacy or success of this
approach in implementing ecosystem-based marine management in Aus-
tralia. Progress is obvious on several fronts; it appears to have captured the
enthusiasm of a good proportion of the nation’s marine scientists, and the
interest at least of many sectors in the country’s intensely used coastal and
marine areas. As with the more embryonic experiments in the ecosystem-
based management of large ocean areas in Canada, the degree to which
lessons learned in one region can be generalized to others remains to be
tested. Certainly, some of the lessons from the GBRMP planning process
have been transferred.
Finally, although one cannot dismisses regional differences in Australia
given the strong assigned and residual powers of the states, the geopolitical
isolation of the nation and the restricted scale of politics in Australia mean
that rapid and definitive decisions can be made on marine management
issues in which the entire nation is engaged. Designation and protection of
islands and seamounts in the nation’s southern ocean are a case in point.75
By explicitly identifying marine ecosystems as objects of management
(Figure 8.3), and allocating resources for research to support decision
making in that context, Australia revolutionized its marine science cadre in
the space of two decades. Note that the politicians and managers drove the
transition from reductionistic to holistic approaches, but there was never any
question that marine science was the key requirement for ecosystem-based
management. In short, while Canadians have talked about and legislated for
marine ecosystem-based management, the Australians have started imple-
menting it as a matter of necessity with the policy and legal tools available,
even in the absence initially of a formal, national policy and dedicated har-
monized legislation. These are now being developed, and will be the better
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for the extensive experience gained. This is adaptive management at the
highest level.
MPA implementation as a metric of ecosystem-based
management
The marine protected area (MPA),76 with its explicit geographical bound-
aries and multiple management objectives, is the most developed manifesta-
tion of marine ecosystem-based management. While the natural and social
science underpinning the design and function of MPAs is largely in place
(i.e. oceanography, fisheries and conservation biology, ecological economics,
public administration), empirical tests and demonstrations of their effective-
ness in achieving desired goals have not yet accumulated to the point that
these interventions may be considered science-based or proven.77 This has
not hindered the establishment of hundreds of MPAs worldwide, but rarely
are they located, configured and managed according to results and predic-
tions of marine ecosystem science (e.g. nutrient-production budgets, food
web structures, source–sink relationships, meta-population dynamics).
Rather, MPAs are selected primarily in response to levels and patterns of
human use and perceptions of value. This is not to say that MPAs desig-
nated on social grounds (e.g. aesthetic value) will not enhance ecosystem
integrity (e.g. maintain biodiversity), or that MPAs managed for societal
benefit (e.g. maintenance of tourism profits) cannot be evaluated with
ecosystem-based metrics of management effectiveness (e.g. stability of
species–area relationships).
Regardless of the role of ecosystem science in their implementation,
MPAs are currently the management tool of choice for governments and
communities seeking to maintain the goods and services (and non-use
values) of marine ecosystems. A crude measure of a society’s progress
towards ecosystem-based management of marine resources is the number or
area of MPAs relative to the total area of ocean space. Of course, not all
MPAs are of equal value in meeting marine management objectives, nor do
they share the same objectives. In both Australia and Canada, MPAs are des-
ignated by multiple agencies for different purposes, operating at two levels
of government in Australia, and only one in Canada. Despite the fact that
Canada has chosen to legislate for MPAs by statute law (the Oceans Act) and
Australia through policy-driven applications of existing legislation, the
many similarities between the two countries (governments, economies,
population distributions, cultures, etc.) suggest that a comparison of the
status of MPA establishment may be interpreted as an indication of their
relative progress in the implementation of marine ecosystem-based manage-
ment. Both nations have similar-sized EEZ areas, but federal and state agen-
cies in Australia have designated at least 178 MPAs covering a total of
646,155km2 (5.38 percent of the EEZ).78 Even correcting for the fact that
only about 33 percent of the world’s largest nominal MPA (the Great
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Barrier Reef Marine Park) is actually protected from fishing, the numbers
are substantial. In contrast, three federal agencies in Canada have established
only four true MPAs (i.e. “no-take” zones) covering approximately
3,700km2 (0.06 percent of Canada’s EEZ), with a further 12 proposed to
cover another 7,800km2. In addition to these unequivocal MPAs, there are
some 56 parks, sanctuaries and fishery closures that include marine space or
species, and afford some degree of protection from certain human activities.
The majority of these are marine bird sanctuaries. At the most generous
estimate, partially protected marine space would cover a total of about
116,000km2 (barely 1.8 percent of Canada’s EEZ).79 The Australian MPAs
are more likely to be designed to serve multiple objectives and to be embed-
ded within multiple-use management areas. In Canada, MPAs often stand in
isolation and are focused on the preservation of a single component of a
marine ecosystem (e.g. a migratory bird population, a whale observation
site, a localized coral community). The few attempts to establish MPAs that
protect entire environments and conform to obvious boundaries of marine
ecosystems have been slow to develop in Canada.80
It would appear on the basis of this criterion that Australia has made con-
siderably more progress on the implementation of marine ecosystem-based
management than has Canada. The reasons for this are several and complex,
but we suggest that the devolution of power over ocean resources to levels of
government closer to resident communities of users (i.e. state governments),
and the healthy separation of the research and management agencies,81
coupled with effective programs of education, produces an environment of
greater public trust in the benefits ecosystem-based approaches bring to the
management of ocean space and marine resources in Australia.
Conclusion
Marine ecosystem management is an oxymoron. It will never happen in the
way that we manage agricultural or aquacultural ecosystems, for example,
because it is operationally limited to the human components of poorly
known and uncontrollable ecosystems. Rather, it is a short-hand term for
“. . . a strategy for the integrated management of land, water and living
resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way
. . . based on the application of appropriate scientific methodologies focused
on levels of biological organization that encompass the essential processes,
functions and interactions among organisms and their environment.”82 To
be effective, ecosystem management should be “. . . goal-driven . . . based on
a collaboratively developed vision of desired future conditions that inte-
grates ecological, economic, and social factors . . . applied within a geo-
graphic framework defined primarily by ecological boundaries.”83 In short,
ecosystem management is part and parcel of what we also call integrated
coastal zone management and good oceans governance.
It is hard to conceive of a more demanding and important challenge than
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translating ecosystem theory into management policy and practice with the
goal of reducing, halting and reversing the anthropogenic degradation of the
ocean ecosystems. Besides the support of those who use the ocean, it will
require fully interdisciplinary collaboration among specialists in the natural,
social and management sciences, as well as economics and law. Perhaps more
significantly, it requires the emergence of transdisciplinary generalists who
build their ideas in the interstices among the specialties (collectively, the
developing field of marine affairs). Organizations such as the ACORN foster
this emergence.
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9 Ecosystem bill of rights
Richard J. Beamish and Chyrs-Ellen M. Neville
Introduction
New information about the factors that affect the dynamics of fish popula-
tions and new policies that expand the responsibilities of managers beyond
single species are changing our attitudes of how we should be stewards of
ecosystems. For example, there is accumulating evidence that climate,
climate change and the ocean environment affect the abundance trends of
commercially important fishes1 in a manner that we previously believed was
exclusive to fishing impacts. This new information indicates that fish popu-
lations are affected by atmospheric impacts as well as by human interven-
tions into their ocean habitats.
We also are learning that there are natural trends in abundance of fish
that persist for periods, then may shift to new states.2 Some investigators
suspect that the frequency and extent of these shifts will change as the
impacts of greenhouse gas accumulations are realized.3 Thus, there is a new
appreciation of the relevance of the impacts of the ocean habitat of a species
when assessing the levels of catch that safely ensure that a population is not
prevented from replenishing itself. In Canada, it is not only an appreciation,
it is policy, entrenched in new legislation.
In Canada, the Oceans Act4 and the Species at Risk Act (SARA)5 are new pol-
icies that identify a requirement to consider ecosystem-based management
approaches and provide protection for any species that is at a critically low
abundance. It is clear from the Oceans Act that Canada intends to move
beyond a single-species-based management approach (Table 9.1). It is true
that developing an ecosystem-based management approach is difficult
because fisheries are often regulated at the single species level. It is also true
that it is difficult for science to determine fishing quotas using multi-species
assessments because the required models are poorly developed. Perhaps our
own organizations perpetuate a single-species orientation by assigning the
management and research of single species to individual investigators rather
than creating multi-species task teams. SARA treats all species equally and
legislates protection and recovery for any species that is determined to be in
need of protection (Table 9.2). In fisheries management there has been a
preference for some species because of their taste or charisma and an indiffer-
ence or even animosity and fear for others. A legislative requirement to
protect species and stocks at risk will eventually require that there is an
assessment of the impacts of fishing on associated species. It will be in the
best interest of the fishing industry to ensure that by-catch, as well as tar-
geted catch, are not overfished. Irradication fisheries, such as existed for
spiny dogfish (Squalus acanthias) in British Columbia in the late 1950s and
early 1960s6 obviously will no longer be tolerated.
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Table 9.1 Highlights from Canada’s Ocean Act that relate to ecosystem-based man-
agement
1 WHEREAS Canada promotes the understanding of oceans, ocean processes,
marine resources and marine ecosystems to foster the sustainable development
of the oceans and their resources.
2 WHEREAS Canada holds that conservation, based on an ecosystem approach,
is of fundamental importance to maintaining biological diversity and
productivity in the marine environment.
3 WHEREAS Canada promotes the wide application of the precautionary
approach to the conservation, management and exploitation of marine resources
in order to protect these resources and preserve the marine environment.
4 WHEREAS the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, in collaboration with other
ministers, boards and agencies of the Government of Canada, with provincial
and territorial governments and with affected aboriginal organizations, coastal
communities and other persons and bodies, including those bodies established
under land claims agreements, is encouraging the development and
implementation of a national strategy for the management of estuarine, coastal
and marine ecosystems.
Table 9.2 Highlights from Canada’s Species at Risk Act that relate to the legislative
requirement to protect species and stocks at risk
1 Create a legislative base for the scientific body that assesses the status of species
at risk in Canada.
2 Prohibit the killing of extirpated, endangered or threatened species and the
destruction of their residences.
3 Provide authority to prohibit the destruction of the critical habitat of a listed
wildlife species anywhere in Canada.
4 Lead to automatic recovery planning and action plans through the listing of
species at risk.
5 Provide emergency authority to protect species in imminent danger, including
emergency authority to prohibit the destruction of the critical habitat of such
species.
6 Wildlife has international value and that providing legal protection for species
at risk would in part meet Canada’s obligations under the United Nations
Convention on Biological Diversity.
Ecosystem rights
We suggest that a logical next step is to agree that ecosystems have rights.
A statement of rights is recognition that our own health and quality of life is
related to the other species that share our habitat. Most humans expect that
our marine ecosystem will continue to function in a manner that will sustain
our fisheries and will not threaten our own well-being. All species compete
for space and humans are no exception to this generalization. A statement of
the rights of ecosystems does not inhibit our intervention into the habitat of
other species, but it does make a commitment that we will attempt to
understand the consequences of our interventions and be responsible stew-
ards of the species that share our ecosystem. In Canada, we place great value
on our Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We believe that people in other
countries deserve similar rights. Canadians and others have defended these
rights, sometimes with horrific consequences. An ecosystem bill of rights
would be an extension of the values we hold for ourselves and a reminder
that we cannot remain indifferent to the health of our environment.
We illustrate the need for responsible changes in the stewardship of
marine ecosystems using two areas off Canada’s west coast. One area is
Bowie Seamount, located 180 kilometers west of the Queen Charlotte
Islands and the other is the Strait of Georgia. Approximately 74 percent of
the population of British Columbia lives close to the shores of the Strait of
Georgia.7 The Strait of Georgia is the most important rearing area for juve-
nile Pacific salmon and habitat for a variety of other species of commercial
and charismatic importance.
Bowie Seamount is one of the shallowest seamounts in the Northeast
Pacific. It rises from 3,100 meters to 25 meters below the surface where the
area above 1,000 meters is approximately 120km2 (Figure 9.1). It is a dis-
crete ecosystem that has a fish fauna similar to coastal ecosystems but
simpler. Surprisingly, the top trophic levels are well represented, and the
mid-trophic levels, such as small pelagics, appear to be reduced in diversity.
Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolipis), sablefish (Anoplopoma fimbria) and
rougheye rockfish (Sebastes aleutiaus) appear to be abundant. There are 19
other species of rockfish and 29 other species of fish.8 Fishing is permitted
on the seamount, but there are no stock assessments made for any of these
species.9 There have not been any evaluations about the impacts of the per-
mitted fishing activity on the species being fished or on any of the associated
species. There is no understanding of recruitment processes for the species
that are fished that extends beyond some creative speculations. There are no
restrictions on halibut fishing. Any licensed fisherman can fish on the
seamount and theoretically remove halibut down to the last fish. Licensed
sablefish fishermen give themselves one trip per year to the seamount. There
is no apparent limit to this catch, and the catch is not counted either in the
individual’s quota or the total annual quota. Apparently, it is believed that
these sablefish are surplus to the population that is being managed. There
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has been some research on sablefish from Bowie Seamount and it indicates
that there is some continuing movement of individuals between the coastal
population and the Bowie Seamount population10 indicating that the fish on
the Seamount are part of the coastal population.
Rockfish catch on Bowie Seamount is also additional to annual quotas
determined for the commercial fishery. There has been some research on the
rockfish stocks on the Seamount, although there are no separate assessments
and the impact of the fishing on the other species has not been assessed.
Fishing was regulated by special permit, sometimes referred to as an “experi-
mental” permit. In some years the catch was large relative to the annual
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Kilometers
Figure 9.1 The west coast of Canada showing the location of Bowie Seamount
(180km southwest of the Queen Charlotte Islands) and the Strait of








quota. In 1999, the catch of rougheye rockfish was about 21 percent of the
total allowable catch.11 Since 2000, rockfish have only been allowed to be
caught incidentally in other fisheries.
We suggest that management of fish stocks on Bowie Seamount is an
example of single species management taken to the extreme. Clearly, the
aggregate of fish have been considered to be outside of the structure of the
“coastal” population that must be managed in a responsible manner. Fish on
the seamount have been treated as some fortuitous discovery of wealth. It
has only been the economic cost of acquiring and transporting the fish that
has slowed the exploitation. The individual species all live in an area less
than 13 percent of the size of the city of Vancouver, but the agencies associ-
ated with the management of the particular species have never considered
the impact of their decisions on the dynamics of the other species, and only
recently on the ecosystem in general. The reason goes beyond the “out of
sight, out of mind” nature of human behavior. Rather, the current manage-
ment structure has never needed to consider Bowie Seamount as a whole
ecosystem. There was no policy, no directive and apparently no interest in
the impacts of the removal of animals from the top of the food chain in this
small and discrete ecosystem.
Beamish and Neville (2002) constructed a model of the Bowie Seamount
ecosystem using the trophic accounting model Ecopath.12 The relationships
(Figure 9.2) are based on relatively poor information and thus speculative as
there has been limited study of the relationships among species. The
biomass estimates and diets for key functional groups can only be considered




































Figure 9.2 Ecopath model of major functional groups at Bowie Seamount (Beamish
and Neville 2002).
“best guesses.” However, there is a requirement within the ecosystem model
to ensure that there is a balance between the food produced or entering the
system and the consumption or export from the system. Therefore, the
model provides a good starting point to examine the species relationships
within the Bowie Seamount ecosystem.
It is interesting that there is an apparent lack of small pelagics in the
Bowie Seamount community.13 Beamish and Neville (2002) also identified
the possible impacts of large removals of the top predators (i.e. Pacific
halibut, sablefish, rougheye rockfish) in the ecosystem. Major reductions of
these species, and the reduced diversity of the small pelagic community, put
increased pressure on the lower trophic levels and caused imbalances in the
system that could potentially last for decades due to the long life span of
these predators.
It is apparent that additional studies at Bowie Seamount are essential.
The most critical information includes basic diet information, biomass esti-
mates of key species and estimates of age of the populations resident at the
seamount. As this information becomes available, the ecosystem model can
be modified and the understanding of the dynamics of the ecosystem at
Bowie Seamount will improve.14
Our second marine ecosystem example is virtually the opposite of Bowie
Seamount. The Strait of Georgia is located between the British Columbia
mainland and Vancouver Island (Figure 9.1). It is a semi-enclosed sea15 that
supports a diverse fish fauna, including a large number of juvenile Pacific
salmon during their early marine residence. Two of the major fish predators
in the Strait of Georgia are lingcod (Ophiodon elongatus) and spiny dogfish
(Squalus acanthius). Lingcod are overfished.16 Oral reports of their historic
abundance would indicate that they were the dominant large predator,
growing to sizes of 14 kilograms in about 15 years.17 We propose that the
large reduction in lingcod abundance could have resulted in an increase in
the abundance of fish in the small pelagic community. It is only speculation,
but the current large abundance of seals (Phoca vitulina)18 may result from
the abundant prey at the small pelagic level. The seals and sea lions also feed
on the resident Pacific salmon, which annoys those trying to increase their
abundance through management and those trying to land a sport-caught
salmon before it is eaten by a seal. There have been recent unpublished pro-
posals by scientists and fishers to correct a perceived “trophic imbalance” by
eradicating seals. We suggest that a better-managed lingcod fishery may
have restricted the growth rate of the seal population by limiting prey, thus
avoiding the current issue that agonizes managers, fishers and the admirers
of small marine mammals. Spiny dogfish, however, have few admirers. In
the late 1950s they were identified as being a nuisance.19 Apparently this
meant that they would eat the bait designed to catch more charismatic
species. People were paid to kill spiny dogfish, and 11 separate eradication
programs were supported by government agencies who did not know better
and scientists who should have known better.
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We explored the possible impact of a much larger population of lingcod
on the abundance of associated species using an ecosystem model for the
Strait of Georgia in 1998.20 There are obvious difficulties with this
approach, but our intent was to show that lingcod were a major predator and
a major influence in the abundance of prey species.
The largest recorded commercial catch of lingcod in the Strait of Georgia
occurred in 1944.21 This catch was approximately 130 times larger than
commercial hook and line catch in 1996–98.22 This increase does not
directly measure biomass, however it does indicate a large-scale change in
abundance. We estimated that the biomass of lingcod in the 1940s might
be at least 100 times the current biomass in our 1998 ecosystem model
(Figure 9.3). We increased the biomass of lingcod 100 times and examined
the impact on other species. The impacts are not dynamic as the resulting
trophic level changes were not modeled. However, it is possible to show that
the prey of lingcod would be dramatically affected. Obviously, the other
species that consume these prey would also be affected. In the Strait of
Georgia, the current dominant fish biomasses are Pacific herring, Pacific
hake and aggregates of species in the small pelagic and miscellaneous dem-
ersal fishes categories. The modeled increased abundance of lingcod resulted
in a significant imbalance of the model as there was no longer enough
annual production from these major categories for the various predators
including lingcod (Figure 9.4). This impact illustrates the important associ-
ations between lingcod and the abundance of Pacific hake and other small
pelagic species. Thus, it is possible that the collapse of the lingcod popu-
lation was linked to the increase in the Pacific hake population. In fact, the







































Figure 9.3 Ecopath model of major functional groups in the Strait of Georgia
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large abundance of Pacific hake was first detected in the early 1970s, possibly
indicating that abundance in the 1940s was low. Our point is that an ecosystem-
based management approach would not have allowed the severe overfishing of
lingcod, which increased the abundance of small pelagic fishes. According to this
logic, we created the “seal problem” when we overfished lingcod.
These are only two examples of interventions into the Strait of Georgia
ecosystem that were undertaken without a commitment to understand the
consequences to the whole ecosystem. There are many more. Our point is
that the Strait of Georgia is in the center of the human community in
British Columbia. Fortunately this community values the health of their
environment. However, it is difficult for people to assess the health of the
Strait of Georgia ecosystem, as there are few standard procedures that can be
used as evaluation criteria that are meaningful to most British Columbians.
We have measures of our own health that are useful indicators of the proper
relationship among the cells and systems that keep our human ecosystem
functioning. Proper care of our own systems usually allows us to live out a
natural life span. Identifying the criteria that promote a healthy Strait of
Georgia ecosystem or a Bowie Seamount ecosystem will begin the develop-
ment of ecosystem-based thinking in the general population. The require-
ment to do this is no longer “a nice thing to do,” it is legislated. We
actually have no choice but to change. Having established the Oceans Act and
SARA, it is no longer possible to ignore the changes in the fish community
that result from fishing, or other interventions into our marine ecosystems.


























Figure 9.4 Changes in the ecotrophic efficiency of the major species or groups of
species in the Strait of Georgia when lingcod abundance is increased 100
times. Ecotrophic efficiency is the proportion of annual production that
is consumed or exported from the ecosystem. A value of 1 means that all
of the production is lost. Values greater than 1 are theoretically not pos-
sible in the model, but for our hypothetical exercise, values greater than
1 would indicate that the population would decline.
An ecosystem bill of rights
We propose that the following five principles, the basis for an ecosystem bill
of rights, are statements that honest people can support. Honesty means that
people have taken the time to evaluate the benefits and difficulties of commit-
ting to managing ecosystems. The principles are statements that recognize
that change is needed. The change is in attitude, and this is the first step. We
suggest that the second, third and subsequent steps will be much easier.
Principle 1: Interventions into the dynamics of marine ecosystems occur naturally,
intentionally and unintentionally. Ecosystem management must improve our under-
standing of these interventions and communicate the knowledge to the public.
This first principle recognizes that ecosystems will change. It is not neces-
sary to know in advance how specific events such as fishing will change
ecosystems, but there is a commitment continually to improve our ability to
understand how ecosystems respond to changes. This principle ensures that
the new information is communicated to the general public. Clients must be
kept informed about what we know, what we do not know, and how inter-
pretations differ. In many cases, client information is not typical of daily
news, thus innovative methods of communication need to be developed.
Principle 2: All natural species in an ecosystem are recognized as being important to
the health of the ecosystem.
This principle is similar to the intent of SARA, which treats all species
equally. Recognizing the importance of all species would not mean that we
must assess the dynamics of all species. However, it would require, for
example, that by-catch be managed. It would mean that we would never
support eradication programs as was done in the past. Principle 2 would
encourage us to begin to assess the impacts of fishing on other species. What
happens when top predators such as halibut are fished? We would also want to
understand how global warming impacts affect the relationship among
species. Principle 2 could be viewed as a minority rights statement. We need
to be stewards of spiny dogfish as well as seals and killer whales. Some may
view Principle 2 as potentially restricting economic development if the prin-
ciple is used to block human expansion. However, we consider that Principle
2 is a statement that the impact of our intervention needs to be evaluated;
evaluation should not prevent all interventions. There is a reality that humans
have babies and expand their habitat. Principle 2 requires that there is an
honest evaluation of impacts when we intervene in marine ecosystems.
Principle 3: Surplus production of some species may be available for human con-
sumption, but estimates of surplus production must include consideration of the impact
on associated species.
This principle reflects basic fishing theory that states that natural popula-
tions produce a surplus yield that can be harvested. Some scientists23 have
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proposed that by removing production that is surplus to the production
required to replenish the population, it is possible to stimulate more growth
in the total population. The concept is best visualized by relating fish pro-
duction to forest production. Very old trees in a forest do not grow much
each year, but the amount of wood in the forest is large. Removing the old
trees encourages young trees to grow and the total amount of wood pro-
duced each year becomes greater than that produced by the old trees. The
removal of the old trees begins a new cycle of succession among plants. Our
Principle 3 is a commitment to begin to understand how the ecosystem
changes when preferred species are fished and sometimes overfished. For
example, using our two marine ecosystems examples, what are the con-
sequences of overfishing lingcod in the Strait of Georgia, or removing large
numbers of the very slow-growing and long-lived rougheye rockfish from
Bowie Seamount?
Principle 4: Ecosystems must be able to re-organize naturally which may result in
declines of charismatic species.
There are natural variations in the trends of fish abundance that are large
and occur quickly, and may be more important for management than fishing
effects in well-managed fisheries. There is a tendency for some to believe
that fish abundance will remain constant in a well-managed fishery. The
belief is founded on an incorrect interpretation of early scientific theory that
reported that the population dynamics of a species could be fitted to an
equation that would allow calculations to be made of maximum sustainable
catch. This was an exciting idea because it proposed that the correct level of
catch could be determined and the stock would become more productive.
Fisheries science no longer supports the idea of maximum sustainable yield,
although variations of the idea are still in use. Unfortunately, there is still a
mythology that good management means that the abundance of preferred
species will be high. Levels lower than expectations are sometimes seen as
management failures that can be corrected through large commitments of
new money. Professionals willing to accept these funds are not hard to find.
Principle 4 recognizes that responsible stewardship will let ecosystems
change and let key species respond naturally. Principle 4 informs managers
and the general public to “let it be.”
Principle 5: Humans are part of the ecosystem and will introduce change, but
because of our trophic level we must be stewards of our changes.
This is an essential principle because it acknowledges that humans compete
for space like all animals and plants. However, we credit ourselves with a
level of intelligence that obligates us to understand and manage our
changes. As our population expands, we will displace other species. Fishing
removes species and involves by-catch and possibly habitat damage. Prin-
ciple 5 recognizes these impacts, but requires that the changes minimize the
impact on the ecosystem. Fishing needs to be managed to minimize impact
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on both the target species and associated species. Fishing must not restrict
the natural ability of a stock to replenish itself. However, it is important to
recognize that the term overfishing is difficult to quantify once long-term
natural variability is included in the definition. If large, natural fluctuations
occur over long periods of time,24 is it possible to identify a “virgin” biomass
that can be used to scale the current impacts of fishing? Implicit in this
principle is an understanding that excessive fishing pressures will occur
despite the best scientific support. It is logical to assume that when science
has not been able to prevent excessive fishing, stewardship should be applied
to promote recovery of stocks. This means that traditional knowledge that is
wise is an acceptable basis for decision making. Traditional knowledge in
this case is wisdom that comes from the old, the young, fishermen, Aborigi-
nal people and local communities.
Conclusion
This ecosystem bill of rights is a first step in changing our thinking. The
five principles are public commitments to understand the impacts of our
society on the species that occupy our marine ecosystems. Such statements
are necessary to draw the attention of humans who do not think about the
large majority of fish that are not as charismatic as killer whales or Chinook
salmon. The five principles are commitments to change how we think. We
need to move away from single species management and we need a new
reward system for professionals who learn how to work cooperatively to
achieve ecosystem-based management. An essential component of our pro-
posal is public communication, which is not a trivial task. Informing the
public is a skill that recognizes that knowledge must be seen to be enter-
tainment as well as education. In Canada, there is new legislation requiring
that we begin to change, but perhaps the time has come to modernize
Canada’s Fisheries Act25 formally to embrace ecosystem principles. This
ecosystem bill of rights is a step in changing our attitude about other species
in our habitat.
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Introduction
The continuing review and development of ocean and coastal policy in Aus-
tralia and Canada in recent years, coupled with periodic efforts at rethinking
and restructuring the institutions and processes of ocean governance, have
stimulated a renewed interest in the role of the community in marine and
coastal affairs. This chapter examines the evolving role of the community in
ocean and coastal management in Australia and Canada, with reference to
case studies from each country.
Community-based management and co-management
The increasing interest in the role of the community in ocean and coastal
management is reflective of a broader effort that has been devoted to devel-
oping a range of options for the devolution of management control over fish-
eries and other marine resources, or over coastal areas in general. Emerging
in part from the literature on common property resources,1 this trend is
reflected in several different terms, including territorial use rights in fish-
eries,2 local level management, community-based resource management and
co-management.3 Perhaps the most expansive, and potentially inclusive,
term in common use is community-based management (CBM), and this is
the descriptor adopted for much of this chapter. However, the related notion
of co-management, which can be thought of as a sub-set of CBM, is also of
particular relevance with respect to fisheries.
These general concepts have received some sanction at the international
level, particularly in the agreements and other instruments connected with the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED). For example, Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development explicitly addressed this issue in the following terms:
Indigenous people and their communities, and other local communities,
have a vital role in environmental management and development
because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should
recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and
enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable
development.4
Similarly, Agenda 21 called for the increased involvement of communities
and resource users in the planning and implementation of environmental and
resource management measures. Chapter 17 specifically called on coastal states to
[i]ntegrate small-scale artisanal fisheries development in marine and
coastal planning, taking into account the interests, and where appropri-
ate, encouraging representation of fishermen, small-scale fishery
workers, women, local communities and indigenous people.5
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive global
review of CBM and co-management, or to settle the terminological ques-
tions referred to above. It is useful, however, to consider some recent
commentaries in order to provide a general working definition of CBM for
the case studies discussed below.
In 1997 Hildebrand6 reviewed trends in “top-down” and “bottom-up”
approaches to the implementation of integrated coastal management (ICM),
and described community-based coastal management with reference to the
following characteristics:
[W]herein the people who live and work in coastal areas and depend on
their resources, are enabled to take an active and responsible role, and
increasingly share planning and decision-making responsibilities with
government.7
It is clear that there is no single, cohesive approach to this issue, and even
the use of terminology varies considerably. The mere use of terms such as
“co-management” or “community-based management” provides little
information about the substance of a program or policy, and it is possible to
overstate the impact of “formal” exercises in devolution.8 Hildebrand noted
the need for tighter definition of terms such as “public involvement,” “co-
management” and “empowerment,” but emphasized that the common direc-
tion is towards partnerships between governments and community-based
organizations or “in essence,” to use his words, power sharing.9
Pursuing the call for tighter definitions of various terms, including
community-based management, Harvey et al.10 quote the following descrip-
tion of CBM from Ferrer and Nozawa,11 which incorporates some of the
rationale for increasing the community’s planning and decision-making
responsibilities. In this construction, CBM is
people-centred, community-oriented and resource-based. It starts from
the basic premise that people have the innate capacity to understand and
act on their own problems. It begins where the people are, i.e. What the
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people already know, and build (sic) on this knowledge to develop
further their knowledge and create new consciousness. It strives for a
more active people’s participation in the planning, implementation and
evaluation of coastal resource management programs.
Harvey et al.12 have produced a very useful diagram (Figure 10.1), build-
ing on similar attempts by Hale et al.13 and Ellsworth et al.,14 that sets out a
continuum of public involvement in coastal management, which will assist
in consideration of the case studies that follow.
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Non-participation – government decides
Decisions made by governments with little or no
information provided to the public. Decisions made by
government agencies, public made aware after the
fact. No request for comment from the public.
Participation in planning
e.g. public consultation, public advisory committees.
Information provided to the Public Building Awareness.
Meaningful consultation. Comments requested from the




Partnerships – voluntary participation of all parties in a process
or activity. Each party makes specified contribution. Process
begins at the needs identification and conceptual stage.
Delegated authority
Higher level of government delegates portion of responsibility
to lower level of government. Higher authority sets limits and
guidelines for delegated decision making.
Community control of coastal areas and resources











Implicit in all of the studies and policy initiatives relating to CBM is a
fundamental contention that devolution of authority is in general a good
thing, leading not only to enhanced management of resources, but to an
improved quality of life for the people who depend upon those resources.15
This understanding of the value of community involvement, which is cer-
tainly central to the relevant Australian and Canadian policy developments,
is supported by a number of underlying premises. These include a belief in
the value of encouraging a sense of “stewardship”16 in the community, which
can lead to a greater sense of collective responsibility or “ownership.” This in
turn is seen as leading to more sustainable use and better conservation out-
comes in marine and coastal environments.
As is noted in the definition of CBM suggested by Ferrer and Nozawa
(above), movements towards CBM are also justified by the argument that
communities have a close association with, and knowledge of, a specific area
and resource that may be qualitatively different from that which is possible
within a government agency. More broadly, local communities are also more
likely to be intimately aware of underlying socio-economic problems con-
fronting their area and to have distinctive ideas on how to address, if not
rectify, those problems.
There is an additional practical impetus that could be seen both as an
opportunity, and as a cautionary note for overextended community institu-
tions. It seems clear that in both Australia and Canada, as resources for
government agencies have decreased in recent years, there has been a corre-
sponding increase in the desirability of replacing agency management efforts
with management by community groups.17
All of these important justifications for community involvement in
marine and coastal affairs, as well as the explanatory continuum in Figure
10.1, provide the frame of reference for the case studies that follow. These
case studies, it should be noted, are not intended to provide an exhaustive
survey of coastal and marine CBM activities in Australia and Canada.
Rather, they are meant to give a sampling of the kinds of policies and initi-
atives which come within the general rubric of community-based manage-
ment or co-management in both countries.
Canadian East Coast fisheries – “legalizing” 
co-management
The past two decades have been a period of major change and readjustment
in the fisheries of the east coast of Canada, as fish stocks have declined dra-
matically throughout the North Atlantic. The latest crisis in the Atlantic
Canada region began in the 1980s and peaked in the early 1990s;18 by 1993
the cod fishery had experienced a catastrophic decline, which resulted in the
federal government issuing a moratorium on almost all cod fishing in
Atlantic Canada. In those areas exempt from this moratorium (including the
waters off the shores of southern Nova Scotia, from Halifax to Yarmouth,
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Georges Bank and the Bay of Fundy), the cod fishery and other groundfish-
eries such as pollock, halibut and haddock were severely curtailed. Although
scientists speculated on a variety of ecological and environmental reasons for
the decline, the chief cause was overfishing – too many boats chasing too 
few fish.
Throughout the region, governments responded to the crisis by putting
in place management policies that increased the economic efficiency of the
fishing industry while promoting sustainability of the marine resources.
Ensuing discussions of the fisheries crisis revolved around the concerns of
managing the fish stocks, methods for harvesting and marketing the
resources, and plans for the economic development of areas hardest hit by
the crisis. Discussions involving government, marine scientists, economists
and fishers covered a wide range of issues, including co-management, quota
systems and other marine resources management practices,19 and local know-
ledge systems and their applicability to marine resources management.20
The moratorium on cod fishing led to a drastic restructuring of the
fishing industry and of the communities that support it and were supported
by it. Fishing companies downsized, dramatically reducing the size of their
fleets and closing processing plants. Small-scale fishers diversified their
catches, replaced hired help with family members, and went further from
shore in search of the few remaining fish. As of 1993, the northern cod clo-
sures had eliminated over 40,000 fishery jobs.21 Susan Williams22 estimated
that, in Atlantic Canada, 50,000 people working in the fishing industry and
another 47,000 people working in fishery-dependent sectors saw their
employment modified by the fisheries’ crisis. In 1995, the federal govern-
ment responded to the crisis through the Atlantic Groundfish Strategy
(TAGS), in conjunction with early retirement packages for plant workers
and the retirement of groundfish licenses by fishers. The “package” compen-
sated plant workers and fishers for lost earnings and offered them retraining
programs. In the summer of 1997, the federal government stopped the
retraining component of TAGS (one year early) and the remainder of the
program ended in the summer of 1998.
Around the world, many coastal communities, previously dependent on
marine resources, have dramatically downsized their fisheries and have
turned to other industries, most notably tourism. Like all communities
undergoing massive restructuring, coastal communities were altered cultur-
ally,23 economically24 and politically.25 The processes of globalization and
restructuring reduced the subsistence production of small-scale fishers as
large multinational companies controlled access to more and more of the
marine resources. As more fishers and their families were deprived of their
access to these resources, they increasingly depended on wage labor and on
government welfare benefits,26 yet these same governments decreased social
benefits. The few small-scale fishers who managed to retain their access to
the marine resources were economically squeezed and became dependent on
the large multinationals for the sale and processing of their products in the
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global market. Fishing-dependent communities also paid the price for this
economic remedy through higher unemployment rates, increased emigra-
tion, higher costs of living, and increased de-skilling of labor.27 International
responses to the world fisheries’ crisis have been similar, including rapid
development of aquaculture, technology transfer, importation of scientific
management regimes, development of the tourist industry, and the liberal-
ization of trade and of direct foreign investment.28
Against this backdrop, resort to some degree of co-management or
community-based management has been a recurrent theme in proposals to
modernize the governance of the industry that survives in Atlantic Canada
(including newly significant fisheries). The industrial fishery is, however, a
highly regulated sector in which the possibility for change is always limited
by what is permissable in law. One aspect of co-management which has
received limited attention has been the implementation of such activities in
legal structures, a task in which the terminological imprecision referred to
above is likely to raise particular problems. There is some consensus that the
lack of appropriate legal instruments may be an easier problem to identify
than it is to solve, as reflected in the following conclusion from a FAO-spon-
sored consultation on community-based management:
With regard to legal aspects, it was noted that the devolution of man-
agement authority to the local level would require, in many countries, a
major or even drastic revision of fisheries laws and possibly other related
legislation. . .. For . . . cases where complex political and socio-economic
conditions prevail, the required legal changes may be difficult to accom-
plish.29
There is currently little or no explicit legislative basis for the general
development of community-based fisheries management approaches in
Atlantic Canada, apart from the usual wide-ranging ministerial discretion
that applies to much of the fisheries management process. The Oceans Act30
does provide for the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to involve “coastal
communities” in the development and implementation of both a national
oceans strategy and integrated management plans, but this is very generally
stated and does not appear to be directly applicable to fisheries.
Despite this gap, which was the subject of one abortive attempt at legis-
lative amendment to provide for legally binding “partnering” agreements
under the Fisheries Act,31 the broad powers of the Minister have been
employed to put in place a number of arrangements which fall under the
general umbrella of co-management or community-based management. As
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) has acknowledged, and con-
sistent with the confusion mentioned above, no one description or definition
adequately addresses the variety of activities which might be lumped
together under the rubric of “co-management.”32 Broadly considered, this
could include most of the Department’s efforts at consultation and involve-
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ment of so-called “stakeholders.” More concrete versions of co-management
have extended to participation in compliance and enforcement activities and
the scientific work of DFO.33
The more formalized efforts at co-management of East Coast fisheries
seem to date from a 1996 consultation with the Atlantic commercial fishing
industry, which resulted in a framework for co-management that was in
place by 1997.34 This framework envisaged at least four levels of co-
management:
The first and most basic level that the Department considers to be co-
management has user groups providing input to the Integrated Fisheries
Management Plans. The second level has user groups, through their
legally constituted, representative organizations, entering into agree-
ments that reflect a greater involvement in the management of their
specific fishery. At the third level, fishers would enter into formal part-
nering through legally binding arrangements that transfer greater
responsibility to industry. This level would require changes to the exist-
ing Fisheries Act. The fourth level is co-management legislated under
land claims settlements.35
The “legislated” option has not been a factor on the East Coast, and the
potential for legally binding Fisheries Management Agreements (FMAs) was
eliminated with the failure to enact the amendments to the Fisheries Act (as
noted above). The minimal option put forth by DFO as a type of co-
management refers to the participation of resource users and others in the
development of Integrated Fisheries Management Plans (IFMPs),36 which set
out conservation requirements and management plans for a given fishery. In
the view of DFO, the provision of input during the process of development
of IFMPs “may be considered the basic form of co-management.”37 Within
the framework established by IFMPs, however, more extensive approaches to
co-management can be found, both in the Joint Project Agreement (JPA)
structure and in the possibility of “community quotas.”
The JPA is a means by which resource users may enter into a voluntary
agreement with DFO covering “specific activities such as data collection,
data analysis, science and/or fishery management activities.”38 The possibil-
ity of a JPA may be provided for as part of the IFMP for a fishery, as in the
eastern Nova Scotia snow crab IFMP. In that IFMP, some idea of the details
of what might be included in a JPA were provided in a draft or model
included as an appendix, based on an agreement between the Minister and a
fishing association.39 The general purpose of this sample JPA is to “enhance
the management” of the fishery, and specific project activities are set out in
the areas of resource management and scientific research. For the latter,
quite specific practical activities are listed, involving annual surveys and
analytical tasks. With respect to other management requirements, however,
the model focuses on a somewhat more general objective:
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The objective, from a resource management perspective, is to have the
industry actively participate in the management of their industry.
Through this Agreement, consultations will be held with the Associ-
ation and its members to discuss and jointly decide upon development
and implementation of policies, management plans, and quota and
fishery monitoring requirements.40
This statement makes it clear that under this model, DFO, consistent
with the applicable legislation, must continue to manage, and that the
Minister’s discretion on matters such as allocation is (at least formally) not
fettered by the existence of a JPA.
DFO has not in practice been entirely constrained by the original options
or “levels” of co-management set out in 1997. In a 1999 summary of “co-
management projects” in the Atlantic and Gulf of St. Lawrence regions,
seven JPAs were listed, of which one did not have the supposedly mandatory
accompanying IFMP. In addition, there were eight “informal agreements” or
“informal arrangements” of unspecified effect.41
DFO has in some cases also moved, within the general framework set out
by IFMPs, to establish “community quotas” over which community man-
agement boards exert some degree of management control. The community
quota approach was introduced in Atlantic Canada on an experimental basis
in 1996, where it was applied to inshore fixed gear license holders who were
divided into seven geographical groups based on counties or similar areas.42
Within quotas established under the IFMPs for certain groundfisheries,43 the
community management boards give “industry associations the opportunity
to develop conservation harvesting plans that address seasonal fishing pat-
terns,” and generally “develop, implement and monitor community fishing
plans,” including internal allocations.44
It is useful to note a few general characteristics of the approaches to “co-
management” as they have developed in Atlantic fisheries.45 First, it must be
remembered that DFO has been careful to make it clear that management
authority over key decisions such as allocation and access still rests with the
Minister, as it must in the absence of amendments to the Fisheries Act. In
this sense, JPAs might be considered to be a very limited form of co-man-
agement, especially given the usual requirement that there be an IFMP in
place as a precondition to moving on to a JPA. That is, the central manage-
ment decisions are, at least formally, made outside the context of the actual
co-management arrangement, and the plan that dictates the management
approach should be in place first. The same is true of community quota
management, which must of necessity remain a subsidiary level, dependent
upon both a quota system and the overall allocation of the quota.46
Second, the co-management options under JPAs and community quotas
have been utilized mainly by sectors of the commercial fishing industry, and
not by “communities” as such. With respect to the JPA, this is encouraged
by the very structure of the arrangement, which requires that the cooperat-
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ing party be a legal entity, whether as a commercial venture or an industry
association.47 Communities might form such an entity, but the thrust of the
program has clearly been towards the inclusion of the organized, commercial
fishery. Similarly, community quotas are in fact structured around gear
sectors, and are based on historical involvement in the relevant fishery. They
do not appear to open up the possibility for serious management involve-
ment by the community at large, or even fishers who have not already
obtained entry to the designated group and sector.
Third, these arrangements are built around temporary, time-limited
agreements48 and not the recognition of permanent claims to specific areas of
the ocean.49 As such, they are not particularly amenable to quasi-territorial
claims of communities to ocean space, but rather are designed around accom-
modation of industrial sectors and their need for a degree of certainty of
access and management measures over a sufficient period of time to justify
an investment. Despite the repeated assurances of DFO that co-management
in the form of JPAs and similar arrangements is not about privatization of
fisheries management, or the limitation of access to those with the capability
to enter into such agreements,50 a significant degree of suspicion exists
among what might be termed the small independent fishers. There is a
widely shared concern that the partnership provisions brought in by DFO
are in fact consistent with other initiatives, such as individual transferable
quotas (ITQs) and the concentration on a “professional” core of fishers, that
are generally intended to concentrate the fishery in the industrial sector and
to reduce the numbers of smaller players.51
This question of the types of participants supported by current
approaches to co-management, as noted above, raises a related problem. It
appears that, with some limited exceptions, government policies have not
been primarily concerned with community-based management, unless one
includes associations, or even affiliations of a few participants in a fishery, as
a “community.” Even if this version of “community” is accepted, most
arrangements concluded to date do not appear to have been based around the
concept of community entitlements to particular geographic areas within
which traditional rights might be recognized, an important subset of poten-
tial community-based approaches. Community quotas have a geographic
element in the description of the relevant fleets, but not in defining the areas
and resources to be managed.
If we accept the proposition that local community claims to some form of
“marine tenure” based on long use and custom are well-established in parts
of Canada, and that such claims could form a natural basis for cooperative
management approaches, why have geographically defined community-
based management schemes not emerged as an important factor?52 This gap
is not peculiar to the question of community-based management. If one con-
siders the critical question of allocation of access to fisheries (again, setting
aside the Aboriginal case), it seems clear that there has been limited room
for allocation on the basis of community claims to some control or tenurial
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rights over marine areas. Other entities and collectives – whether “enter-
prises” or gear sectors – have been recognized as part of the allocation
process, but local community claims to particular resources and spaces have
not been included in the same way, although locality has been incorporated
as one factor to be considered in some cases.53
It is, of course, possible to argue that this is not necessary to reflect
marine property rights in law, in that they operate most effectively at a local
level based on local custom, and will continue to do so within the legal
framework of the formal system.54 The most important reason given to
explain the lack of recognition given to such rights, however, is that they do
not have critical characteristics of property rights in a legal sense, and are
therefore difficult to include in a system that bases its definition of rights on
legal notions of property. Most significant, these “rights” are generally com-
munal in nature, representing an intermediate form of private title, neither
true “common property” nor individual ownership in a legal sense, and this
is a form of property currently unrecognized in Canadian law (outside the
Aboriginal context):
Claims or ownership and control of property [are] centred in the
community, and individual use-rights are derived from membership in
the community. Although basically foreign to the system of owner/non-
owner property relations dominant in capitalist-industrial societies, col-
lectively based property claims and associated individual use rights
represent a distinctive form of property relation.55
Future prospects
Existing approaches to fisheries co-management in Atlantic Canada, with
some exceptions, do not really extend to what can properly be termed
community-based management, if one considers the delineation of a
“community” as requiring something more than narrow criteria rooted in
fishing sectors. Indeed, the extent to which existing arrangements constitute
co-management of the oceans, as opposed to enhanced participation for some
in the normal fisheries management and allocation process, is doubtful. The
caution with which this issue is being approached, and the slow pace of
progress, is emphasized in the February 2001 DFO discussion document
prepared as part of the Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review:56
Government and industry have talked about co-management since the
1970s, but the concept has undergone an evolutionary maturation.
In the initial stages, the emphasis was on effective consultation processes
through advisory committees for individual fisheries and through ad hoc
policy and planning conferences. In the 1990s, co-management took the
more specific form of IFMPs and joint project agreements to share
management responsibilities in particular fisheries . . .
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Today, the Department recognizes that efforts to share management
responsibilities and costs with resources users on a fishery-by-fishery
basis have to be supplemented by an expanded role for resource users in
overall policy and planning. To this end, we offer the following defini-
tion: . . .
The sharing of authority and responsibility for fisheries management, and of
accountability for results, between DFO and resource users.57
It could be argued that the 30-year process of “maturation” seems to have
led to something less than an expansive definition of “co-management,” and
none at all for community-based management. Furthermore, other references
in the discussion document make it clear that co-management for Atlantic
fisheries is still primarily viewed as a matter for cooperation between DFO
and industry sectors, with “other” interested parties having input of a dis-
tinctly lower order. For example, after a description of the various means by
which industry participants were drawn into the management process, there
is the following description of the issues related to broader participation:
[T]here is also the issue of public interest representation. Local
community organizations, employers and workers in the fish and
seafood processing sector, local and provincial governments, environ-
mental and animal rights groups and other users of the marine environ-
ment may sometimes look for opportunities to participate in fisheries management
decision making.58
As noted above, the discussion document in which this statement appears
is part of an ongoing process of policy development for the Atlantic fisheries.
In 2004, DFO released a document representing the next stage in this
process: A Policy Framework for the Management of Fisheries on Canada’s
Atlantic Coast,59 which provides a general policy framework as the first phase
of a two-part process, the second of which will establish priorities and move
towards implementation. There are numerous references to co-management
in this policy, but it is evident that the concept is still being considered at a
high level of generality. The tentative nature of the approach to co-
management is reflected in the following definition, which emphasizes the
future possibilities over the present reality, and acknowledges the lack of a
legal underpinning:
Co-management means the sharing of responsibility and accountability
for results between Fisheries and Oceans Canada and resource users, and
in time and with the required legislative amendments, the sharing of
authority for fisheries management.60
It remains to be seen whether the next evolution of policy will result in
an approach to fisheries co-management for the Atlantic coast that is closer
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in form to community-based management, as opposed to the more limited
industrial co-management models of the past. There are signs that institu-
tions involved in the management of community quotas, such as the Fundy
Fixed Gear Council, may over time move to broader efforts at the sustain-
able management of fisheries, and engage as participants in more compre-
hensive community-based approaches to ocean management.61
Community-based management of fisheries on Canada’s
West Coast
There is a significant difference between the east and west coasts of Canada
in terms of the nature of the fishing industry and the communities that
depend on them. On the West Coast, wild salmon traditionally formed the
basis of the fishery (as opposed to groundfish on the Atlantic coast), and
there is a long history of its association with the culture and practices of
Aboriginal peoples before white settlement. Fewer fishing-dependent
communities developed on the British Columbia (BC) coast compared with
Atlantic Canada. Gislason et al.62 identify 50 BC communities of which only
11 are single-sector communities. These communities range from isolated
First Nations villages to larger more diversified centers.
As on the East Coast, British Columbia’s fisheries and their dependent
communities have experienced severe decline over almost two decades.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, salmon prices fell in response to global
competition and declining access to adjacent resources. At the same time,
salmon stocks began to decline due to factors such as overharvesting, poor
ocean survival rates, habitat destruction and management cutbacks. Strict
conservation measures were put in place to protect these stocks in the mid-
1990s, including closures and reductions in fishing times.63 This has
resulted in more effort on groundfish, elasmobranchs and invertebrates. One
of the first formal co-management approaches, introduced in 1992, was the
Skeena Watershed Committee. During the 1990s, various other commun-
ity-related initiatives were introduced, including the Coastal Communities
Network (CCN). At conferences related to this network, and in various
other public forums and workshops on fisheries held in BC coastal
communities, there was a call for increased community participation in 
fisheries management in BC, and concern about the viability of fishing-
dependent communities.64
There has been debate about the merits of community-based fisheries
management in the province, particularly in the management of migratory
salmon stocks.65 Since the beginning of the 1990s, there have been a myriad
of multi-stakeholder processes initiated in BC coastal areas that to some
degree or another can be considered as co-management processes. These
include watershed management initiatives, regional management associ-
ations, Aboriginal fisheries strategies and community-based organizations.
The federal Oceans Act 1997 has stimulated renewed attempts to pursue co-
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management approaches in the management of ocean resources.66 A
recent initiative is the West Coast of Vancouver Island (WCVI) Aquatic
Management Board launched in February 2002. The three examples of co-
management practices on the BC coast noted above – the Skeena Watershed
Committee, the Coastal Communities Network and the WCVI Aquatic
Management Board – are each discussed briefly below.
The first formal fisheries co-management arrangements made in BC were
those associated with the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy, which was funded
by the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans. In 1992–93, the
program’s first year, 80 agreements were made with Aboriginal groups on
co-operative management projects and pilot projects for commercial salmon
sales.67 A widely cited example of fisheries co-management in BC is the
Skeena Watershed Committee.68 The Skeena River flows into the Pacific
Ocean at Prince Rupert in northern BC, just south of the Alaska border.
Two major allocation conflicts existed, one between commercial fishers near
the mouth of the river and sport fishers upstream, and a second between
commercial fishers and the Gitskan and Wet’suwet’en First Nations. The
Committee comprised five “equal partners” including First Nations, com-
mercial, recreational, federal and provincial interests. Its accomplishments
included devising a three-year fishing plan for the Skeena River salmon
fishery, public education programs and dialogue, selective harvest and
sockeye enhancement initiatives, and increased data collection through a
tagging program.69 Despite this success, the conflict between sectors that
motivated the initiative re-emerged in the difficult years of 1996–97 and
the partners could not reach consensus over harvesting issues. The Commit-
tee was dissolved in March 1997 when the North Coast Advisory Board,
representing commercial harvesters, withdrew its participation.70
The Coastal Community Network (CCN) promotes itself as the “big
voice for small communities” in British Columbia. CCN’s role is to link
coastal communities, to develop common ground on resource and marine
policy, and to articulate the needs of coastal communities to senior govern-
ments, industry, media and the general public. Their goals are to enhance
the long-term viability of communities, increase their self-reliance, and
ensure a balanced and fair approach to the development of public policy
related to the marine environment. CCN grew out of the Coastal
Communities Conference on Fisheries held in Port Alberni in April 1993.
At this conference, representatives from community councils, native bands,
tribal councils, fishers, processors, cooperatives and unions gathered to
discuss the future economic development of all coastal regions of BC.
Organized and facilitated by Simon Fraser University, and in partnership
with the CCN, a subsequent series of conferences were held in BC coastal
communities in 1996–97. Three themes emerged from these meetings con-
cerning the involvement of coastal residents in fisheries management.71 First,
coastal people have the right to share in benefits obtained from resources
adjacent to them and to participate in related decisions. Second, local
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knowledge is important to ensuring sound fisheries management, and third,
coastal communities have stewardship capabilities that cannot be cost-
effectively matched by government in terms of data collection, enhancement,
habitat protection and even enforcement.72 The CCN is currently struggling
with leadership and financial difficulties and its future is uncertain.
A recent example of co-management approaches is the WCVI Aquatic
Management Board, which covers an area that corresponds with the tradi-
tional Nuu-chah-nulth territory on Vancouver Island. This is a new forum
for individuals and organizations to participate in the integrated manage-
ment of aquatic resources and represents the delivery of a new approach to
governance of aquatic resources. The creation of the Board was influenced by
growing pressure to consider different approaches to the management of
aquatic resources. These pressures include: increased demand from coastal
communities, the Province of British Columbia and various public interest
groups for an enhanced role in decision making; the government’s need to
establish more extensive, localized and integrated consultation and advisory
processes as outlined in the federal Oceans Act; and the First Nations’ desire
to redevelop management processes with an enhanced First Nations’ juris-
dictional role.73
The federal, provincial, Nuu-chah-nulth and local governments jointly
established the Board as a three-year pilot project. This pilot will test the
implementation of a community and area-based process that will allow local
communities, in partnership with others, to provide input and have an influ-
ence over aquatic management issues affecting their area. The Board will
address issues in areas related to fisheries and integrated oceans manage-
ment, stewardship, aquaculture and community economic development. The
Board’s purpose is to lead, facilitate and participate in decision-making
processes related to these issues. This will involve working closely with
other regional advisory and management processes as well as other groups.
Recommendations from the Board will be presented to the appropriate
statutory authority for their consideration.
In conclusion, the success of various community-based fisheries man-
agement approaches has varied depending not only on the mix of
participants and the availability of resources, but also on a host of exter-
nal factors ranging from changing ocean conditions to federal and provin-
cial resource policies that are beyond the capabilities of any local group to
address.74 Pinkerton75 suggests that barriers to community conservation
initiatives relate to two general areas: distrust and resistance of manage-
ment agencies and lack of broadly organized political support. While
Savioe et al.76 concluded “there is no one model that can possibly fit all in
co-managing the fishery,” much experience has been gained through trial
and error over the past decade. A planned evaluation of the WCVI
Aquatic Management Board should provide future direction on how
community voices can more effectively be incorporated into decision
making in fisheries management.
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The Central Coast Land and Coastal Resource
Management Plan, British Columbia
Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) is a sub-regional integ-
rated resource planning process for Crown land in British Columbia that
began in 1993. Through a variety of participatory processes, alternative land
and resource management scenarios are identified and evaluated by particip-
ants. The principles of LRMP include consideration of all resource values,
public participation, inter-agency coordination and consensus-based decision
making. As the planning guide suggests, “the intent is to develop a
community forum for communication and understanding among residents
and government agencies” and to serve as “a vehicle for education and
promotion of long-term participation in resource management.”77 The
LRMP forums are, however, only advisory to governments who are legally
responsible for resource decision making.
The Central Coast Land and Coastal Resource Management Plan
(CCLCRMP) began in 1996 as part of the LRMP process. CCLCRMP was
distinguished from previous processes because land, water and coastal
nearshore resources were considered simultaneously. This necessitated that
federal and provincial governments work together with First Nations and
the public in addressing long-term strategic and management directions.
The planning area is large, covering 4.8 million hectares of marine foreshore
and forested upland on the mainland west coast for British Columbia. Tem-
perate rainforest, major watersheds, rugged shorelines and steep mountain-
ous terrain characterize the area. The population of about 4,400 consists of
predominantly First Nations people dependent on fishing and forestry for a
living.78
Participation, which evolved during the process, includes about 60 stake-
holders from all levels of government, industry, residents, environmental
groups and outdoor recreation groups. Due to the size of the planning area,
participants were divided into North and South Forums to allow better local
representation. In addition, a special sub-committee, the Coastal and Marine
Committee, was established to provide recommendations to the planning
forums. The intent was to integrate provincial LRMP into the federal
government’s recently initiated integrated coastal zone management
approach, for example, using the CCLCRMP process as the initial forum for
recommending, by consensus, marine protected areas and marine study
areas. At the strategic level only, the CCLCRMP addresses the management
of marine and freshwater habitat and will provide recommendations on man-
agement objectives for aquaculture. A special First Nations Forum was also
established to facilitate discussion among participating First Nations. An
inter-agency planning team with representatives from federal and provincial
agencies, local governments and First Nations provided technical analysis
and mapping expertise.
The coastal component of the CCLCRMP began in 1997 with the Coastal
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Zone Strategic Plan completed and approved by April 2001.79 The key prin-
ciple in the coastal zone plan is ecosystem-based management, which
encompasses not only ecological integrity but also seeks to sustain social,
economic and cultural activities.80 However, the then newly elected provin-
cial government reviewed the decision and decided it had been rushed and
that while approved in principle, final discussions were needed with First
Nations and Fisheries and Oceans Canada.81 While the marine planning
work has been completed, the terrestrial component adopted a more stream-
lined approach to facilitate completion and a final land use plan is expected
by 30 June 2004.82 In the meantime, the new (2001) provincial Ministry of
Sustainable Resource Management introduced a coast sustainability
strategy.83 Within this strategy, the Central Coast plan will be coordinated
with the plans from two other coastal LRMP processes.
The CDN$35 million Coast Sustainability Trust was also established to
support the outcomes of the Central Coast plan. The Trust will ensure that
the planning process continues and is designed to help workers, contractors,
communities and companies whose interests are negatively affected by land-
use decisions such as the establishment of protected areas and the implemen-
tation of ecosystem-based management practices.
Despite the fact that the coastal plan is not finally approved, work is
going ahead on a key recommendation to undertake more specific integrated
coastal planning in key areas in the southern part of the coastal area. The
intent is to provide direction to government concerning tenure decisions for
aquaculture, ecotourism and economic diversification opportunities. As part
of the provincial government’s coastal strategy, a Coast Information Team
(CIT) was established. The CIT brings together the best available scientific
traditional and local knowledge, environmental expertise and community
experience to develop information and analyses to support the development
and implementation of ecosystem-based management.84
The Central Coast LCRMP has faced several challenges, some unique to
the planning area, and others inherent to many shared decision-making
processes. First, the process has taken much longer than anticipated. In part
this relates to the large size of the planning area, and to the fact that it
includes a coastal component. This has required the federal and provincial
governments to establish new working relationships, which was done
through a special agreement. Further, First Nations participants have been
concerned over their ability to meet the expectations of the planning process
with respect to such issues as time, information sharing and the impact on
treaty settlement.85 Indeed, many participants expressed concern about their
ability to dedicate the time and resources needed to complete the planning
process. In similar processes elsewhere in the province, availability of time
and burnout have also been identified as problems.86
Appropriate representation is also an important variable. Not all First
Nations chose to be part of the process. However, due to the importance of
having their support, the government has been required to engage in separ-
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ate negotiations in some instances. However, the extensive involvement of
many stakeholders from a comprehensive array of interests has lengthened the
process. The new streamlined approach to complete the process employs a sec-
toral model with a collaborative approach to reaching decisions. As a result,
there are fewer people at the table representing larger constituencies. This final
“completion table” includes representatives from the environmental commun-
ity, the forest industry, tourism, recreation, labor, small business forestry, local
governments, the federal government and First Nations.87
To conclude, the Central Coast LCRMP, while a lengthy and as yet
incomplete process, has already resulted in tangible results, especially in
terms of identifying areas for protection. While the planning has been at a
strategic level with maps at a scale of 1:250,000, local scale coastal planning
(1:50,000) is already under way in some places and these integrated land use
plans will provide important information for decision makers.88 While there
are many gaps in data and many policies that need reforming, the process
has resulted in the beginnings of an integrated coastal management strategy
for BC’s coast that has engaged local residents in an active role in determin-
ing the future of their communities and livelihoods.
Coastcare in Australia
Coastcare is a community-based grants scheme run jointly by the Common-
wealth government and state/territory governments. Coastcare is primarily
funded from the Natural Heritage Trust fund that arose from the partial sale
of the government-owned Telecommunications Corporation (Telstra). The
parent program under the Natural Heritage Trust, the “Coasts and Clean
Seas,” had a total of AUD$141 million to distribute over the first phase of
the program, which ended in June 2002. Of this amount, AUD$27.3
million went to Coastcare. The general purpose of the program is summar-
ized as follows:
Coastcare is a national program that encourages community involve-
ment in the protection, management and rehabilitation of our coastal
and marine environments. The program assists local communities to
form partnerships with local Land managers to undertake projects that
aim to improve and protect our coastal and marine habitats.89
The National Office of Coastcare is based in the headquarters of Environ-
ment Australia, with 30 regional facilitators spread across Australia. The
program is jointly funded with state and territory governments, and local
governments are vitally and actively involved. The stated aims of Coastcare
include the following:90
• To engender in local communities, including local industries, a sense of
stewardship for coastal and marine areas.
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• To provide opportunities and resources for residents, volunteers, busi-
ness and interest groups to participate in coastal management.
• To support community identification of natural and cultural resources.
• To facilitate interaction between the community and bodies with
responsibility for managing coastal areas.
The focus of Coastcare was to assist on-ground work such as:
• protecting or rehabilitating dunes, estuaries and wetlands;
• rehabilitating coastal and marine habitats;
• removing threats to coastal environments;
• monitoring beach conditions, and coastal flora and fauna;
• helping to develop and implement local management plans;
• education and training activities that raise community awareness, know-
ledge or skills on coastal and marine conservation issues.
As can be seen from these objectives, the program is an example of “col-
laborative management” as set out in the continuum of public involvement
in coastal management outlined earlier (see Figure 10.1).
Since the inception of Coastcare in 1995, over 2,000 projects around Aus-
tralia have been funded,91 with grants made ranging from AUD$1,000 to
$30,000 per project. Community groups apply for funds to state-level state
assessment panels (SAPs) which rank the applications, with the final
decision resting with the federal minister. Applications are received in
March each year and are assessed by regional and state assessment panels
(both with strong community representation), prior to the announcement of
grants in December.92 According to Tarte, the combination of state,
community and local government financial and “in-kind” contributions
meant “each Commonwealth Government dollar contributed is matched at
least two-fold by ‘in kind’ or direct financial support.”93
The most comprehensive and independent evaluation of the Coastcare
program has been that conducted by Harvey et al.94 with respect to South
Australia. This review, which included interviews with key stakeholders,
provides a more detailed picture of program implementation at the state
level. South Australia received AUD$150,000 in 1995/96 rising to
$500,000 in 1998/99, with funds being matched by the state government.
In addition to the direct grants, funds were used to employ a state co-
coordinator and three regional coordinators whose role is to promote
involvement of organizations, assist community groups in preparing appli-
cations and to facilitate local level participation in the Coastcare program.
Although total funds available increased over this time period, the
number of grants decreased (from 81 to 64). This reflects the fact that most
projects are modest (less than AUD$5,000) and the possibility that some
groups continued to apply while others began to see the application pro-
cedure as too tedious for such small amounts of money.
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Consistent with the national situation, the majority of the South Aus-
tralia grants (80 percent) were for on-ground projects. In terms of the
purpose of grants, protection and rehabilitation of sensitive areas (usually
sand dunes) and enhancement of sustainable recreation and tourism (usually
pathways and boardwalks) made up 66 percent of all projects. Community
participation in development and implementation of management plans
made up a disappointing 6.5 percent of projects, while community-based
monitoring of the coast accounted for a mere 9.2 percent of projects. In
general, the majority of projects are moderately funded, but directed to a
decreasing number of volunteers (mainly conservation, resident and eco-
nomic development groups). In terms of the degree of participation in
coastal management (as reflected in Figure 10.1), this suggests a strong role
in collaborative management but a very low participation in direct decision
making. This has led observers to suggest that the community is being used
as a substitute for work previously performed by government agencies.95
The authors of the South Australia study concluded that Coastcare has
effectively harnessed community groups to work in partnership with local
authorities and has led directly to capacity building for local communities.96
In addition, they determined that the program had “kick started” commun-
ity projects and had stimulated local interest and commitment based on a
partnership with educational management agencies in which coastal exper-
tise already existed. The challenge that remains is whether funds can be
generated from new sources (other than government) to ensure that these
positive benefits are sustainable in the medium to long term.97 Furthermore,
it remains to be seen whether governments are truly interested in moving
along the participation spectrum and offering people a genuine involvement
in decision making on the coast, rather than simply using the community as
an unpaid workforce.
Harvey et al. point out that in the South Australia case, the lack of an
overriding coastal policy has hampered the allocation of funds,98 but that the
factors that have worked for community-based management in Coastcare
have been the role of the program in building community cohesion and
capacity, which are less tangible benefits. They highlight the fact that the
lack of evaluation of the projects’ environmental value has also restricted
how much could be learned about the potential of community-based man-
agement.
The experience in South Australia contrasts with the position in Victoria
where the SAP uses the Victorian Coastal Strategy (the state’s overall coastal
policy) as a means of setting priorities in allocating Coastcare grants. As
approximately half of the members of the SAP are members of the Victorian
Coastal Council (the lead agency in Victoria), and the VCC has primary
responsibility for preparation of the Victorian Coastal Strategy, the grants
are consistent with integrated coastal management principles outlined in the
Strategy. This allows for some continuity and coherence in the selection of
projects (at least in theory). Despite this advantage, however, Wescott99
Australia and Canada: community involvement 267
nonetheless criticized the trend in Victoria to use Coastcare annual grant
funding as a substitute for recurrent government funding, consistent with
the critique of the South Australia program by Harvey et al.
In summary, Coastcare has been a valuable community-based program,
despite its identified shortcomings. The federal government’s political
assessment of the program is reflected in its commitment to extend Coast-
care until 2007 as part of a series of programs (including Landcare, Bushcare
and Rivercare).100 The overall prescription for change in Coastcare offered
from Harvey et al. could be seen as a fair assessment of Coastcare as a
community-based management program:
There is a requirement for long term vision for community-based
coastal management because without that vision there is the capacity for
short-term funding rounds to influence the type of activity that local
communities undertake.101
The Marine and Coastal Community Network in
Australia
The Marine and Coastal Community Network (MCCN) grew out of the
Ocean Rescue 2000 initiative of the Australian government, and stemmed
from a recognition that progress in coastal and marine conservation could
only come with a greater understanding (and consciousness) of the coastal,
and in particular, marine environment amongst the general community.102
The MCCN was a unique attempt to build an alliance of interested indi-
vidual and groups (called “participants”) to ensure the sustainability of the
lessons learned by communities in coastal management, and to bring
together like-minded people who shared a commitment to the coastal and
marine environment (though they might well disagree on specific issues).
The first meeting of the Network was in Sydney in May 1993, in the
form of the rather gloriously named National Implementation Committee.
The Committee was formed by the Australian Marine Conservation Society,
a non-government conservation organization that had been given the con-
tract from Environment Australia to establish the Network. The Network’s
stated role was to raise consciousness of the marine and coastal environment
and to promote ecologically sustainable use of the Australian coastal and
marine environment. It was not to take sides in any debate on marine issues,
nor become involved in partisan politics, but to draw together a wide spec-
trum of Australians interested in the marine and coastal environment. As
such, it was seen as an “honest broker” that could act as an advocate for the
marine and coastal environment.
The 1993 meeting put in place a mission statement and operating prin-
ciples and set about its task. By October of that year, a Southern Regional
Coordinator had been placed in Melbourne and a Northern Regional Coordi-
nator in Darwin. The idea caught on rapidly and very soon afterwards
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regional coordinators were in place in Western Australia, New South Wales,
South Australia and Tasmania. The Network was initially funded at approx-
imately AUD$800,000 per year, and at $500,000 per year for the two years
following June 2001. The budget remained at $500,000 for 2003–04.
There is little likelihood of the budget being restored to its former level.
Indeed, there is speculation that the only reason the budget was not cut
further was because MCCN was awarded the “Gold Banksia” Environmental
Award (Patron of the Prime Minister) as the most outstanding organization
for environmental protection in 2003.
By December 2003, the Network was composed of over 9,000 registered
participants from every possible interest group involved in coastal and
marine matters, including government agencies, non-governmental organi-
zations, indigenous organizations, conservation groups, coastal recreational
users, fisheries associations, private industry, universities and other educa-
tional groups, and individuals. It is fair to say that all tiers of Australian
society are represented in the Network.
Participants in the Network are kept informed of recent coastal and
marine initiatives, including relevant conferences and workshops, through a
national bi-monthly newsletter (“Waves”) and state-level inserts (“Ripples”).
MCCN has responded to the recent budget cuts by developing the
Network’s Internet resources.103 Regional coordinators located in a “host”
organization disseminate information and answer inquiries from the general
community, business and media. The host organizations provide the phys-
ical infrastructure for the coordinator and are paid a contribution toward
these costs. The types of organizations acting as hosts vary from state to state
and include fisheries organizations, tertiary education institutions, conserva-
tion groups and local government agencies. The experience has been that the
relationship with host organizations aids in expanding the diversity of the
Network.
Each regional coordinator has a mentor who is a member of the National
Reference Group (NRG). NRG members are drawn from a wide variety of
backgrounds (including state and local government agencies, academia and
conservation groups) and a range of disciplines. The NRG provides support
and advice to the coordinators and develops the overall policies that guide
the Network. The NRG and regional coordinators meet twice a year for 
2–4 days.
Consistent with its original mandate, the Network is non-political and
does not take “sides” in controversial issues. Rather it acts as honest broker
through the dissemination of information and as a conduit for different
opinions. Since its commencement in 1993, the Network has grown
steadily, with full funding provided by Environment Australia (EA, the
federal government environment department). The fact that the Network is
seen as neutral and independent of government allows all groups in the
community to use it as a vehicle for dissemination of information and as a
mechanism for capacity building in coastal and marine affairs in Australia.
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By way of illustration of the Network’s community-based approach, it is
useful to consider the role it played in the development of a constituency for
Australia’s Ocean Policy. The March 1997 discussion paper prepared by the
Commonwealth government on the proposed ‘comprehensive and integrated
Oceans Policy’ resulted, after a period for submissions of eight weeks, in
only 63 submissions being received, predominantly from academics and
non-governmental organizations. This was a rather disappointing response
considering the difficulties an overarching policy was going to face from
well-entrenched sectoral interests. The government department leading
development of the policy (Environment Australia) and the Network set out
to rectify this problem.
The agencies targeted a series of sectoral groups (e.g. conservation groups)
who had not responded in the numbers expected. The Network had earlier
surveyed its participants on the critical issues involved in the Policy, and
now set up seminars and meetings across the country, cajoling the media
and turning its concentrated efforts into increasing the response rate to the
second set of documentation (the May 1998 Issue Paper). One of the key
methods employed was to encourage people to find some specific issue or
item in the Policy to comment on, despite the somewhat daunting breadth
and complexity of the document. It was hoped that, once a party felt com-
fortable in dealing with the Policy, they would go on to comment on other
issues. The strategy seemed to work, as the second round of public submis-
sions drew 660 responses. This provided important input, and allowed the
federal Minister to demonstrate wide-based support for the notion of an
integrated, non-sectoral oceans policy.
The Network’s regional coordinators have also worked closely with the
regional facilitators of the Coastcare program to encourage community
groups to become involved in Coastcare. Furthermore, the Network’s
participants database has been a valuable resource to publicize Coastcare
grant rounds and to advertise Coastcare-related workshops and seminars.
The role of the Network in community-based management, therefore, has
usually been indirect or facilitative, but as the work areas shown in Table
10.1 illustrate, it has been diverse. In addition, production of such items as
the Australian Marine Project Guide, the Blue Pages (a directory of coastal and
marine groups), and the management of projects such as “Dragon Search”
(monitoring the numbers and conservation of seadragons) have led to more
direct involvement.
The Network has regularly surveyed its participants. In a 2001 survey, 90
percent of respondents regarded the continuation of the Network as “highly
important” with 70 percent rating the overall service provided as “excel-
lent.” The newsletters were regarded as “very useful” by 96 percent of
respondents.104 With reference to the continuum of public involvement set
out in Figure 10.1, the Network is involved in some way in the middle
three levels, but in reality its major input to community-based management
does not fit well into this spectrum. Its primary role is stimulating the
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Table 10.1 Major areas of work for the MCCN regional coordinators, mid-October
2001 to mid-February 2002
Category of work Vic NT Qld NSW Tas SA WA NO
Contract derived work
Administration × ×× ×× ×× ××× ×× ×× ×××
Events ××× – × ×× – ×× × –
Facilitating/organizing ××× – – ××× ××× × × –
workshops
Info collated for ×× ×× ××× ×× ××× ××× ×× ×
dissemination
Networking/liaison ×× ×× × ××× ××× × ××× ××
Regional visits ××× × ×× × ××× × × ××
Waves and Ripples ××× ×× ××× ××× ×× ×× ×× ×××
Web pages ×× × ×× × × × × ××
Progress reports, etc. × ×× ××× ×× ×× × ×× ××
Oceans Policy ×× ×× × ××× × × ×× ××
Marine protected areas ××× × × ××× ×× ××× ××× ×
Coast and Clean Seas – × – – – × ×× –
Participants’ database × × × × × × × ×××




Events × – – – ×× × – –
Projects ×× ×× ×× ××× ××× ×× – –
Short courses – × – – – – – –
Training for regional – – – – – – × ×
coordinators
Community radio × × × – – × ××× –
New grant applications ×× – – – – – – –




Assessment panels – – – – × – – –
Committees × – × ×× ×× ×× ×× ××
Interview panels – – – – – – – –
Media ××× × × ×× ×× × × –
Submissions × ×× ××× ××× ×× ××× ××× –
Workshop/conference ×× – ××× ××× – ×× × ××
attendance
Issues × – ×× × × ××× ××× ×
community to become involved in community-based management, a role
that may be difficult to track in concrete terms, but which is nonetheless
essential.
Conclusion
The range of potential approaches for CBM and co-management, as
reflected in the literature noted at the outset of this chapter, is borne out
in practice in both Australia and Canada. It is clear that no one “package”
of institutions and arrangements presents an ideal that will work in all cir-
cumstances; even the fundamental purpose for seeking community
involvement can vary from participation in planning and conservation
actions to some form of power-sharing in the regulatory context. The
breadth of the experience in both countries would suggest that the devel-
opment of CBM is, above all, a pragmatic and responsive process, with
agencies and communities challenged to craft the particular variant that
will best serve their interests. Given the strong demand for progress on the
full participation of communities in coastal and ocean management, it
seems certain that CBM, or co-management, will continue to be an
important aspect of the development of new forms of governance. The
cases examined here, however, suggest that a number of small cautions
should be kept in mind.
First, while the quest for terminological precision should not be allowed
to stifle creativity, and the names given to community-based activities are
less important than the practical progress that can be made, proponents and
analysts alike should still be clear on the degree of community involvement
that is proposed. The overuse of terms like co-management to include, for
example, routine consultation with no sharing of decision-making power is
likely to lead to suspicion and cynicism on the part of communities. Second,
and related to this problem, we must be aware of the danger in labeling a
narrow interest group such as a fishery sector as the “community,” when
numerous other interests may be left as outsiders, with no option but active
opposition to the new mechanisms. Finally, careful attention must be paid
to the level of downloading and demands placed upon overstretched
community institutions. Community involvement should be more than a
means of shuffling off government responsibilities (and costs) to those with
no institutional or financial base to support them.
Notes
1 For a survey of the early work in this area, see the collection of essays in B.
McCay and J. Acheson (eds) The Question of the Commons (University of Arizona
Press, Tucson: 1987).
2 See, for example, S. Siar, R. Agbayani and J. Valera “Acceptability of territor-
ial use rights in fisheries: Towards community-based management of small-
scale fisheries in the Philippines” 14 Fisheries Research (1992) 295–304.
272 Marian Binkley et al.
3 See, for example, B. McCay and J. Acheson “Human Ecology of the
Commons” in McCay and Acheson, note 1 at 31–4.
4 (17 June 1992) U.N. Doc A/CONF. 151/5 Rev. 1. (1992) 31 International
Legal Materials 874.
5 Reprinted S.P. Johnson The Earth Summit: The United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff,
London: 1993) 123–508, para. 17.82 (a) at 321.
6 L. Hildebrand “Community-based coastal management” (1997) 36(1–3) Ocean
and Coastal Management 1–9. This article appeared as an introduction to an
entire issue of the journal devoted to “Community-based Coastal Manage-
ment.”
7 Ibid., at 2.
8 In the context of fisheries management, for example, despite the widespread
retention of real management control in the hands of the state, it has been sug-
gested that devolution efforts have led to a “. . . new paradigm in fisheries
management. This is not a biological, model-driven approach with top down
state managers recommending management interventions to state enforcers
but a decentralized people/community-centred approach to resource manage-
ment.” See K. MacKay “Sustainable Management of Fisheries Resources:
Common Property Issues” in Philippines Coastal Resources Under Stress: Selected
Papers from the Fourth Common Property Conference (Marine Science Institute, Uni-
versity of the Philippines, Manila: 1995) at 2.
9 Hildebrand, note 6.
10 N. Harvey, B.D. Clarke and P. Carvalho “The role of the Australian Coastcare
program in community-based management: A case study from South Aus-
tralia”(2001) 44(3–4) Ocean and Coastal Management 163–4. In this work,
Harvey et al. comment on the many examples of CBM assembled by Cicin-Sain
and Knecht in their book, B. Cicin-Sain and R. Knecht Integrated Ocean and
Coastal Management – Concepts and Practices (Island Press, Washington, DC:
1998).
11 E.M. Ferrer and C.M. Nozawa “Community-based coastal resources manage-
ment in the Philippines – key concepts, methods and lessons learned,” as cited
in Harvey et al., ibid. Online at: www.web.idrc.ca/en/ev-5994-201-1-
DO_TOPIC.html (accessed 22 January 2004).
12 Harvey et al., note at 10.
13 L.Z. Hale, M. Amaral, B.W. Mwandotto, M. Amaral and A. Issa “Catalysing
coastal management in Kenya and Zanzibar: Building capacity and commit-
ment” (2000) 28 Coastal Management 75–85.
14 J.P. Ellsworth, L.P. Hildebrand and E.A. Glover “Canada’s Atlantic Coastal
Action Program: A community-based approach to collective governance”
(1997) 36(1–3) Ocean and Coastal Management 121–42.
15 Abregana, P. Gardiner-Barber, M. Maxino, P. Saunders and D. VanderZwaag
Legal Challenges for Local Management of Marine Resources: A Philippine Case Study
(CIDA/Environment and Resource Management Project, Halifax: 1996) 7–9.
16 G. Wescott “Partnerships for capacity building: Community, governments
and universities working together” (2002) 45(9–10) Ocean and Coastal Manage-
ment 549–71.
17 G. Wescott “Reforming coastal management to improve community partici-
pation and integration in Victoria, Australia” (1998) 26 Coastal Management
3–15.
18 R. Arnason and L. Felt The North Atlantic Fisheries: Successes, Failures, and Chal-
lenges (Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, Charlot-
tetown: 1995).
Australia and Canada: community involvement 273
19 See, for example, P. Copes “A critical review of the individual quota as a device
in fisheries management” (1986) 62 Land Economics 278–91; B. McCay “Indi-
vidual transferable quotas (ITQs) in Canadian and American fisheries” (1995)
28(1–3) Ocean and Coastal Management 85–116.
20 See, for example, B. McCay “User participation in fisheries management:
Lessons drawn from international experiences” (1995) 19(3) Marine Policy
227–46; B. Neis, L. Felt, D. Schneider, R. Haedrich, J. Hutchings and J.
Fischer Northern Cod Stock Assessment: What Can be Learned from Interviewing
Resource Users? (Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, Dartmouth: 1996).
21 “Atlantic Canada reels under fishery closures” (1993) National Fisherman
(December) 14–15.
22 S. Williams Our Lives Are at Stake: Women and the Fishery Crisis in Newfoundland
and Labrador (ISER Report No.11, Institute of Social and Economic Research,
Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s: 1996) at 1.
23 Appadurai “Disjuncture and difference in the global economy” (1990) 7
Theory, Culture and Society 295–310.
24 M. Watts “Living under Contract: Work, Production, Politics and the Manu-
facturing of Discontent in a Peasant Society” in A. Pred and M. Watts Rework-
ing Modernity: Capitalism and Symbolic Discontents (Rutgers University Press,
New Brunswick: 1992) 65–105.
25 Harvey The Condition of Postmodernity (Basil Blackwell Press, Oxford: 1996).
26 J. Nash “Global integration and subsistence insecurity” (1994) 96(1) American
Anthropologist 7–30.
27 R. Apostle et al. Community, State and Market on the North Atlantic Rim: Chal-
lenges to Modernity in the Fisheries (University of Toronto Press, Toronto: 1998);
Watts, note 24.
28 S. Shrybman A Citizen Guide to the World Trade Organisation (Canadian Centre
for Policy Alternatives, Ottawa: 1999); S. Stonich, J. Bort and L. Ovares
“Globalization of shrimp mariculture: The impact of social justice and
environmental quality in Central America” (1997) 10 Society and Natural
Resources 161–79; A. Wilks “Prawns, profit and protein: Aquaculture and food
production” (1995) 25(2–3) The Ecologist 120–5.
29 Report of the FAO/Japan Expert Consultation on the Development of Community-Based
Coastal Fishery Management Systems for Asia and the Pacific (FAO Fisheries
Report 474; FIDP/R474, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome: 1993) 
at 7.
30 S.C. 1996, c. 31, Part II.
31 This was undertaken as part of a rewriting of the Fisheries Act, with An Act
Respecting Fisheries, Bill C-62 (1996); the bill did not proceed past first reading.
The degree of caution with which DFO approaches this is indicated by their
distinction between “partnering” and “partnership” – with the latter seen as
potentially referring to a legally binding agreement. See D. Savoie, G. Filteau
and P. Gallaugher Partnering the Fishery: Report of the Panel Studying Partnering
(Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Ottawa: 1998) at 4 (hereinafter Savoie
Report).
32 See, for example, the discussion of “partnering” vs. “co-management” in the
Savoie Report, ibid., which viewed co-management as a lesser form of coopera-
tion that did not extend to any serious participation in actual management
decisions.
33 It should be noted that some of the most advanced forms of co-management
applied in Canada to date, with apparently mixed results, have been with
respect to the Aboriginal Fishing Strategy and particularly legislated co-
management under land claim settlements, both of which function under legal
274 Marian Binkley et al.
authority not explicitly provided for other categories. See Marcus Haward,
Rod Dobell, Anthony Charles, Elizabeth Foster and Tavis Potts “Fisheries and
oceans governance in Australia and Canada: From sectoral management to
integration?” (2004) 26(1) Dalhousie Law Journal (in press).
34 The current draft of the Framework dates from 1999 and removes references to
the legally binding Fisheries Management Agreements that depended upon the
revised Fisheries Act, which were dropped from the Guidelines pursuant to recom-
mendations of the Savoie Report. See Department of Fisheries and Oceans Draft
Framework and Guidelines for Implementing the Co-management Approach Volume 1
(DFO, Ottawa: January 1999) 10–11. Online at: www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/Library/
237529.pdf (accessed 19 January 2004) (hereinafter, Draft Framework).
35 Auditor-General of Canada Managing Atlantic Shellfish In A Sustainable Manner
(Office of the Auditor-General, Ottawa: 1999) para 4.92. Online at: www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9904cd.htm1#0.2.2Z141Z1.WEP9CA.K
YSX9F.B7 (accessed 19 January 2004).
36 The Integrated Fisheries Management Policy was introduced in 1996, calling
for the introduction of Integrated Fisheries Management Plans (IFMPs) for all
fisheries, although this has not been achieved. The Policy foresaw plans for
each fishery that would include “conservation, management and scientific
requirements for a fishery and also spell out the process and implementation of
resource management, conservation and protection measures.” In addition,
IFMPs were seen as providing the “basis upon which co-management and part-
nering can be developed.” Review of Integrated Fisheries Management Plans,
(DFO, Ottawa: 1997) (prepared by GTA Consultants and Review Directorate),
section 1 and 2 (hereinafter IFMP Review). See also, the following examples of
IFMPs: Eastern Nova Scotia Snow Crab Integrated Fishery Management Plan (DFO,
Ottawa: 2000) (hereinafter, Snow Crab IFMP); 1998 Scotian Shelf Shrimp Man-
agement Plan (DFO, Ottawa: 1998) (hereinafter, Scotian Shelf Shrimp IFMP).
37 Draft Framework, note 34 at 8. See also DFO Press Release NR-HQ-96-55E,
12 July 1996. This is a somewhat inflated assessment of the normal process by
which the Department seeks input and consensus for what is still their plan,
finalized under the discretion of the Minister and with no obligation to take
account of any particular views.
38 Draft Framework, ibid., at 9.
39 Snow Crab IFMP, note 36, Appendix 7.
40 Ibid.
41 Draft Framework, note 34, Annex I.
42 See Groundfish Integrated Fisheries Management Plan, Scotia-Fundy Fisheries: April
1, 2000–March 31, 2002 (DFO, Ottawa: 2000). Online at: www.mar.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/fisheries/res/imp/2000grndfish.htm (accessed 20 January 2004)
(hereinafter, 2000 Groundfish IFMP), sections 1.0 and 1.6.1. The seven areas
were: eastern Nova Scotia, Halifax County (west of Halifax),
Lunenburg/Queens Counties, Shelburne County (with two boards, based on
differing interests), Yarmouth County, Digby and other counties on the Bay of
Fundy in Nova Scotia, and southwestern New Brunswick.
43 The measures applied generally to cod, haddock and pollock fisheries, and
there is also some involvement of the boards in harvesting plans for species not
covered by community quotas. Ibid., at section 1.6.1. Community quotas have
also been established for dogfish. See DFO News Release NR-MAR-02-07E,
May 30, 2002.
44 2000 Groundfish IFMP, note 42, at section 1.6.1.
45 It should be noted that these comments may not be applicable to several ad
hoc cases of cooperative approaches to fisheries, but the special cases do not
Australia and Canada: community involvement 275
change the overall picture as it applies to the legal structure and the commer-
cial fisheries.
46 See, for example, comments on co-management in the Atlantic shellfish indus-
try at Office of the Auditor-General, note 35, paras 4.92–4.94.
47 See Snow Crab IFMP, note 36, Appendix 7; Scotian Shelf Shrimp IFMP, note 36,
section 4.2.
48 Both one-year and multi-year plans have been utilized. The Snow Crab IFMP,
ibid., used a one-year plan for some areas and a three-year plan for others.
49 This is distinct from defining an area within which the IFMP and/or any JPA
might apply. The geographic limits are still accompanied by a restriction to a
particular resource, so that there is no effective “marine” management in the
broader sense.
50 See, for example, the 1996 DFO announcement of partnering initiatives in the
revised Fisheries Act in which [then] Minister Mifflin offered reassurance that
the process was “open to all sectors of the industry, be they rich or poor, large
or small.” DFO Press Release NR-HQ-96-88E, 6 November 1996.
51 These concerns, which were by no means shared by all participants, emerge
from the record of consultations held in connection with the Atlantic Fisheries
Policy Review in 2001. Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review Public Consultations
(DFO, Ottawa: 2001). Online at: www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/afpr-rppa/input_e.htm
(accessed 19 January 2004). In this view, DFO’s assurances that the existence
of JPAs will not influence critical allocation decisions are simply formal state-
ments made with a view to forestalling legal challenges to the Minister’s exer-
cise of discretion. That is, it seems unlikely that the parties to a JPA or similar
arrangement would not be in a favored position with respect to allocation of
limited quotas, particularly if they also fit the profile of the “preferred”
participants in the industry. DFO has also indicated that co-management
approaches are also at times considered as a means of reducing effort. See 2000
Groundfish IFMP, note 42, section 5.3(c):
The introduction of Community Boards to manage the activities of the
fleets engaged in the competitive fixed gear fishery allows boards a certain
flexibility in designing fishing plans that result in a better match of number
of vessels to catch allocations . . . These measures have had the result of
reducing the utilization of licenses in these fleets also.
52 Parts of this brief discussion appear as part of a broader review in P. Saunders
“Marine Property Rights and the Development of Jurisdictional Regimes:
Private Rights, Communal Tenure and State Control” in D. Vickers (ed.)
Marine Resources and Human Societies in the North Atlantic Since 1500 (ISER Con-
ference Paper No. 5, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial
University of Newfoundland, St. John’s: 1995) 245–74.
53 Prior to the community quota concept, there was a requirement for residency
in an “area of fishing or home port” as an eligibility requirement of license
issuance.” Department of Fisheries and Oceans Commercial Fisheries Licensing
Policy for Eastern Canada (Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa: 1992) at 23.
This did not, however, extend to any real recognition of a right to fish in
defined areas based on community, although community “adjacency” was a
factor to be considered in allocation.
54 A related problem is the incompatibility of scientific and traditional manage-
ment approaches, both in the knowledge sources upon which they rely and the
management paradigms to which they apply. F. Berkes “Common Property
Resource Management and Cree Indian Fisheries in Subarctic Canada” in
McCay and Acheson, note 1 at 89.
276 Marian Binkley et al.
55 Davis “Property Rights and Access Management in the Small Boat Fishery: A
Case Study From Southwest Nova Scotia” in C. Lamson and A. Hanson (eds)
Atlantic Fisheries and Coastal Communities: Fisheries Decision-Making Case Studies
(Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme, Halifax: 1984) 146.
56 Department of Fisheries and Oceans The Management of Fisheries on Canada’s
Atlantic Coast: A Discussion Document on Policy Direction and Principles (2001).
Online at: www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/afpr-rppa/Doc_Doc/discodoc_e.htm (accessed
19 January 2004).
57 Ibid., at section 4.6 (emphasis added).
58 Ibid., at section 4.6.1 (emphasis added). See also the statement of future intent
which makes it clear that other interested parties can expect input, but not
necessarily a management role: “Planning and decision making in the fisheries
management system must provide opportunities for meaningful input from
individuals who are not direct resource users but have an interest in the fishery
or represent a broader public interest.”
59 (DFO, Ottawa: 2004). Online at: www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/afpr-rppa/Doc_Doc/
policy_framework/Policy_Framework_e.pdf (accessed December 2004).
60 Ibid., at 33.
61 Significant progress in this regard has been made in the Bay of Fundy through
the Bay of Fundy Fisheries Council and the Bay of Fundy Marine Resource
Centre (Online at: www.bfmrc.ns.ca/ accessed 25 April 2005).
62 G. Gislason, E. Lam and M. Mohan Fishing for Answers: Coastal Communities and
the BC Salmon Fishery (ARA Consulting Group Inc. for the BC Job Protection
Commission, Victoria: 1996).
63 P. Gallaugher and K. Vodden “Tying it Together along the BC Coast” in D.
Newell and R. Ommer (eds) Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issues
in Canadian Small-Scale Fisheries (University of Toronto Press, Toronto: 1999)
374.
64 Ibid.
65 Savoie Report, note 31 at 53; E. Pinkerton “Factors in overcoming barriers to
implementing co-management” (1999) 3(2) Conservation Ecology. Online at:
www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/iss2/art2/index.html (accessed 12 February
2004).
66 National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy Sustainable Strat-
egies for Oceans: A Co-Management Guide (Renouf Publishing Co., Ottawa: 1998)
85.
67 T. McDaniels, M. Healey and R. Paisley “Cooperative fisheries management
involving First Nations in British Columbia: An adaptive approach to strategy
design” (1994) 51 Canadian Journal of Aquatic Sciences.
68 E. Pinkerton and M. Weinstein Fisheries That Work: Sustainability Through
Community-based Management, A Report to the David Suzuki Foundation.
(David Suzuki Foundation, Vancouver: 1995).
69 Ibid.
70 K. Vodden Nanwakola: Co-management and Sustainable Community Economic
Development in a BC Fishing Village, Unpublished MA thesis (Department of
Geography, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC: 1999).
71 P. Gallaugher Coastal Communities Taking Action: A Year of Dialogue along the
British Columbia Coast (Simon Fraser University, Burnaby: 1996) at 124.
72 Gallaugher and Vodden, note 63.
73 West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board. Online at:
www.westcoastaquatic.ca (accessed 19 January 2004).
74 Vodden, note 70.
75 Pinkerton, note 65.
Australia and Canada: community involvement 277
76 Savoie Report, note 31.
77 Integrated Resource Planning Committee Land and Resource Management Plan-
ning: A Statement of Principles and Process (Government of British Columbia,
Victoria: 1993).
78 CCLCRMP. Online at: www.srmrpdwww.env.gov.bc.ca/lrmp/cencoast/news/
bkgrnd111501.htm (accessed 23 January 2004).
79 The Coastal Zone Strategic Plan is a revised version of an earlier working docu-
ment. Online at: www.srmwww.gov.bc.ca/cr/resource_mgmt/lrmp/cencoast/
processcomp.htm (accessed 23 January 2004). The earlier working document
is also available. Online at: www.srmwww.gov.bc.ca/cr/resource_mgmt/lrmp/
cencoast/ prelim401.htm (accessed 23 January 2004).
80 Plan, Ibid., at 27.
81 These discussions have been deferred until after March 2004 when the Com-
pletion Table submits its final report on the terrestrial component of the
CCLRMP. At that time, the marine plan will be reconciled with the land plan
and the Trust (see below). John Bones, Director, Coast and Marine Planning
Branch, Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management, Government of British
Columbia (Personal communication, 23 January 2004).
82 “Central Coast Planning Table Reaches Consensus” Press Release
2003SRM0023-001103, 11 December 2003, Ministry of Sustainable Resource
Management. Online at: www.srmwww.gov.bc.ca/cr/resource_mgmt/lrmp/
cencoast/docs/cc_consenus001103.pdf (accessed 23 January 2004). The 
Central Coast LRMP Completion Table Report of Consensus Recommendations
to the Provincial Government and First Nations was issued in May 2004. Online
at: www.srmwww.gov.bc.ca/cr/resource_mgmt/lrmp/cencoast/table_rec.htm
(accessed 25 April 2005).
83 See Coastal Sustainability Strategy website. Online at: www.srmwww.
gov.bc.ca/rmd/coaststrategy/ (accessed 25 April 2005).
84 Online at: www.citbc.org (accessed 23 January 2004).
85 Central Coast LCRMP Newsletter, Fall 1999. Online at: www.srmwww.
gov.bc.ca/cr/resource_mgmt/lrmp/cencoast/news/nl1299.htm (accessed 23
January 2004).
86 D. Duffy, L. Hallgren, Z. Parker, R. Penrose and M. Roseland Improving the
Shared Decision-Making Model: An Evaluation of Public Participation in Land and
Resource Management Planning (LRMP) in British Columbia, Vol 1: Summary
Report, Report for Forest Renewal of British Columbia (Community Economic
Development Centre, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby: 1998) 60.
87 Ibid. See also Central Coast LRMP Completion Table Report, note 82.
88 Online at: www.srmwww.gov.bc.ca/cr/resource_mgmt/lrmp/cencoast/mapfo-
lio.htm (accessed 23 January 2004).
89 Commonwealth of Australia Coastcare: Vision and Strategic Plan (Canberra:
1997).
90 Ibid.
91 A mid-term review/audit of the program was conducted in 1999, but it con-
centrated on financial issues and did not comment on whether the program
had met the objectives described above. Commonwealth of Australia Improving
Performance In Partnership: Mid Term Evaluation Of Coasts And Clean Seas
1997–1999 (Marine Group, Environment Australia, Canberra: 1999).
92 The author of this section is a member of the State Assessment Panel (SAP) for
Victoria.
93 Ibid.
94 Harvey et al., note 10.
95 Wescott, note 17.
278 Marian Binkley et al.
96 Harvey et al., note 10.
97 Ibid.
98 Wescott, note 17.
99 Ibid.
100 See the Coastcare website. Online at: www.nht.gov.au/nht1/programs/coast-
care/index.html#information (accessed 26 January 2004).
101 Harvey et al., note 10 at 179.
102 Wescott, note 17.
103 See the MCCN website. Online at: www.mccn.org.au (accessed 29 January
2004).
104 Ibid.









The Oceans Act1 of Canada sets out a broad framework for the unified man-
agement of Canada’s oceans based on an ecosystem approach. In particular,
the Oceans Act calls on the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to lead and facili-
tate the development of a national strategy to guide the management of
Canada’s estuarine, coastal and marine ecosystems.2 The Oceans Act also
reflects awareness that aboriginal rights may affect the development or
implementation of policy surrounding oceans management. For example, s.
2(1) of the Act states that “. . . nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to
abrogate or derogate from any existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”3 The
Oceans Act also provides for collaboration with aboriginal organizations4 in
the development and implementation of a national strategy and plans for
integrated management of all activities affecting estuarine, coastal and
marine waters, and provides for the possibility of aboriginal participation on
certain advisory or management bodies,5 thus creating an opportunity for
aboriginal input into Canada’s ocean policy in the future.
The extent and nature of the interaction between aboriginal rights and
oceans policy may depend on a number of factors, both political and legal.
Political factors include the extent to which successive federal governments
perceive it to be feasible or necessary to incorporate the recognition of abo-
riginal interests into oceans policy in light of the collaboration envisaged by
the Act. Legal considerations include the kinds of aboriginal rights that
Canadian courts may be willing to recognize in relation to ocean areas and
how courts interpret and apply the tests which have been developed regard-
ing governmental justification of infringements of aboriginal rights.
This chapter focuses primarily on the first of these legal issues by asking
whether the doctrine of aboriginal title6 could be applied to the seabed.7
How Canadian courts might reconcile claims of aboriginal title in the
seabed with common law rights of fishing and navigation, as well as the
international right of innocent passage, is uncertain; however, while it is dif-
ficult to offer definitive conclusions, it is possible that the doctrine of
aboriginal title could be applied at least with regard to the seabed beneath
Canada’s territorial waters. The possible application of aboriginal title to an
area of seabed, when taken in conjunction with the collaboration already
required by the Oceans Act, makes it clear that the participation of First
Nations will be an important element of the implementation of an oceans
strategy.
Aboriginal title
The starting point for any discussion of aboriginal rights in Canada is s.
35(1) of the Constitution Act, which states that “[e]xisting treaty and aborigi-
nal rights are hereby recognized and affirmed.” Canadian courts have made it
clear that the term “aboriginal rights” encompasses a range of different
rights, including:
• title to the land itself;
• site-specific aboriginal rights where exercise of the right is tied to a
particular piece of land, although the community does not hold aborigi-
nal title to that land (for instance, the right to hunt or fish in a particu-
lar area); and,
• aboriginal rights to carry out certain activities that are not linked to any
particular area.8
Source of aboriginal title
The first decision in Canadian law that commented on the source of aborigi-
nal title (or “Indian title” as it was referred to at that time) was St.
Catharine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen.9 The issue in that case was
whether, on the surrender of Indian title, the underlying fee simple lay with
the federal or provincial Crown. In the course of deciding in favor of the
provincial Crown, the Privy Council referred to the Royal Proclamation of
176310 as the basis of Indian title.
Modern Canadian jurisprudence on aboriginal title begins with the 1973
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney-
General).11 Six of the seven justices of the Supreme Court who heard Calder
addressed the substantive issues, and all of these six accepted that the area
claimed had been inhabited by the claimants and their ancestors “since time
immemorial.”12 The Court made it clear that aboriginal title did not have its
primary source in any document or agreement and instead characterized abo-
riginal title as flowing from historic occupation and use of the land: “when
settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying
the land as their forefathers had done for centuries.”13
Subsequent cases have accepted the Calder principle that aboriginal title
is inherent. The most recent and comprehensive Supreme Court analysis on
aboriginal title is the 1997 decision in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.14 In
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that case, two First Nations claimed aboriginal title to over 58,000 square
miles in British Columbia. Because of deficiencies in the pleadings and
errors in the trial judge’s assessment of the evidence, the Court held that a
new trial would be needed to determine the claim for aboriginal title;
however, the Court went on to describe, among other things, the nature of
aboriginal title, and the tests for establishing and justifying an infringement
of aboriginal title, so as to give guidance to the lower courts. In
Delgamuukw, Lamer CJC confirmed that aboriginal title flows from “the
prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal peoples”15 but also identified a
second source for aboriginal rights; that is, “the relationship between
common law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal law.”16
Nature of aboriginal title
The Canadian law on the nature of aboriginal title has also evolved since St.
Catharine’s Milling. In that case, the Privy Council made its now-famous
remark that “the tenure of the Indians was a personal and usufructuary
right, dependent on the goodwill of the Sovereign,”17 thus indicating that
aboriginal title is not a right in the land itself. This is no longer the law
today, however. In Calder, neither Judson nor Hall JJ. attempted to describe
in any detail the exact nature of aboriginal title, but Judson J. suggested
that “. . . it does not help one in the solution to this problem to call it a ‘per-
sonal and usufructuary right’.”18 Justice Hall did set out three characteristics
that are still part of the doctrine of aboriginal title: aboriginal title is not the
same as a title in fee simple; aboriginal title exists in conjunction with the
underlying “paramount” title of the Crown; and aboriginal title is inalien-
able except to the Crown.19 In the 1983 Supreme Court of Canada decision
of R. v. Guerin,20 Dickson J. described aboriginal title as a “legal right to
occupy and possess certain lands, the ultimate title to which is in the
Crown,”21and as a sui generis title which cannot be transferred to anyone
except the Crown.22
Delgamuukw contains an extensive discussion of the nature of aboriginal
title. The claimants in Delgamuukw characterized aboriginal title as “tanta-
mount to an inalienable fee simple”23 while the provincial government char-
acterized it as no more than a collection of aboriginal rights to engage in
specific activities, or, at most “the right to exclusive use and occupation of
land in order to engage in those activities which are aboriginal rights them-
selves. . ..”24 According to Lamer CJC, who wrote the leading opinion:25
The content of aboriginal title, in fact, lies somewhere between these posi-
tions. Aboriginal title is a right in the land, and as such, is more than the
right to engage in specific activities which may be themselves aboriginal
rights. Rather, it confers the right to use land for a variety of activities,
not all of which need be aspects of practices, customs and traditions which
are integral to distinctive cultures of aboriginal societies.26
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Elsewhere in Delgamuukw, Lamer CJC reiterated that aboriginal title is a
proprietary interest in land rather than a mere license to use and occupy, and
that “the Privy Council’s choice of terminology in St. Catharine’s Milling is not
particularly helpful to explain the various dimensions of aboriginal title.”27 In
keeping with previous case law, Delgamuukw also held that aboriginal title
exists in conjunction with an underlying fee simple in the Crown. Lamer CJC
went on to describe aboriginal title as sui generis in a number of ways:
• The source of aboriginal title lies in the “prior occupation of Canada by
aboriginal peoples”28 and in “the relationship between common law and
pre-existing systems of aboriginal law.”29
• “[I]ts characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either
to the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property
found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it
must be understood by references to both common law and aboriginal
perspectives.”30
• Aboriginal title is inalienable except to the Crown.31
• Aboriginal title is held communally.32
• The activities that may be carried out on aboriginal title land are not
limited to traditional uses; however, such land cannot be used in ways
that are “irreconcilable with the nature of the community’s attachment
to the land.”33 This was described by Lamer CJC as an “inherent” limit,
which distinguishes aboriginal title from fee simple. On this point,
Lamer CJC added that if a First Nation community wished to use its
land in a way that is incompatible with this restriction, it must surren-
der the land to the Crown in exchange for valuable consideration.34
Proof of aboriginal title
The decision of Lamer CJC in Delgamuukw also discussed how the existence of
aboriginal title is to be proved. The test was set out by Lamer CJC as follows:
In order to establish a claim to aboriginal title, the aboriginal group
asserting the claim must satisfy the following criteria:
i the land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty,
ii if present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre-
sovereignty, there must be a continuity between present and pre-
sovereignty occupation, and
iii at sovereignty that occupation must have been exclusive.35
Extinguishment of aboriginal title
Once aboriginal title is established, the next issue becomes whether the
claimants still hold aboriginal title to the area in question, or whether that
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title has been lawfully extinguished, either unilaterally by the Crown or bilater-
ally through a treaty or land claims agreement. The burden of proving extin-
guishment falls on the party disputing the claim to title.36 The assumption that
aboriginal title could be extinguished is clear in St. Catharine’s Milling, with its
description of aboriginal title as “dependent on the goodwill of the Sover-
eign.”37 In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court held that since the advent of s.
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, aboriginal title can no longer be unilaterally
extinguished, although it can still be surrendered to the federal Crown in a land
claims agreement. From the time of Confederation until 1982, only the federal
Crown had the power to extinguish aboriginal title.38 This flows from the fact
that s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 186739 provides exclusive legislative juris-
diction with regard to “Indians and lands reserved for the Indians” to the
federal government. In the pre-Confederation period, the authority to extin-
guish would have rested with the British Crown, whether that authority was
exercised directly or delegated to colonial governments.
A clear and plain intent to extinguish must be shown40 before a court will
accept that a particular piece of pre-1982 federal legislation or particular
pre-1982 actions of the federal government had the effect of unilaterally
extinguishing aboriginal title. Specifically, Lamer CJC stated in Delgamuukw
that “[w]hile the requirement of clear and plain intent does not, perhaps,
require that the Crown ‘use language which refers expressly to its extin-
guishment of aboriginal rights’ . . . the standard is still quite high.”41
Regulation and justification
The recognition of aboriginal rights in s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that government actions
can only limit aboriginal rights when those actions can be justified. The
analysis regarding which limitations will be allowed is a two-step process,
involving tests for infringement and tests for justification.
If a First Nation wishes to argue that a particular governmental action
infringes an aboriginal right, the First Nation must first show that the
action interferes with that right. The court will consider such factors as
whether the limitation is unreasonable, whether the limitation imposes
“undue hardship” on the aboriginal people affected, and whether the limita-
tion denies the holder of the right the “preferred means” of exercising the
right.42 Where an interference is established, a prima facie infringement
exists and the onus shifts to the Crown to demonstrate that the infringement
is justified. In an earlier case involving fishing rights, R. v. Sparrow, the
Supreme Court of Canada set out a two-part test for justification: the legis-
lative objective must be valid, and applying the legislation must be in
keeping with the honor of the Crown. The Court also noted that the justifi-
cation may place a “heavy burden” on the Crown.43
In Delgamuukw, Lamer CJC discussed the Sparrow test in the context of
aboriginal title. Lamer CJC made it clear that provincial as well as federal
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legislation may be seen by the courts as justifiably infringing aboriginal
title.44 He also stated that in order for legislation which limits aboriginal
title to be considered compelling and substantial, the legislative objective
must be related to “the recognition of the prior occupation of North
America by Aboriginal peoples or . . . the reconciliation of aboriginal prior
occupation with the assertion of the sovereignty of the Crown.”45 It was sug-
gested by Lamer CJC that:
the range of legislative objectives that can justify the infringement of
aboriginal title is fairly broad . . . In my opinion, the development of
agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general eco-
nomic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of
the environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure
and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are the
kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose, and in prin-
ciple, can justify the infringement of aboriginal title. Whether a
particular measure or government act can be explained by reference to
one of those objectives, however, is ultimately a question of fact that
will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis.46
The degree and kind of consultation required will be very dependent on
the circumstances, and could range all the way from showing that the
government had the “full consent of an aboriginal nation”47 to merely
showing that it had discussed decisions affecting aboriginal title land with
the relevant First Nation. There are a range of possibilities between these
two extremes, and Lamer CJC gave an example of an intermediate point on
the spectrum: a requirement that First Nations be involved in making
decisions regarding the land. It was also stated by Lamer CJC in Delga-
muukw that because there is an “inescapable economic aspect” to aboriginal
title, the Crown’s “duty of honour and good faith” means “compensation
will ordinarily be required where aboriginal title is infringed.”48
Oceans management policy
Application of the doctrine of aboriginal title to the seabed
Having outlined the basic contours of the doctrine of aboriginal title, it is
now possible to consider the applicability of that doctrine in the context of
the seabed. Where the fee simple to subaquatic land lies with the Crown, it
seems logical that this land, like terrestrial areas, could be subject to aborig-
inal title; in fact one of the sui generis aspects of aboriginal title is that it
exists as a burden or limitation on the underlying Crown title. Therefore it
must first be determined in Canada whether the Crown itself is seen as
holding title to the land beneath its territorial waters.
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Title below the low water mark
In the 1876 English case of R. v. Keyn, it was held the Court did not have
jurisdiction over an offence committed on a foreign ship in waters within
three miles of the English coast. According to the majority, the “dominion”
of the common law
extends no further than the limits of the realm. In the reign of Richard
II the realm consisted of the land within the bodies of the counties. All
beyond the low water mark was part of the high seas. At that period the
three-mile radius had not been thought of. International law . . . cannot
enlarge the area of our municipal law, nor could treaties with all the
nations of the world have that effect. That can only be done by an Act of
Parliament. As no such Act has been passed, it follows that what was
out of the realm then is out of the realm now . . . Therefore, although, as
between nation and nation, these waters are British territory, as being
under the exclusive dominion of Great Britain, in judicial language they
are out of the realm and any exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a
foreign ship must in my judgment be authorized by an Act of Parlia-
ment.49
Although Keyn was not universally accepted at the time as having settled
the issue of title to the seabed,50 in Reference Re: Ownership of Offshore Mineral
Rights, the Supreme Court of Canada accepted R. v. Keyn as representing the
law in Canada. As set out in the passage quoted above, however, the Court
in Keyn acknowledged that the Crown could, by way of legislation, extend
its title beyond the low water mark.
Arguably, this is what Canada has done by way of the Oceans Act, which
states:
s.7 For greater certainty, the internal waters of Canada and the territo-
rial sea of Canada form part of Canada.
s.8(1) For greater certainty, in any area of the sea not within a
province, the seabed and subsoil below the internal waters of Canada
and the territorial sea of Canada are vested in Her Majesty in right of
Canada.
Certainly this language of vesting is very much the language of real 
property law.
If sections 7 and 8 of the Oceans Act vest the radical fee simple in the
federal Crown, this may permit the recognition of aboriginal title in the
seabed. Aboriginal title has been described by the Supreme Court of Canada
as flowing from continued use and occupation of the land since the time of
British sovereignty, and from the relationship between aboriginal systems of
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law and the common law. On its face, nothing about this aspect of the doc-
trine of aboriginal title is inconsistent with a First Nation being able to
claim aboriginal title in the seabed. The Delgamuukw decision did not,
however, deal directly, or even indirectly, with the question of whether the
test enunciated for establishing aboriginal title applies equally to submerged
lands. In addition to evidentiary hurdles relating to physical possession, the
courts will have to determine whether the notion of aboriginal title to the
seabed can co-exist with the right of innocent passage at international law,
or with established common law principles, such as the public rights of
fishing and navigation.
Although the applicability of aboriginal title to the seabed has not been
decided by a Canadian Court, the High Court of Australia has held that an abo-
riginal title claim could not be made to the seabed,51 noting that recognition of
exclusive aboriginal title in the seabed would conflict with the international
right of innocent passage and domestic public rights of fishing and navigation.52
More recently, however, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has acknowledged
the potential for aboriginal title to exist in the foreshore and adjacent seabed.53
International law
One might argue that the Oceans Act cannot be read as vesting title in the
Crown (therefore precluding an aboriginal title claim), because any notion of
title in the seabed is irreconcilable with the fact that, in international law,
foreign vessels have a right of innocent passage through the territorial seas of
other nations. Thus in Yarmirr, the High Court of Australia held that “[a]s a
matter of international law, the right of innocent passage is inconsistent
with any international recognition of a right of ownership by the coastal
state of territorial waters.”54 International law, however, has come to view
the land beneath a coast’s territorial waters as forming part of that state’s
territory in the same manner as does the land above water.55
If international law is willing to accept radical Crown title in the seabed
as co-existing with the right of innocent passage, then presumably aborigi-
nal title could also co-exist with the right of innocent passage, given that
aboriginal title encompasses a more limited set of rights than does Crown
title. True, in Delgamuukw, Lamer CJC describes aboriginal title as includ-
ing the right to exclude others; however, this characterization of aboriginal
title is not necessarily irreconcilable with the right of innocent passage. The
fact that a form of title is seen as encompassing a right to exclude others
cannot be automatically incompatible with the international right of inno-
cent passage, since Crown title itself carries with it notions of exclusivity. A
key component of both state and private ownership is the power to exclude
others except where that power is otherwise limited by law.56 Where this
right to exclude is curtailed with regard to the underlying radical title of the
Crown, it seems logical that any aboriginal title that exists as a burden on
that radical title would be similarly curtailed.
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When the international law perspective is taken in conjunction with the
wording of sections 7 and 8 of Canada’s Oceans Act, there seems to be an
argument for saying that both international and Canadian law recognize the
federal Crown as holding title to the seabed beneath Canada’s territorial
waters, although this title is subject to the international right of innocent
passage. If that is so, then we are one step closer to saying that the doctrine
of aboriginal title (subject to the right of innocent passage) could be applied
to the seabed.
While the existence of underlying Crown title and the possibility of
reconciling ownership with the international right of innocent passage are
necessary prerequisites, these alone do not, however, allow for the conclusion
that aboriginal title could exist in the seabed. There is a further argument,
which also relates to Lamer CJC’s description of aboriginal title as “exclus-
ive,” that must be explored; that is, can exclusivity be reconciled with
common law rights of navigation and fishing?
Common law rights of public navigation and fishing
Since the time of the Magna Carta, English common law has recognized
public rights of fishing and navigation in tidal waters. Further, in Gladstone
the Supreme Court of Canada stated, with regard to aboriginal fishing
rights, that:
the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) exist within a
legal context in which, since the time of the Magna Carta, there has
been a common law right to fish in tidal waters that can only be abro-
gated by the competent legislation . . . While the elevation of common
law rights to constitutional status obviously has an impact on the public
common law rights to fish in tidal waters, it was surely not intended
that, by the enactment of s. 35(1), those common law rights would be
extinguished in cases where an aboriginal right to harvest fish commer-
cially existed . . . (I)t was not contemplated by Sparrow that the recogni-
tion and affirmation of aboriginal rights should result in the common
law right of public access in the fishery ceasing to exist with respect to
all those fisheries in respect of which exist an aboriginal right to sell fish
commercially. As a common law, not constitutional, right, the right of
public access to the fishery must clearly be second in priority to aborigi-
nal rights; however, the recognition of aboriginal rights should not be
interpreted as extinguishing the right of public access to the fishery.57
Does this mean that the existence of public rights of fishing and naviga-
tion preclude the possibility that aboriginal title could be established in the
seabed? Arguably not, on both constitutional and common law grounds,
which are discussed below. It may mean that the public rights would to
some degree limit the rights which would otherwise be encompassed by
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aboriginal title, but that is substantially different than concluding that there
can be no aboriginal title in areas where the common law would recognize
rights of fishing and navigation.
The constitutional law argument is as follows: Lamer CJC’s comments
must be read narrowly, as simply meaning that the constitutionally recognized
right of aboriginal fishing is not so extensive as to extinguish completely the
common law right to fish. His comments cannot be interpreted as meaning
that the common law right will overcome the constitutionally recognized abo-
riginal right such that the aboriginal right cannot exist, which would be the
effect of saying that aboriginal title cannot exist in the seabed because of
public rights of fishing or navigation. It was acknowledged by Lamer CJC in
Gladstone that common law rights must be “second in priority” to constitu-
tional rights. Common law rights can be curtailed or extinguished by the
legislature, which is in turn curtailed by the constitution; thus, it is doubtful
whether a court would find that common law rights of navigation and fishing
could so completely trump constitutionally recognized rights that the doctrine
of aboriginal title would be inapplicable to the seabed.
Even leaving aside the constitution and considering only the common
law, it seems clear that the existence of title in submerged lands is not
negated by public rights of fishing or navigation in the water over those
lands. The common law did not resolve the tension between title and public
rights by holding that there can be no ownership of the land beneath public
waters, but by holding that where there is conflict between the rights associ-
ated with title and the public rights, the latter are paramount.58 At English
common law, land beneath tidal waters is held by the Crown, unless the
Crown has granted that title to another.59 Thus a privately held fee simple or
even the radical title held by the Crown can co-exist with (but would be
subject to) the common law rights of fishing and navigation. Presumably so
too could aboriginal title co-exist with public rights.
Building on Lamer CJC’s comments in Gladstone regarding aboriginal
fishing rights, if aboriginal title were found to exist in an area where the
common law would recognize public rights of fishing or navigation, the
court might have to configure the rights associated with aboriginal title in
such as way that the common law public rights were not completely extin-
guished, but that also recognized the priority of constitutional rights over
those grounded only in the common law.
Conclusion
Thus, on the question of whether aboriginal title could be established in the
seabed beneath Canada’s territorial sea, the following tentative conclusions
can be drawn:
• Given that aboriginal title is a “burden” on the underlying Crown title,
aboriginal title cannot exist in the absence of that underlying title.
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• By way of sections 7 and 8 of the Oceans Act, Canada has extended its
territory to include the seabed beneath its territorial waters so that the
federal Crown holds title to that portion of the seabed.
• Crown title in the seabed co-exists with and is subject to the inter-
national right of innocent passage.
• Aboriginal title cannot be more extensive than the Crown title on which
it is overlaid; therefore, aboriginal title in the seabed could also co-exist
with, but would also be subject to, the international right of innocent
passage.
• At common law, the rights of public fishing and navigation are not seen
as negating ownership of land beneath tidal waters.
• Therefore even at common law, these public rights should not be seen as
negating the possibility of aboriginal title.
• However, at common law, the rights associated with ownership of the
land beneath tidal waters are subservient to the public rights of fishing
and navigation.
• Given the comments by Lamer CJC in Gladstone, it seems unlikely that
aboriginal title, once established, would completely extinguish the
public rights recognized by the common law; however, it is not clear
that the balancing between a constitutionally recognized right and a
common law right should necessarily bring the same outcome as the
balancing of a common law right against a common law right. In fact, it
seems unlikely that a constitutionally protected right should be wholly
subservient to a common law right.
Obviously, there would be crucial evidentiary issues involved in any abo-
riginal title claim to the seabed. Leaving those aside however, and looking
solely at the doctrine of aboriginal title, there seems to be a strong argument
that the doctrine could apply to the seabed beneath Canada’s territorial
waters. Such title, if recognized, would be subject to the international right
of innocent passage and might also be limited in some way by public rights
of fishing or navigation.
Impact on oceans policy
The Oceans Act already mandates collaboration with certain aboriginal stake-
holders and provides an opportunity for aboriginal participation on advisory
and management bodies. The question which policy makers would have to
consider is whether recognition of aboriginal title in the seabed would
require more accommodation than is already provided in the Oceans Act.
Canada’s oceans policy involves three broad themes: declaring Canada’s
rights with regard to its territorial waters, the contiguous zone and the
exclusive economic zone; providing for the development of a national oceans
strategy based on the principles of sustainable development, integrated man-
agement and the precautionary principle; and consolidating various aspects
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of federal responsibility regarding oceans. Looking at each of these in turn, and
considering whether there might be conflict between federal activities based
on the themes of the Oceans Act and rights arising from aboriginal title:
• The declaration that the seabed beneath Canada’s territorial waters is
vested in the federal Crown strengthens rather than diminishes the pos-
sibility that the doctrine of aboriginal title could be applied to the
seabed, since such title always exists in conjunction with underlying
Crown title and Crown sovereignty.
• With regard to Canada’s oceans strategy, conflict with aboriginal title is
less likely to be identified at the level of generality with which the prin-
ciples of that strategy is articulated in the Act. If aboriginal title were
recognized in a portion of the seabed, the issue would be whether the
implementation of a particular aspect of the oceans strategy infringed
rights flowing from that aboriginal title. For instance, if a First Nation
intended to use its aboriginal title area for hunting, fishing and gather-
ing, would the federal government be able to establish a marine pro-
tected area within the area held by aboriginal title and restrict the First
Nation in its hunting, fishing and gathering activities? According to
Sparrow, this would constitute a prima facie violation of aboriginal title,
but both Sparrow and Delgamuukw make it clear that such an infringe-
ment might, depending on the circumstances, be upheld as valid.
• Similarly, potential conflict between aboriginal title and other aspects of
the exercise of federal jurisdiction in the Oceans Act would require a case-
by-case analysis to determine whether federal legislation or activities
infringed aboriginal rights and whether such infringement could be jus-
tified.
Even allowing for the fact that some limits on aboriginal title would
likely be accepted as justified, recognition of aboriginal title in the seabed
would significantly affect both how oceans policy is developed in the future
and how it is applied. In the development and application of such policy,
government will have to school itself to ask the same kinds of questions as it
should now be asking with relation to terrestrial land, regarding the possible
existence of aboriginal title in the relevant area, the possibility that legisla-
tion or policy initiatives might infringe such title, and whether or not such
infringements would be seen as justified. Thus, what will be required is an
awareness of the law on aboriginal title and a nuanced and contextual analy-
sis of the potential interplay between aboriginal title and the implementa-
tion of federal oceans policy.
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12 Canada’s seas and her First
Nations
A colonial paradigm revisited
Russ Jones
Introduction
Canada’s claims to the seas surrounding her – the Pacific, Atlantic and
Arctic oceans – have expanded to include land and resources from three to
200 nautical miles offshore over the short span of the past 40 years. But
First Nations1 occupied and utilized Canada’s shorelines and ocean spaces
long before Canada’s most recent colonization. This chapter illustrates his-
toric relationships of several First Nations in Canada to ocean spaces and dis-
cusses Canada’s current approach to ocean management and sea title from a
First Nation perspective. Canada’s oceans policies are cautious about
acknowledging specific aboriginal or treaty rights or prescribing a role for
First Nations in ocean management and planning. This lack of direction is
likely to lead to delays in implementing the Oceans Act, 19962 or uncertainty
about the validity of resulting management plans if the government pro-
ceeds without substantive First Nations’ input.
The aboriginal peoples of Canada, comprising Indian, Inuit and Métis, are
made up of many individual First Nations with their own distinct history
and culture. European advances and colonization in what is now known as
Canada began on Atlantic shores in the early 1500s, the Pacific in the late
1700s, and the Arctic in the mid-1800s. First Nations often played a pivotal
role in conflicts between Old and New World powers in the early settlement
era. Britain eventually colonized what is now known as Canada, and relation-
ships with many First Nations in eastern Canada and the Prairies were
defined by means of treaties.3 However, few treaties were struck on the Pacific
coast due to disputes with British authorities in the late 1800s over who
should provide treaty monies and policies of British Columbia leaders to deny
aboriginal title.4 Except for one disputed treaty in the MacKenzie River
Valley, no treaties were signed in the Yukon and Northwest Territories up
until the 1990s.5 Canada’s foundation myths include “fairness” to First
Nation peoples and that land pre-empted for settlement was not being uti-
lized by First Nations.6 Colonizers in the end achieved their goals of prevent-
ing First Nations from impeding settlement or standing in the way of
economic development. Dispossession of land and resources may have been
less violent than other colonial episodes because First Nations may have
believed that they could work with the newcomers and find ways to share the
land and its resources.7 Instead, First Nations have been effectively marginal-
ized in one of the most prosperous countries in the world.
Processes are currently underway on all three coasts to define modern rela-
tionships between Canada and First Nations where these do not exist or are
lacking,8 with elevated attention to ocean issues in modern negotiations.9
Yet, despite encouragement by courts to negotiate issues of aboriginal title
and rights, the same pattern of dispossession is now being repeated with
Canada’s oceans.
Canada’s approach to ocean management has been to pass legislation first
and then develop policies and plans. The Oceans Act authorizes the Minister
of Fisheries and Oceans to lead the development of a national oceans man-
agement strategy. Implementation of this legislation is in the early stages
and a largely unresolved issue is how First Nations’ ocean interests will be
accommodated in planning and development. The legislation is likely suffi-
ciently broad to encompass a variety of outcomes, but there is little clear
direction set on how to proceed with difficult issues involving First Nations
where issues are not already explicitly addressed in existing treaties.
Examples of First Nations’ ocean interests
Canada’s First Nations are diverse, with a wide range of ocean interests and
practices adapted to specific environments. This section provides examples of
First Nations’ ocean interests drawn mainly from the Pacific Northwest
coast. First Nations in this region were generally ocean-going peoples who
utilized a wide variety of ocean resources and developed sophisticated
technology, including canoes for hunting and fishing and general transporta-
tion. There were a variety of styles and sizes of canoe depending on purposes
and traditions, ranging from less than six meters up to 20 meters in length.
As an example, attention will be given to First Nation offshore utilization
of halibut (Hippoglotus stenolepsis) and blackcod (also known as sablefish or
Anoplopona fimbria) on the Pacific coast. These fish are abundant on offshore
fishing grounds at certain times of the year. First Nation peoples would have
learned this through experience and passed this knowledge on from genera-
tion to generation.10 First Nations had the means and technology to travel
offshore to catch these fish and utilized these fishing grounds long before the
arrival of Europeans.
The Nuu-chah-nulth and Ditidaht First Nations from the west coast of
Vancouver Island in British Columbia fished for halibut at banks ten to 25
miles offshore.11 To the north, the Haida from Haida Gwaii,12 or the Queen
Charlotte Islands, similarly used landmarks to locate fishing grounds that
they called gyu.13 Another fish that was caught offshore was skil or blackcod.
Blackcod are commonly found at depths of 1,000 feet or more.14 The Makah
and Haida fished blackcod using fishing gear consisting of kelp lines with
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20 to 100 bent-wood hooks attached, the latter made from steamed hemlock
knots. The fishing line was said to be equal in strength to the best hemp
cod-lines.15 There is also evidence of proprietary interests in offshore fishing
banks. In 1868, Sproat wrote, “The fishing tribes on both sides of the Straits
of Fuca would drive away any other tribes which had not been accustomed
to fish on the halibut banks.”16 Niblack, in 1890, observed that stretches of
shorelines belonged to Haida lineages. Further, “Nor is this boundary con-
fined to the strip of coast, but extends well out to sea, carrying with it the
right to shoot seals and gather birds’ eggs on outlying rocks, hunt sea otter,
and to fish on well-known halibut or cod banks.”17 Similarly, in 1905,
Swanton wrote of the Haida, “The halibut fishing grounds were all named
and were owned by certain families.”18
Halibut and blackcod had economic importance for tribes that fished off-
shore. Sproat notes that the Nuu-chah-nulth traded dried halibut, herring and
cedar bark baskets to the Salish tribes of southern Vancouver Island.19 Swan
observed that the Makah traded dried halibut as well as whale oil and blubber
to the Nuu-chah-nulth.20 The Haida also traded halibut with the Tsimshian.21
Blackcod oil was a valuable trade item for the Haida, not only with the main-
land First Nations, but with Haida from other areas of Haida Gwaii who did
not have access to blackcod.22 Despite historic trade there is presently only
minimal First Nation participation in commercial halibut and blackcod fish-
eries due in large part to government policies such as limited entry licensing.23
First Nations connections with the landscape and seascape were spiritual
as well as physical. Haida beliefs about their origin and relationship to the
natural world give an intrinsic spiritual value to the natural world and all its
elements, including fish, sea mammals, birds, land animals, creeks and
places.24 First Nations in Canada have been marginalized in most economic
pursuits, including the fisheries, and are struggling to regain access. At the
same time, First Nation interests in ocean spaces have broadened from tradi-
tional activities such as fishing and hunting to a variety of modern economic
and environmental ocean interests. Many new developments in the ocean
sector such as oil and gas, aquaculture and marine tourism are seen as threat-
ening traditional pursuits and encroaching on ocean spaces that are in the
traditional territories of First Nations.
Canada’s emerging ocean management framework and
First Nations
Sea title – a new legal frontier
First Nations have a clear sense of their ownership of ocean spaces but the
recognition of rights and title to ocean spaces remains a source of debate in
Canadian law.25 As yet there are no defining cases in Canada about sea title
and, as a result, government policy has been exceedingly cautious. For First
Nations, the existence of sea title is as obvious as aboriginal title to dry
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land26 as there are no dividing lines when you step out your front door onto
the beach or when you board a canoe to travel to a nearby fishing ground.
The Government of Canada on the other hand sees the ocean as a common
property resource and a frontier that must be developed and managed for the
prosperity of all Canadians. These opposing views create a situation that
encourages confrontation and litigation unless First Nations are willing to
accept the minimal role offered in oceans stewardship through proposed
ocean development processes.
Haida, Tsimshian and Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations recently initiated
court proceedings concerning their sea title and fishing rights, but these
claims are still at an early stage. The Haida case is a broad land and sea
claim to the lands and inland and offshore waters surrounding Haida Gwaii.
The statement of claim, filed in November 2002, claims infringement of the
aboriginal rights and title of the Haida Nation and seeks a declaration of
Haida aboriginal title and rights to Haida Gwaii, damages, and a quashing
of licenses, leases, permits and tenures over Haida Gwaii. This would
include foreshore leases, oil and gas tenures, and fishing licenses. The Haida
suit was followed in September 2003 by an offer of 200,000 hectares of land
by the British Columbia government mainly comprising of areas declared by
the Haida as protected areas from logging.27 There was no offer from the
federal government regarding the offshore component of the claim. The
Haida rejected the offer.28 The Lax kw’alaams Indian Band and nine allied
Tsimshian tribes filed a statement of claim in January 2003 that was specific
to fishing rights and title to fisheries resource harvesting sites. Harvesting
sites would include the mouth of the Skeena River, a prime commercial
fishing area for salmon. The plaintiffs are seeking a declaration of Tsimshian
aboriginal rights to harvest fish for commercial purposes and aboriginal title
to resource harvesting sites, that Canada and British Columbia have
infringed those rights, and damages. In June 2003, ten Nuu-chah-nulth
First Nations filed a writ of summons claiming aboriginal rights and title to
a large portion of the land and offshore waters on the west coast of Vancou-
ver Island from Kuyoquot to Port Renfrew. The writ claims aboriginal
rights to harvest all species of fish, the right to sell these fish on a commer-
cial scale, aboriginal title to the fishing territory and fishing sites, and
infringement of these rights by Canada and British Columbia. It is anticip-
ated that these claims may take some time to settle.
Legislative provisions relating to First Nations
The main provision relating to First Nations in the Oceans Act is a non-
derogation clause found in s. 2(1). It provides:
For greater certainty, nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to
abrogate or derogate from any existing aboriginal or treaty rights of the
First Nations of Canada under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
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Similar clauses are repeated in other legislation.
There are several provisions for involving First Nations, among others, in
ocean management activities. The Oceans Act refers to collaborating, cooper-
ating and consulting with affected First Nations’ organizations and bodies
established under land claims agreements. In addition, the National Marine
Conservation Areas Act, 2002 adds aboriginal governments to the list and has
several provisions not included in the Oceans Act. One provision allows the
Minister of Canadian Heritage to make management agreements with other
entities including First Nations. Another provision provides for the designa-
tion of marine conservation area reserves where:
(An) area or a portion of an area proposed for a marine conservation area
is subject to a claim in respect of aboriginal rights that has been
accepted for negotiation by the Government of Canada.29
This designation allows for possible changes to be made to reserve bound-
aries once land claims agreements (or treaties) are negotiated.30
The Migratory Bird Conventions Act, 1994 ratifies a 1995 Protocol31 to the
1916 Convention between the United Kingdom and the United States for
the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the USA.32 The protocol
adds “use of aboriginal and indigenous knowledge, institutions and prac-
tices” as a conservation principle and recognizes regulatory and conservation
regimes for harvesting migratory birds and eggs in Canada as defined in rel-
evant treaties, land claims agreements and co-management agreements.
Assessment
The foregoing legislation enables Canada to proceed with development of
ocean resources in a seemingly orderly manner that may involve First
Nations, at least where there may be provisions in existing treaties or agree-
ments. There was little consultation with First Nations about the foregoing
legislation.33 While provisions relating to First Nations do no harm to abo-
riginal and treaty rights, they are more likely enacted in an effort to prevent
legislation from being struck down, rather than being proactive about
addressing First Nations’ ocean interests.
Policy provisions relating to First Nations
Policy documents and recent land claims agreements provide further insight
into Canada’s approach to addressing First Nation marine issues. As man-
dated in the Oceans Act, the federal government released Canada’s Oceans
Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future (Oceans Strategy) in August 2002 that “sets
out the policy direction for ocean management in Canada.”34 The Oceans
Strategy repeats commitments not to override aboriginal and treaty rights
and to provide opportunities for First Nation involvement in integrated
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management planning and ocean management decision making. The Oceans
Strategy identifies “collaboration” as the governance model for integrated
management. But it indicates that this may extend to “co-management” in
cases such as settled land claims agreements where structures established
through land claims agreements might be applied.35 Two of the three
examples of integrated management initiatives cited in the Oceans Strategy
involve First Nations. These are the Beaufort Sea Integrated Management
Planning Initiative (BSIMPI) in the Arctic Ocean that involves committees
established under the 1984 Inuvaliat Final Agreement and a marine plan-
ning process on the British Columbia central coast.36
The 1994 Parks Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Policy predates
the National Marine Conservation Areas Act but provides little policy direction
different from the legislation.37 While Parks Canada’s means may not be
explicit, their ends are described in a system plan that sets a goal of estab-
lishing National Marine Conservation Areas in 29 distinct marine regions of
Canada.38
Assessment
A major deficiency of existing oceans legislation and policy is that there is
little or no policy guidance on the role of First Nations or mechanisms for
involving them in oceans planning and management except where treaties and
specific processes are already in place. Parks Canada’s approach to creation of
protected areas signals some flexibility in dealing with First Nations through
temporary designations of marine conservation areas in advance of treaties
with the potential to negotiate management agreements. However, it is too
early to say how satisfied First Nations will be with that approach. Another
difficulty with implementation is that until June 2005, when the Oceans
Action Plan Phase 1 was announced, there was little in the way of new govern-
ment resources identified for implementing the Oceans Act. This has affected
the ability of government to consult with and effectively involve First Nations
in ocean planning initiatives, although this may improve in future.
Marine protected areas
Marine protected areas (MPAs) can be created under the Oceans Act and related
legislation.39 A key lesson learned from MPAs worldwide is that “Local people
need to be deeply involved from the earliest possible stage in any MPA that is
to succeed.”40 Indigenous peoples are recognized as having a special role to
play in protected area management because of their unique relationship to
their environment. In Canada, First Nations may exercise aboriginal and treaty
rights in protected areas unless prohibited for valid reasons such as conserva-
tion.41 Thus a major motive for government seeking agreements with First
Nations about protected areas is to define and limit aboriginal and treaty
rights. From Canada’s perspective, agreements provide certainty about First
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Nation activities in protected areas and benefit First Nations by giving them a
say in protected area development and management.
The Oceans Act gives the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans power to estab-
lish MPAs without any special limitations or requirements to consult or col-
laborate with others. In contrast, provisions of the National Marine
Conservation Areas Act and the Parks Canada National Marine Conservation
Areas Policy allow for agreements with First Nations and interim designa-
tions of protected areas where treaties are not yet in place. Parks Canada has
entered into a variety of co-management agreements with First Nations
regarding terrestrial parks. One example is the Gwaii Haanas National Park
Reserve – Haida Heritage Site that is co-managed by an Archipelago Man-
agement Board comprised of two Haida and two Parks Canada representa-
tives.42 Despite the lack of a clear policy regarding First Nations, the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) seems to be following a similar
approach with MPAs on the Pacific coast. These MPAs provide opportun-
ities for First Nations and Canada to work together on common issues, but if
rushed could lead to confrontations or court challenges resulting in the cre-
ation of MPAs that are ineffective.
Self-government
Self-government has been a prominent First Nation issue in recent years that
has yet to be realized despite political commitments. In a 1995 policy state-
ment, the Government of Canada recognized the inherent right of aboriginal
self-government as an existing right within the Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35.
Canadian examples of modern self-government include recognition of the
Nisga’a government in British Columbia and establishment of Nunavut
Territory. Self-government was directly implemented for the first time in
the 1998 Nisga’a Final Agreement that came into effect in 2000.43
Nunavut, which is larger than any province in Canada, consists of Inuit and
non-Inuit lands and has its own elected government. Although the Nunavut
Lands Claims Agreement and federal legislation established a new self-gov-
erning territory, Nunavut has a public rather than an Inuit-exclusive
government structure, which does not benefit from constitutional protec-
tion.44
Traditional knowledge
Both the Oceans Strategy and the National Marine Conservation Areas Act
acknowledge the value of First Nations’ knowledge although traditional
knowledge is not necessarily applied exclusively to First Nations in the
latter. Despite recent recognition of the benefit of First Nations traditional
knowledge, there are few examples of successful melding of traditional
knowledge and science in natural resource management. Establishment of
co-management committees through treaties provides a venue for exchange
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of information and makes it more likely that traditional knowledge will be
used in decision making. In the Arctic, at least, traditional knowledge has
come into play in establishing management plans for wildlife. In much of
Canada, century-old policies of assimilation of First Nations have been far
too successful. Fewer and fewer First Nation languages are being spoken in
the home. And as a result of a variety of social and economically-driven
changes, young First Nations peoples are no longer able to spend as much
time on the land and waters as past generations. Other factors are the polit-
ical nature of information and that there are limited resources available to
assist with recovering or documenting First Nations traditional knowledge.
Non-commercial fishing and hunting
First Nation fishing and hunting rights have been a source of controversy in
Canadian society. But it is now understood that existing hunting, fishing
and trapping rights are constitutionally protected in s. 35(1) of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982 and, as such, prevail over federal, provincial and territorial
legislation unless that legislation is justifiable.45 Current policies also recog-
nize the priority of First Nations fishing for food, social and ceremonial pur-
poses over commercial and recreational users.
These and other requirements are incorporated into modern land claims
agreements through explicit allocations and the establishment of fish and
wildlife co-management boards. For instance, the Nisga’a Final Agreement46
establishes a Joint Fisheries Management Committee and a Wildlife Com-
mittee to provide advice to Canada and the Nisga’a (through the Nisga’a
Lisims Government) on fisheries and wildlife management. The committees
generally aim to make consensus recommendations which helps to create a
climate of cooperation in decision making. Similarly, in the Arctic, the
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement establishes a Nunavut Wildlife Manage-
ment Board responsible for managing and regulating access to wildlife in
the Nunavut Settlement Area.47 Even though the legal groundwork has been
established, there are still frequent court cases that have helped to define
Canada’s ability to regulate food, social and ceremonial fisheries when there
are conservation issues.
Commercial fishing and hunting
Fishing and hunting are traditional activities commonly addressed in early
treaties and have continued to be important in modern treaties. However,
government polices have tended to limit and restrict these First Nations
activities as they gained economic value in Canadian society.48 Modern
treaties contain explicit references to fish and wildlife, but commercial access
remains controversial. For example, the Nisga’a have a commercial alloca-
tion of salmon returning to the Nass River. However, the allocation is an
agreement separate from the treaty that is not constitutionally protected due
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to provincial objections to including commercial allocations in the treaty. In
addition, Nisga’s organizations hold commercial fishing licenses that are uti-
lized in the regular commercial fishery. In the northeast Arctic, the Nunavut
Land Claims Agreement establishes co-management boards and gives prior-
ity to Inuit organizations in developing sports and commercial ventures
with the purpose of developing a long-term, healthy renewable resource
economy.
Recent court decisions are causing major changes in government policy.
In Marshall v. The Queen, the Supreme Court ruled that certain Mi’kmaq
Indians had a treaty right to catch and sell eels without a license and during
a closed season.49 It affirmed the right of the Mi’kmaq to sell the products of
their hunting, fishing and other gathering activities to achieve a moderate
livelihood. The decision led to confrontations between Mi’kmaq exercising
their rights in local lobster fisheries and the federal fisheries department.
The government response has been short-term measures such as increasing
participation of affected First Nations in the commercial fishery and steps to
establish negotiating processes to address long-term issues involving First
Nations, federal and provincial players. The Supreme Court of Canada also
found in R. v. Gladstone that the Heiltsuk people of British Columbia pos-
sessed an aboriginal right, protected under s. 35(1) of the Constitution, to
trade in herring spawn on kelp because this activity was a central and
significant feature of their society.50 However, the court said that these were
not blanket rights but would have to be proven on a case-by-case basis. The
federal fisheries department has allocated new commercial spawn on kelp
licenses to the Heiltsuk on an interim basis, although the amount has not
been to the Heiltsuk’s satisfaction.
Commercial fish allocations are expected to be a major part of British
Columbia treaty settlements with the federal government following a policy
of purchasing commercial licenses from willing buyers and transferring
them to First Nations. The allocation transfer program is one component of
the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy that was initiated in 1992 in response to a
court decision on aboriginal rights to fish for food, social and ceremonial
purposes.51 Three pilot sales initiatives were also initiated in 1992 in which
First Nations received fixed allocations of salmon that could then be sold.
The sales initiatives have been controversial but were recently upheld by
British Columbia Appeal courts after civil disobedience and court challenges
by commercial fishermen.52
Assessment
Unless there is adequate policy intervention, disputes over rights to fish
commercially in Canada are likely to continue and may resemble the “fish
wars” in the state of Washington. The American dispute continued even
after the courts allocated up to 50 percent of the catch of salmon to treaty
tribes. A policy of “circling the wagons” in the face of fundamental change
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did not work in Washington and is unlikely to work north of the border in
Canada.
Offshore oil and gas and minerals
In Canada, development of offshore resources and exploration was halted in
the Arctic and the Pacific in the 1980s due to environmental risks, land
claims and a poor economic climate. But development in the past decade of
the Hibernia oilfields offshore of Newfoundland signals that environmental
risks of offshore development are acceptable to Canadians if there is political
support, including royalties for the provincial government. In the Arctic,
where treaties have recently been concluded, there has been a shift in the
position of First Nations on development of oil and gas and mineral
resources. The Aboriginal Pipeline Group, representing the ownership inter-
est of aboriginal peoples of the Northwest Territories of the proposed
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline, recently reached a funding agreement with oil
companies and the project is moving ahead with regulatory reviews.53 While
the reserves in this case are located onshore, the announcement signals a fun-
damental change in approach by First Nations.
In British Columbia, virtually all First Nations oppose oil and gas devel-
opment, but the provincial government has requested that the federal
government lift a moratorium on exploration and development. In response,
the federal government announced the creation of three task groups to inves-
tigate issues concerned with lifting the moratorium. But oil companies have
not been interested in investing in areas where there is uncertainty about
title. While there is little interest in offshore mineral deposits at present,
this is an emerging issue that will get more attention as less costly sources
become depleted.
First Nation interests in development of offshore non-renewable resources
have varied. Settlement of treaties in northern Canada recently resulted in a
change in the position of some First Nations to onshore development. An
important factor has likely been economic incentives provided through
recent treaties. However, environmental risks of offshore development are
still a major concern, particularly on the Pacific coast. In the end, develop-
ment of oil and gas is likely to be a political decision rather than one that
can be resolved by integrated ocean planning and one that is closely tied to
the resolution of aboriginal rights in offshore areas.
Aquaculture
Aquaculture is another developing industry that can significantly affect First
Nation utilization of foreshore and nearshore areas.54 However, new aquacul-
ture tenures alienate foreshore and marine areas and may adversely affect
traditional First Nation practices. In addition, there may be environmental
effects such as introduction of exotic species and waste generation. Aquacul-
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ture is an area of shared federal–provincial responsibility that has only
recently started to receive serious federal attention. The provinces have a
significant role in aquaculture, including siting, economic development and
environmental protection. DFO’s role according to its 2003 Aquaculture
Policy Framework is to create policy, program and regulatory conditions in its
areas of responsibility that will enable aquaculture development. There are
ten policy principles in the Framework including:
DFO will respect constitutionally protected Aboriginal and treaty
rights and will work with interested and affected Aboriginal communit-
ies to facilitate their participation in aquaculture development.
In British Columbia, salmon farming has been contentious. A morato-
rium on new operations was lifted in April 2002 after being in place for
seven years. Many First Nations opposed the lifting of the moratorium.
Current issues for resolution include sea lice infestation of wild salmon and
Atlantic salmon escapes.55
Assessment
Federal government policies recognize that aquaculture is a significant issue
for First Nations. Implicit in this is that First Nations may have power to
stop or at least slow development in their territory. The government
approach appears to encourage First Nation participation in development by
trying to put First Nations inside the tent with government and business.
These policies appear to be making inroads with several salmon farms pro-
ceeding in remote First Nation communities with the consent and involve-
ment of the affected First Nations.
Protecting the marine environment
Like many other countries, Canada is experiencing the negative effects of
coastal development. The Oceans Strategy supports improved collaboration
between federal and provincial governments and measures such as the cre-
ation of a national network of marine protected areas and establishment of
marine environmental quality guidelines. In addition, Canada has recently
passed legislation, including the Species at Risk Act, 2002 that imposes
mandatory restrictions on taking threatened or endangered species. First
Nations can play a significant role in species recovery plans as they are col-
lectively a major owner of undeveloped lands in Canada. Increased environ-
mental protection is clearly in the interest of First Nations due to their
reliance on wild fish and game and dependence on a healthy ecosystem for
cultural survival.
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Conclusion
This chapter had provided a glimpse of First Nations’ ocean interests and
practices and a survey of Canada’s current approach to ocean management
and development. The Canadian government’s approach resembles a fortress
mentality where issues such as aboriginal and treaty rights are denied until
explicitly defined in treaty negotiations or proven in court. As shown
through a few examples, First Nations exercised proprietary rights to ocean
spaces and resources and developed sophisticated skills and technology for
exploiting many offshore resources such as groundfish long before the arrival
of Europeans. Historic treaties focused to a large extent on depriving First
Nations of land and limiting interference with development activities such
as agriculture, mining or other resource development. Modern treaties and
emerging oceans policies have a similar focus by denying aboriginal title to
ocean spaces and encouraging non-interference and even offering limited
participation by First Nations in ocean development.
Canada’s ocean policies are still emerging, but the general direction has
been set by the Oceans Act and Oceans Strategy, and legislation and policies
concerning marine conservation areas and migratory bird refuges. In general,
aboriginal and treaty rights are recognized as a burden on the Crown, and
the role of First Nations in oceans management or planning is not defined
except where management arrangements (relating to fish and wildlife) are
established under existing treaties or agreements. Canada’s position of
denying aboriginal title to ocean spaces is unlikely to change as shown by
recent conflicts over aboriginal and treaty rights to fish commercially. A dif-
ferent approach is being followed with co-management of fish and wildlife
where a role has been spelled out in treaties and marine conservation areas
and allows for agreements with First Nations (and others) in advance of
treaties.
Based on the scope of recent treaties, it is unlikely that the Canadian
approach to ocean areas will change through negotiation except in a limited
way. Some First Nations describe the Constitution Act, s. 35 as an empty box
– a box that is being filled little by little through “negotiated” aboriginal
and treaty rights in modern treaties and rights defined through court
decisions. The broader Canadian society has been reluctant to accept differ-
entiated citizenship for First Nations or to recognize broader ocean interests
than hunting and fishing. So far it has been possible for Canada to be suc-
cessful at limiting aboriginal rights to ocean spaces through interest-based
negotiations where access to land-based resources are traded for extinguish-
ment of marine interests. But the broader issue of sea title is about to be
tested in Canadian courts, and the result is likely to require fundamental
changes to Canada’s ocean policies.
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13 Indigenous rights in the sea




The seminal decision of the High Court of Australia in Mabo (No. 2) deter-
mined that the common law of Australia was capable of recognizing that
indigenous rights and interests in land and sea could form part of the
common law. This chapter examines the development or extension of native
title below the high water mark through decisions of courts in interpreting
the legislative schemata created by the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). The
chapter goes on to examine the structural mechanisms for mediation
between parties under the Native Title Act. It postulates that the legislative
schemata offers significant opportunities for parties to the process (including
indigenous parties) to reach significant agreements on native title and non-
native title matters. The chapter concludes that, at least in Australia, the
embryonic developed state of the case law, the structural provisions of the
legislation, and the model of mediation available point to the need for
matters in relation to the integration of indigenous customary marine tenure
and Western maritime management systems be resolved through agree-
ments rather than litigation.
The development of the common law and statute law of
native title
The development of the common law
The starting point for contemporary legal recognition of indigenous rights
in land and waters in Australia is the 1971 decision in Milirrpum v. Nabalco
Pty Ltd.1 In that case, Blackburn J declared:
The evidence shows a subtle and elaborate system, highly adapted to the
country in which the people led their lives, which provided a stable
order of society and was remarkably free from the vagaries of personal
whim or influence. If ever a system could be called “a government of
laws, and not of men”, it is shown in the evidence before me.
Nevertheless, Blackburn J found that, despite the existence of the subtle
and elaborate system of law, the Aboriginal plaintiffs did not “own” land in
property law terms.2 This decision gave rise to a political response to Abo-
riginal needs for land. At a federal level, the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) was enacted. State parliaments followed the Com-
monwealth example of statutory land rights in a rather haphazard fashion.
Statutory land rights schemes were eventually established in South Aus-
tralia, New South Wales and Queensland.
Mabo and the development of the common law
The High Court decision in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) was handed down on
3 June 19923 as a result of proceedings that lasted some ten years.4 A major-
ity of six to one of the judges agreed:
1 There was a concept of native title at common law;
2 The source of native title was a traditional connection to or occupation
of the land;
3 The nature and content of native title was determined by the character
of the connection or occupation under traditional laws or customs; and
4 Native title could be extinguished by the valid exercise of governmental
powers provided a clear and plain intention to do so was manifest.5
Until the Mabo (No. 2) judgments, the general law of Australia did not
recognize that indigenous people possessed any inherent or pre-existing
legal rights to land. Post-Mabo (No. 2), such an inherent right was recog-
nized in areas where it was not extinguished. Native title is therefore inher-
ently different from statutory land rights titles. Under land rights schemes,
groups of indigenous people in Australia are granted a fee simple title or a
lease by the Crown. On the other hand, native title is the recognition of
something that groups of indigenous people already have. Native title laws
exist to identify, recognize and protect what already exists. The Crown
grants nothing, as native title is not the Crown’s to grant.6
The legislative response to Mabo
The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) was the Commonwealth of Australia’s
response to Mabo. The protracted parliamentary debate over the Act, and the
1998 amendments to it, attracted considerable public interest and
comment. The Act is long and detailed. For the purposes of the present
chapter it is necessary only to outline the scheme of the Act.
The preamble of the Act “sets out considerations taken into account” by
the federal Parliament in enacting it.7 The policy considerations underlying
the Act have been summarized as follows:
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• the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples;
• the need to provide a special procedure for the just and proper ascertain-
ment of native title rights and interests;
• the importance of ensuring that native titleholders are able to enjoy
fully their rights and interests and the need to significantly supplement
those rights;
• the requirements for certainty and the enforceability of acts which were
potentially made invalid because of the existence of native title; and
• the importance of providing certainty to the broader Australian
community that future acts that affect native title may be done validly.8
Key concepts
Two key concepts lie at the core of the Native Title Act: what is Native Title
and what does the Federal Court of Australia have to consider in making a
determination that native title exists? These two concepts permeate and sub-
liminally direct Federal Court proceedings and the mediation process that
usually occurs as part of those proceedings.9 The definition of native title
common law rights and interests is set at s. 223 of the Act. Essentially
native title rights and interests are:
• the communal or group rights possessed under traditional laws and
customs including rights to hunt, fish or gather;
• where the group seeking to assert the rights have had and maintained a
connection to the land or waters; and
• the rights are capable of being recognized by the common law.
Section 225 of the Act provides that a determination of native title by the
Federal Court must specify:
• how the group of native titleholders is composed;
• the rights and interests held by the group;
• any other rights and interests held by non-native titleholders in the
claimed area; and
• how the native title rights and rights and interests held by others in the
claimed area will co-exist.
The difficulty, in an operational sense, posed by s. 225 lies in ss 225(d). This
requires a precise enumeration of how the native title rights are to operate
beside or be integrated with the rights granted to parties by the Crown.
The schemata of the Native Title Act
The Act seeks to establish legislative schemata for resolution of native title
claims. This “codification” of native title rights and interests and how they
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are to be determined distinguishes the Australian process from that which
operates in Canada, New Zealand and the United States. The principal fea-
tures of the statutory scheme are:
• claimant applications are lodged with the Federal Court of Australia;10
• the Federal Court sends the application to the Tribunal Registrar11 who
undertakes administrative procedures, including applying the registra-
tion test to the application;12
• the Tribunal Registrar is responsible for notifying the relevant persons
and bodies and the public about each application;13
• persons who feel their rights may be affected by a determination of native
title apply to the Federal Court to become parties to the application;14
• once the party list is settled, the Federal Court will usually refer the
application to the Tribunal for mediation;15
• mediation must be presided over by a member of the Tribunal;16
• the Tribunal carries out mediation of each matter referred to it and
reports to the Federal Court on the progress of mediation.17
Where native title exists, the Federal Court makes an appropriate deter-
mination of native title, either in or consistent with the terms agreed by the
parties or as decided by the Court after a trial.18
Native title in the sea
Introduction19
Thus far the chapter has focused on the common law and statute law recogni-
tion of indigenous rights and interests in land and water. This part focuses on
the development of common law and statute law native title rights and interests
in the sea. The term “sea” is used to describe waters below the high water mark.
Ironically, the application for a determination of common law rights that
resulted in the Mabo (No. 2) decision was brought by representatives of an
island culture located on the eastern edge of the Torres Strait at the northern
tip of Australia. The application was originally one for a determination that
indigenous rights and interests could be found to exist in both the land and
the surrounding seas.20 In the course of proceedings, the application was
amended to remove the sea component of the claim.21 The judges in Mabo
(No. 2) made fleeting reference to the question of whether native title could
be found to exist in the sea. Similarly, the subsequent landmark decision of
the High Court in Wik22 made scant reference to the recognition of custom-
ary marine tenure by the common law. Prior to the 1998 and 1999 decisions
of the Federal Court of Australia in Yarmirr23 and the subsequent 2001
decision of the High Court,24 the only judicial consideration of native title
in the seas had arisen from defences raised to prosecutions for taking marine
resources contrary to legislation. In those cases,25 the court took the view
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that native title rights could be likely to include a right to fish offshore in
relation to particular areas.
The legislative approach to native title rights in the sea
In framing their response to Mabo (No. 2), the legislators sought to extend
the application of the Native Title Act to the area below the high water mark.
They took as their fundamental tenet the areas over which the Common-
wealth sought to exercise sovereignty – even in a limited or qualified form.
This approach is demonstrated in the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s. 6,
which extends operation of the Act to Australia’s territorial sea, contiguous
zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.26 Nevertheless, it
would be wrong to think that, in practice, native title rights and interests
would extend to the edge of the continental shelf. As the native title rights
and interests must be sourced in traditional laws and customs and must be
exercisable in a discrete area, it would be extremely difficult to prove that
such rights had traditionally been exercised some 100 miles from a land
base. However, it would not be difficult to prove the exercise of such rights
closer to shore such as in the territorial sea.
Judicial application of the Native Title Act – the Yarmirr cases
The application of the Native Title Act to Australian offshore waters fell to be
determined in the Yarmirr line of cases. These cases involved a claim for
native title rights to the seas, including the seabed and its resources, in the
vicinity of Croker Island, Northern Territory. At first instance, Justice
Olney of the Federal Court27 reached several conclusions including the
following:28
• The Native Title Act contemplates recognition and protection of native
title over the sea, at least to the 12 nautical mile limit of the territorial
sea.
• Native title can only be understood as a combination of rights and
interests, and the term “ownership” in the context of native title does
not necessarily equate with the type of dominion normally associated
with ownership in its absolute form.
• The evidence did not support a finding that the applicants enjoy exclusive
possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the waters in the claimed
area, although a system of permission operates as between the applicants
themselves and perhaps other Aboriginal people.
• A right of exclusive possession would be inconsistent with the right of
innocent passage29 recognized in international law, and with the public
right of navigation and the public right to fish recognized by the
common law, and therefore a right to exclusive possession could not be
recognized by the common law.
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• In relation to fisheries legislation, the scheme of such legislation was
regulation, and there was no plain and clear intent to extinguish any
non-exclusive, non-commercial native title fishing, nor to create any
third party rights inconsistent with such native title. Rather, the native
title rights are capable of co-existence with the regulatory regime.
• There was no evidence to support any control over any of the resources of
the sub-soil, and any right to control the resources of the sea is necessarily
co-extensive with the right to control access, which was not established.
• There was no evidence to suggest any traditional law or custom in rela-
tion to minerals, and no native title to minerals could be recognized. In
any event, any native title right could not survive legislative enactments
which vested beneficial ownership of minerals in the Crown.
• The rights to protect places of importance and to safeguard cultural
knowledge were established.
• The evidence did not support any native title right to trade in the
resources of the claimed area.
As noted by Olney J:
The net result of all of the foregoing is that native title rights have been,
and are now, regulated, but not extinguished, by prior legislative enact-
ments or administrative action. However, to the extent that the scheme
of regulation would otherwise require the applicants to obtain a licence,
permit or other instrument under a law of the Northern Territory or of
the Commonwealth to lawfully exercise their native title rights of
hunting, fishing, gathering or to engage in any cultural or spiritual
activity for the purpose of satisfying their personal, domestic or com-
munal non-commercial needs, they are not required to have any such
licence, permit or other instrument.30
Whilst the decision may not have pleased the applicants, it certainly
established that native title rights can be found to exist in the sea, although
it is unlikely that those rights could be found to be exclusive rights.
The appeal in the Federal Court31
The decision of Olney J was subject to appeal to the Full Court of the
Federal Court. In its judgment,32 a majority (Beaumont and von Doussa JJ,
Merkel J dissenting) dismissed both appeals. The key points to note from
this decision are that all of the judges agreed that the Native Title Act recog-
nized and protected native title rights and interests in respect of offshore
places. The majority also adopted Olney J’s reasoning that as the right to
trade in resources of the claimed area was inexorably linked with the right to
exclusive possession, once the former could not be made out, the latter was
unsustainable.33
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At first instance, Olney J had also found that the native title rights were
regulated but not extinguished by municipal and Commonwealth fishing
legislation and administrative action. The majority essentially adopted this
view and found that because of the legislative regime and administrative
actions that existed over the claim area, any right of the public to fish for
commercial purposes and any asserted traditional right to fish for commer-
cial purposes were, at a minimum, regulated or partially extinguished by
statute or executive act.
The appeal in the High Court
In October 2001, the High Court gave its decision on the appeal from the
Full Federal Court34 in which the essential tenets of the decision at both first
instance and on appeal were upheld.35 The main features of the Court’s
decision were:
• The Court rejected the Commonwealth argument that the common law
did not “extend” beyond the low water mark.
• The feudal concept of “radical title” that had been used in native title
cases to denote the Crown’s ultimate ownership of land can extend to
the offshore area. That concept does not have a “controlling role” but is
no more than a “tool of analysis which is important in identifying that
the Crown’s rights and interests in relation to land can co-exist with
native title rights and interests.” The concept is not determinative but
simply an aid that “reveals the nature of the rights and interests which
the Crown obtained on its assertion of sovereignty over land”36 (and
waters).
• Native title rights in the sea cannot be absolutely exclusive. “There is a
fundamental inconsistency between the asserted native title rights and
interests and the common law public rights of navigation and fishing, as
well as the right of innocent passage.”37
• Accordingly, management regimes on resources imposed by the Com-
monwealth or the littoral state did not, of themselves, operate to extin-
guish native title.
Obviously, the High Court decision has disappointed some of the inter-
ests represented in the case. Nevertheless, the legal landscape is now clear.
At the time of the decision there were approximately 120 native title
claimant applications taking in sea areas around Australia and another 61
applications included areas in the inter-tidal zone between high and low
water marks.
The Yarmirr decision is an important precedent that lays the foundation
for successful claims to extensive areas of Australia’s coastal waters. A major
issue still to be determined is in what manner the existence of native title
rights and interests in those areas will affect the management and use of
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those places. One major issue still to be worked through is the operation of
the future act provisions of the Native Title Act in the sea. The Act estab-
lishes schemata whereby registered claimants are entitled to be consulted
about proposed activities in the claimed area that may impact on their
asserted native title rights and interests. This is known as the “right to
negotiate” process. The registered claimants do not possess a veto right in
relation to the proposed activity, but proponents are required to undertake a
process of consultation. This is designed to promote agreements between the
applicants and the proponent about the doing of the future act. In instances
where the future act operates to extinguish native title, the native title-
holders are entitled to compensation for that extinguishment. In addition,
where native title rights and interests have been determined to exist, they
co-exist with other rights and interests.
The current matrix of offshore native title
Coastal waters
Registered claimants enjoy a right to negotiate for future acts in onshore
places (defined in s. 253 as effectively within three miles of the shore).38 This
is considerable in some parts of Australia where there are extensive islands
close to the mainland.39 Native titleholders will be entitled to compensation
for future acts that impact adversely on their determined native title rights
and interests.
Offshore places
With respect to waters beyond the three mile limit, registered claimants
have no right to negotiate in respect of offshore places (defined in Native
Title Act, s. 253) but native titleholders will be entitled to compensation for
future acts that impact adversely on their determined native title rights and
interests.40
Such a complex matrix points to the need for agreement about co-
existence in onshore and offshore areas rather than for parties to seek to liti-
gate each future act and to then conduct compensation litigation in respect
of each future act or class of future act. The complex jurisdictional matrix,
when coupled with the issues facing resource managers about the nature and
extent of the level and kind of native title interests that can exist below the
high water mark, demonstrate the difficulty of seeking to resolve both the
existence of native title rights and interests and how those native title rights
and interests will co-exist with statutory schemes for resource management
through litigation. These are issues that are so complex as to be resolved
through negotiation, rather than litigation. The complexity is enhanced by
reference to s. 211 of the Native Title Act which effectively provides that
municipal laws that regulate or control activities under government regula-
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tory or management regimes do not and cannot operate to limit or prevent
the right of native titleholders to take resources for communal, non-
commercial purposes. The framers of the Act contemplated a situation
where regulators and indigenous peoples would negotiate the interaction of
the resource management regimes and the native title rights. The entire leg-
islation is focused on mediation and agreement making.
It is important that those responsible for the management of offshore
waters understand and appreciate the opportunities that are provided by the
framework of the Act and the manner in which the National Native Title
Tribunal carries out its mediation function. It is only when seized of that
understanding that managers will be in a position to optimize the develop-
ment of an integrated approach to resource management that provides
durable agreements that afford of consensual management regimes that can
operate without disruption and challenge.
Mediating sea claims: the powers and functions of the
National Native Title Tribunal
Introduction
Faced with a narrowing “black letter law” approach to customary marine
tenure by the courts, it is appropriate to look at how native title is mediated
in Australia within the litigation framework. This involves an examination
of the legislative focus on agreement making rather than on litigation, the
role of the Tribunal in mediating claims,41 and how the Tribunal operates in
its agreement-making practice.
The National Native Title Tribunal is an administrative body established
in accordance with the main objects of the Native Title Act 1993, with power
to make determinations about whether certain future acts can be done and
whether certain agreements concerning native title are to be covered by the
Act, and to provide assistance or undertake mediation in other matters relat-
ing to native title.42 The powers and functions, membership and administra-
tion of the Tribunal are governed by the Act and regulations made under
the Act.
The Tribunal has certain functions in relation to Federal Court proceed-
ings arising from native title determination applications (or claimant appli-
cations). When the Court refers proceedings to the Tribunal for mediation,
the Tribunal holds conferences of the parties. The Act sets out how media-
tion conferences are to be conducted, who may attend or participate in con-
ferences, the circumstances under which questions of fact or law may be
referred to the Court, and the way in which reports about the mediation are
to be made to the Court.
The Tribunal must pursue the objective of carrying out its functions in a
fair, just, economical and prompt way.43 In carrying out its functions, the
Tribunal may take account of the customary and cultural concerns of
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indigenous peoples, but not in a way that unduly prejudices other parties to
any proceedings.44 The Tribunal is not bound by technicalities, legal forms
or rules of evidence.45 The Tribunal may sit in a wide range of places,
including external territories.46 The Tribunal may carry out research for the
purposes of performing its functions, including research into anthropology,
linguistics or the history of interests in relation to land or waters in
Australia.47
How mediation occurs under the Native Title Act48
It has been recognized that mediation is at the center of the work of the Tri-
bunal.49 Generally speaking, the Federal Court refers every claimant applica-
tion to the Tribunal for mediation50 as soon as practicable after the end of
the notification period for the application.51 Further, the Court may, at any
time in a proceeding, refer the whole or part of the proceeding to the Tri-
bunal for mediation if the Court considers that the parties will be able to
reach agreement on (or on the facts relevant to) any matter set out in the
Native Title Act, s. 86A(1).52
In making Federal Court orders in relation to the case management of
claimant applications, the Court has referred to the “central role” of the Tri-
bunal in the mediation process. That role is apparent from the mandated
terms of referral and is reinforced by the Federal Court’s facility to request
the Tribunal to provide reports to the Court on the progress of mediation.
The various statutory provisions relating to mediation conferences convened
by the Tribunal are “ancillary to the referral of applications” to the Tribunal
for mediation and they “do not define the limits” of the Tribunal’s role.53
A myriad of factors impact on and determine how mediation occurs in
each particular case. To its credit, the Parliament, in developing the Act,
made no attempt to dictate how mediation should be conducted. There is no
prescribed way of proceeding. The Tribunal may “hold such conferences of
the parties or their representatives as the Tribunal considers will help in
resolving the matter.”54 The formal part of the mediation process is con-
ducted at such “conferences.” Each mediation conference must be presided
over by a member.55 The President may appoint a consultant to mediate.56
The presiding member at a mediation conference is provided with several
statutory powers, including:
• to allow parties to participate in a conference in person, by telephone, or
any other means of communication;57
• to hold conferences with only some of the parties;58
• to exclude persons from conferences at the member’s discretion;59
• to permit (with the consent of parties present) non-parties to attend a
conference as observers60 or as participants;61
• to refer (at the member’s own initiative) to the Federal Court a question
of fact or law that arises during a mediation62 and to continue the medi-
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ation whilst the referred question of fact or law is being determined by
the Federal Court;63
• to prohibit, limit or qualify the disclosure to persons (including to other
parties or parties’ constituencies) of any information given or statement
made at or documents produced at a conference.64
The Tribunal member appointed by the President to conduct mediation
in a particular application develops a process or framework for progressing
the mediation from stage to stage towards the identification and resolution
of the issues raised by the application. That program will usually include a
series of time frames for each stage of the process. This is known as the
design phase of the mediation.
The emphasis on agreement and consensus building
Having set out the legislative schemata for resolution of native title, it is
appropriate to examine the statutory and practical emphasis on agreement
making. The starting point of such an examination is the preamble to the
Act that provides:
A special procedure needs to be available for just and proper ascertain-
ment of native title rights and interests which will ensure that, if pos-
sible, this is done by conciliation and, if not, in a manner that has due
regard to their unique character.
Similarly, the main objects of the Act include providing for the recogni-
tion of native title and establishing the mechanism for determining claims
of native title. Whilst the preamble to the Act uses the term “conciliation,”
it is interesting to note that (since the 1998 amendments) the Act is replete
with the term “mediation.”65 Whatever words like “mediate,” “negotiate” or
“conciliation” mean to the different parties, the aim of the process is to
resolve a range of issues by agreements that will endure based on relation-
ships that will develop.66
It is difficult to judge how successful (in empirical terms) the agreement
making emphasis in the Act has been. Optimists would point to the 31
determinations of native title that have been made by the Federal Court as at
June 2003, of which over 25 have been by consent of all of the parties.67
Optimists would also point to the 77 Indigenous Land Use Agreements
already registered under the Act and the 24 such agreements currently in
the process of being registered.68
The law and practice of native title in Australia 325
The Tribunal practice in mediating native title claims
The interest-based negotiation model
The Tribunal has adopted the interest-based model of mediation as a basis
for the manner in which it will conduct mediation of native title issues. The
interest-based mediation model is based on the interest-based negotiation
model. The underlying process for the interest-based negotiation model is
that disputing parties attempt (without the help of another person) to deter-
mine each other’s interests and to generate options that satisfy the interests
of all of the parties. The discussions do not focus on each party’s rights but
on their interests. Unlike some other schools of negotiating, this model does
not prescribe what the negotiator should say at every point in the negotia-
tion. This model provides a framework for proponents to work through their
issues and to explore their options.69
Interest-based mediation model
This term is used to describe principled or interest-based negotiation
between parties with a negotiation expert, a mediator, who can assist the
parties to overcome any obstacales during their negotiations. Although there
are several models for interest-based mediation, all of the models attempt to
determine the parties’ interest in the hope that the disputants and the medi-
ator will develop or create solutions to satisfy the interests. The classical
model of interest-based mediation is a seven-stage model. The stages are:
• setting the table;
• storytelling;
• determining interests;
• determining the issues;
• brain-storming options;
• selecting an option;
• closure.
It will be seen that the stages in interest-based mediation reflect quite
closely several elements in interest-based negotiation.
Moving through the stages
It would be wrong to imagine mediation as involving a linear transition
from one stage of the mediation to the next. Inevitably, mediations involve
jumping from one stage to the other and normally not in sequence. A
typical pattern is for mediation to jump from storytelling to options, to
interests, and back to storytelling as interests are jointly explored. Each
mediation develops its own ebb and flow, and the wise mediator is always
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conscious of this and does not seek to be too prescriptive. The greatest facili-
tator of progress in mediation is storytelling. If the parties need to go back
and tell the story from another angle or from a different perspective then the
wise mediator lets them do that.
Sea claims – where to from here?
The Croker Island case was “the first significant opportunity for the courts to
clarify complex legal issues regarding native title and the seas, including
whether the common law is capable of recognizing indigenous sea rights,
the relationship between native title and statutory fishing interests, and the
relationship between native title and the public right to fish.”70 The law, at
least on the basis of the evidence adduced, is now clear. Native title can exist
in offshore waters, although the rights may not be exclusive.
Customary marine issues
It is argued that, “Following the Mabo judgment coastal communities are
. . . seeking to exercise their sea rights through native title claims, co-
management arrangements of conservation and joint venture economic
developments.”71 This is consistent not only with the inherent interest of
many Aboriginal peoples in Australia in marine areas,72 but also as a result
of the clarification of marine native title following the High Court’s decision
in Yarmirr.
In many parts of Australia, there are competing private, recreational and
commercial uses of the traditional clan estate areas of native titleholders
with the potential for conflict. Such conflict may be avoided or minimized
by agreed resource sharing or by spatial separation of competing or inconsis-
tent interests. Native titleholders may seek various mechanisms for involve-
ment in the management of their traditional clan estates including some or
all of the following arrangements:
• indigenous control of areas of particular resources through sea closures,
traditional hunting and fishing zones;
• joint management of areas in conjunction with relevant government
agencies and/or relevant industry bodies; and
• co-management arrangements where decision making is by a relevant
government agency in a close working relationship with the relevant
indigenous group.73
None of the above, or any variations thereof, can be directly determined
by litigation. They are best resolved and structured through negotiation.
Sparkes suggests74 consideration should be given to using such tools as
Indigenous Land Use Agreements75 to provide interim and lasting solutions
to meet the needs of all of the parties. Such agreements may be a precursor
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to consent determinations in relation to native title and amendment of rele-
vant legislation to meet the needs and aspirations of indigenous peoples in
relation to offshore areas.
Conclusion
The decisions of the Courts have established sufficient principles for appli-
cants to commence proceedings for a determination of native title rights and
interests in offshore waters. Given the state of the law, it is reasonable to
assume that applicants will seek to negotiate with governments and others
who have interests in the claimed waters. Those negotiations will usually
occur as part of the mediation process established under the Native Title Act.
In other words, applicants (and other parties) will decide that they can
achieve more by negotiation than by litigation.
The mediation of negotiations about those rights and interests will
require the Tribunal to manage cross-cultural, multi-party negotiations
about rights and interests in the sea. The Tribunal will seek to carry out
interest-based negotiation within the framework of a rights-based court
process. Successful outcomes from those negotiations will be determined by
a number of factors including:
• the ability of the Tribunal to create the appropriate environment in
which parties will feel comfortable enough to set aside their bargaining
positions and put their issues on the table;
• the ability of the parties to recognize that the negotiations present an
opportunity to develop cooperative processes going forward that create a
basis for sound resource and management arrangements for the claimed
areas; and
• a common understanding of the parties that issues of customary marine
tenure, at least in the coastal management zone will not simply “go
away” but needs, wherever possible, to be integrated into a holistic
management regime.
However, it is suggested that there has been sufficient judicial develop-
ment of the legal principles involved. The parties now have a comprehensive
statutory framework and sufficient certainty in the mediation model for
them to prepare for and to proceed through the process with some degree of
certainty.
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In a recent publication on aboriginal customary marine tenure, it was noted
that even in the field of anthropology, Aboriginal peoples’ relationships to
the sea have been misunderstood and neglected in a manner that “has
resulted in the indigenous relationship to the sea being seen only in terms of
resource usage and in the many and complex indigenous systems of near-
shore marine tenure worldwide becoming invisible.”1 One of the reasons
proffered for this “blind spot”2 was the manner in which Western relation-
ships to the sea, including views that the seas were open to all, blinkered the
way in which indigenous cultures were understood.
This “invisibility” has been more than just a “blind spot” in the field of
anthropology. It has been a matter of great convenience to governments and
industry groups who, by ignoring Aboriginal peoples’ interests in marine
environments, have been able to exploit the resources that Aboriginal
peoples have always managed. It has also served to deny us a right to make a
livelihood from those resources. While the myth of invisibility is being
increasingly dispelled, the desire of governments and industry to continue to
reap the benefits of that historical injustice remains largely unchanged.
Despite being the subject of numerous reports and policy statements espous-
ing principles of increased participation in both resource management and
industry participation, tangible benefits for Aboriginal people have yet to be
realized.3
Australia’s Oceans Policy was released on 23 December 19984 and creates a
new policy and political framework for the management of Australia’s
oceans and seas. This chapter will review the impact of the Oceans Policy
upon the interests of Aboriginal people in Australia from an indigenous
perspective. Reference will be made to how Aboriginal people’s rights and
interests are addressed in the Oceans Policy, and the challenges to be faced in
implementing Australia’s Oceans Policy consistently with Aboriginal people’s
rights and interests.
Aboriginal peoples’ interests in the marine environment
The special relationship between Aboriginal peoples and marine environ-
ments is at least becoming increasingly understood by non-indigenous
people. For Aboriginal peoples living in coastal regions, the marine environ-
ment has always constituted a fundamental economic and cultural resource.
It is central to the spiritual well-being of Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, in
some parts of the country, it is not unusual for Aboriginal people to have
stories and Dreaming tracks that travel through the sea, imbuing those areas
with the cultural identity of the communities to which they belong. The
travels of Dreaming creatures and the songs associated with them are sign-
posted by numerous sites of significance that can be located several kilome-
ters offshore.5
The coastal environment is also important to Aboriginal peoples in other
ways. Activities such as hunting and fishing have been passed down over the
centuries and are carried out with the knowledge and pride that they repre-
sent the continuing of a tradition. It is a means of being on country, of
enjoying our home, and making a living from a country that has always been
ours. In these ways, hunting and fishing by Aboriginal people are not mere
physical activities, they are cultural activities that are central to our identity.
Understanding Aboriginal hunting and fishing in these ways makes it easy
to understand why Aboriginal people are angered6 when governments and
policy-makers treat them as just another category of recreational user of
marine resources.
Aboriginal people have an understanding of our coastal environment that
has assisted us to manage coastal resources for generations. We understand the
life cycles and seasonal movements of many species. We have knowledge of the
times of the year when it is appropriate to fish certain species. There are areas
where we do not fish at particular times of the year because they are known
breeding areas. We know how to look for, and understand, indicators from the
environment that tell when a particular resource is under threat and should be
left alone. When we see those signs we do not fish in those areas. That is how
we have traditionally ensured that the species is properly managed.
For Aboriginal people, the marine environment is not only an important
source of food, it remains an important economic resource. It constitutes a
resource that has always been exploited to the extent necessary to satisfy the
needs that were required to be satisfied in order to sustain our existence.
The requirement that Aboriginal peoples’ interests in coastal environ-
ments be protected is no longer solely in the realm of the goodwill of gov-
ernments. The entitlement of Aboriginal peoples to have our interests in
coastal waters protected arises from a range of international instruments and
the decisions of Australian courts. The need for the involvement of Aborigi-
nal people in the management of resources and our active participation in
resource industries also arises as a matter of social justice. This was recog-
nized by the Commonwealth Coastal Policy, which states:
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As a matter of social justice, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples should be recognised as participants in the coastal management
process, and should be able to derive social, cultural and economic
benefit from the use of coastal environments in which they have an
interest.7
Native title
The recognition of native title in the High Court of Australia’s decision in
Mabo8 was a significant step for Aboriginal people and is a means to obtain
limited recognition and protection of Aboriginal people’s relationships to land
and sea, including some hunting and fishing activities. However, native title is
a white man’s law. Yet it also sanctioned the dispossession of Aboriginal
people by recognizing the authority of Australian governments to extinguish
Aboriginal people’s interests in land and sea.9 Such concepts of “extinguish-
ments” are foreign to our cultures. Furthermore, the recognition of native title
itself only occurs on limited terms that have nothing to do with the full and
meaningful recognition of Aboriginal people’s interests in land and sea.
Despite the fact that many Aboriginal people’s cultures consider that they
own their sea country as much as their land, the Australian courts will not
recognize the existence of those interests.10 The courts have also introduced
arbitrary requirements in relation to continuing connection, which have meant
that although Aboriginal people themselves maintain their laws and customs,
the courts will no longer recognize them.11 This is done through criteria that
pay no regard to the views of indigenous people in relation to such matters.
The manner in which Aboriginal people’s cultures are dealt with under
the Australian legal system was highlighted in Yarmirr v. Northern Terri-
tory.12 First, the court held that the recognition of aboriginal inter-tidal
rights would be inconsistent with the common law.13 Second, exclusive
fishery rights were held to not exist.14 Third, in relation to the requirements
of permission to fish in the sea, the court held that although the system of
permission applied to Aboriginal people, it did not apply to white people.15
This has in effect meant that white people are not bound by that system of
law and custom. To have a system of law and custom that can be freely
ignored by a section of the community is little different from having that
section of the community saying it does not exist at all.
The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA) affords little protection to native
title rights and interests even in the limited form in which they have been
recognized. Any future act in relation to the management of waters and
living resources in those waters is valid.16 Although native title holders are
afforded a right to comment in relation to those acts,17 that right has been
read to provide for only minimal involvement in the management
processes,18 and even if the procedural right is not afforded to native title-
holders, the future act will be valid anyway. Furthermore, there is no right
to negotiate in relation to the inter-tidal zone or areas below low water
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mark.19 Any act in relation to an offshore place affecting native title is also
valid regardless of whether the appropriate procedural rights20 are afforded
to native titleholders.21 While Aboriginal people are entitled to be compen-
sated for such acts,22 no such compensation has been paid to date. While the
NTA protects aboriginal hunting and fishing rights,23 that protection does
not extend to the protection of those rights carried out for commercial pur-
poses, even where they are recognized.
Finally, one unintended and negative impact of the recognition of native
title has been the increasing tendency of Australian governments to consider
Aboriginal peoples’ interests in marine resources only in terms of native title
rights and interests. It is, however, a flawed approach to see the need to
recognize the rights of Aboriginal people only in terms of the limited and
artificial confines of native title. Aboriginal people’s involvement in resource
management, the continuation of customary fishing rights, and the need to
be able to obtain a livelihood from our country is a human right as well as
an issue of social justice.
Aboriginal people and Australia’s Oceans Policy
Australia’s Oceans Policy identifies the concerns of the coastal Aboriginal
peoples as including the equitable and secure access to resources, direct
involvement in resource planning, management and allocation processes and
decisions, formal recognition of traditional patterns of resource use and
access, traditional management practices and customary law and conserva-
tion of the oceans and its resources, intellectual property, and ownership. In
its response to those concerns, the Commonwealth has committed itself to a
number of goals in relation to several different areas of aboriginal concern.
The Oceans Policy and the recognition of Aboriginal sea titles
While the legal recognition of pre-existing Aboriginal peoples’ interests in
Mabo increased focus on Aboriginal peoples’ interests in the marine environ-
ments, it should not have taken that recognition to trigger such an interest.
The 1993 Coastal Zone Inquiry noted the perceived inadequacy of land
tenure arrangements and marine estates commensurate with the status of
Aboriginal peoples as the original owners of the coastal zone.24 The Oceans
Policy does not satisfactorily address this issue. The absence of an adequate
legislative response to the non-recognition of aboriginal sea titles and the
limitations of native title means that there will be an ongoing grievance on
the part of Aboriginal people in relation to this lack of recognition.
The Oceans Policy customary fishing rights
The recognition of aboriginal hunting and fishing rights has been the
subject of numerous reports including the Law Reform Commission’s
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inquiry into the Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law25 and the Coastal
Zone Inquiry.26 What is clear from the numerous reports and the recommen-
dations contained therein is that, in recent years at least, it is not through a
lack of any identification of Aboriginal peoples’ interests that they have not
been recognized. It is through a lack of willpower, and in some instances out-
right antagonism, on the part of governments. Indeed, it has often been more
convenient for governments merely to have another report or inquiry than
meaningfully to implement the recommendations of the previous report.
For most Aboriginal people, the protection of aboriginal hunting and
fishing rights has generally only taken the form of exempting Aboriginal
people from licenses and otherwise allowing Aboriginal people to take flora
and fauna that the general public are prohibited from taking.27 Very little
regard has been given to protecting Aboriginal people from the effects of the
intrusion caused by the exploitation of our traditional sea country by com-
mercial fishers, tourist operators and recreational users.
Australia’s Oceans Policy provides that the government will “continue” to
“remove barriers to indigenous groups practicing subsistence fishing on a
sustainable yield basis consistent with conservation of species.”28 Several
points can be made in relation to this aspect of the strategy. First, any meas-
ures that will increase the ability of Aboriginal peoples to exercise tradi-
tional hunting and fishing are welcomed. The second is that the measure is
limited to “subsistence” hunting and fishing. It is regrettable that a similar
goal was not made in relation to aboriginal hunting and fishing activities
generally. Third, the goal is limited to a “sustainable yield basis.” While
this is in principle a matter of general support, in practice it is a matter of
considerable controversy. Unless the government is willing to address all
matters relevant to a particular resource, it is wrong simply to point the
finger at Aboriginal people for the impact on the species and judge sustain-
ability by that criteria without first reducing the impact on species by other
users and coastal development generally.
Finally, it is doubtful just how committed the Commonwealth is in rela-
tion to this matter anyway. At the time of the release of the Oceans Policy,
which undertook to “remove barriers to indigenous groups practicing sub-
sistence fishing,” the Commonwealth was actively arguing in Australian
courts that the Australian legal system should not recognize the traditional
native title rights of Aboriginal people below low water mark.29 Far from
trying to remove barriers, it was actively seeking to create them. With such
a two-faced approach to such a fundamental issue, is it any wonder that
Aboriginal people are skeptical that the other measures in the Oceans Policy
will be approached in good faith?
Oceans Policy and Aboriginal cultural heritage
Nowhere is the tension between being seen to protect Indigenous peoples’
interests and the need to protect the convenience of the “invisibility” of
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Aboriginal peoples’ interests more apparent than in the area of aboriginal
cultural heritage. White Australians are happy to hang the works of Aborig-
inal peoples on their wall or use them in opening ceremonies for sporting
events. However, when it comes to a choice between protecting sites of
significance and other cultural interests which conflict with the interests of
industry, aboriginal cultural heritage is seldom the winner.
Commonwealth and state heritage protection legislation is as inadequate
to protect Aboriginal peoples’ interests in coastal areas as it is in relation to
other areas.30 Some state heritage legislation tends to emphasize the protec-
tion of aboriginal cultural heritage of archaeological value, such as “artifacts”
and “relics,” but is inadequate to protect sites of spiritual significance.31 Fur-
thermore, in some legislation, part of the protection mechanism is to deem
those “artifacts” and “relics” the property of the Crown.32 This is offensive to
Aboriginal people. Far from providing protection, it often is no more than a
means of regulating the destruction of that material, with government agen-
cies being provided with authority to give consent for its destruction.33
While the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984
(Cth) is supposed to provide protection where state regimes are inadequate,
that protection is afforded at the discretion of the government.34 Not only
has it been sparingly used,35 but when convenient the government has also
passed specific legislation removing the protection afforded by the Act.36
The Coastal Zone Inquiry noted the concerns of Aboriginal people that
their cultural heritage, including sites of cultural significance in coastal
areas, was not under aboriginal control, was inadequately protected or
managed by government agencies and that such heritage should be under
the control of Indigenous people.37 There has been little change to heritage
legislation since that report.
Australia’s Oceans Policy now provides that the government will address
the threats of impacts posed by activities on fishery resources and marine
sites valued by Aboriginal communities.38 While this is welcomed, it is in
many respects an example of the government being seen to be doing some-
thing without really doing anything. If the government was serious about
addressing our concerns it could have enacted legislation improving the pro-
tection of aboriginal cultural heritage and implemented the recommenda-
tions of the “Review into the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage
Protection Act” which took place in 1996.39 In any event, given the reluc-
tance of the Commonwealth to use its own legislation to protect sites of
significance, Aboriginal people can have little comfort that this will be
meaningfully implemented. Indeed, at the same time that the Oceans Policy
was being developed, the Commonwealth was removing the protection of
that legislation in relation to one coastal region to allow the construction of
the Hindmarsh Island bridge in South Australia.40
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Oceans Policy and the recognition of Aboriginal marine
knowledge
There is presently an inadequate recognition of aboriginal cultural know-
ledge in the marine environment. It receives inadequate protection under
copyright laws and as a native title right.41 The courts have recently also
stated that native title does not extend to the protection of knowledge of
sites and country because such matters are not regarded as interests in land
and waters as defined in the NTA.42 It is also inadequately protected under
aboriginal cultural heritage legislation. In relation to aboriginal cultural
knowledge, the Oceans Policy states that the government “will continue to
implement the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Cultural
Industry Strategy as it is applicable to the natural and cultural heritage
values of Australia’s marine areas.”43 That strategy is aimed at providing
economic empowerment, access and coordination and various support net-
works to enable indigenous communities to use their cultural resources to
obtain a degree of self-sufficiency.44
Oceans Policy and the involvement of Aboriginal people in
management of marine resources
Along with the rejection of the stereotype of hunter-gatherers as passive
“food-collectors” in opposition to “active, food producing agriculturalists”45
has come a greater recognition of the benefits of Aboriginal people’s partici-
pation in resource management,46 including coastal resource management.
Despite this, in most areas, governments have refrained from permitting
Aboriginal people to enjoy meaningful partnerships or management of
coastal environments. The Oceans Policy provides that the Commonwealth
government will:
• provide for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander representation on the
National Oceans Advisory Group and on Regional Marine Plan Steering
Committees;
• provide for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander participation at the
National Oceans Forum;
• consult with Indigenous groups on the requirements for establishing a
national consultative mechanism, such as an annual forum; and
• continue to develop and implement principles and guidelines for co-
management or relevant marine areas and resources.47
Making a statement in relation to Aboriginal people’s involvement in the
management of coastal resources, and even making provision for such con-
sultation to occur, does not guarantee effective involvement. Aboriginal
people will be unable to benefit from measures designed to increase their
involvement in those processes unless they are adequately resourced to
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participate effectively in those processes.48 Furthermore, creating require-
ments for Aboriginal people to be consulted or to have representation on
various committees does not mean that their views will be accommodated.
Meaningful recognition of a role in marine resources management means
being able to make decisions in relation to the management of resources.
There are now, across the country, numerous policies that require consulta-
tion with Aboriginal people in relation to resource management. However,
merely being able to put a point of view across, which may or may not be
taken into account, does not constitute management of resources.
Furthermore, Aboriginal people’s involvement in the management of
resources, while important, should not be seen as a means of avoiding 
the need to address other matters of importance, such as the need to increase
the involvement of Aboriginal people in the fishing industry.49 Again, the
government’s commitment to meaningful involvement in the management
of resources is questionable. Around the same time that the Commonwealth
was formulating the Oceans Policy it was enacting the amendments to the
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). These amendments ensured that native title-
holders would only have “a right to comment” in relation to any future act
affecting native title that is done under legislation in relation to the man-
agement of waters and marine resources.50
Oceans Policy and Aboriginal peoples’ involvement in the
commercial fishing industry
Aboriginal people in coastal areas have always made their livelihood from
the sea. The disruptions caused by white settlement have meant that there
are new pressures and demands on Aboriginal communities. Accordingly,
our use of sea resources has been required to adapt in order to deal with
those new pressures and demands. In many areas, Aboriginal people have
had a history of involvement in the fishing industry. That involvement has
been both with Aboriginal people themselves participating in those indus-
tries as well as comprising a labor force for the industry.51 With more com-
plicated licensing regimes being introduced and the introduction of share
quota management systems, it is Aboriginal people who are increasingly
being denied a livelihood from the exploitation of resources that they have
always exploited. Similarly, with greater mechanization of the fishing indus-
try, the industry has become less labor intensive and the employment
opportunities for Aboriginal people have decreased.
Aboriginal people continue to be disadvantaged by being increasingly
isolated from the commercial fishing industry. The emphasis on regional
management plans tends to focus on existing uses rather than a reconsidera-
tion of the equitable distribution of resources. The nature of the use that
Aboriginal people should be entitled to is not properly considered in the
preparation of those plans. This can itself form a barrier to the future
involvement of Aboriginal people because remedial measures for Aboriginal
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people, which may be considered at a later date, may be inconsistent with
the plan and this can be used as an excuse not to take any further action.
A similar problem arises in the context of the increasing trend towards
share quota management fisheries. Under share-managed fisheries, the allo-
cation of quotas is often worked out by existing commercial operations and
the current catches under various licenses. In circumstances where we have
already been excluded, such a criteria effectively excludes us from the indus-
try permanently. In effect, such criteria rely on the historical invisibility of
Aboriginal people and entrench that injustice into legislative regimes.
The need for a greater level of Aboriginal people’s involvement in the
fishing industry has been the subject of numerous reports in the last 20
years. The Coastal Zone Inquiry recommended that an indigenous fishing
strategy should be developed that includes measures to improve economic
development and employment opportunities for indigenous communities in
fisheries and mariculture ventures. Options included the reservation of a
proportion of fishing or other licenses for indigenous communities, the pur-
chase of such licenses on behalf of indigenous communities by the Aborigi-
nal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, and the establishment of fishing
zones adjacent to land owned or controlled by indigenous people in which
communities could operate their own commercial enterprises, participate in
joint ventures, or license access by other marine resource users.52 Despite
such recommendations, there have not been any significant moves to involve
Aboriginal people in the commercial fishing industry.
Australia’s Oceans Policy does not take any significant step forward on this
issue either. The Oceans Policy provides that Australia will enable increased
opportunities for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to be involved
in commercial fishing and will implement the National Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Rural Industry Strategy as it is relevant to ocean-based
industries.53 That Strategy relevantly states that the Commonwealth is 
only to:
• encourage the extension of preferential licensing to indigenous people
for collection of abalone, trochus, beche-de-mer and mud crabs in
appropriate locations;
• support the reservation and buy back of fishing licenses where Aborigi-
nal people have been excluded from the local commercial fishing indus-
try; and
• assess market opportunities for increased production and value adding
by indigenous communities in relation to abalone, trochus, beche-de-
mer, shark fins, rock lobster and mud crabs.54
The goals of the Oceans Policy are not sufficiently clear to ensure their
effective and meaningful implementation. The Policy focuses on increasing
opportunities within the existing regime. Where detailed measures could
have been implemented, the Policy instead speaks in terms of providing
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“increased opportunities.” The nature and extent of the increase remains
undefined.
If the requisite goodwill was forthcoming, the Oceans Policy could have
been much more precise in its standard setting in this regard. Not only
could it have identified tangible steps to ensure a more equitable distribu-
tion of the commercial fishery, it could have also set out principles for inclu-
sion of Aboriginal people where new share quotas or developmental fisheries
are established. The absence of such measures is unfortunate because both
these last mentioned matters represent clear opportunities to provide equity
to Aboriginal people in the context of either a broader restructuring of the
industry or otherwise with minimal interference with other existing com-
mercial operations. Yet even in these circumstances it seems that the disad-
vantage to Aboriginal people is difficult to address.
The Oceans Policy and Aquaculture
Aquaculture is one area where there has been increasing interest in develop-
ing partnerships with Aboriginal people, and it represents a valuable
opportunity for a different outcome for Aboriginal people from our isolation
from traditional fish resources. The “National Aquaculture Development
Strategy for Indigenous Communities”55 at least identifies several steps that
may be undertaken to provide Aboriginal people with the means to enter
into that industry. The undertaking in the Oceans Policy to implement the
“National Aboriginal Torres Strait Island Rural Industry Strategy”56
includes the references in that Strategy to measures in relation to aquacul-
ture. Those measures include that the Commonwealth is to:
Action 2.10: Recognise the interests of Indigenous communities within
the National Aquaculture Strategy.
Action 2.11: Provide technical support to Indigenous communities
wishing to plan for and establish aquaculture enterprise for
community food supplies or for external sales.
Action 2.12: Assist the planning and establishment of aquaculture
enterprises where they are likely to achieve significant eco-
nomic benefits for Indigenous communities, either in their
own right or as a component of diversified production.
As this is a developing area of the fishing industry it is perhaps too early
to pass judgment on how meaningfully these measures will be introduced
and how effectively the Strategy will lead to the ongoing involvement of
Aboriginal people in the industry. It is hoped that the Strategy will be
pursued with more conviction by Australian governments than other areas of
the Oceans Policy relating to Aboriginal people.
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Conclusion
Smyth has succinctly summarized the frustration of Aboriginal people over
the inaction by governments in relation to Aboriginal participation in the
management of marine resources and the commercial fishing industry.57 The
Oceans Policy does not contain structural change in the management of
coastal resources or Aboriginal involvement in the commercial fishing
industry. Even with those aspects of the Oceans Policy that may deliver real
change to Aboriginal people, there has been no rush to commit to genuine
reform. Instead, we have been left wallowing in a morass of reports and
“feasibility studies” containing recommendations calling for “the examina-
tion of options,” the “development of protocols,” the further investigation of
“options,” and the identification of “further strategies.” While the various
policies nearly always represent an improvement on what was previously
available, the fundamental issues are not addressed. In this way the disad-
vantage for Aboriginal people, which arises from the historical invisibility of
our interests, is entrenched for future generations. The extent to which the
Oceans Policy can deliver outcomes where previous reports and policies have
failed remains to be seen, but current indications are that it will be unlikely
to deliver real change to how indigenous peoples’ interests are recognized
and protected.
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The concept of “governance,” distinguished from “government,” envisages a
broad array of legitimate inputs into public policy making under the chang-
ing conditions of contemporary society.1 At the international level, the gov-
ernance concept is the latest intellectual response to the “anarchic” state of
world society,2 and reflects a general awareness of the inadequacy of govern-
ment systems and intergovernmental organizations to deal with complex
problems. The broadened governance view of legitimacy, embracing eco-
nomic and societal as well as political values, coincides with a new determi-
nation to achieve a higher degree of effectiveness in the highly complex field
of ocean management. The need for a higher degree of sophistication in
“ocean governance” opens up challenging opportunities for cross-disciplinary
and cross-sectoral interaction, whether or not one espouses the vision of
“comprehensive ocean management,”3 or subscribes to the educational goal
of “consilience.”4
We are living in an age of ambitious hopes for the future of international
society. With a view to evaluating the case for optimism in the field of ocean
management, it may be useful to identify some institutional, ethical and
conceptual dilemmas that seem to obstruct progress. This chapter concludes
with reflections on the future role of maritime regime building as the best
approach to effective ocean governance.
Institutional dilemmas
The Westphalian framework and UNCLOS III
The global governance concept has become popular in many circles because
of the general perception of the limitations inherent in state institutions.
Yet among specialists in the sub-discipline of international relations theory,
the Westphalian model still occupies a central position. It postulates a
“system of territorially organized states operating in an anarchic environ-
ment,”5 each state being “capable of defining its own goals and cultural
mission.”6 Although the goal of ultimate control within a specific territory
remains elusive to many actors, it is still widely assumed by them that their
potential should be defined in terms of “an autonomous state, nationally
unified and in control of its own economic policy.”7
Traditionalists in the sub-discipline of public international law have rein-
forced the Westphalian view of the world by insisting on the centrality of the
principles of state sovereignty and formal equality among states. By assuming
that sovereignty must reside in “final authority,”8 they have imposed a strait-
jacket of dichotomous (either–or), sovereignty-related concepts such as auto-
nomy, jurisdiction, control and territoriality.9 The traditional principle of
territorial sovereignty, so long and so widely regarded as the grundnorm of the
Westphalian system of nation-states,10 has been subject to “reduction” within
the United Nations (UN) system since 1945, originally on the basis of over-
riding human development values invoked in the Charter11 and more recently
within the expanding framework of human rights.12 On the other hand, very
few would argue, as a matter of law, that the international community’s
interest in environmental protection gives it an entitlement to intervene in
the territory of a state against the will of the sovereignty-holder, although
some multilateral interventions, as in the case of Kuwait, have been responses
to crises with several dimensions, including the threat of environmental dis-
aster. Yet it can certainly be argued that neighboring states sharing a vulner-
able transboundary ecosystem or migratory range have special responsibilities
to each other, responsibilities that would limit the sovereignty-holder’s auto-
nomy within its own territory.13 The special case for transboundary respons-
ibility might be said to rest on “soft law” obligations to consult, notify,
negotiate and cooperate that necessarily reduce the degree of autonomy inher-
ent in the traditional concept of territorial sovereignty. In certain circum-
stances, such an obligation might take the form of a duty to participate in the
building of a cooperative environmental regime designed to serve protective
or problem-solving purposes.14
In the modern age of environmentalism, which places unprecedented
emphasis on transboundary cooperation, wholly rational ocean management
is virtually inconceivable within the Westphalian framework of sovereign
nation-states. At the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III) ingenious efforts were made to cultivate more equitable statist concepts,
such as “sovereign rights,” that would be free of the rigidities associated
with absolute sovereignty and yet provide the assurance demanded by devel-
oping, and (mostly) newly independent, coastal states that their nation-
building would be assisted by a huge seaward extension of their land
economy without the threat of obstruction by technologically superior
foreign states and enterprises. Indeed the establishment of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone (EEZ) and the re-definition of the continental shelf accom-
plished at UNCLOS III have helped a number of these states to develop
their own national fishing and offshore oil industries, and others to acquire
new sources of revenue from foreign states or enterprises permitted to
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operate in their waters. But the seaward extension of the Westphalian order
at UNCLOS III has failed to achieve an effective system of ocean manage-
ment, as distinct from an equitable system of state entitlement.15
Despite the progress achieved at UNCLOS III in the development of
“functional jurisdiction,” which is intended to de-territorialize the concept
of extended coastal state jurisdiction, it remains difficult to promote the goal
of cooperative ocean management on the foundation of national entitlement
that was solidified at UNCLOS III. Adjustments would have to be made
within the Westphalian framework of state autonomy principles and ana-
logues, through the application of relativist notions such as modified or con-
ditional sovereignty, shared territory, or degrees of authority to the holders
of EEZ and continental shelf entitlements. The future of such relativist con-
cepts is taken seriously by some political scientists, and there are some
historical analogies.16 Yet in retrospect, it seems that the neo-Westphalian
ethic of nation-building that pervaded the UNCLOS III restructuring of the
law of the sea may have raised, rather than lowered, the barriers to inter-
national cooperation in the oceans, overweighting national entitlement at
the price of transnational responsibility. In most countries around the world,
the goal of truly effective national ocean management remains remote, and
will become less so only if the entitled state is prepared to sacrifice some
degree of national autonomy, de facto if not de jure. The “structural dilemma”
is how to persuade sovereignty-holders to comply with globally negotiated
provisions that can be implemented effectively only through resort to
genuinely cooperative ocean management arrangements.
The world community arenas
Since the 1920s, and especially since the creation of the United Nations in
1945, the traditional “transactional” model of international law, based on
(mostly) bilateral inter-state relationships, has been complemented by an
“organizational” model based on a proliferation of intergovernmental agen-
cies. Today we have inherited a myriad of arenas for official interactions and
cooperative initiatives in a wide variety of complex problem contexts. At the
global level, both inside and outside the UN system, these arenas serve
several sectors of ocean management: fishery management and conservation
(the Food and Agricultural Organization – FAO), whaling regulation (Inter-
national Whaling Commission – IWC), vessel-based marine pollution
control (International Maritime Organization – IMO), marine scientific
research (International Oceanographic Commission – IOC), environmental
protection (United Nations Environment Programme – UNEP), and the
prospective regulation of deep ocean mining (International Seabed Authority
– ISA). Noticeably missing is one economically important ocean use sector,
the management of offshore hydrocarbon development, which from its
infancy in the 1930s has remained exclusively within the jurisdiction and
control of coastal states and been permitted a high degree of autonomy.
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It was understood at UNCLOS III that all of these international organi-
zations, and several others, would have a major role in the implementation
of the numerous provisions in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Con-
vention (LOS Convention) that invoke the need for “international coopera-
tion.”17 Indeed it was foreseen that the effectiveness of much of the new
normative system would depend on the potentiality for institutional devel-
opment at the regional as well as the global level. But these tasks of imple-
mentation are enormous.18
The fatal flaw in the Westphalian model of world affairs is the “problem
of difference”: states are very far from equal except in legal fiction. Participa-
tion in international organizations is assumed to be the key to reducing dis-
parities that tend to limit the functionality of cooperative management
regimes. In theory such participation is voluntary; in practice it is virtually
obligatory. Yet, in reality, all of these organizations are sadly deficient in
funds and other resources. Despite the numerous programs and projects
generated at the global level, most developing coastal states are making only
glacial progress toward the Westphalian goal of national autonomy in con-
texts as difficult as ocean management.
Specialists in the sub-discipline of international organization generally
emphasize the limitations inherent in large-scale structures at the global or
macro-regional level – arguably all those structural, hierarchical, political
and financial limitations inherent in all large-scale national government
bureaucracies, overlaid by inter-cultural, strategic and even ideological con-
straints that operate at a high “international community” level.19 Even in
relatively favorable circumstances, where an international organization func-
tions with relatively minor friction and infrequent eruptions over fundamen-
tal issues, the politics of conference diplomacy at the global or
macro-regional level is rarely simple. In most of those organizations devoted
to ocean development and management, the national strategies of the
United States, Western Europe, Japan, and a few other well-endowed
member states, such as Canada and Australia, tend to carry the day more
often than not, but only if they are consistent with one another, as
demonstrated by climate change diplomacy.20 It is by no means certain that
the American electorate will support a US government policy favoring more
generous funding of international organizations than in the past, except
perhaps in situations where the use of these funds is seen to be in line with
US foreign policy. Since the terrorist attacks on the American homeland in
September 2001, the specter of US unilateralism, if not neo-isolationism,
has become a more disturbing threat to the attainment of ambitious global
goals, such as international ocean and environmental management, 
especially if the undertaking is seen to depend on intergovernmental 
organizations.
The dilemma here, the “organizational dilemma,” is whether it is realistic
to adhere to the orthodox UNCLOS III view that international organizations
are central to national efforts to achieve ambitious ocean management goals.
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In the theory of international relations, the “globalization debate” has re-
introduced the question of why states cooperate at all. In the past, utilitari-
ans such as Hobbes, Locke, Madison and Mill regarded institutions as
necessary to provide solutions to problems, because without them chaos
would reign.21 Modern political realists have scant regard for international
institutions, which they consider to have no capacity to enforce compliance,
and therefore no power. For modern institutionalists, on the other hand, the
power of an institution arises not from its capacity to use physical force, but
from the benefits its members derive from participation.22 By this neo-
utilitarian reasoning, international organizations in the field of ocean man-
agement can play a central role only if they are able to generate sufficient
benefits for their members in the form of “mutual gains.”23 The modest scale
of such benefits in that field is a further reminder to governance advocates of
the inadequacy of organizations consisting of state institutions.
Development assistance strategies
The prospect of accelerating progress toward the goal of global ocean gover-
nance might be enhanced if the development assistance agencies, charitable
foundations and other institutions that fund (and often conceptualize) pro-
grams and projects were to assign a higher priority to ocean affairs. But
these institutions are divided over the best way to allocate development
assistance and administer funds. Some development assistance agencies, for
example, are beginning to favor increased allocations to global and regional
funding outlets (e.g. World Bank, the Global Environment Facility – GEF,
favorite UN agencies like the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and
UNICEF, and the regional development banks); others, in a minority,
suggest that trust should be reposed in the supervisory capacities of at least
the more effective and reliable regional political organizations (e.g. the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN, South Pacific Forum, the
Caribbean Community – CARICOM) as vehicles for the delivery of ocean-
related programs and projects within their region.24
It seems to be generally agreed that there is, and ought to be, a gradual
(or not-so-gradual) movement away from the traditional emphasis on direct,
bilateral (donor-to-donee) assistance. It is often argued that this emphasis
made sense only in the era, now passing, when primacy had to be given to
basic infrastructural deficiencies in public works such as housing, hospitals,
roads, bridges, railways and communications. Although these deficiencies
are still severe in many countries, especially in Africa, a growing number of
countries have reached a stage of development where greater weight should
be given to their need for technical and professional expertise in dealing
with problems of great complexity.
Not so long ago much of the funding allocated to “ocean affairs” was still
seen to contribute to the highly developed, relatively homogeneous, though
increasingly cross-disciplinary, field of the “law of the sea.” By the early
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1980s much of that funding, applied to developing regions such as Asia-
Pacific, was justified chiefly by the practical need to provide a forum for
regional law of the sea specialists to meet and discuss their countries’
common problems associated with the implementation of the LOS Conven-
tion.25 But very quickly after the completion of UNCLOS III, law of the sea
issues lost much of their appeal to funding sources,26 and it became increas-
ingly necessary for project proponents to gear their applications for funds to
the training and human resource development requirements of developing
coastal states.27 By the late 1980s the focus was on the more ambitious tasks
of institutional capacity building,28 with special attention to the nurturing
of indigenous institutions.29 Since then, and especially since the 1992 Earth
Summit (the UN Conference on Environment and Development), funding
in “ocean affairs” has often focused on the implementation of such docu-
ments as Agenda 21 framed around ambitious goals such as integrated
coastal zone management.30 In the eye of hard-headed project officers, this
surely represents a weakening of focus, creating administrative problems of
project evaluation that are aggravated by demands for stricter accountabil-
ity.31 Moreover, those responsible for executing ambitiously conceived,
broadly designed, projects find it increasingly difficult to show impressive
results within the normal five-year time frame.
Given the trend to increasingly ambitious objectives, a number of crucial
dilemmas have to be addressed. Is the goal of effective ocean management of
such transcending priority as to justify the increasing use of “leverage” by
such institutions as agents for the “international community”?32 How many
kinds of equal or non-equal partnerships between donors and recipients can
be usefully invented? Would the participation of regional political organi-
zations as “intermediary” between donor and beneficiary be likely to acceler-
ate or delay progress toward the twin international goals of effective and
equitable ocean management? Would conditionality imposed by a regional
organization be more acceptable than that imposed by a global organization?
Is the growing concern with the fact or prospect of climate change the most
reliable means of raising worldwide consciousness of the need for a rational
and equitable use of the oceans? How much will non-governmental organi-
zation (NGO) assistance to developing countries contribute to that objective
without undermining the statist objectives and methods of international
organization?33
Diplomatic options
The foreign policy approach to ocean management does perhaps bring in
some of the brightest and best of those in government service; many with a
flair for flexibility and an internationalist view of the world. The danger has
always been that diplomats, dealing much of their professional lives with
counterparts from other foreign ministries, may bring home an ingenious
and forward-looking text that cannot, however, be “sold” to the managers of
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foreign policy, much less to the managers of the various cognate sectors of
domestic policy. To reduce this risk, international negotiations in complex
situations are increasingly preceded by careful, and often protracted,
“internal diplomacy” at national and sub-national levels. Intra-national con-
sultations often result in the appointment of national delegations composed
of representatives of divergent, but potentially convergent, viewpoints, in
the hope that intra-national compromises can be reached through exposure
to the greater complexity of divergences, and the greater need for compro-
mise, within the international arena.
Perhaps the chief danger in global diplomacy today is the tendency to
generate “over-expectations” through ambitious and ostensibly successful
negotiations. In the specific context of ocean management, idealized goals
such as “integrated coastal or ocean management” set an exciting agenda for
both kinds of diplomacy, intra-national as well as inter-national.34 Selling
such an ambitious, and potentially sophisticated, goal is a stirring challenge
to the art of salesmanship. But the international marketing of this vision
may be resisted by ocean managers of less developed countries who interpret
the new thrust as unduly ambitious, creating educational challenges that
cannot be met by their institutions.
Resistance of this kind might be more easily overcome if the “foreign
policy challenge” is brought down to the regional level. Arguably, the
global goal of integrated ocean or coastal management is a degree less intim-
idating if it becomes the focus of regional diplomacy designed to adapt
global commitments to local conditions and realistic expectations at that
level. Moreover, a regional organization (e.g. ASEAN, the South Pacific
Forum, or CARICOM) may be more likely than individual member states to
be able to engage in successful fundraising outside the region with a view to
initiating research networks, programs and projects designed around glob-
ally approved goals.35
By this argument, the foreign policy approach to ocean management,
begun at the global level, requires follow-up diplomacy at the regional level
in order to make the goals attainable. But it is certainly true that few, if any,
of the existing political organizations at the regional level are capable of
more than the promotion of ocean management goals and priorities in the
region, and perhaps the supervision or coordination of research, training and
other modes of capacity-building among the members. So the “operational
dilemma” is whether it is feasible for regional political organizations to
assume responsibilities for facilitating operational cooperation among its
members in the field of ocean governance.
The “political regions” associated with such organizations rarely, if ever,
correspond with what would be regarded as appropriate units of ocean man-
agement.36 The “ecological imperative” that has had so much impact on
post-UNCLOS thinking about the future of ocean management has fur-
nished a new kind of idealism around the concept of “large marine ecosys-
tems” (LMEs).37 Marine ecologists in particular advocate the need to pursue
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lines of research that would demonstrate both the feasibility and desirability
of cooperative ocean management regimes structured and designed for each
LME.38 However, even the most enthusiastic recognize the range of political,
legal and perhaps even cultural barriers that would have to be circumvented
before the vision of a global system of LME regimes could be realized.
Given these institutional difficulties, it might be more sensible to focus
instead on developing cooperative ocean management arrangements at the
sub-regional level, whereby smaller groupings of neighboring coastal states
would be required to participate in the day-to-day tasks of building and
operating an appropriate regime. The most obvious example of sub-regional
cooperation of this kind would be in semi-enclosed waters, where the neighbor-
ing littoral states have a shared interest in the negotiation, formation and
maintenance of such a regime.39
The role of social institutions
Even with the political energies of intergovernmental organizations, the
resources of international development institutions and the skills of
sophisticated diplomats, state institutions in most developing countries find
the challenges of ocean management to be beyond their capacity. Increas-
ingly they find themselves dependent on the growing array of “civil society”
institutions that offer funds and talents to supplement the resources avail-
able in the public sector. Through the combined contributions of state and
social institutions, in various kinds of coalitions and partnerships or sepa-
rately, it becomes possible to bring much more significant capacities to focus
on the complex tasks of ocean management under the banner of “ocean
governance.”
The involvement of NGOs in international ocean affairs began modestly
at the time of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, the
first of many UN mega-conferences organized for designated fields of
particular complexity.40 The 15-year law-making process of UNCLOS III
presented more technical issues to be grasped and more stubborn diplomatic
hurdles to be circumvented. Yet by the end of the process in 1982, over 100
NGOs had been accredited as observers, and the history of external penetra-
tion of the diplomatic arena had begun. Since then it has become increas-
ingly common for government delegations with ocean management
mandates to be composed of at least a limited number of non-governmental
participants, and the global-level initiatives in ocean-related conference
diplomacy are now frequently accompanied by parallel initiatives on the part
of NGOs.41 With the accessibility of huge amounts of information through
instant electronic communication and the explosion of “civil society” insti-
tutions, the traditional “knowledge gap” between state and social institu-
tions has very nearly disappeared.
The impact of NGOs on the shaping of ocean management is, of course,
particularly evident in the treatment of environmental and resource manage-
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ment issues. Since the end of UNCLOS III, environmental NGOs have
become extraordinarily successful in influencing, or even determining, the
outcome of inter-state ocean-related conferences and meetings in such varied
contexts as whaling, fur seal harvesting, overfishing, by-catch, ocean
dumping, ocean transportation of radioactive and other hazardous materials,
offshore hydrocarbon production, river discharge, marine protected areas,
coastal habitat protection and other aspects of coastal management.42
Despite philosophical, strategic and tactical differences among them, they
all tend to be critical of governmental efforts to deal with such issues. Many
of them are also highly critical of the community of professional marine sci-
entists for its perceived obsession with excessive rigor in quantification,
measurement and prediction. Since these scientists are mostly government-
employed, they are perceived as fatal flaws in the Westphalian system,
tending to delay or obstruct preventive action.43 Frequently, the preference
of environmental NGOs is to substitute prohibitions for regulatory mechan-
isms, which they perceive to be government-driven, amenable to industrial
pressures and intellectually sustained by a tradition of “scientism.”
Above all, the outlook of activist organizations is ethical, in contrast to
the more “neutral” influences of bureaucracy and the modern industrial
economy. The legitimacy of NGO opinion seems to have been conceded in
Article 71 of the UN Charter.44 However, the sheer size and power of the
“transnational ethical community” that now exists has caused alarm and
resentment in many countries, and there is probably no bureaucracy or
extractive or manufacturing industry that feels entirely secure in the face of
this army of dissenters. Resistance to these social pressures takes different
forms, but chiefly it requires diplomats, bureaucrats and industrial represen-
tatives to “discover among themselves a consensus on how to distinguish
reasonable demands from unreasonable ones, realistic from utopian, and
popular from radical, in the hope of separating the moderates from the
extremists.”45
These conflicts reveal a deeply rooted “societal dilemma”: whether state
and social institutions can find an accommodation in the common interest
based on a generally shared perception of what constitutes reasonableness in
public policy. As argued below,46 a struggle for power-sharing of this kind
might be welcomed if it were to result in a wider sharing of responsibilities
for developing a more effective system of guardianship of the world’s oceans.
The proliferation of “soft law” norms and instruments
Over the last two or three decades it has become evident to political scien-
tists and international lawyers that formal, legally binding agreements of
the classical kind that create legal obligations are now outnumbered by a
rapidly growing proliferation of instruments characterized as “informal” or
“non-binding.”47 Moreover, many international instruments, both bilateral
and multilateral, that seem to pass the normal test of what constitutes a
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legally binding agreement contain provisions that are too loosely worded to
possess clear obligatory force. Thus, their binding effect is not much greater,
from a functional point of view, than the content of clearly non-binding or
non-legal instruments.48 Increasingly, the normative language negotiated at
global and even regional levels is, at least partly, in the form of “soft law.”49
In the past, international lawyers have been inclined to view the corpus of
the law of the sea, including especially the LOS Convention, as “hard law” in
its essence. In contrast, much of the newer domain of international environ-
mental law is thought of as evolving juridically from a normative foundation
that consists primarily of “soft law” principles and commitments that gener-
ate political expectations or ethical commitments rather than strictly legal
obligations. But this distinction seems simplistic. Even the LOS Conven-
tion, which is certainly a formally binding treaty in the fullest sense of that
term, contains a lot of generally or loosely worded provisions that seem to
await more specific or more clearly mandatory language in order to qualify
as obligatory and enforceable “hard law.”50 Conversely, many of the prin-
ciples of international environmental law are now quite deeply rooted in
juridical soil, nourished by successive textual incorporations. Moreover – to
pursue the organic metaphor – we are all witnesses to numerous recent
efforts by the diplomatic community to “graft” “hard law” and “soft law”
together in areas of overlap between the law of the sea and international
environmental law. So the new, post-UNCLOS legal framework for inter-
national ocean governance becomes an increasingly miscellaneous mixture of
“hard law” and “soft law.”
A pointer in this direction was provided by the Brundtland Commission,
whose report in 1985 paved the way to endorsement of a number of “prin-
ciples” such as those that address the need for sustainable development, pol-
lution prevention, and precaution and recognize that liability for
environmental damage should be fixed on the polluter.51 But jurists differ on
the juridical status of these norms, and indeed the concept of a “principle”
has a rather broad “penumbra of uncertainty.”52 Despite controversy over its
legal status, the need for precautionary restraint – whether principle, policy
or goal – has been incorporated into several important instruments, both
binding and non-binding, straddling the undemarcated boundary between
the law of the sea and international environmental law.53 Scholars differ also
on whether the European “polluter pays principle” has now passed into cus-
tomary international law, and has thus acquired universally binding effect
on all states.54 Similarly, it is debatable whether the unquestionable need for
environmental sustainability and prevention (or at least reduction) of pollu-
tion generates automatically some kind of responsibility in customary inter-
national law.
So this trend poses the “normative dilemma” of whether such norms at
the center of the “soft,” but gradually “hardening,” environmental law of the
sea should be regarded as imposing operationally binding responsibilities on
state institutions. This question that might seem scholastic has practical
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implications not only for national governments, which drive the West-
phalian system, but also for social institutions now challenging the system’s
legitimacy.
Order versus anarchy in ocean management
Underlying this set of institutional dilemmas is a serious concern that our
institutions do not have, and may not acquire, the necessary will or capacity
to deal effectively with the complex problems and expensive tasks of inter-
national ocean management. At the national level, state institutions with
the coercive capacity to bring “order” into the field of national ocean man-
agement rarely display a determination to do so. Normally, national govern-
ments are reflectors of sovereignty sentiment, striving for “autonomy” and
usually reluctant to yield to the need for operationally effective regimes of
cooperative ocean management with neighboring and other states. At the
international level, intergovernmental organizations have the will to assist
member governments with ocean management problems, to the extent it
falls within their mandate to do so, but are chronically underfunded and
understaffed. Most of the more affluent donor states display an unwilling-
ness to increase their international development contributions in a field such
as ocean management, perhaps because its technical complexity limits its
political attractiveness. Modern conference diplomacy is quite impressively
creative, perhaps more so than ever before, but chiefly at the global level, far
removed from the regional and sub-regional levels at which it may be realis-
tic to develop effective cooperative ocean management regimes or more
modest arrangements.
The best hope may be that the rising awareness of the “sustainability
crisis” in ocean affairs is convincing more and more governing elites of the
urgent necessity for collaboration with responsible social institutions, and
with ocean industries and coastal communities. Yet, even armed by the
latest technologies of worldwide communication, the “transnational ethical
community” is likely to remain highly heterogeneous in a field as difficult as
ocean management. Even though they are becoming more influential on
governing elites in many countries, INGOs (international non-governmental
organizations) will continue to lack coercive power so as to ensure appropri-
ate official action, even if a consensus could emerge on such a requirement.
The problem of reducing the “anarchy” of international society is com-
pounded by the mixture of “hard law” and “soft law” norms, instruments,
institutions and expectations in the evolving environmental law of the sea.
On the one hand, a “softer” or more relativist normativity in global ocean
governance seems to be contributing to the formation of “apparent consen-
sus” reflected in a wider range of (mostly unthreatening) instruments and
commitments. On the other hand, the soft–hard mixture of negotiated texts
creates confusion over the “musts” and “oughts” of ocean governance and
over the limits of attainability.
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International law has always been on the cusp between idealism, in one
form or another, and a practical understanding of reality of one kind or
another. It has survived down the ages because all elites have agreed on the
need for maintaining such a balance, and nothing else can take its place.
Many of the new, bold, visionary principles of the environmental law of the
sea are derived from the tradition of legal idealism. “Ah,” we might exclaim
with Browning, “But a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, Or what’s a
heaven for?” Yet the realist, looking out, sees the challenge as a thousand
tiny steps.
Ethical dilemmas
Elitism, participatory democracy and the quest for consensus
In the scientific literature, it is generally assumed, idealistically, that effect-
ive ocean management must be “rational,” and to that extent must be con-
trolled – or at least strongly influenced – by the scientific community. In
short, it is assumed that hope for effective ocean management rests with the
appropriate scientific elite, or with an intellectual elite whose nucleus resides
in the marine science community. Ethical dilemmas in international ocean
governance might, therefore, be said to begin with the alleged inevitability
of elitism in modern society.
In the history of liberal democratic theory, the utilitarians, led by Jeremy
Bentham and James Mill, argued for a “protective” brand of democracy in
response to the perceived reality of a threatening mass of politically ignorant
or apathetic citizens.55 This model of democracy was soon to be challenged
by John Stuart Mill’s more optimistic “moral vision” of human improve-
ment, which according to one well-known analysis gave rise to the model of
“developmental democracy.”56 The apparent failure of this second model
during the totalitarian challenges of the 1930s brought a more somber
theory of “equilibrium democracy” that was dependent on a kind of enlight-
ened elitism designed to balance out claims to general interest within a plu-
ralistic framework of political interactions.57 By the 1960s, however, an
alternative model of “participatory democracy” had begun to evolve,
responding to some successes in employees’ shareholding and workers’
control arrangements in certain sectors of industry, but also coinciding with
the idea that there should be substantial citizen participation in governmen-
tal decision making.58 Most today are likely to agree “the hope of a more
participatory society and system of government has come to stay.”59
In a context as complex as ocean management, it is likely that most spe-
cialists believe that professional expertise is essential to understanding the
problems and issues within their field. Yet these experts will certainly
concede that policy making in virtually all ocean-related sectors must be
“democratic” in some sense. Probably they would begin with the premise
that “elite consensus” is essential for all sophisticated societies, and for
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progress in world community development, especially in an environment
dominated by bureaucracy such as that of ocean management. Nervousness
about the dangers of manipulation by an established “power elite” may
result in the reservation that the latter must be responsive to “the humaniz-
ing force of an intellectual elite.”60 At this point the argument for demo-
cracy in public policy formation turns on the question of how far to support
a broadening of the concept of the elite whose consensus is necessary to
humanize bureaucratic decision making without risking the civic chaos or
anarchy that might arise from “mass participation.”
Since the “transformational decade” of the 1960s, it has become common
among political theorists and ethicists to support experiments in participa-
tory democracy that center not on the participation of the people or the ordin-
ary citizen, but on that of minority elites.61 In general, participatory
democracy, in contrast to representative (or parliamentary) democracy, is
associated with “those decision-making structures that adhere to basic
democratic procedural norms, such as equality and majority rule, yet tend to
extend equality by some sort of ‘grass roots’ decision-making of an authori-
tative nature.”62 Radical theorists advocate the “self-determination” model of
participatory democracy, whereby “amateurs” pursue lines of political action
independent of those lines followed by “non-amateurs” (i.e. formally trained
experts and regularly elected officials). More moderate theorists, on the other
hand, tend to prescribe the “co-determination” model, which involves coop-
eration between amateurs and non-amateurs.63 Advocates of this second
model of participatory democracy invoke the need for civic goodwill or
responsibility and for the reconciliation of rationality and democracy.64
In the ocean management context, the first ethical dilemma under
contemporary conditions of democracy is how widely to seek for consensus on
issues that have both technical and social components. Political and social
ethicists differ among themselves in the identification of the “enemy” they
are challenging: the bureaucracy, the state, the political establishment, the
military complex, capitalism, industry, the science community, experts in
general or central government seen to reflect the values of the urban middle
class. Yet within the “transnational ethical community,” despite the wide
dispersion of its energies and emotions, there is widespread agreement on
the legitimacy of their challenge to established authority and the institu-
tions seen to support the distrusted status quo, however defined.
Sustainability and the obligation to future generations
In a world seemingly threatened with overpopulation, nothing appears more
likely to win general acceptance than the notion that the finite natural
resources of the planet need to be wisely conserved. Significantly, the conser-
vation movement first surfaced in the final quarter of the nineteenth century,
coinciding with sharply rising levels of human population. Indeed, to the
extent conservationism originated in the fear of overpopulation, it can be
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said to have found its first apostle in Thomas Malthus (1766–1834), who as
early as 1798 published an anonymous pamphlet arguing that population
will always tend to outrun the growth of production, expanding to the limit
of subsistence but checked there by the ravages of famine, disease and
warfare.65
Over the two centuries since that original publication, economists have
been sharply divided over the Malthusian legacy of pessimism. Critics have
found it easy to demonstrate the shallowness of Malthus’ analysis, and his
lack of understanding of the many factors that are now seen to contribute to
economic growth, such as technological innovation, entrepreneurship and
product substitution. Yet in recent times neo-Malthusian environmentalists
such as Lester Brown and Paul Ehrlich have staked their reputations on the
essential correctness of economic “catastrophism.” The fear of impending
planetary catastrophe is shared so widely among so many contemporary
environmentalists (and indeed voters) that resource sustainability is now
accepted by almost all national governments as a goal of the highest prior-
ity. This global priority was set through worldwide adoption of Agenda 21
at the Earth Summit in 1992 and the subsequent establishment of the UN
Commission on Sustainable Development to monitor and guide its imple-
mentation.
On the other hand, there is a great deal of reason to question the claims of
catastrophists and to counter their influence on policy makers. Indeed the
“eco-skeptical” challenge extends to all four of the principal environmental
fears that underlie contemporary environmental ethics: (i) natural resources
are running down; (ii) population is growing out of control; (iii) species are
becoming extinct; and (iv) air and water are increasingly polluted. Since the
publication of The Limits of Growth by the Club of Rome in 1972 a lot of
counter-evidence has been presented. First, energy and other resources have
become more abundant, not less so, over the last 30 years. Second, starvation
is decreasing steadily, as global per capita food production today is higher
than ever before. Third, although many species are indeed threatened with
extinction, only about 0.7 percent of them are expected to disappear in the
next half-century. Fourth, most forms of environmental pollution seem less
severe or more transient than claimed by catastrophists, except global
warming and greenhouse gases, which seem likely to prove to be a serious
long-term phenomenon.66
Moreover, The Limits of Growth has been strongly criticized for its faulty
methodology, its factual distortions and false assumptions. Given the ideo-
logical popularity of catastrophism on the political left, as a weapon to be
used on behalf of the poor against market capitalism, technocracy and the
forces of globalization, it is to be noted that The Limits of Growth has been
the target of leftist as well as rightist critics. On the right, the criticism
stems from belief that economic growth is necessary to end poverty; on the
left from the belief that catastrophism is an expression of pessimism gener-
ated by the contradictions inherent in imperialism.67
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At a more technical level, economists are divided over the usefulness of
the concept of sustainability as a sophisticated tool of economic policy.
Much of the technical debate focuses inevitably on the question of opera-
tionally useful “indicators”: that is, how to measure progress toward such an
elusive goal. To be operationally useful, it is argued by many economists and
biologists, the indicators must be quantifiable.68 In response to this, many
environmentalists question whether it is possible to reconcile the goal of
sustainability with that of economic growth to the extent they represent two
distinct perceptions of human values.69
The ethical dilemma over sustainability turns, then, on value priorities as
much as on factual interpretations. “Weak sustainability,” it might be said,
rests on the perceived value of maintaining economic output and the
lifestyle associated with it, whereas “strong sustainability” gives the ulti-
mate priority to sustaining the “ecosystem services of the natural world.”70
Whereas optimists may still put faith in the possibility of “consilience,” the
integration of disciplines and the paradigmatic values inherent in them, pes-
simists are more likely to conclude that adherents of weak and strong sus-
tainability goals “each have their own specific valuation approach and thus
different ethical perspectives.”71
The ethics of sustainability is buttressed by further considerations. Not
the least of these is the question of obligation to future generations.72 The
issue of intergenerational equity has surfaced not only in the domain of moral
philosophers (or professional ethicists) but also in that of economists and
lawyers. Philosophers with concerns about “environmental justice” are
divided over whether, how and why to distinguish present and future rights.
Some are prepared to defend the rights of the unborn, but others resist this
notion to the extent that the “right to life” seems to limit a pregnant
woman’s freedom of action and to downgrade, if not eliminate, her right to
choose an abortion. It is not obvious why unconceived and unborn genera-
tions, as a future collective, have the right to a healthy environment, as so
often argued,73 while a conceived but unborn fetus, as a potential individual,
has no right to life itself. It seems anomalous, moreover, to assign prece-
dence to collective rights over individual rights, especially in cultures that
traditionally place a premium on the rights of the individual. Discomfort
with this anomaly may displace the focus of debate from the human species
of the present generation to ecosystems that are expected to survive indefin-
itely, but not many will be easily persuaded that an ecosystem’s right to
survive, or to remain undamaged, transcends the rights of the present gener-
ation of humans to a better quality of life, if that is what is promised
through economic growth. To argue that all species, human and non-
human, have the same rights to life, both in the present and future, is surely
logically unsustainable, and impossible to convert into behavioral norms.
Most economists willing to concede the rights of the unborn do so from
the perspective of “weak” sustainability, whereby a development is sustain-
able if it is “non-diminishing from generation to generation.”74 In this way
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economic growth theory translates weak sustainability into intergenerational
equity, whereby a reduction of human welfare is allowed “as long as the level
of consumption exceeds some subsistence level.”75 Lawyers are familiar with
the difficult concept of individual “future interests” in the fields of property
and inheritance, and are becoming accustomed to the recent idea of cross-
generational collective rights in such contexts as that of cultural property. In
international environmental law an elegant case has been made for an oblig-
ation to respect the rights of the unborn to a healthy environment, no less
than the same entitlement of the living human population.76 But it is arbi-
trary to stipulate “how much” of an ecosystem should be protected for the
benefit of future generations. So it has been suggested by environmental
economists that we move away from the future-regarding concept of sustain-
ability to the future-regarding concept of “social bequests,” which puts
emphasis on “what” to leave to our descendants rather than on “how
much.”77
In the context of ocean management, it is the collapse or disappearance of
major commercial fishery stocks that seems to make the strongest case for
the principle of conservation or sustainability. The reservations of “eco-
skeptics” regarding allegedly dwindling world food supplies cannot be
allowed to discount the economic and social distress suffered in many
regions as a result of such problems. The argument for “sustainable fisheries”
has been accepted widely for a long time by conservationists, long before the
coinage of the Rio terminology. Yet it is true, at the least, that the concept
of “sustainable fisheries,” with its ethical connotation, gives fishery manage-
ment priorities a sharper political edge than was possible under the rubric of
the more limited concept of fishery conservation.
Both the FAO’s 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries78 and
the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement79 reflect acceptance by the UN system of
the need for a comprehensive, ecosystem-based approach to sustainable
development. These soft-law and hard-law instruments, respectively, have
stimulated FAO to undertake new and potentially innovative initiatives
such as the development of a “sustainable development reference system”
(SDRS) for fisheries based on specific indicators of sustainability.80 If plans of
action such as the 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU)81 can
achieve operational significance at the national level, credit would have to be
given to the mobilizational influences of the goal of sustainable fisheries.
IUU fishing is believed to account for about one-third of the actual world
fishing catch.82 Moreover, the IPOA-IUU represents, among other things, an
effort to give port states a role in monitoring IUU fishing, so as to reduce
the problem of overdependence on flag states to enforce their fishery treaty
obligations.83
It might be supposed, then, that the emphasis on sustainable fisheries is
bound to be progressive. But it remains to be seen how successful the Code
of Conduct and the Fish Stocks Agreement will be in operation.84 The
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ecosystem-based approach to fishery management associated with both of
these instruments has its critics. Diplomatic efforts at the global level to
advocate a LME approach to fishery management have run into difficulties
because of its perceived threat both to coastal state authority within the
limits of the EEZ and to international high seas fishery commissions with
management responsibilities immediately adjacent to such limits.85 In short,
ecosystem-based fishery management may prove to be unworkable because
of recently extended institutional investment in “politically defined” ocean
spaces.86
Obligation to nature
Of the intellectual and political developments of the 1970s, one of the most
significant was the rise of environmental ethics, arguably derived from the
earlier work of Aldo Leopold and his conception of “land ethics.”87 Prior to
the 1970s, nature conservation and the extent of human responsibility for
the preservation of ecological balance were largely the concerns of human-
ists, biologists and certain nature-nurturing religions, sects and tribes.88 The
preparations for the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment
might be regarded as the first globally organized effort in the diplomatic
arena to articulate the need for a world community ethic in support of the
environment, conceived as embracing the entire spectrum of species and
habitat areas: the “biosphere” or “ecosphere.”89 Today nothing receives more
attention as a potential “world ethic” than environmentalism, with its
imperatives purporting to transcend all cultures, societies, economic systems
and political regimes.
At the heart of environmentalism is the deeply felt sentiment or convic-
tion – held as a matter of faith as much as reason – that, above all, humans
have a fundamental obligation to “nature.” When feelings run so deep,
intellectual and political issues assume a spiritual dimension. In the new age
of globalization, prevailing views based on environmental ethics could
become as “transformational” as any widespread beliefs that have arisen from
the history of religions.
Understandably, huge dilemmas emerge over questions of moral philo-
sophy regarding the extent of human responsibility for nature. Before the
modern era, most moral philosophers shared the view that humanity is the
moral center of the universe. Only a small minority were prepared to chal-
lenge the predominant opinion that humans are of exclusive or overriding
moral significance. But there is now a rapidly growing literature on ques-
tions concerning the existence and nature of values in the non-human
natural world.90
For professional environmental ethicists, the minimal position is that we
all have environmental responsibilities, not only to one another, and to our
children and grandchildren, but to all succeeding human generations every-
where, beyond the limits of our family, community and nation. From this
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minimalist perspective, it is conceded to be essential we develop a profound
understanding of nature – of all species and ecological relationships – so as
not to underestimate the impact of the human presence on the biosphere and
thereby jeopardize the welfare of future human generations at projected
demographic levels. But this position might be construed as anthropocen-
tric, restricted by the vision of foreseeable future human needs: long-range
sustainability to serve projected human interests.
Today many environmental ethicists believe that this minimal position is
insufficient. Indeed some “deep ecology” spiritualists seem prepared to go
quite far toward the extreme ideal of equality among all species that make
up the ecosphere.91 Yet most of the philosophic debate focuses on how to
draw lines between “moderate” and “immoderate” claims. For example, can
we distinguish “interaction” with nature from “interference” with nature?92
Is “interference” necessarily non-beneficial to non-human components of
nature? If not every component of the natural environment has an absolute
“right to life,” as maintained by some deep ecology theorists, how can
humans make morally acceptable distinctions? Condemned to a relativist
position, those seeking the middle ground may have to accept that public
policy on obligation-to-nature issues will have to fluctuate uncomfortably
between two competing, and essentially incompatible, value systems: the
ethical and the institutional.
Such dilemmas are increasingly likely to be political rather than scientific
or philosophical in nature, and public policy on such matters will rarely be
entirely ethical. Yet in the context of ocean management, environmental
politics has brought an ethical dimension to many issues that might other-
wise have been regarded as technical or managerial problems. Nowhere has
the obligation-to-nature ethic been more insistent than in the international
politics of whaling and the harvesting of other marine mammals.93 The
extraordinary success of the anti-whaling and anti-sealing movements is well
documented, and many pragmatists, who would personally prefer further
experimentation with regulatory measures based on scientific evidence, are
almost ready to acquiesce in the prohibitory approach through moratoria or
otherwise, although the latter seems inappropriate in the case of “stocks”
that are not seriously threatened.94 Whales, dolphins and similar creatures
attract so much human affection, perhaps as kindred species, that they have
become beneficiaries of the animal rights movement.95 Few, however, are
prepared to cross the line and argue that all other marine species, including
commercial stocks of fish, should be extended the same right to life. At the
present stage of human development it is difficult to envisage a collective
decision to forego ocean-based sources of animal protein. The primacy of
human need is evident in most ethical systems, and only a small, though
growing, minority are strict vegetarians.
Moderate ethicists, shunning absolutist concepts such as the “right to
life” of all species, are unlikely to yield to it when it creates a threat to a
supply of universally accepted human food, such as fish. But more difficult
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dilemmas arise when the non-human species has a limited consumptive
appeal, as in the case of whales and seals, which are either a traditional food
in certain aboriginal communities or a luxury food in certain affluent soci-
eties.96 Ethicists strongly opposed to the hunting and eating of such species
– as distinguished from conservationists concerned with resource sustain-
ability – often have to contend with competing ethical considerations
focused on such value concepts as cultural diversity, aboriginal prerogative
and communal or local entitlement. Such ethical dilemmas have to be con-
fronted in the diplomatic arena, and increasingly in arenas penetrated, or
even “hi-jacked,” by non-governmental participants representing civil
society institutions.97 So the taking of sides on these substantive issues is
often influenced, if not determined, by how strongly one feels about the pro-
cedural or institutional implications of such “intrusions” or “participatory
interventions.”
Supporters of the obligation-to-nature ethic are likely to attract allies
more easily over issues arising from “non-consumptive” uses of the ocean
and its resources. Like the sport hunting (as distinct from conservationist
culling) of foxes and grizzly bears on land,98 the sport fishing of salmon and
the sport hunting of polar bears and other marine mammals may seem more
difficult to justify, although to most observers the issue of animal cruelty
seems quite different in the case of salmon. In many ocean-side communit-
ies, sport fishing is a fairly important branch of the tourism industry, and
coastal community development policy must take economic considerations
into account. Similarly, in many other contexts of coastal recreation and
tourism, public policy must accommodate economic interests without sacri-
ficing the universally approved goal of marine biodiversity.99
Despite the general preference for moderate rather than immoderate
public policy on obligation-to-nature issues, there is no doubting the
growing intensity of minority sentiment in various contexts. At least in cir-
cumstances where there is evidence of animal cruelty, prohibition rather
than regulation seems to be increasingly favored by a majority. Yet even in
these cases it is clear that such concerns have not yet been reflected in public
policy outside a limited number of (mostly Western) societies, and questions
must be asked about the ethnocentric tendency of these countries to attempt
to impose their cultural values on others.
Equity in ocean governance
Broad as the range of ethical issues in ocean governance is seen to be under
the obligation-to-nature rubric, the range is further expanded if we incorpo-
rate the many correctives that have been advocated and negotiated in the
arena of ocean diplomacy. The need for equity as well as effectiveness in
ocean law, policy and management has been recognized since the late 1960s.
An equitable redistribution of global wealth derivable from the ocean was at
the heart of Arvid Pardo’s vision for a new ocean order that resulted in the
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UN decision to launch the UNCLOS III process of radical reform. Equitable
correctives agreed upon at the conference include (among others):
1 the extension of coastal state jurisdiction, perceived as protection for
vulnerable developing coastal states;
2 the common heritage ethic reflected in the International Seabed Author-
ity (ISA), intended as a cooperative global system for generating rev-
enues from deep ocean mining that would be allocated among the most
deserving states on a need basis;
3 provisions for the transfer of ocean-based technologies from developed to
developing economies; and
4 recognition of the special entitlements of landlocked and other geo-
graphically disadvantaged states.
However, in practice relatively little benefit has accrued to the intended
beneficiaries from these and other correctives. The extension of coastal state
jurisdiction has allowed many developing coastal states to develop their
own, relatively viable, fishing industries, but most developing coastal states
still lack the capacity to take advantage of their legal entitlements. The ISA
was substantially weakened through the post-UNCLOS III “revisions” nego-
tiated in the early 1990s,100 and in any event the postponement of hopes for
deep ocean mining has delayed the intended result of wealth redistribution
under the common heritage regime. The technology transfer provisions have
remained in place, but seem to have little, if any, operational vitality in an
age dominated by market-driven ideologies such as the intellectual property
movement supported by transnational corporations. Similarly, the rights
vested in the world’s 40 or more landlocked (and other geographically disad-
vantaged) countries have not yet been translated into the kind of beneficial
cooperative arrangements envisaged in the LOS Convention.101 In short,
UNCLOS III has very largely failed to correct the inequities inherent in the
inter-state system of ocean use and management.
In response, the Brundtland Commission placed an emphasis on the need
for ocean equity in Chapter 17 of its Agenda 21; and more recently the
Independent World Commission on the Oceans has addressed the same need
with greater firmness.102 In light of these two reports, priority should be
given to a number of equity issues, of which the following five in particular
might be singled out.
Geographically disadvantaged countries
The dilemma of how to implement the UNCLOS III provisions in favor of
landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states is institutional in
nature. Even if this grouping is limited to the truly landlocked, there is no
forum in existence, or in prospect, where these problems can be discussed on
the basis of shared interest. It may be unrealistic to expect the elites of these
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countries, with so little expertise in ocean affairs, to mount an effective
collective strategy for attracting the world community’s attention to this
issue of neglect.103 Moreover, many of the new landlocked countries, for-
merly republics of the Soviet Union, have much more exciting possibilities
of economic development through the production of their land-based hydro-
carbon resources.
Small, developing island states
By contrast, this grouping of resource-deficient countries has an extremely
high degree of ocean awareness and their new jurisdictional entitlements as a
result of UNCLOS III, covering vast ocean spaces, have motivated a fairly
vigorous diplomatic campaign before and after the Rio Summit of 1992.104
Despite the lack of any provisions specifically directed at these states in the
LOS Convention, several conferences have been organized and proposals
developed on their behalf. Needless to say, the capacity-building problem
for these semi-viable economies is paramount.
Coastal communities
Outside the inter-state framework of UNCLOS III, various equity issues can
be articulated at the sub-national level of society. Coastal populations in
most countries are peripheral to the power centers of central government
and to the wealth centers of the corporate community, and often subject to
the threat of natural disasters. In some nations, strong efforts have been
made to involve local community institutions in “community-based coastal
management” or “co-management” (or other multi-level approaches) to
coastal management. Yet the equity argument for local engagement in such
arrangements adds to the institutional complexity of the concept of integ-
rated ocean (or coastal) management. Instead of replacing the politics of
central government, local community participation often compounds the
politicization process by contributing a further layer of political conflict.105
Traditional fishing communities
In most parts of the world, the pressure on fish stocks is intensified by the
economically efficient but environmentally destructive methods of industrial
fishing. These capital-intensive technologies are deployed mostly within
corporate structures that are controlled outside the local community and
designed essentially to maximize profits rather than to sustain the local
economy and maintain its traditional lifestyle. Conservation measures taken
by central governments in response to the phenomenon of industrial over-
fishing often result in prohibitions or strict regulations that cause distress in
fishing communities that are almost totally dependent on traditional stocks
and yet may have had only a minor role in causing the problem.106
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Indigenous coastal fishing communities
All of these problems tend to be compounded when the local coastal
community consists mostly of an indigenous people that is not strongly
represented in state institutions and forms a minority with real or perceived
grievances against the dominant ethnic sector of the population. Efforts to
address the grievances of indigenous peoples and to promote the principle of
aboriginal rights at the world community level resulted in the 1994 Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, but government resistance
to such claims of special entitlement, in the form of independence, sover-
eignty, or self-government, is widespread. Yet at the national level, espe-
cially in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, public
policy is evolving in support of traditional fishing rights of indigenous
coastal fishing communities.107 Also encouraging is the effort to develop
“indigenous ecotourism,” but here too both institutional and ethical dilem-
mas have to be confronted.108
The precautionary controversy
No account can be given of the ethical dilemmas of international ocean gov-
ernance without some discussion of the long-running controversy over the
“precautionary principle.” The idea behind this concept can be considered a
reaction to the perceived failures of conservationism based on scientific evid-
ence and of ineffective regulatory regimes. Accordingly, for many propo-
nents, the core meaning of the principle is the radical idea of a need to shift
the burden of proof: from proof of unacceptable risk on the part of the
accuser to that of minimal or tolerable risk on the part of the accused, the
would-be-polluter.
However, the more extreme, onus-shifting formulations introduced at
global conferences have encountered resistance, not only by developing
countries concerned with their potential impact on economic growth, but
also by the United States and other non-European developed countries.
Invariably, the need to secure consensus in global negotiations has produced
less stringent formulations. In some cases, the norm is characterized as an
“approach,” or “concept,” not as a “principle,” with a view to defeating the
argument that the norm carries a binding obligation in international law. In
other cases, the term “principle” may be permitted, but the formulation
omits the reversal of onus of proof, which has caused particular consternation
in the scientific community. In still others, of course, the legal impact of the
terminology is reduced by reason of the non-binding nature of the instru-
ment in question. Because of the diversity of terminology in global instru-
ments, it has become difficult to demonstrate that any particular
formulation has become established through state practice as a principle of
customary international law.
As a result of this variance, it might be argued that the precautionary
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concept – not to beg the question – is at present an ethical norm that is still
evolving in the world community, where deference must be made to the fact
of economic disparity and the legitimacy of cultural diversity. The dilemma,
which is at least partly ethical, is whether there is a “core” within the pre-
cautionary norm, an “essential” component that can be said to be an
accepted part of world environmental ethic.
Ethics versus autonomy in ocean management
Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of international ocean affairs today is
the struggle between the transnational ethical community and the inter-
state system. In the sectors discussed above, a sense of ethical commitment,
held particularly strongly outside government service, is having an increas-
ingly profound effect on governmental and intergovernmental decision
making, threatening the statist tradition of national autonomy. Essentially,
it is a struggle between ethical commitment and political legitimacy.
Virtually all ethical elements in international ocean governance come to
the field through the global arena, where ethical principles and constructs
are negotiated as important provisions of instruments, both binding and
non-binding. Now, more than ever, the conventional international law of
the ocean, in this expanded sense, represents a synthesis of the new idealism
that is being brought to the arena in the form of ethical prescriptions and
the pragmatism that has always resided there. Realistic expectations of the
outcomes of international ocean diplomacy – and perhaps other “ethicized”
sectors of international relations – require a balancing between the prescrip-
tions contained in the negotiated texts and the various limiting factors and
considerations that can be assessed only by contextual analysis.
These limiting factors and considerations, which may, but usually do not,
become textually explicit, arise from a variety of economic, political, cul-
tural, geographical and historical realities and perceptions that make up the
milieu of international diplomacy. In the case of most ambitious global
instruments, the milieu tends to reduce the real significance of the outcomes
of conference diplomacy. Reluctance to implement or comply typically finds
expression in invocations to sovereignty, sovereign rights and other modes of
national prerogative. The classic dilemma of our age is how to reconcile the
ethical imperatives produced in the diplomatic arena with the national enti-
tlements still associated with the concept of national autonomy.
Conceptual dilemmas
“Sovereignty of science” tradition
Historically, the first sector of ocean management to evolve was fishery man-
agement, which has its roots in the 1880s, when North European zoologists
and statisticians first came together to provide a scientific foundation for
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international efforts to regulate the fishing of overexploited stocks in the
North Sea and adjacent waters. The next step was the formation in 1901 of
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) to serve as a
forum for the exchange and discussion of data. ICES is still the principal
forum for such purposes despite the emergence elsewhere of other organi-
zations in the field of ocean science, both at the global (e.g. the International
Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO) and the regional level (e.g. the
North Pacific Marine Science Organization – PICES, which serves as a coun-
terpart to ICES for the North Pacific).109
For well over 100 years, then, a tradition has been building that places
applied ocean science at the center of efforts to regulate ocean activities as
rationally as possible, ideally within a framework of regulatory measures
that can be adjusted periodically in light of updated research findings.
Between the early 1920s, when the first international fishery commission of
this kind was brought into existence, and the late 1950s, which saw the
arrival of numerous FAO fishery commissions,110 there was little doubt
about the sovereign status of science. By then numerous international agree-
ments contained language calling for the best available scientific knowledge
as the rationale for regulating fishing and whaling. In the case of most
Western countries, these instruments represented an extension of the “sover-
eignty of science” tradition in ocean affairs reflected in their domestic policy
and legislation. Moreover, by the early 1960s this tradition was beginning
to be exported from the fishery sector to marine pollution prevention and
control and, of course, habitat protection and the protection of endangered
species. In every sector of ocean management where a regulatory approach
was seen to be the key to the control of overuse or misuse, the marine science
community was given a pivotal role. Indeed, in some countries the scientific
community has been the chief influence on the design of ocean management
mechanisms.
The public policy dilemma is how much it is appropriate to expend on
ocean science conceived as the essential foundation of ocean management. It
would seem obvious that effective ocean management or governance depends
on the availability of reliable information about the ocean: its structures,
movements, organisms and processes. But the immensity of three-dimen-
sional ocean space poses an enormous challenge to the scientific community,
consisting as it does of 320 million cubic miles of water covering 140
million square miles of sea floor that encompasses seven-tenths of the surface
area of Earth. Moreover, oceanography is a fairly recent convergence of four
distinct fields of science: marine geology, ocean physics, marine chemistry
and marine biology. The first systematic effort to integrate the scientific
exploration of the ocean was as recent as the 1870s, when HMS Challenger
embarked on its famous four-year voyage, the first truly global oceano-
graphic expedition. Since then a great deal has been learnt about the ocean,
the seabed and subsoil; and yet the marine sciences have only begun to
scratch the surface.111
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Despite its newness as a “master discipline,” oceanography quickly
became an important presence in the scientific community. Perhaps because
of the exciting nature of so many of their discoveries in the deep, oceanogra-
phers acquired a rather prestigious status in the eyes of the general public.
Compared with other “basic sciences,” the field of marine science could be
presented rather easily as an area of popular interest. Its obvious importance
as a focus of research ensured a steady supply of public funds, and even now
its total endowment may be second only to space science. The scale of public
funds made available for ocean science has created expectations that the
scientific-bureaucratic elite could bring rationality into the elusive “science”
of ocean management, and even into the highly political domain of “marine
policy.”
Competing orders of rationality
The “sovereignty of science” tradition began to encounter challenges in the
late 1950s. In the fishery sector, the first generation of fishery regulatory
bodies had been governed by biological constructs, the most famous being
the goal of “maximum sustainable yield.” With the entry of economists into
the field of fishery management and the introduction of such goals as “net
economic yield,” concepts of biological rationality had to compete with
those of economic rationality.112 Just as there seemed to be some hope for
reconciliation between the two disciplines in the late 1960s, it became
increasingly obvious that in practice, in the management of most major
commercial fisheries, social and political realities (including commercial and
economic development interests) were trumping both the biological and
economic orders of rationality. Both the biologists and the economists were
able to agree on pinning the blame for serious stock depletion on the
problem of overcapacity, and on the need for limiting severely the right of
entry. But successful examples of dramatic stock recovery due to strict entry
controls are still relatively few. In many countries around the world, the
normal situation is for fisheries to be managed, or more precisely misman-
aged, chiefly on the basis of social and political “realities.”
It can perhaps be argued that placing social and political considerations at
the center of ocean management – or of any kind of management – is hardly
“irrational.” The concept of management applied to the ocean, or any other
“natural” domain, is, after all, somewhat vague. The ocean itself, in its
boundless vastness, cannot be managed; only users and institutions that
impinge upon it. By this reasoning “ocean governance” is essentially an
effort to provide a system of incentives and disincentives, backed up by an
array of positive and negative sanctions, with a view to the larger, land-
based purposes of social and economic development, limited but not con-
trolled by “scientific realities” and “economic constraints.” The most
dramatic way of making this point is by noting that in Canada the total cost
of fishery management is said to exceed the total revenue produced by the
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Canadian fishing industry, a paradox explainable only by reference to the
overriding social and political need to maintain peripheral coastal
communities that cannot develop an alternative local economy.113 So the
“dilemma of rationality” is how to choose among these competing orders.
Lawyers – or, more properly, lawyer-diplomats – have also played a role
in the competition among different orders of rationality in ocean manage-
ment. By restructuring the law of the sea framework at UNCLOS III, the
diplomatic community created the concept that coastal states have legal
entitlements that cannot be abridged by reference to the traditional free-
doms of the high seas. These coastal entitlements do not depend upon the
coastal state’s capacity or willingness to discharge its international
responsibilities for the protection of the marine environment within its
greatly extended limits of jurisdiction. So, in that sense, UNCLOS III
created an ethos of coastal entitlement that is sufficiently robust to support
the notion that a sophisticated level of effectiveness might eventually
become attainable in the rational management of coastal waters.
The coastal zone management movement
The “goal concept” of comprehensive, cross-sectoral ocean management was
conceived in the womb of the United States Marine Council, which was
established in the early 1960s in response to constant prodding by Vice-
President Hubert Humphrey.114 One of the Council’s first acts was to engage
a blue-ribbon task force, the Stratton Commission, to study the need for a
comprehensive cross-sectoral approach to the management of the ocean.
Some emphasis was placed on offshore areas that had become areas of special
interest to the United States since the famous Truman Proclamations of
1945, which revolutionized the concept of coastal state entitlement and
responsibility far beyond the traditionally narrow belt of territorial waters.115
The result of the Commission’s work was Our Nation and the Sea (1969), a
“visionary four-volume study describing all aspects of US interests in the
oceans, complete with recommendations for policies and strategies for carry-
ing them out.”116 Pre-eminent among the Commission’s prescriptions was
its call for federal government leadership in the establishment of a “coastal
zone” around the territories of the United States, an area of overlap at the
interface between the land and the ocean.
Although the area conceived by the Stratton Commission was narrowly
defined, its concept of “coastal zone management” (CZM) carried the seed of
modern thinking about techniques of coordinated management required in
coastal areas, which are notorious for the multiplicity of agencies with
related responsibilities. In short, the Stratton Commission provided the
cradle for the nurturing of the modern (or “post-modern”) concept of “integ-
rated coastal management.” The intellectual influence of Our Nation and the
Sea was enormous, extending throughout most of the world, although few
countries succeeded in matching the institutional energy expended in the
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United States on the implementation of this overarching strategy of intra-
governmental coordination.117
Despite inevitable disappointments in certain regions of the United States,
most observers concede the relative success of the CZM experiment.118 Yet
those most skeptical about the attainability of the goals of integrated coastal or
ocean management might feel entitled to blame this institutionally ambitious
American model for the global trend to overly ambitious goals of ocean man-
agement and the associated risk of over-expectation.
The proliferation of “governing constructs”
Since the promulgation of the US Coastal Zone Management Act, we have
become witness to an extraordinary proliferation of concepts in the field of
ocean and coastal management. Most of these concepts might be regarded as
available to guide, or even govern, decisions on the scope, focus, rationale or
technique of ocean management.
Spatial constructs
These concepts are designed to serve legal or general administrative pur-
poses. Some are of long standing, but many are new or redefined products of
the global diplomatic arena. The most obvious examples are:
• Internal waters
• Archipelagic waters
• Coastal management zones
• Ports, harbors, roadsteads
• Territorial seas
• Bays (historic and non-historic)
• International straits
• Exclusive economic zones
• Enclosed or semi-enclosed waters
• Ice-covered waters
• Continental shelf (as legally defined)
• Regional seas
• International sea-floor (“International Area”)
• High seas
Most of these 14 constructs define, or at least suggest, the scope of water
areas that could be designated for ocean research, planning, regulation, mon-
itoring, enforcement or other ocean management purposes. Even the high
seas, the most extensive of all, has been used as the referent for certain kinds
of management arrangements. Most are internationally defined legal regimes
designed to serve general or multiple administrative purposes, suggestive of
scope rather than focus.
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Focal constructs
Like the foregoing, focal constructs are mostly areal in conception. But, by
contrast with spatial constructs, these are created in order to focus national
or sub-national administrative controls or regulatory arrangements on spe-
cific problems. They can be broken down into at least 13 categories:
• Wetlands
• Functional inshore zones
• Functional coastal zones
• Functional contiguous zones
• Specific types of fisheries (e.g. anadromous species, catadromous species,
straddling stocks, high migratory species)
• Endangered or threatened species (e.g. marine mammals)
• Specific habitat areas
• Marine protected areas (e.g. marine parks)
• Special protected areas (under Art. 211 of UNCLOS)
• Particularly sensitive areas
• Functional offshore zones
• Large marine ecosystems
• Zones of peace (or non-nuclear zones)
These are all examples of actual or potential units of specific research,
planning, management, regulation or policy application. The area in each
category is determined by the nature of the problem for which it is desig-
nated, and it tends to be unifunctional in its rationale.
Choices among these focal constructs, as alternative levels of ocean plan-
ning and management, have to be made chiefly at the national level. In the
case of Canada, for example, the choice cannot be made entirely by any one
national agency. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) envisages
the establishment of “ecosystem-based management” objectives at the level
of Large Ocean Management Areas (LOMAs), within which “integrated
management” plans of various scales would be “nested.”119 However, it is
recognized that the “identification of areas of interest for marine protected
areas (MPAs), to be established by the Government of Canada” includes not
only MPAs under the Oceans Act, which is administered by DFO, but also
Marine Conservation Areas under Heritage Canada and Marine Wildlife
Sanctuaries under Environment Canada.120 The overlapping of agency man-
dates underline the virtue of “integrated management,” but also the great
difficulty of achieving such a goal.
Normative constructs
Unlike the spatial and focal constructs, normative concepts are non-areal,
having a geographically general, if not universal, relevance. Essentially, they
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provide guidance for more specific goal setting or priority ordering in ocean
management. The most familiar, and perhaps most influential on the devel-
opment of ocean governance thinking, are six in number:
• Sustainability in ocean use
• Common heritage
• Integrated ocean/coastal management
• Biodiversity conservation
• Ecosystem management
• Precautionary principle or approach
Each of these goal concepts is “value-laden” and has its own relatively
controversial history. Each might be conceded, even by its advocates, to be
ambitious, or even idealistic, exhibiting its own order of rationality and
ethic. Their practicality depends not least on how they are applied in rela-
tion to the spatial and focal constructs.
Most of these normative constructs are reflected in the language of
national legislation around the world. In the case of Canada, chief emphasis
is placed by DFO on the goal of integrated ocean management, but it is to
be “guided” by seven “principles,” including three of those listed above: (i)
ecosystem-based management, (ii) sustainable development and (iii) the pre-
cautionary approach (in a modified, “erring on the side of caution,” formula-
tion). The four other principles are: (iv) conservation, (v) duty in shared
responsibility, (vi) flexibility and (vii) inclusiveness.121 Overall, primacy
seems to be given to sustainable development, integrated management and
the precautionary approach.122
Technical constructs
Within these frameworks of spatial, focal and normative constructs, there
has emerged a host of ideas that represent alternative “techniques” of ocean
management. It may be sufficient to list 14, although it would be possible
to add many more, or break these approaches down into more specific cat-
egories:
• Data collection and synthesis
• Statistical analysis
• Population dynamics (e.g. maximum or optimum sustainable yield)
• Regulation of ocean activities
• Prohibition of certain ocean activities
• Biomass monitoring
• Community-based management
• Co-management of coastal waters
• Adaptive management
• Conflict resolution
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• Sea use planning
• Regime building
• Climate change research and monitoring
• “Trade-and” linkage strategy
Like most taxonomies, this system of classification can be criticized on
the ground that certain constructs could be included under two, if not three,
of these headings. For example, the prohibition of certain ocean activities
could be seen as the product of ethic as much as technique, and thus classifi-
able as normative. The same might be said for community-based manage-
ment, conflict resolution and “trade-and” strategy. But the utilitarian test is
whether all these constructs deserve to be distinguished with a view to the
need for greater conceptual clarity.
The greening and glossing of UNCLOS
Since the end of UNCLOS III in 1982, there has been a steady succession of
new global instruments with an oceanic orientation. Some of these instru-
ments are orthodox, legally binding instruments of “treaty character;” others
are legal in form but possessing provisions or norms of a “soft law” nature;
and others again are not legal instruments in form yet have a fundamental
“legal policy” significance – arguably a significance that seems to endow
them with a potential legal effect that may be realized over a period of
normative development. At the end of UNCLOS III the delegations were
close to “burn out” after 15 exhausting years of immersion in ocean law and
policy issues of unprecedented complexity. Collective fatigue ruled out any
decision making on an intergovernmental apparatus that would be man-
dated to monitor subsequent treaty or related developments that might
affect the interpretation and application of the LOS Convention’s numerous,
and often open-ended, provisions.
In the absence of a mechanism to provide studies and recommendations
on changes taking place in the law of the sea, and especially in the environ-
mental law of the sea, it has fallen to the “invisible college” of academic
international lawyers to supply insights into the implications of this “green-
ing” of the law of the sea. Those who are uncomfortable with the prospect of
a plethora of unofficial, scholarly glosses of a “sacred text” such as UNCLOS
may have to consider the alternative of finding a politically acceptable mode
of “revision.”
The LOS Convention itself provides for amendments through three distinct
procedures under Articles 312–14.123 In addition, Article 155 of the original
text provided for a review conference to review Part XI on the International
Area, but this provision has been transcended, or rendered virtually “dead-
letter,” by the replacement language of the 1994 Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982.124 This new language is much more flexible than what
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it replaced, leaving it to the discretion of the Assembly of the International
Sea-Bed Authority whether this review should be conducted formally
through a conference of the kind originally prescribed in Article 155, or in a
less formal manner.
The 1994 instrument cited above is officially characterized as an “imple-
mentation agreement,” but functions to serve the purpose of revision. The
1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks125 seems more appropriately
described, although its addition of much more specific responsibilities
might seem to carry out the function of revision beyond the original lan-
guage of commitment. Moreover, there are other ways of “revising” existing
treaties without resorting to the difficult and time-consuming diplomacy
associated with formal amendment, and without resorting to the tried and
politically proven, if juridically dubious, practice of “revision” through sub-
sequent “implementation” agreements. Given the fundamental or constitu-
tive nature of the LOS Convention, it might be suggested that at least part
of the “revisionary” process could be executed through a group of non-
official experts meeting in “scientific” or “quasi-glossatory” mode, by
analogy with those scholars who compiled the influential Harvard Draft in
the inter-war period.126
Conceptual balance in international ocean governance
The critical conceptual dilemma in contemporary ocean management lies in
the selection or creation of a generally convincing frame of reference that is
both progressive and realistic. Such a balanced framework would have to
satisfy the following criteria of acceptability.
First, the LOS Convention retains “quasi-constitutional” status, especially
on jurisdictional matters pertaining to the allocation of states’ basic rights
and obligations, and yet must be treated as a “living constitution” open to
re-interpretation, development and revision in accordance with important
changes in the mores of international society.
Second, there is no single “truth” in the conceptual apparatus of inter-
national ocean governance. The closest to a normative construct of universal
validity is the first-order requirement that ocean uses must be as consistent
as possible with the goal of sustainability. Sadly, the truth is that there is a
compelling need to “breathe life and content into the notion of ‘sustainabil-
ity’ to make it into a fundamental norm of the world ocean regime for the
21st century.”127 The other principal normative constructs (integrated
ocean/coastal management, common heritage, biodiversity conservation,
precaution and ecosystem management) are important, but not overarching,
in the manner of sustainability. Their weight should be determined through
contextual analysis and political interaction. For example, the principle of
common heritage should continue to be applied to secure the goal of
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common benefit outside established limits of national jurisdiction, but
interpreted restrictively inside these limits; otherwise the nation-building
work of UNCLOS III would be undermined.128 Ecosystem and biodiversity
approaches to ocean management should be encouraged as innovative experi-
ments in ocean science, where resources permit, and tested out as a foundation
of ocean management operations in selected ocean areas and sectors, where
appropriate institutional capacities are in place. Integrated ocean/coastal
management likewise is experimental, deserving a special effort to raise the
bar in intra-governmental collaboration, and also in cooperation between
state and society. Precaution is generally accepted as a sensible guide to dis-
courage overuse or misuse of ocean resources, but should not itself be
overused or misused as a policy to justify the underuse of ocean resources or
as an unduly costly burden on responsible use. The co-existence of various,
incompatible formulations of the precautionary principle underlines the
need to subject issues of how to apply that principle to the increasingly rig-
orous techniques of risk analysis.
Third, debates between science and ethics in ocean governance at the
level of abstraction should be avoided since they encourage prejudgments
and over-generalizations, generating heat rather than light. As rival
“drivers” of international ocean governance, they have a political significance
in the global context of inter-state disparities. Science, though inherently a
difficult and expensive business, is culturally and politically neutral, to a
large extent, whereas the dominance of ethics might put the cause of global
ocean governance in jeopardy, seeming more attractive to cost-conscious
affluent economies. The respective merits of science and ethics, when in col-
lision, are best evaluated within the context of specific public policy issues,
such as inshore versus offshore fishing policy, coastal pollution and tourism
development, alternative ocean energy policy, offshore hydrocarbon develop-
ment, the transportation and storage of ultra-hazardous wastes, and the reg-
ulation of land-based activities that contribute to contamination of the
marine environment.129
Scope versus focus in ocean management
The proliferation of “governing constructs” in international ocean gover-
nance will make it very difficult to bring back the age when science was vir-
tually sovereign in ocean management. The competition among different
orders of rationality in the fishery management sector has spread to other
sectors of ocean use. This kind of intellectual competition puts a public
policy premium on breadth of vision rather than on depth of technical
knowledge. The dilemma is how much “rigor” it may be safe to sacrifice in
order to gain the highest possible level of “sophistication.” Each of these
manifestations of intellectual bias may be regarded as potentially harmful as
a fully “rational” foundation of ocean management unless corrected by the
other, equally legitimate, bias.
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The search for intellectual balance between these biases is never-ending,
fluctuating in its outcome from one context to the next. It would be unfor-
tunate for the searchers for balance if mechanisms such as the Joint Group of
Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection
(GESAMP) were to be dismantled for the lack of financial support. As
matters now stand, it is difficult enough for funding agencies to understand
the debates within the ocean-related disciplines and to make choices
between “rigorous” and “sophisticated” proposals.
In recent years, the premises of marine ecology have become increasingly
saleable. After enduring many years of resistance on the part of more “rigor-
ous” disciplines (or siblings) within the oceanography family, marine ecolo-
gists have begun to win important “pro-scope” battles in the shaping of
marine scientific research. With the prospect of NEPTUNE and other major
oceanography programs based on the latest and highest technology, there is
likely to be a very different kind of cross-disciplinary research methodology
in oceanography that promises to yield results of a “sophisticated” kind
without a damaging loss of “rigor.” For example, from a scientific research
(program design) perspective, the LME approach might make a great deal of
sense, reflecting a balance between rigor and sophistication.
The difficulty is, however, that what makes intellectual sense as a unit of
sophisticated scientific research does not necessarily make operational sense
as a unit of international governance, regulation or management. Other
things being equal, a smaller grouping of neighboring coastal states is more
likely to be induced to participate effectively in cooperative ocean manage-
ment, at the sub-regional level, than a larger grouping of states urged to
cooperate at the LME level. The paradox is that the “scope” approach in the
case of science and the “focus” approach in the case of institutional develop-
ment are equally “rational,” belonging to quite different orders of ration-
ality.
The challenges
The regime-building role in ocean governance
In the present age of history we tend to emphasize the legitimacy of the
global conference arena and to place our confidence in its outcomes: global
prescriptions and institutions. As a result we have inherited a plethora of
universally negotiated principles, concepts, goals, techniques and proce-
dures. They are all well-intentioned, but the ocean management “frame-
work” that has emerged from the global arena consists of highly disparate
components, and analysis of the world “milieu” reveals an abundance of
institutional, ethical and conceptual dilemmas.
In light of these dilemmas, the best prospect for progress toward effective
ocean management seems to reside with bolder experiments in the formation
and maintenance of maritime regimes.130 By stressing the practical
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importance of international regimes in ocean governance, we have the best
chance of circumventing at least some of these theoretical debates over the
institutional, ethical and conceptual issues reviewed above.
The apparent advantages of the regime-building approach are at least six
in number:
1 The sub-global level of diplomacy required for regional regime-building
purposes reduces consensus-building difficulties. Smaller groupings can
select from the global stock of ocean management principles, concepts,
goals, techniques and procedures, choosing those that are found most
appropriate for the target region.
2 The fear of Western impositions perceived to influence the outcomes of the
global arena is unlikely to frustrate the formation of non-Western
regional regimes. Admittedly it might be feared that Western funding
in support of non-Western regimes may not be forthcoming for such
regimes that are seen by Western observers to depart too radically from
Western-favored outcomes of global diplomacy, but this may be a
healthy fear that would work to achieve a balance between global ortho-
doxy and regional variation.
3 Regional maritime regimes can be designed specifically around the
political, economic, geographical, oceanographic, social and cultural
realities of the region they are intended to serve. Globally conceived
“models” may still have suggestive value, but regional groupings should
be encouraged to rely upon their own knowledge, experience and judg-
ment.
4 Regionally negotiated regimes should generate a higher degree of commit-
ment to the goals and principles of ocean management on the part of par-
ticipating governments than they display in response to the outcomes of
global diplomacy. Such evidence of serious regional or sub-regional
commitment should have the effect of attracting substantial external
support for ocean management programs of operational importance in
the target region.
5 Regional regimes are essentially experiments and can be adjusted, as sub-
sequent experience may dictate, much more easily than the outcomes of
global conference diplomacy. For example, the initial version of such a
regime may be tentative on matters of political or cultural sensitivity
such as the role of non-governmental institutions, but become bolder as
experience demonstrates the net benefits of a broader, societal, “gover-
nance” approach that would involve partnerships between “track-one”
and “track-two” participants.
6 Developing coastal and island states will see the building and mainte-
nance of regional ocean regimes as relatively low-cost kinds of intergovern-
mental interaction, compared with global interactions. The smaller the
grouping, the more economically feasible it will be to integrate the
domains of ocean diplomats and ocean managers.131
382 Douglas M. Johnston
The effectiveness of maritime regimes
There is, of course, a large and constantly growing literature on inter-
national regimes. Recent studies concentrate less on their structure and
process than on their apparent effectiveness. The most rigorous effort so far
to confront theory with evidence has produced some interesting insights.132
First, the researchers, concentrating chiefly on 15 case studies of environ-
mental regimes, distinguish between two kinds of effects that can be com-
pared for evaluative purposes: behavioral and functional. Behavioral effects
(“outcomes”) are revealed in changes in behavioral patterns, especially
bureaucratic actions and interactions at national and regional levels. Func-
tional effects (“impacts”) are revealed in longer-term changes beyond human
behavior, which in the case of environmental regimes means changes in the
sector of the natural environment targeted by the regime. Second, this study
shows, on the whole, a higher degree of effectiveness achieved by reference to
behavioral effects than by reference to functional effects.133 Third, much of
the work is devoted to the various factors that contribute to regime effec-
tiveness, and the regimes studied are distributed under three classifications:
effective regimes, mixed-performance regimes and ineffective regimes. Three
of the ocean-related regimes studied are judged to be effective (North Sea
dumping,134 ocean dumping of low-level radioactive wastes135 and tuna
management in the West Central and Southwest Pacific);136 four ocean-
related regimes are judged ineffective (the Mediterranean Action Plan,137 oil
pollution from ships at sea,138 the International Whaling Commission139 and
CCAMLR);140 and two are classified in the intermediate mixed-performance
category (land-based marine pollution in the North Sea141 and the manage-
ment of high-seas salmon in the North Pacific).142
The conclusions reached by these authors are important, and deserve to be
summarized:
1 Most of the regimes studied have succeeded in changing “actor behav-
ior” in the directions intended. Regimes engaged in activities beyond
mere standard setting – devoted to functions such as planning and
implementation – tend to be more effective than those not so
engaged.143
2 Even those regimes that achieve significant results have modest begin-
nings. New mechanisms need time and experimentation to find an
appropriate mode of operation. The initial difficulties tend to be the
most difficult to overcome.144
3 Most regimes fail to solve the problems they were designed to solve, and
often fail by a wide margin. Nearly 60 percent of the cases studied
scored low in terms of functional or problem-solving effectiveness.
Moreover a fair degree of effectiveness is not at all the same thing as effi-
ciency.145
4 Failure to deal effectively with substantive problems may, however, be
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accompanied by success in the development of problem-solving capac-
ity. Effective capacity-building measures may be expected to lead even-
tually to effective problem-solving measures. So, in the face of
intractable substantive difficulties, the regime builders may be wise to
focus their energies initially on the building of institutional and indi-
vidual capacities.146
5 Entrepreneurial leadership is important in the design, development and
implementation of international regimes. Leadership often needs to be
cultivated through interaction within and between governments, dele-
gations, transnational networks and small groups. Sometimes informal
leadership is more important than the leadership provided by secretari-
ats and delegates appointed to chair conferences and committees.147
6 Power may be overestimated as a factor in determining regime effective-
ness. The evidence suggests that power is more potent in bringing
about behavioral change than in promoting the common good, and at
worst may be counter-productive in dealing with problems that are
“politically benign.”148
Levels of approach to maritime regime building
There are three principal levels of sub-global international regimes within
the context of ocean management: the regional sea level, the LME level and
the sub-regional (or neighborhood) level.
In its first two decades (1975–95), the UNEP Regional Seas Programme
received acclaim from most observers. What seemed impressive was its inno-
vativeness and good intentions, and its foundation on the concept of
common interest in “shared waters,” which appeared to promise a collective
willingness to cooperate. Now, however, much of the original optimism
invested in the Programme has declined, if not evaporated. Many have
wished to believe that at least the prototype designed for the Mediterranean
has been relatively effective, but the recent re-evaluation of the Mediter-
ranean Action Plan scores it low as “ineffective.”149 Most of the success
achieved in that region is attributed to the action of international bodies
such as the European Community, not to the Plan itself.150 Some advocate
the need to revitalize the Regional Seas Programme on the ground that the
conceptual framework exists, but it may be the wrong framework.
Much more recently, several initiatives have been taken to experiment in
ocean regime building at the large marine ecosystem level. The LME
approach has been institutionalized in the Southern Ocean,151 and there are
LME advocates for institutional experiments elsewhere. As an approach to
scientific program development, the LME level has much to commend it.
Arguably only at this level can hopes for innovative, systematic, cross-
disciplinary “consilience” be realized. But the case for creating operationally
viable ocean management regimes (as distinct from scientific programs)
based on LMEs still has to be made. Diplomatic and bureaucratic energies
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and priorities focus very sharply on sovereign territories and national waters.
There is very little evidence of governmental willingness to ignore man-
made national boundaries in the sea, except in situations where the prospect
of joint development opportunity transcends the normal preference for
national autonomy. The larger the LME, the less likely it provides a realistic
platform for effective ocean regimes.
Of the three approaches, the sub-regional level may be the most likely to
support effective ocean regimes. Admittedly the scale of such endeavors is
only one factor out of many, and almost certainly not the most important.
Regime effectiveness turns on numerous variables that seem only indirectly
related, if at all, to the geographical scale of the regime. But, other things
being equal, a relatively small area of “neighborhood” waters seems the best
candidate as a unit of cooperative ocean management, particularly if the co-
users are only three or four in number.152 The experience in the Gulf of
Thailand, facilitated by the Southeast Asian Programme in Ocean Law,
Policy and Management (SEAPOL), suggests that regime building on the
part of previously uncooperative littoral states (viz Cambodia, Malaysia,
Thailand and Vietnam) may become effective at least in the behavioral sense.
Moreover, neighborhood waters such as the Gulf of Thailand may often
qualify as semi-enclosed waters, where the littoral states “should” or “shall”
cooperate in accordance with Article 123 of the LOS Convention.
Types of maritime regimes
Because the word “environment” tends to be all-encompassing, the literature
on international regimes gives the impression that almost all regimes are
environmental in nature. For the sake of greater clarity, it would be useful to
apply criteria to the task of classification. Environmental terminology has
become emotive in effect, both attracting and repelling at the same time.
Regime classification should not be difficult, since all regimes, by definition,
are functional settlements and arrangements.
It may be sufficient to suggest the existence of a growing family of inter-
national maritime regimes: some wholly environmental in purpose, some partly
environmental, and some non-environmental. In a recent article on the future
of the Arctic Ocean, five possible categories are distinguished: (i) law of the sea
Arctic regimes, (ii) Arctic environmental regimes, (iii) integrated Arctic sus-
tainable development regimes, (iv) Arctic science regimes and (v) strategic
regimes.153 Given the limitations inherent in the Arctic Ocean, it seems
unlikely that other oceans would not benefit from an even wider range of cat-
egories and sub-categories of functionally defined international regimes.154
Conclusions
Our present era has been characterized as “an age of absurd expectations.”
Those of us in the ambitious field of international ocean governance may be
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wise to take stock of the dangers of “overexpectation.” The above reflections
give cause surely for a degree of pessimism, guarded against the dangers of
despair. At least, it can do nothing but good to be clear about the impedi-
ments to significant progress and the different kinds of faith that must be
embraced.
The institutional dilemmas discussed in this essay are difficult, but pos-
sible, to deal with. Some advances in cooperative ocean management (e.g. in
the sector of high seas fishery management) will require, sooner or later,
revisions of the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention. It will require a
huge diplomatic effort to capture anything close to worldwide consensus on
the necessary revisions within an inter-state system that still depends upon
the consent of sovereignty-holders. The problem of treaty implementation
will remain severe in most regions of the world as long as the basic tasks of
capacity building receive inadequate support from the major sources of
international development assistance. Even more urgently, the sustainability
of fish stocks within the limits of national jurisdiction, which account for
over 90 percent of protein ocean food captured in the wild, looks like an
impossible goal in the absence of substantial investment in fishery educa-
tion, at all levels of sophistication. Yet there is some evidence that the issue
of ocean food security is beginning to receive closer attention outside the
technical communities. Non-state institutions can play a crucial role in pro-
moting realistic change on the part of state institutions through constructive
partnerships. There are some encouraging examples of harmonious partner-
ships between track-one and track-two institutions in the context of inter-
national ocean governance, as indeed reflected in the success of ACORN.
Moreover, we might be carefully optimistic that intergovernmental organi-
zations like FAO now recognize the utility of proceeding jointly with hard-
law and soft-law instruments instead of feeling an obligation always to
choose between them.
The problem with ethical dilemmas is that ethicists are notoriously diffi-
cult to satisfy with compromises. It is difficult to see a convergence between
the two distinct cultures that seem to make up the community of ocean
management specialists. The ecological/ethical perspective on ocean affairs,
which is justified by the interconnectedness of environmental concerns, has
had a significant impact on the politics of marine affairs, especially in the
more highly developed countries. Above all, the “transnational ethical
community” has attracted more financial support for its “lobbying” purposes
than the other culture, which might be characterized as reflecting a “tech-
nical” or “sectoral” perspective. Specialists in ocean science and technology
sectors, by their own admission, are not usually adept in lobbying. They
may be disadvantaged by the rigorous, quantitative nature of their own
training and the relativist, comparativist cast of their judgment. It is not
always easy to transact compromise judgments with those of another culture
endowed with “moral clarity”! However, the pressures of the policy-making
arena create the need for constant experiments in accommodation. Lawyers –
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the merchants in words – are likely to find themselves increasingly engaged
in supplying mediational language for articulating international commit-
ments, even at the cost of precision.
The conceptual dilemmas arise from the problem of oversupply. The multi-
plicity of ways of characterizing the complex problems of ocean management
arises chiefly from the number of disciplines that are needed to bring exten-
sive “sophistication” as well as intensive “rigor” to the field. The best way of
obtaining a balance among different kinds of expertise would be by invest-
ing more public resources in the development of specialized, graduate-level,
university courses in marine affairs. Such interdisciplinary courses already
exist in a few Western universities, but they are too few in number to
produce the degree of educational roundedness that is so badly needed
around the world in the crucial arena of ocean management. Educational
correctives are unlikely to be found until we can all collaborate effectively in
raising the public and political levels of maritime consciousness.
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16 Principled oceans governance
agendas
Lessons learned and future challenges
David L. VanderZwaag and Donald R. Rothwell
Introduction
This volume has addressed principled oceans governance from the perspect-
ive of two large coastal states that, during the past decade, have actively
engaged in domestic, regional and international ocean governance agendas.
It would be wrong to think that between them Australia and Canada can set
the international ocean governance agenda, though they have certainly
attempted to influence that agenda both regionally and globally.1 What can
be said is that a review of the Australian and Canadian experiences assists in
understanding the “lessons learned” from both their successes and failures.
Given the vast extent of their respective maritime domains, these lessons
have application for nearly all coastal states seeking to engage in an oceans
governance process. In addition, because of their distinctive political and
constitutional dynamics, it is possible to identify particular challenges not
only for other federations, but also for States which have complex and multi-
layered domestic governance structures. In this final chapter a brief review
will be undertaken to identify the lessons learned from Australian/Canadian
experiences, before turning to assess the challenges at the global, regional
and national levels.
Lessons learned
Perhaps the most significant of all the lessons to be learned from the Aus-
tralian and Canadian experiences is that there is no single model for opera-
tionalizing oceans governance at the national level. How each state
approaches marine use issues will very much depend on its legal, cultural,
political, social and economic context. Australia and Canada have taken dis-
tinctive approaches to national ocean governance with no commonality in
the legal and policy frameworks or in bureaucratic structures. A range of
challenges has been faced including bureaucratic, constitutional, inter-gov-
ernmental, political, institutional and structural. Both countries continue to
face legislative and regulatory fragmentation at not only the national level
but also at the provincial and state levels. This only serves to highlight an
important general lesson: the adoption of a national oceans statute or a
national oceans policy does not ensure that a country will actually get its
“oceans act” together.
There is common ground in the Australian/Canadian responses to com-
pliance and enforcement strategies. Reflective of their federal systems, central
administration and management is the norm with some devolution of author-
ity to provincial and state authorities. An increased emphasis upon maritime
security and cooperation with neighbors, which for Canada is a particular
challenge given the concerns of the United States, is also a common feature.
Specific lessons can be drawn from implementation experiences for each of
the main principles emphasized in this volume. For integrated coastal/ocean
management at least four instructive realities stand out. First, development
of integrated management plans is not a “quick process” but involves
numerous steps including the need to:
• identify existing and proposed ocean uses;
• assess marine resource distributions and ecosystem relationships;
• engage affected interests;
• get endorsement of the plan by planning participants and decision-
making authorities; and
• ensure implementation of the plan through monitoring and evaluation.
After nearly eight years of implementation efforts under its Oceans Act,
Canada has yet to finalize a plan for the initial Large Ocean Management
Areas (LOMAs) chosen.2 Australia has only completed one regional plan, the
South-East Regional Marine Plan.
Second, defining management planning areas may be an “iterative
process.” Countries have to start somewhere, and rather restrictive bound-
aries may be initially chosen to allow practical launching of the integrated
planning process. For example, Canada’s Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated
Management (ESSIM) Initiative3 has focused planning on marine areas
outside the territorial sea4 and has not adopted a large marine ecosystem
approach. It has excluded areas of the Western Scotian Shelf including
numerous transboundary management challenges involving fish stocks and
other living marine resources shared with the United States.5
A third lesson from Australian and Canadian integrated planning experi-
ences is that a federated system of governance certainly does  complicate and
even call into question the eventual effectiveness of  planning exercises.
Neither Canada nor Australia has ensured the “buy in” by provinces or
states, for example through financial incentives to encourage provincial/state
coastal planning initiatives or a guarantee that federal permitting powers
will be exercised consistent with provincial/state planning priorities. Off-
shore claims by First Nations add a further complication in some areas.
In Canada, an especially complex layering of jurisdictional accommoda-
tions seems likely to evolve in relation to integrated coastal/ocean planning.
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In September 2004, Canada entered into the first federal/provincial memo-
randum of understanding for the implementation of Canada’s Oceans Strategy.
The Canada-British Columbia Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
Respecting the Implementation of Canada’s Oceans Strategy on the Pacific
Coast pledges the development of further sub-agreements including on
implementation measures for coastal planning and integrated oceans man-
agement planning.6 The Government of Canada has noted its intent to
explore similar MOUs with other jurisdictions.7 Canada’s Oceans Action
Plan, receiving an initial budget of CDN$28 million over two years, has as
one of its four pillars a commitment to expand integrated management and
federal–provincial partnerships.8
A fourth learning dimension in relation to integrated management is the
common Australian and Canadian collaborative approach to planning. Both
States have opted, at least initially, for leaving integrated management plan
implementation to existing permitting and authorization processes for the
various sectoral areas, such as fisheries and oil and gas exploration/exploita-
tion.9 The cooperative implementation experiences promise to be test cases
for how far various departments and agencies will be willing to use their
powers and resources to achieve plan objectives.10
The precautionary principle/approach has been a driver for oceans gover-
nance reform for both Australia and Canada. As strong supporters of the
Stockholm and Rio processes and associated principles underpinning
environmental management in the law of the sea, plus having relatively
sophisticated environmental law and management regimes, both countries
have a track record of giving effect to precaution in various forms.
However, while the record superficially is impressive, it is clear there has
been much “wading and wandering in tricky currents.” This seems to have
been as a result of variable political will, economic and social pressures,
bureaucratic inadequacies, and judicial reluctance to fully engage with the
principles.11
Other than adapting a strong “reverse listing” approach to ocean
dumping where only wastes on a “safe list” may be considered for disposal at
sea,12 both countries have favored quite weak versions of precaution. For
example, Australia’s Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act
1999 (EPBC) adopts a rather diluted form of precaution.13 Canada’s Frame-
work for the Application of Precaution in Science-based Decision Making about
Risk14 avoids suggesting a burden of proof reversal to development propo-
nents and does not discuss possible standards of proof. Instead, the Frame-
work favors trade and economic agendas and suggests that precaution should
only be triggered upon an adequate risk assessment.15
Judicial considerations of the precautionary principle in Australia and
Canada are still quite limited and the content of the principle and implica-
tions for administrative review remains largely to be determined.16 Compli-
cating the interpretive context are the ongoing differences of opinions
among academic writers as to whether the precautionary principle provides
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little or no guidance,17 or whether the principle is in fact clear and powerful,
for example, calling for the reversal in the legal burden of proof.18
Further lessons to be learned in relation to precaution can be drawn from
the field of fisheries management. Australia stands out as an example of how
environmental assessment can be applied to fisheries as provided in the pro-
gressive EPBC Act. Canada’s discussions of the precautionary approach as
applied to fisheries show how there may be a tendency for managers and sci-
entists to get caught up with a “quantification mentality” of trying to model
fisheries reference points for healthy zones, cautious zones and critical zones.
Broader law and policy implications of precaution may be ignored or mar-
ginalized, such as the need to develop environmentally friendly fishing gears
and techniques and the need to ensure a network of marine protected areas.19
While Australia and Canada have committed to promoting ecosystem-
based management,20 both countries are facing difficult implementation
challenges that are common around the globe. How to measure marine
ecosystem integrity and health is still being debated,21 along with what
should be the most appropriate objectives and indicators.22 Lack of sufficient
funding for marine ecological research continues to be a concern.23 Lack of
scientific data and understanding of marine environments has been openly
acknowledged.24 Limited knowledge in relation to marine species at risk is
becoming an especially pressing problem in light of the need to ensure that
survival and recovery of endangered/threatened species are not jeopardized.25
There is also the challenge of fostering understanding among scientists
and managers that ecosystem-based management does not just hinge upon
inputs from the natural sciences. Conserving ecosystem integrity and ecosys-
tem health are, indeed, emerging as dominant concepts in the humanities
and social sciences.26
Both Australia and Canada have experimented with community-based
and co-management arrangements from other countries, and various cau-
tions emerge from the experiences. Use of terms like “community-based
management,” “co-management” and “community consultation” should be
carefully distinguished to avoid suspicion and cynicism on the part of the
communities. The term “community” should also be used with care in light
of the numerous interests that may make up a community beyond the
narrow fisheries sector. Effective community involvement requires adequate
institutional and financial bases and government departments need to be
sensitive to downloading governance responsibilities upon what may 
be over-stretched communities.27 Modernizing national legislation may also
be needed in order to provide an adequate legal foundation for the establish-
ment of community-based and co-management arrangements.28
One of the great challenges for both countries is their response to
indigenous rights in the coastal and oceans context, and both commonalities
and significant distinctions between Australian and Canadian approaches
have emerged. In Australia, there is no real recognition of marine native
title, and whilst the oceans policy process has sought to engage indigenous
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communities, the success of those approaches seems to have been marginal at
best.29 In Canada, roles of First Nations in oceans management and planning
have been only partly defined (in relation to fish and wildlife) pursuant to
existing treaties or agreements.30 While Canada has constitutionally
entrenched aboriginal rights31 in contrast to Australia,32 Canada has likewise
taken a position to denying aboriginal title to ocean spaces.33 Neither
country has fully worked out the spectrum of possible indigenous rights
including the possible human right to environmental quality for indigenous
peoples.34
Overall the Australian and Canadian approaches at national oceans gover-
nance can be labeled a partial success to date. During their first decade
significant advances have been made. However, both countries remain at the
early stage of the process and there are challenges still to be confronted.
Future international challenges
The Australian and Canadian experiences have undoubtedly been influential
in international oceans governance. As two of the largest coastal States with
complex jurisdictional and varied marine environments, there was sure to be
significant interest in how they tackled oceans governance. Because of the
interactions of their respective marine ecosystems, there was also going to be
attention given to how they addressed the complex web of bilateral issues
raised in seeking to manage “joint” maritime areas whether it be the Tasman
Sea, Torres Strait,35 the Gulf of Maine, Georgia Basin/Puget Sound,36 or the
Arctic Ocean.37 In addition, because of their presence and role on the global
stage – Australia as a principal supporter of the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) framework and initiatives
for high seas ecosystem management, and Canada as a major player in moves
to reform international fisheries and also global environmental management
– there was inevitably going to be interest in their domestic oceans gover-
nance experiments and global implications. The regional and global agenda
for principled oceans governance is therefore one which Australia and
Canada have already been shaping through their own national agendas and
proactively influencing through their diplomacy and initiatives at both
regional and global forums.
Regionally, both countries have been active supporters of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which, in addition to hosting annual
leader’s summits, has a range of forums involving ministers and government
officials. APEC has had a strong marine focus over the past decade and
several working groups have actively addressed a range of marine environ-
mental issues ranging from fisheries, resources conservation and transport.
Both countries have played an active role in several of these working groups
promoting domestic oceans and coastal governance arrangements, including
the protection of marine biodiversity and promotion of marine protected
areas.38 The Department of Environment and Heritage (Australia) and Fish-
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eries and Ocean Canada have been the principal agencies pursuing this
agenda with ministerial support. Working in collaboration with other
APEC members, Australia and Canada were able to win endorsement for the
adoption of the Seoul Oceans Declaration at the 2002 APEC Ocean-Related
Ministerial Meeting.39
At the global level, in addition to their ongoing engagement with a range
of multilateral fora with a marine environmental focus,40 the processes estab-
lished under the framework of the LOS Convention have also given Australia
and Canada additional opportunities to promote global oceans governance.
The work of the United Nations Informal Consultative Process on Oceans
and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS) in particular has proven to be an
important avenue for individual and collective Australian/Canadian concerns
to be expressed over enhanced cooperation and coordination on oceans issues,
fisheries governance, mechanisms to combat illegal, unregulated and unre-
ported (IUU) fishing, and sustainable uses of the oceans including conserva-
tion and management of biological diversity.41 Australia has been
particularly active in this area, having sponsored meetings on high seas bio-
diversity conservation and the deep sea.42
What then are the key international issues for the future? One is the need
for a more integrated legal framework that encompasses the key concepts
and principles and provides the “tools” for principled oceans governance at
the regional and global level. The LOS Convention provides a sound founda-
tion for the legal framework, but it contains several weaknesses reflective of
its 1970s roots and insufficiently incorporates contemporary principles of
oceans governance. In particular, the Convention’s Part XII environmental
framework fails to develop fully principles of marine environmental manage-
ment that were beginning to be recognized in the 1970s following the
Stockholm Conference and which have gained further acceptance following
the 1992 Rio Conference. Likewise, whilst the fisheries management provi-
sions of the Convention concerning the EEZ, high seas, and straddling and
highly migratory stocks have all been subjects of further development, the
overarching framework of the Convention now seems to be somewhat
lacking in how it seeks to balance sustainable resource and environmental
management. It could be argued, then, that the time has truly come for a
“Constitution of the Oceans”43 which builds upon the legal framework of the
LOS Convention and takes into account the parallel developments in integ-
rated and principled oceans governance arising from environmental law and
policy, international human rights law and policy, and, increasingly, inter-
national security law and policy. Whilst such a proposal is not new, it is
inevitably greeted with wearied dismissal from those who remember the
battles associated with the LOS Convention. It is, however, a proposal with
increasing force as states take oceans governance to new levels of sophistic-
ated integration not imagined during the 1970s.
Management of the high seas also poses a particular challenge. As coastal
state claims extend further offshore, the area of “true high seas” gradually
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diminishes, resulting in further competition for increasingly scarce
resources. Whilst there is at least a regime in place for the management of
the deep sea-bed,44 the same cannot be said for the living resources and asso-
ciated ecosystems of the high seas.45 Global high seas fisheries management
is one of the last true gaps in the law of the sea, and whilst mechanisms are
gradually emerging to manage these fisheries, the enforcement of these new
regimes will remain a challenge for some considerable time to come. Here
international oceans governance runs up against a range of other regimes,
including international trade regimes as managed by the World Trade
Organization and long-established principles of maritime law, including the
rights of a “flag state.”46 Canada’s long-standing efforts to confront the issue
of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks has brought some success in
tackling this high seas issue following the adoption of the 1995 UN Fish
Stocks Agreement, whilst Australia’s initiatives through bodies such as
UNICPOLOS have further raised the profile of high seas biodiversity conser-
vation. Whilst these are welcome developments, much more remains to be
achieved before the high seas are sustainably managed.
Related to high seas governance is the challenge and potential of regional
oceans governance. At one level this presents as an opportunity. Several of
the world’s oceans and seas already fall under a form of regional manage-
ment, some of which are relatively sophisticated and reflect high levels of
interaction and cooperation amongst the states parties.47 However, the forms
of regionalized oceans governance structures vary and environmental consid-
erations are not always paramount.48 Whilst it is possible therefore to point
to the apparent success of some forms of regional oceans governance –
including the broad Asia Pacific initiatives of APEC49 – these successes seem
to mask the reality where notwithstanding very strong regional interests and
apparent institutional structures, success is not always guaranteed. Regional
oceans governance, as both Australia and Canada have discovered from their
own experiences, provides not only opportunities but also presents consider-
able challenges, not the least of which is the size of the ecosystem but also
the weakness of the legal frameworks.50
A further agenda item is the speedy resolution of outstanding maritime
claims. The new law of the sea created by the LOS Convention was esti-
mated to create a need for the resolution of more than 350 maritime bound-
aries.51 In more than two decades since the Convention’s conclusion, there
has been insignificant resolution of the vast majority of maritime boundary
disputes, although new ones have emerged,52 or are in the process of emerg-
ing.53 Oceans governance will succeed in a maritime environment free of
tensions over sovereignty and based upon principles of cooperation, not
competition. It is therefore essential that as many contested maritime claims
as possible be settled expeditiously so as to avoid rising political and mili-
tary tension.54 Some disputes remain intractable and incapable of speedy res-
olution,55 others are more straightforward and their finalization would
greatly assist in moving forward some bilateral oceans management issues.56
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Closely related to maritime boundaries is maritime security.57 In the
wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks upon the United States, there has been a
global upsurge of initiatives responding to international terrorism. A
number of these have had a maritime perspective,58 including the amend-
ment or adjustment of existing legal frameworks and new responses such as
the 2003 “Proliferation Security Initiative” that has been promoted by
several leading maritime states, including Australia.59 Whilst national
responses are clearly important, regional and global responses remain essen-
tial in addressing the security threat posed by terrorist organizations and the
shipment of hazardous cargoes such as weapons of mass destruction. Here a
philosophical challenge must be faced. The law and policy of international
oceans governance has been predominately founded upon “the peaceful uses
of the seas and oceans”60 consistent with the original Grotian vision of the
sea as being free for all to use.61 Maritime security initiatives, however, have
inevitably placed constraints upon the use of the oceans for certain activities
and have sanctioned certain enforcement measures to give effect to this new
regime. Whether these initiatives remain consistent with the freedom of
navigation remains to be settled. Likewise, there is the potential for too
much power over the oceans to be conferred on the United Nations Security
Council – a body that has little interest in oceans management other than
for purely security purposes.
Concluding remarks
Numerous challenges remain for the development of national agendas for
principled oceans governance. The interrelationships of various principles
such as precaution, the ecosystem approach, intergenerational equity and
public participation have yet to be worked out.62 The jurisprudential under-
pinnings of sustainability principles need to be considered, including
whether the content of principles should be ascertained in the positivist tra-
dition of focusing upon what States have agreed to in treaties, texts and
practices or whether normative currents should be sought from other sources
such as natural law derived from human reason, the laws of nature or divine
inspiration.63
While it is easy to feel “lost at sea” in light of all the institutional, ethical
and conceptual dilemmas surrounding ocean governance,64 sustainability
principles do set a course towards rethinking and redefining human–nature
relationships.65 Perhaps the greatest challenge of all is trying to obtain wider
social understanding and consensus on the ethical perspective that should
guide principled decision making. Various ecophilosophical viewpoints have
been advocated.66
A growing cadre of writers in the ecosystem management and ecological
sustainability areas may provide the epistemic groundswell needed to push
states and individuals beyond traditional anthropocentric ethical theories
and the utilitarian tendency to give market and commercial values
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prevalence in public policy decisions.67 The emerging groundswell,68 largely
ecocentric in nature but recognizing that humans are an integral part of
nature, urges that ecological integrity be maximized through the establish-
ment of biodiversity reserves while ecosystem health is maintained through
ensuring ecologically sustainable human uses.69
Both Australia and Canada are already riding the groundswell through
recognition of marine ecological integrity and marine ecosystem health as
important policy goals.70 However, the goals have yet to be achieved and
ocean law and policy voyages have hardly begun.71 Lofty words remain to be
translated into actions.72
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